The bird have landed in LHR today at 17:25 z as BAW9157. At least it have been safe to fly at FL410.

G-ZZZC veered of the centre line landing back at LHR. Caused a VS jet to go-round.

And various other diversions to runway 27L. 27R was apparently closed for nearly 20 minutes after the 777 landed.

I had fumes in the cabin and cockpit leaving MIA for Honduras, declared an emergency and returned. It was about a year after the Swissair crash off Halifax. It smelled like electrical smoke. I shut off all non essential busses and landed our major airliner using immediate action before checklist. Two weeks later our airline changed our procedure to what I did. Prior.to this it was a check list item. Swissair crashed because they delayed landing to dump fuel and didn't eliminate the source of the fire. The galley oven was the source of our problem even though we could smell the fumes on landing. I knew our procedures were the same as Swissair so made my own to protect our crew and passengers.

I think this latching switch is an old CAA/UK thing, I don't think many, if any, U.S. spec'ed airliners have it.

I agree, those O2 masks and the comm panels are a joke in the simulator, worse in the plane, and need to be improved.

Having had a smoke incident on the 777 and been on O2 from shortly after rotation until shutdown on the ground, I have to agree that the masks could do with a bit of a re-design. Running the smoke and/or smoke removal checklist involves a fair amount of work on the overhead panel and coordinating that with breathing, etc. can be a bit of a game, especially if the ECL was obscured and you ended up with the QRH in one hand.

The major consideration was that I was glad to have a mask that fitted and was supplying 100% oxygen and for that purpose it worked excellently...

Going back to post #21, why did it veer off the centre-line after landing having completed a long flight with (assumedly) no crew incapacitation issues ? :confused: or this was a totally unrelated whoopsy that coincidentally involved the same airframe ?

Sunday Express 10th February 2013
 

@BUBBERS Wow, and you were single crew as well. Well done you :D

Bubbers

Your statement on SR111 is wrong and disrespectful. These rumours went on for some years but professional pilots should read the investigation before they make judgements.

From the investigation:

"Based on these factors, it is evident that even if the pilots had attempted a minimum-time emergency diversion starting at 0114:18, it would have been impossible for the pilots to continue maintaining control of the aircraft for the amount of time necessary to reach the airport and complete a safe landing."

Sr111
 

You are correct - they didn't have time whatever anyone else says - had two mates who were on the aeropers team.
What you would need to ask is who was responsible for the design of the system and the materials.

I have one question... If pilot during the flight became's incapacitated, what happens to his career? Does he still can be a pilot?:confused: Can he still work as a commercial pilot after such an accident?

@F Dolarhyde/blind pew - correct.

The other crucial aspect was that the seat of the SR111 fire was in the IFE wiring bundle. It ran through the ceiling behind a panel and the thermal insulation blankets (which in turn caught light) - there was no practical way to get even hand-held fire suppression apparatus to the source of the fire.

Medical Protocol
 

Kristupito,

Anybody exposed to toxic fumes, along with their medical providers should read this 2009 US funded advice - which refers to long term effects:

http://www.aerotoxic.org/download/do...ocol031909.pdf

But many 'interested parties' insist there is 'no evidence' of ill health from toxic fumes in a confined space.

Sorry if i've already published this, but few seem to know about it.

Why would anybody make it all up?

The investigation report did state what you posted, however, the accident did raise the question of whether it is a good idea when on fire, to delay landing in order to dump fuel. Something to consider.

or more generally...to what degree should (priorities?) - and even can (time constraints?) - checklists and ECAM actions be followed in an emergency.

SR111 could, as has been pointed out, not have been saved even with an immediate landing, but clearly the SR A/C smoke checklist was taking too much time to complete, and many checklists have been adapted to reflect this. Yet, the crew of US1549 did not have the luxury to ponder whether to complete various checklists while gliding and preparing to ditch, their aircraft simply didn't wait for checklist completion.

UA232 didn't have any checklists for complete loss of hydraulics and flight controls...

QF32...a torrent of ECAM actions, some of which contradict each other ( "aircraft CoG out of limits", asking to transfer fuel, and then "THS transfer not available").

The final report for QF32 isn't out yet I think (?), but I believe one of the lessons to take away - once again - is that while non-normal checklists and ECAM actions are extremely important tools, and can no doubt be further streamlined and improved, no standardized course of action can completely and safely resolve EVERY possible emergency situation.

Elec Fire vs. ACM
 

Sometimes that which appears to be the smell of an electrical fire might just be an ACM that has packed up.

Boeing QRH for smoke was amended after swissair crash to include:

Initiate a diversion to the nearest suitable airport
while continuing the checklist.

and

Consider an immediate landing if the smoke, fire or
fumes situation becomes uncontrollable.

and

If a smoke, fire or fumes situation becomes uncontrollable, the flight crew should consider an immediate landing. Immediate landing implies immediate diversion to a runway. However, in a severe situation, the flight crew should consider an overweight landing, a tailwind landing, an off-airport landing, or a ditching.

So, what is the outcome of this incident? What is the condition of the co-pilot? What as found to be the source of the fumes?