Just reading the Japanese news and it is being reported that it wasn't smoke but a burning smell, and that the main battery(ies) in the forward electrical compartment have now been discovered to be off-color and discharging a liquid. (Japan Yahoo news in Japanese from TBS and JNN.) My translation.
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NHK News
 

NHK news spent 15 minutes on this issue.

Passenger reported a very quick decent with a newspaper falling off a seat and coffee cups sliding forward.

Pilots apparently received several warning messages in the cockpit including generator issues and backup system issues. Smoke was detected in the forward battery /electrical compartment. A burning smell was also noticed.

Battrey was found to be discolored and leaking fluid. Japan air safety authorities said the battery temperature may have been extremely high.

Takamatsu controllers noticed smoke after landing and the pilot then initiated emergency evacuation
Rgds.

The A388 issues (thus far) don't constitute a fire risk, that's the difference.

Even the most partisan of people in the A v B debate (of which, in spite of reputation, I am not) are likely to recognise that.

According to Reuters a Japanese firm makes batteries for the Dreamliner, which is a tad ironic.

The company is GS Yuasa Corp and the shares were hit on the Tokyo bourse, falling nearly 5 percent.

However, the report only says the company makes batteries for the aeroplane, not all batteries. If they don't make the batteries in the forward compartment, fill your boots as the shares will bounce back!

I don't have the time to search for the statement, but ANA have said words to the effect that "NH203 will continue to FRA and the aircraft will stay there. It will not operate back, nor will it be ferried back."

I wouldn't say the response has been subdued. The media response has been quite strong. Until yesterday all the issues were different and the FAA decided on a design review, but not ground the aircraft. That seemed appropriate at the time. Now we have seen two battery fires in two weeks, the Japanese have decided to ground their planes. That also makes sense. I think the FAA should do the same, however hysterical the media get.

It does look bad for Boeing, but they must have contigencies for this sort of thing, And if you are going to have a problem which grounds the aircraft, it is far better that it happens when you have 50 planes in service, not 500.

Well, about four hours after scheduled departure, it is still being shown as departed on time in FRAport and flightaware but there is no position info on flightaware.

I activated email notifications from FRAport for Thursday's NH203/204, and while the showed 787 initially, they were changed to 772 about an hour ago. US flights remain cancelled in flightaware.

�q‹óŒ” —\–ñ�E‹ó�È�Ɖï�E‰^’ÀˆÄ“à�E�‘“à�ü�bANA now shows tomorrow (Th 17th) cancellations and changes of equipment. It states that all international flights will be operated with different equipment.

I wonder how long they can keep that up?

There was no list of We 16th cancellations on the English ANA website until an hour ago (and there is not now either that the schedule for tomorrow has shown up).

Li-ion 787 certification special condition
 

The FAA issued a Special Condition for the use of li-ion batteries on the 787. Boeing made several design provisions for control of fire and smoke spread.

Recent incidents suggest these may not have been sufficient.

It will be interesting to see FAA's reaction, and how quickly Boeing can address what may be a significant issue.

Freighters, after several hull losses, can no longer carry these batteries as cargo. It is surprising that even with special provisions the FAA has allowed passenger aircraft to have them designed in.

from today's Japan Times:
"Boeing chose lithium-ion batteries for the 787, which uses five times more electricity than similar jets, because they hold more energy and can be quickly recharged, Mike Sinnett, chief 787 project engineer, said. In a worst-case scenario in which the batteries do burn, they are designed to do so in a way that doesn't threaten the aircraft, Sinnett said.
If the jet is airborne, smoke is supposed to be vented out of the compartment so that it doesn't reach the cabin, he said, and all of the battery cells can ignite without harming the plane's ability to stay aloft."


So that must be a heck of a fire shield...

"Boeing chose lithium-ion batteries for the 787, which uses five times more electricity than similar jets, because they hold more energy and can be quickly recharged, Mike Sinnett, chief 787 project engineer, said. In a worst-case scenario in which the batteries do burn, they are designed to do so in a way that doesn't threaten the aircraft, Sinnett said."

