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-   -   Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350 (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/496702-airbus-takes-pilots-back-basics-a350.html)

DozyWannabe 2nd Oct 2012 16:51


Originally Posted by ventus45 (Post 7444396)
Just "Smoke and Mirrors" to make it look like they are addressing the concerns of some, who they arrogantly dismiss as "misguided". They are merely trying to placate those people, so that they will have to "shut-up".

Nice conciliatory attitude there. From where are you getting the idea that Airbus themselves have ever called anyone "misguided"?

(Not to mention the fact that you consider anyone who does not agree with your position "arrogant" for not doing so...)



1. Regarding the "tactility" issue.

I personally consider the deliberate removal of "tactility" in Airbus FBW aircraft to be a critical, and unacceptable, design philosophy failing, that I do not, and will not, accept.
Hence, I refuse to fly on one, period.
Your loss.


Furthermore, I don't know how such an idiotic design philosopy ever got "certified" in the first place, and consequently, I no longer have any faith in the regulators concerned.
It was co-designed and certified by one of the best engineering pilots to ever come out of the UK. I think a lot of this nonsense would have been nipped in the bud decades ago had he not tragically died during an accident investigation in the Himalayas.

Lyman 2nd Oct 2012 17:47

"Handling qualities
In order to preserve pilot feel of electronic flight control systems, the minimum acceptable criteria are those specified in SAE
International ARP 4104, which provides design objectives for civil transport aeroplane handling qualities in the following sections:
1) Longitudinal flying qualities, section 2.3;
2) Lateral directional flying qualities, section 2.4;
3) Miscellaneous flying qualities, section 2.5;
4) Characteristics of the flight control system, section 2.8.
In addition, flight control systems which serve reduced statically stable aircraft (by their aerodynamic characteristics), such as the
fly-by-wire system, should provide a back-up system, totally independent of the primary system.
Note: It is acceptable that the flight envelope becomes restricted when using the back-up system.
Dual control capability
The system design should ensure:
a) that all inputs from one side are reflected in equivalent simultaneous movement of the other side; and
b) that all inputs into the control system from the auto-pilot are reflected in equivalent simultaneous movements of both
control devices.
Thrust/power control
Where an automatic thrust/power control device is used the system design should ensure that all the device’s outputs aimed at
changing the thrust/power level are reflected in equivalent simultaneous movement of the thrust/power levers. Throttle movement
(reflecting power modulation) is essential to enable the pilot to monitor effectively the change in power levels achieved by the
automatic full authority digital engine control (FADEC) device.
Note: Monitoring of power levels by observation of engine instruments is not adequate due to the fact that the engine instrument
panel does not lie in the normal scan pattern of the pilot.
Stall protection system
Where a stall protection system is fitted to an aircraft, the pilot should be informed by an appropriate means when the system is
limiting the angle of attack.
The target angle of attack and the actual angle of attack should be displayed so that the pilot can monitor any system discrepancy
and correct manually to provide the optimum angle of attack in the event of a discrepancy.
Stall protection should be available at all heights, right down to the flare on landing.
The system should be set to maintain conventional margins to the stall and should not be used as a device to allow reduced
margins in all flight phases."


"Toulouse, we have a problem..."

DozyWannabe 2nd Oct 2012 18:09

I've got to wonder if that document is simply a reprint of this 1989 screed from another report:


Last, S.R. (1989). Electronic Flight Control Systems: Overview of the A320 in Relation to
IFALPA Policy. In Proceedings of the IFALPA ADO Committee Meeting, June 1989. IFALPA.
Either way it seems extraordinarily short-sighted given the accumulated evidence of 24 years of operation.

Looking more deeply into it, it was published by a committee of 8, of whom only 2 represent Airbus (one as a pilot, the other as a company rep). I'd be interested to know if their input was either sidelined or outvoted by the 5 Boeing pilots/reps.

Lyman 2nd Oct 2012 18:16

@Doze...

"Either way it seems extraordinarily short-sighted given the accumulated evidence of 24 years of operation."

Short sighted? Or Prescient?

Bottom Line. One or the other or both of these two things have caused problems that are unacceptable:

1. Poor Pilotage

2. Poor Interface

Can either/both be improved? I would say of course, yes.

Until this happens, I'll still fly on the 320. I'll give the heavies a miss...

DozyWannabe 2nd Oct 2012 18:20


Originally Posted by Lyman (Post 7445479)
Bottom Line. One or the other or both of these two things have caused problems that are unacceptable:

1. Poor Pilotage

2. Poor Interface

Rubbish - show me one accident caused in whole or in part by the flight deck layout or FBW implementation. If it *was* causative then there'd be a significant discrepancy between Airbus FBW types and other in terms of accidents and incidents - there isn't.

The idea that automation has related to accidents caused by lack of handling experience or mode confusion has nothing to do with FBW or the Airbus flight deck design. All manufacturers have followed the same path regarding that.

Clandestino 2nd Oct 2012 18:33


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
I get the point of the defenders of the Airbus philosophy. From their purely intellectual and technological point of view everything is perfect and because the system has once been set up a certain way, the users simply have to deal with it.

Nope. That's severe misinterpretation of points made by those trying to tell you your ideas are somewhat at odds with the real world. Airbus is far from perfect, it has her issues but having independent sticks without q-feel just isn't one.


Originally Posted by gretchenfrage
“Need to Know”-FCOM, has to stand as remedy for any shortcoming of the system. A knowledge that is meant for engineers, constructors and programmers, but certainly not for users.

FC in FCOM stands for flight crew. Have you ever had a chance to peek in AMM? Or just see how massive it is compared to FCOM?


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
The absence can be easily covered with view of either the controls of the other pilot, or by interpreting the different displays, so they pretend.

It is covered by control architecture, there is neither need nor way to replace it with any kind of display. Do you have any idea what q-feel is for?


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
I have participated in almost 100 Airbus Sim-sessions and more than 250 in others and I have seen more confusion in the AB sessions than in all others.

Is there any verifiable study that can confirm your experience? It is very serious issue you are rising here, it must have been researched.


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
They mainly originated in overload of the intellectual human sensors and subsequently a reduced performance of his brain functions.

This is a very serious neurological judgment. We have already established you are a pilot. What are your neurological qualifications?


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
What was almost never lost, was the primary instinctive functions, the basic and instinctive flying ability

Psychologically speaking, there is nothing instinctive about flying. All the flying reflexes are acquired through training. If you wonder: it is part of HF ATPL syllabus, I'm not a psychologist.


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
plus the lower back functions that has its sensors not in the eyes, but in the lower back and in the hands.

So Airbus makes pilots unable to fly by the seat of the pants. I'd chalk one up for her if it were unique Airbus characteristic.


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
This is a very autistic moment and to interact with a fellow pilot or the surrounding happens almost exclusively through feel.

Despite the rumors to contrary, I do talk to my co-pilots. I even make proper callouts. So help me my training department!


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
It seems strange that fellow pilots can seriously defend taking away a primary source of helping us in such moments, namely the tactile feedback

Tactile feedback of what? Mind you: this question is neither rhetoric nor trivial.


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
There are so many occasions and incidents where an honest aviator must admit that with a moving stick and lever his fellow aviators would have had a slightly better or faster chance of grasping the situation.

Disagreeing makes me dishonest?


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
I conclude that it begs my belief that a simple enhancement to a good system would not be looked into.

Write to EASA and Airbus. You might have a point but it won't be heard if you confine it to PPRuNe.


Originally Posted by Mike 777 LR
They'll tell you it took them a year or so to get fully comfortable with the airplane. That's the way it is.

...posted on PPRuNe. Is out there study called "US pilots need a year to be comfortable ona Airbus" or similar?

Originally Posted by Monarch man
I can't however get my head around what the AB system designers were thinking when they decided to forgo any tactile feedback.

Tactile feedback of what? Mind you: this question is neither rhetoric nor trivial.


Originally Posted by Monarch man
Put simply, all us humans rely on tactile feedback in our day to lives, our very existence relies apon actions and muscle memory that can only be accomplished with a feedback loop that makes sense to us.

Put simply: Airbus pilots make thousands of uneventful flights every day, allegedly without proper feedback sense. Occasionally they prevent inflight crises from turning into catastrophe. Even more occasionally they fail. Now, its either they are not subset of "all us humans" or one of us is not telling the truth.


Originally Posted by Monarch man
no need for a gun, how wrong they were.

Anyone with more then passing interest in Peace for Galilee or Corporate, let alone Allied Force can recognize their overconfidence was just a matter of being too optimistic, too early.


Originally Posted by A37575
Individual flying ops inspectors who are "the regulators" may or may not ignore what they read on PPRuNe but often these regulators are not always the experts they purport to be. They would learn a lot from reading PPRuNe opinions while discarding posts by the occasional pedant.

Regulators are not always the experts. PPRuNers are experts. Wow.

Sorry, in my world real experts make living out of their expertize, they sign their opinions and are bound to held liable for them. I see no such thing on anonymous internet forum with big red caveat at the bottom of the every page.


Originally Posted by A37575
Despite the cynics who knock everything on PPRuNe, there are some very experienced and knowledgeable contributors in these pages.

Yes there are and their contributions are recognizable.


Originally Posted by acbus1
Get real. AF447 with yokes would still be in one piece and the passengers would be moaning about nothing more than a bumpy flight. Try arguing otherwise. It'll be amusing to watch your attempts.

1. there were many a recorded incident where lack of interconnected sticks or stickshaker or q-feel did not prevent the crews form turning AF447-like loss of airspeeds into satisfactory conclusion of their flights, without any injury or damage.

2. there were many a well investigated and documented accidents where A310, Q400, CRJ200, MD-80, Tu-154, B757, B737, all neat aeroplanes with q-feel and interconnected sticks, some even stick-pusher equipped, were stalled with mainly fatal results.

You are completely free to feel amused by the facts.


Originally Posted by Alpageur320
If somebody could quote the original passage, I would be very grateful...

Sure:


Originally Posted by David Petit Davies, Handling the big jets, third edition, page 129
In the field of the warning stimuli one can only "get at" a human being through on of his senses. Of the five senses, two - smell and taste - cannot be used in flying, or at least they haven't been yet. Of the reminder there is a definite order of preference - tactile, aural and visual. A pilot is always receptive to tactile warning (a thump on the shoulder from an agitated flight engineer, say) and indeed an aural warning (perhaps a shout from an equally agitated co-pilot), but a visual warning pre-supposes the pilot to be looking in the area of the warning and this cannot be relied upon.

You're welcome.

However, DP Davies warns his book's intended public are senior transport pilots witha a good background of basic airmanship and considerable experience on 'traditional' aeroplanes. He also warns, regarding his dissertation, that the whole thing about flying qualities of jet aeroplanes has to be kept in perspective and balance. This:


Originally Posted by Alpageur320
Considering D Davies's background as a test pilot, I can imagine his views were shared by many of his colleagues, and it makes me wonder where those guys were when Airbus decided to remove what they might have thought was the 'best line of defense'....????

doesn't just go against the recommendation, it involves stupendous amount of misunderstanding what is written in HTBJ.

Davies was discussing warning systems, synthetic pitch feel is absolutely not designed or in any way intended to be warning device!

Stickshakers and pushers are only fitted if certifying authorities (i.e. certifying test pilots) consider natural characteristics to be unsafe. Now we know that A330 has very violent pre-stall buffet and benign (for size and wing loading) stall characteristics (RTF AF447 report) so not-fitting the shaker and pusher is completely justified. Anyway, crew of NW6231 got so puzzled they believed stickshaker activation was mach buffet. So much for "shaker would save the day".



Originally Posted by Mike 777LR

Originally Posted by EEngr
Don't count on that. Back in my days at Boeing, we managed the FAA's expectations very carefully. We were the authorities on the right way to do things and any opinions to the contrary were pushed back aggressively. The FAA was there to bless the design certification (which our DERs approved) and as long as we checked off the applicable regulatory requirements by test or analysis, that was the end of it.

Oh man, isn't that a fact or what?

Sure it is, you've read it on the PPRuNe! :}
Whatever the facts are and whoever pushed whom, Boeings turned out to be well thought out and fairly performing aeroplanes with a flaw or two. So did Airbi. Etc.


Originally Posted by boofhead
ACBUS is exactly right; why does not everyone see this?

Probable cause: some folks around do know a thing about flight controls in general and about Airbus FBW in particular.


Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
Davies was coming from a postwar to early '70s perspective. A lot changed between then and the advent of the A320.

True, but this statement must absolutely not taken to mean that HTBJ is outdated. There are only small, system specific, parts that are no longer relevant as the braking parachutes are no more fitted or FADEC made fuel dippers obsolete, but most of the book is equally applicable to Comet as is to Dreamliner. If all pilots read and understood the book, lot of PPRuNe bandwidth would be saved. Also there would be a few thousand less premature dead.

It would be insult to compare HTBJ to some holy book or other; there is absolutely nothing dogmatic about it, it is a magnificent piece of stark realism.

Airbus trainers are right: FBW Airbi do fly similarly to any other aeroplane. HTBJ is still very, very much relevant to any Airbus.


Originally Posted by Squawk-7600
Given that you have precisely zero experience with Airbus, don't you think it would be somewhat prudent to keep an open mind before making it up?

Zero experience in Airbus did not prevent some posters to provide us with meaningful, insightful and relevant posts. Also, judging by the posts, some (self-alleged) Airbus old hands kept their minds so open that the mind content started dropping out. I don't care about who the poster is or what is his emotional investment in topic. I prefer reading some opinions well supported by the facts to being bombarded with I-say-so's.


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Agree. But in the aftermath of AF447 we tried to duplicate the event in a T7 sim. -- We were simply not capable of upholding a full back-pull for more than 20"! The forces were too big. How about that as protection?

Irrelevant. Panicky pilots of CRJ and Q400 pulled against the trim and even against the pusher, you can read actual forces in the report, not just subjective "we couldn't hold it".


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
In my experience most even very good pilots are a bit confused at some time in a modern cockpit, even the very good Airbus pilots.

Yes they are but it is not type specific or long lasting. Except once in a couple of hundred thousand flights.


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
The difficulty of direct intervention beyond protections

Of what use would be going over 2.5 G or into the stall or into the overmach or overspeed or beyond 67° bank.

Could you please provide at least one case of classic aeroplane where it saved the day or Airbus accident where this feature would be available?


Originally Posted by Microburst 2002
The lack of tactile feedback is a flaw.

Tactile feedback of what? Mind you: this question is neither rhetoric nor trivial.


Originally Posted by Monarch Man
Gretchenfrage has got it spot on, and as a A/B (got my first command on a 320) and Boeing experienced driver, I agree entirely.

From purely aeronautical point of view, he got some points pretty wrong, but I do concede that to some purpose, which I currently cannot understand or appreciate, his claims might be spot-on.


Originally Posted by aguadalte
Here's the institutional position of IFALPA

Thanks, very interesting read. Basically it can be summed up as: we want 777, not Airbus. While it is signed opinion and represents a step forward compared to PPRuNe, I would be rather interested in reading how they got to their conclusions than just having them served on a single page. Oh, well.


Originally Posted by Ventus 45
I personally consider the deliberate removal of "tactility" in Airbus FBW aircraft to be a critical, and unacceptable, design philosophy failing, that I do not, and will not, accept.
Hence, I refuse to fly on one, period.

Tactility of what? Mind you: this question is neither rhetoric nor trivial.


Originally Posted by Ventus45
Furthermore, I don't know how such an idiotic design philosopy ever got "certified" in the first place, and consequently, I no longer have any faith in the regulators concerned.

Regulators don't operate on faith, they operate on knowledge and the starkest pragmatism.


Originally Posted by Ventus45
Stick shakers and stick pushers have been around for a long time.

...fitted to aeroplanes with unacceptable natural stall characteristics! Do you have any reference that confirms Airbi need them?


Originally Posted by Ventus45
Since it is also the apparent concensus of PPRuNe, that it is impractical, or actually un-do-able, to install an equivalent stick-shake or stick-push functionality to a side stick,

Consensus or not, it is very false. It would be easy (though probably not cheap) to fit shaker and pusher to Airbus but it would take severe (and IMHO totally unjustified) paradigm shift: certifying authorities would need to start considering shakers and pushers as universal stall warning devices, not just devices that help aeroplanes with nasty stall characteristics to get certified.


Originally Posted by tumtiddle
To the uninitiated, what will the IFALPA findings mean for Airbus (particularly the point regarding 'reflective' movement in both the surface and thrust controls)?

There is fine print at the bottom of the IFALPA position. Basicly it says: nothing.

Unless Boeing starts putting stickers "As approved by IFALPA" on 777 and 787, that is. :E


Originally Posted by Dozy Wannabe
From where are you getting the idea that Airbus themselves have ever called anyone "misguided"?

If I may venture a guess: from certain anonymous forum that warns about the possible motives of the posters.

Lyman 2nd Oct 2012 18:37

With the greatest respect, Doze,

"Rubbish - show me one accident caused in whole or in part by the flight deck layout or FBW implementation. If it *was* causative then there'd be a significant discrepancy between Airbus FBW types and other in terms of accidents and incidents - there isn't."

Airbus have made plain that for whatever reason, they have admitted to a problem, hence the "Warning" to line pilots to revisit their high altitude skills, and their Stall procedures.

Similarly, the existence of this recent change in marketing shows there is a perception of a problem.

It does not matter what you think, or believe...

If I did lend your 'rubbish' statement credence, I would offer 447, of course, where lack of AoA, lack of visibility of SS, and cluttered cockpit vis a vis audio and visual cueing created demonstrable obstacles to recovery.

imo of course.... OOPS, also in the opinion of BEA, EASA.

jcjeant 2nd Oct 2012 20:50

clandestino

Originally Posted by aguadalte
Here's the institutional position of IFALPA
Clandestino
Thanks, very interesting read. Basically it can be summed up as: we want 777, not Airbus. While it is signed opinion and represents a step forward compared to PPRuNe, I would be rather interested in reading how they got to their conclusions than just having them served on a single page. Oh, well.
If you are interested in reading how they got to their conclusions .. the best to have a answer is certainly not to ask here but instead .. contact IFALPA
I think they are still alive :)
International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations - IFALPA

DozyWannabe 2nd Oct 2012 21:51


Originally Posted by Lyman (Post 7445509)
Airbus have made plain that for whatever reason, they have admitted to a problem, hence the "Warning" to line pilots to revisit their high altitude skills, and their Stall procedures.

An industry-wide problem, not an Airbus-specific problem.


It does not matter what you think, or believe...
What I think or believe is inconsequential - it has sweet Fanny Adams to do with this.


If I did lend your 'rubbish' statement credence, I would offer 447, of course, where lack of AoA, lack of visibility of SS, and cluttered cockpit vis a vis audio and visual cueing created demonstrable obstacles to recovery.
There's plenty of evidence to suggest that even if there was an AoA indication, linked SS or whatever that the crew would have still been overwhelmed, but I don't want to go down that rabbit hole again.

Cluttered cockpit? I suggest you have a look at the 707's flight deck and compare it with the Airbus layout before you start throwing that kind of argument around (hint: not all 707s were alike).


imo of course.... OOPS, also in the opinion of BEA, EASA.
EASA have released no material as yet, as far as I know.


Originally Posted by jcjeant (Post 7445726)
If you are interested in reading how they got to their conclusions .. the best to have a answer is certainly not to ask here but instead .. contact IFALPA
I think they are still alive :)
International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations - IFALPA

It's not a publication of IFALPA as a whole (which would imply consensus of thousands), but a publication of their Aircraft Design & Operation (ADO group), who number 8 people and can be found here:

Who's Who

I will try to get in touch with them if I can...

TTex600 2nd Oct 2012 23:48

Some of you guys appear to be doing nothing more than seeking personal relevance.

Why else continue an anonymous fight? It's insanity, relevance in anonymity. Go figure.......

coineach 3rd Oct 2012 07:27

I am sure Airbus Industries could modify the instrument which shows which sidestick is being operated (currently a simple left - right arrow) to provide information which shows the actual position the stick is in - for example a square display with cross-hairs and a moveable dot to show actual position of the stick in relation to its "neutral" position.
Regarding Flight AF 477, if the Captain had been able to ascertain that the First Officer was holding the stick in the fully back position causing the nose to rise, he might have been able to reverse situation instead of allowing the aircraft to stall out of the sky.

Reinhardt 3rd Oct 2012 12:40


Originally Posted by coineach
if the Captain had been able to ascertain that the First Officer was holding the stick in the fully back position causing the nose to rise, he might have been able to reverse situation instead of allowing the aircraft to stall out of the sky

Why ? because as Captain, he would have been with twice as many hours experience as each of his F/O but that's forgetting that 2 x 0 = ... 0 !Flight hours of airline pilot pilots are just armchair hours, spent 50% as PNF (navigator hours) - for the remaining 50% you just remove 30% for reading magazines, eating, going to the toilet, sleeping in the bunk, and 10% on the ground (some captains will stop the engines, wait for 30 minutes for a tug to come with APU running, and still call that "block/flight hours"... thus getting astronomical flight hours which don't mean And autopilot use, never getting more than 30° AOB.... the day the aircraft starts moving really, everybody is dead - unless at least one of the pilots in the cockpit has been with more serious training, like fighter pilot or tactical transport....But this has to be silenced - please media people, if you read that, spread the world....

Rananim 3rd Oct 2012 16:31

Good thread but nothing new is being said.And this supposed "new direction" in Airbus' philosophy is a smokescreen.It was clearly in Airbus' interest to have pilot error stated as probable cause in the 447 report and the BEA duly obliged.In fact,no mention was made of design factors and how a super-stall was commanded by one pilot that went unnoticed by his 2 colleagues.Pilot error and errors in the system(ie TRAINING) were also to blame but to leave out the role system design played in the crash makes the BEA look like EADS pawns.Which is probably what they are.The FAA have acted ignobly in the past,but not the NTSB.Their only mandate is flight safety.This is how it should be with accident investigation.

DozyWannabe 3rd Oct 2012 16:43


Originally Posted by DozyWannabe (Post 7445834)
I will try to get in touch with them if I can...

OK - so I sent an email last night and generously got a reply today.

The gist of what was said was that the publication as it stands is in fact largely the same as it has been since 1989, so the answer to my question:


Originally Posted by DozyWannabe (Post 7445469)
I've got to wonder if that document is simply a reprint of this 1989 screed from another report:


Last, S.R. (1989). Electronic Flight Control Systems: Overview of the A320 in Relation to IFALPA Policy. In Proceedings of the IFALPA ADO Committee Meeting, June 1989. IFALPA.
appears to be "yes". It was recently revised, mainly to include wording about angle of attack indications. The reason it was published recently was due to an IFALPA decision to print all their policies to provide visibility rather than keeping them buried in their annexes.

It was also said that the ADO will be meeting this year and will propose modifications to the policy, based mainly on the historical success, actual utilization, and additional features of the FBW design.

Lyman 3rd Oct 2012 17:00

Quote:
"Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
I've got to wonder if that document is simply a reprint of this 1989 screed from another report:...."


So...It is an old report, and that is somehow disqualifying?

I resemble that.

Any way: "appears to be "yes". It was recently revised, mainly to include wording about angle of attack indications. The reason it was published recently was due to an IFALPA decision to print all their policies to provide visibility rather than keeping them buried in their annexes."

So a reaffirmation from IFALPA, then? Will you address any of the body of their report that isolates Airbus FBW as not compliant?

I'll wait....

DozyWannabe 3rd Oct 2012 17:02

@Lyman - In the sense that it cannot take into account the successful introduction of the technology and its continued safe operation, yes.


Originally Posted by Lyman (Post 7447380)
So a reaffirmation from IFALPA, then? Will you address any of the body of their report that isolates Airbus FBW as not compliant?

Sure, it's a 24-year-old airframe design not compliant with a 23-year-old statement of position (*not* a report of any kind - it carries no practical, operational, legal or airworthiness weight) that seems to have been written as something of a kneejerk response to the appearance on the line of that specific type.

I'd imagine most of the ADO probably weren't aware of its existence. When amended for the AoA display, they had to publish it whole - and if the position on FBW was still as hardline now, then it's unlikely they'd be meeting soon to revise the whole thing!

DozyWannabe 3rd Oct 2012 17:49


Originally Posted by Rananim (Post 7447327)
It was clearly in Airbus' interest to have pilot error stated as probable cause in the 447 report...

How so?


...and the BEA duly obliged.
The term "pilot error" does not appear in the report at any point.

Actually, the BEA report does not give "bullet-point" causes, probable or otherwise - it follows the sequence of events and highlights factors. The "causes" section is a relatively long-form summary of the findings.



Originally Posted by Rananim
In fact,no mention was made of design factors and how a super-stall was commanded by one pilot that went unnoticed by his 2 colleagues.

See:

Originally Posted by BEA AF447 Final Report (English) - p.174
It would also seem unlikely that the PNF could have determined the PF’s flight path stabilisation targets. It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one and that the conditions of a night flight in IMC make it more difficult to monitor aeroplane attitudes (pitch attitude in particular). In addition, a short time after the autopilot disconnection, the PF’s statement that he had the controls and his reaction to the initial deviations observed (in particular in roll) may have led the PNF to change his action priorities.


Originally Posted by Rananim
Pilot error and errors in the system(ie TRAINING) were also to blame but to leave out the role system design played in the crash makes the BEA look like EADS pawns.

Except they didn't and therefore they don't.


Originally Posted by Rananim
The FAA have acted ignobly in the past,but not the NTSB.

Same deal with the DGAC and BEA (and for that matter UK CAA and AAIB). A lot of the controversy surrounding earlier incidents laid at the BEA's door never in fact originated from the BEA.

[EDIT : Regarding controversy from NTSB findings, go ask IGh about "Hoot" Gibson! ]

infrequentflyer789 4th Oct 2012 00:50


Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage (Post 7444451)
There is no statistcal sample. Question would be why? Answer: No one in charge is interested.

They should be, and they were once. There are Boeing quotes around about the 777 being designed with inputs from over 600 pilots, and Airbus consulted at least one... :E

Why would the next guys down the track not take the opportunity when they have even more to gain from less effort - there are now two proven successful civilian FBW control systems they could copy, and it's much simpler, and cheaper, to ask "which of these is better" than "what might be a good design / better design than the last one".

Even if you were Boeing or Airbus, and worried about maybe being the next Betamax, wouldn't you be evangelising your system and getting stats to back it up ? Maybe even they don't care ?


Wow, I didn’t know that airline safety was a democracy!
It's not, and I didn't say it was. Nor is human interface design, but until someone standardises the human it is a percentages game.


I wrote further up, that if a respectable number of professionals voice concern, even in minority, I would hope that they’d be taken seriously and not brushed under the carpert by the “majority”.
It's a percentages game, just because it doesn't go the way you want doesn't mean your concerns are invalid or brushed under the carpet, just that they aren't on the right side of the numbers.

Personally, I find current 3D movies difficult to watch, tolerable but distracting. I am in a minority. A smaller minority finds them impossible to watch, causing nausea, headaches etc.

Is anybody listening to us ? - yes
Are they taking this seriously ? - yes
Will 3D movies get "better" for us ? - quite possibly not
Why ? - because over 90% think what we've got is good, maybe another 5% tolerable and only a small percentage has a major issue. Probably no system will ever be good for everyone and what we've got might actually be the best that is possible in terms of acceptance. Humans are not standard.

Recently I read that some research shows a common class of font used on car dashboards is "harder" to read than other fonts, so drivers have their eyes off the road for longer. Clearly could improve safety there, right? But, do you think when they said "harder" to read they meant "harder to read for 100% of the population" ? Guess. Change that font and some drivers will be happier and safer. Some will not. Some will find it worse. Guaranteed. It's percentages game again.


Maybe. The danger here is that airliners are not chosen or purchased by the line pilots, like i.e. your personal car.
Maybe.


Look at the layout of the car controls. A lot of fancy ideas, but it has leveled out long ago and no mass manufacturor rattles the proven design. Why? Because the self driving customer wouldn’t buy something he didn’t feel comfortable with, even if all the designers and Stigs, in the world told him how much better it would be.
Have to disagree there.

I started driving sometime around the time buses got sidesticks.

I can recall being driven once in a nice looking, fast (for the time), but older (then) sports car. First (and last) time I've seen double-de-clutching first hand. I couldn't have driven that gearbox, then or now.

On the other hand, in my time I've driven with manual choke and without power steering. