The other critical difference between the two engine cowls is that, when unlatched, the CFM cowl door sits with a noticeable gap around the forward and aft edges of the door, sufficient to insert your fingers and pull the unlatched door open.

The V2500, on the other hand, has a smaller gap (which you can't get your fingers into) when unlatched, such that it's usually necessary to pull on the bottom edge of the door to open it. The smaller gap, of course, is easier to miss, as events have shown.

See


and


(around 2:15 on both videos)

They do if its a V2500.

Having expressed discontent elsewhere about the 787, I can now even things up by saying that it is unacceptable that this keeps happening on Airbuses. It is a known problem that, as I understand it, can and should be checked for prior to moving the plane. There is a lot of worrying negligence being shown.

"There is a lot of worrying negligence being shown"........................

As also there is a lot of worrying fatigue, overstretch, undermanning and 'sweating' of resources being highlighted in CHIRP and elsewhere.

So PLEASE, before the armchair designers start inventing microswitch activated alerting systems, warning flags, completely new latches etc, can we just keep this ever present common cause of incidents and accidents prominently on the table?

Then maybe the xAAs various may be forced to confront their inaction and timidity in NOT facing up to big business as we pay them big bucks to SUPERVISE on our behalf, whether we are taxpayers or licence-holders!

FATIGUE yet again springs to mind reading of the tragic UPS crash in USA, but the word and the existence of the problem appears to be the elephant in the room which nobody wants to discuss.

And still the awful EASA regs bubble away in the EU cauldron, ready to make the likelihood of HF incidents/accidents MORE likely.

@Barking: I'm not sure if you are agreeing or disagreeing with me! However, yes, this is what I meant - the people with final responsibility for ensuring that the aircraft are safe are failing. Whatever the reason, it is negligence on the part of all, from the airline CEOs to the people on the ground. What proportion of this collective negligence needs to be allocated where is for discussion, but the fact is unchanged.

Like you, I see fatigue in a lot of recent incidents. A relevant question, though, is whether technology (micro-switches or whatever) could help to reduce the impact of fatigue.

peakcrew
 

As opposed to non-worrying negligence presumably?

But, yes I do think technology can help overcome the effects of under-manning and fatigue but I'm not sure that is necessarily a good thing.
The more people rely on that, the greater the risk of something very bad happening when the technology fails - which it will - and if the human beings are not ready and in a condition to do what human beings are great at, namely look at a bunch of weird and unexpected stuff going on and figure out quickly what to do about it, then some folk are likely to have a bad day.

Unfortunately as more and more companies that rely on technology, and I'm not talking just airlines here, are run by people who don't have a grasp of that fact (or indeed of the technology they are in charge of) the greater the risk of things going bad.

But, hey, I'm an engineer, what would I know?

"But, hey, I'm an engineer, what would I know? "
 

Fenland787 but, hey, I'm just an old pilot, what would I know?

Unless we've got a MBA in Underwater Basket-Weaving, neither of us is qualified nor suitable to manage, or even to advise the current crop of bean-counting whizz-kids, as to desirable ways of achieving the task without endangering lives.

And of course lives are priced, as seen in the projected freighter accident rates quoted in the UAE 747F LI-Ion batteries accident report.

So we'll all carry on like creatures from the film "Metropolis" hoping it wont be our :mad:, or the :mad: of a loved one or colleague which get burnt.

And all the time the mealy-mouthed responses of the CAA and other AAs can be read in the pages of CHIRP and elsewhere.


And we can watch as our elected representatives look on idly whilst EASA FTLs are drafted and enacted without a single qualified aircrew member in the midst of those movers and shakers.


Time to take out and dust off those copies of "The Tombstone Imperative"?


But then we should not have joined if we couldn't take a joke, what??

Of course it can, but surely it is better to reduce or eliminate the incidence of fatigue?

When the :mad: hits the fan and the technology lets you down, a fatigued mind is the last thing you need.

Turin, sorry but they don't safety critical items are control rods flight, controls etc. Not engine cowls, it is perhaps a recomendation or a maintenance manual requirement but is NOT a mandated requirement. I have been a line engineer for over 35 years and have never seen a duolicate inspection required for an engine cowl. The main reason that the safety critical item is rarely required is so as not to degrade the check and leave it for items that can affect the aircraft performance/handling.

The cowls falling off the BA A320 seemed to affect its performance so I think its fair to say the long standing Dupes that are called for on V2500 fan cowls are a fair shout.

But yes I hear what you are saying that you do not want to degrade the significance of the check lest you end up needing a dupe on a seat cushion change....

VS, exactly my point.

V2500 Cowl Verification Check
 

At least one UK Airbus operator demands a second inspection, signed off in the log in the same manner as a 'Dupe'.

They call it a Verification Check as it can be certified by two 'A' Licenced Technicians as opposed to a Duplicate (or Secondary) Inspection which, as far as I know, requires two 'B' Licenced Engineers.


This was introduced on the V2500 Airbus fleets after a number of operators had reported cowl losses.

Dual cowl inspection
 

My own employer has mandated "Dual" inspection of all engine cowlings, for security and closure. On all company types, ie. A330 (CF6) A320 (CFM) & B737. This procedure has been in place for at least the last 10 years.

Surely, this is just good engineering practice!

ED I agree with you it is indeed good engineering practice however where does it stop? Dual inspections are there for a certain purpose and not just for anything, surely it is enough that a licensed type rated engineer should reasonably be expected to carry out this task without the need for duplicates?
When I worked the line (QA office now:=) we always closed and latched the cowls as soon as the task was finished that required you to open them in the first place. The cowls on the JT9 were the worst design you could imagine and frequently were lost in flight even though they were closed properly:ugh:

Turin, what an Operator demands is entirely up to them but that is not what we are talking about we are talking about mandatory duplicate inspections.

Yes, but a check list doesn't exist in a vacuum, it exists for a real-world purpose.

Changing how the cowlings are checked in response to a known, ongoing problem with certain aircraft/engine combinations would lead to an overall improvement in safety.

Surely that outweighs any 'degrading of significance' of the check?

But recent events show that this isn't happening. :(

matkat

Superq's original post..

No mention of 'mandatory'.

Your response...

Still no mention of a mandate.

The point is this, engine cowlings are a safety critical item....now. They may not have been but experience has shown that they are. My understanding of the BA a/c, for example, is that it was very nearly an insurance write off due to the effect the fire had on adjacent structure. An annealed wing is not what we want now is it?

Just to avoid any confusion. This is not a personal attack on matkat, just healthy debate. :ok:

Turin I do not take it personally as I do not make the rules only enforce and adhere. Until an applicable NAA MANDATE the cowl latching duplicate inspection it is at least in the eyes of the authority not a safety critical item, it is the NAA that mandates not an individual operator, however see my previous post in which I state that if the operator wants to include cowl checks on their pre-departure checklist then it is entirely up to them but nevertheless it is an 'over and above' requirement.

FWIW, at my airline an additional layer of safety is achieved by the pilot preflight inspection, cowl latch security is considered a significant item on the walk around, for all the reasons mentioned above.

Add another to the list.

Florida-Bound Plane Returns To O?Hare After Engine Cover Falls Off « CBS Chicago

Oops!
I think MX crews need to be re-educated in the importance of closing those pesky latches!