**********************

So what we see, fundamentally, is a waiver. As such, the elements of impenetrable protection of the airframer....

Sinnett admits the likelihood they will burn, and protects the company from liability via "designed to not threaten the aircraft."

Stop, think..

BRE,
To be fair, the structural damage caused by the battery fire that did occur was quite limited. The NTSB talked about it being "confined to the area immediately near the APU battery rack (within about 20 inches) in the aft electronics bay".

Perhaps not that big a shield, but only good venting, and thermally resistant materials in the area where the heat is going.

So maybe they did a proper risk analysis after all. The statement did not say that it would leave the aircraft undamaged, only that it "could stay aloft" and wasn't threatened by the fire. The venturi-suction system would have to be able to vent all smoke out of the E/E bay without it entering other parts of the craft. From what I've seen the system is supposedly able to maintain adequate equipment cooling during cruise, but what about a full-blown Li-Ion battery fire during descent?

The venturi system as such is fine, as it requires no moving parts to operate, however it does require moving parts (valves closing and opening, fans switching off), to get it to start working.

I wonder if they did flight-tests, or at least full-size wind-tunnel tests with actual fires.


Lyman,
I see that rather as a positive statement, indicating that they did a risk analysis, and considered the likelihood and severity of a battery fire. Doing a proper risk management means that once a hazard has been identified and the associated risk (as far as is possible) quantified, you take measures to either reduce its likelihood, or its severity, possibly by mitigating the effects on people and equipment. If it is well engineered and the regulator agrees that can be acceptable.

I haven't seen the engineering details (and probably never will) so I cannot say that it wasn't adequately done; it seems plausible. The amount of energy that can be set free can be known, the temperature, heat, propagation and duration of a worst-case fire can be estimated, and mitigating technology can be incorporated. I think it depends in large parts on the reliability of the E/E bay ventilaton system entering "override" mode, i. e. passive overboard-venturi suction.


Bernd

Of course they did. No aeronautical engineering team is going to propose a solution of that sort without performing one if not several. The potential issue is that such analyses and tests are only as good as the pre-existing data, and with new solutions there's only going to be a limited amount of that.

Gentlemen....

You are "not wrong". Neither of you has stated anything untrue. My assumption is that you expect to have had an effect on the discussion....

I am missing it.....

Can you elaborate? In light of recent events? That will allow my response in presenting an argument that FAA and Boeing are acting incestuously....

DozyWannabe,

I know they did. My comment was rather tongue-in-cheek to all those saying "how could they do this? Didn't they think of the consequences?"

The development and physical properties of Li-Ion batteriy fires can be estimated quite well. Although maybe they were too optimistic on the likelihood, the mitigating measures may be adequate for the severity.

The probability of failure of the mitigating measure (venting override) of course has to fit the probability the of the original hazard (battery fire), and a redesign may be required in this case.


Bernd

IIRC correctly from the SAA 747 Combi fire Boeing did tests for a fire as well. Turned out they used a straw bale and a quickly extinguished fire. When they re-ran them with a high-temp sustained fire after the event the results were drastically different.

The FAA/NTSB may be interested in investigating the test scenarios used against the events to date.

So they (presumably) are designed to burn with no immediate danger to the a/c. What is then standard procedure in case of burning smell: land ASAP except when it's from the Li-Ion battery?

pax2908

A serious answer to your question would be, "It's SOP.." Get out the manual.....


My innocent guess is that their is no SOP for onboard fire of any description except to land, immediately....

"If located in either EE bay, (fire).....disregard"

I am hopeful someone will take a very long, hard look at the relationship....

Don't You say in english "never buy an A-model of something"?

ATC Recording?
 

Does anyone know if there is an ATC recording of the landing at Takamatsu (or Osaka airspace control) available?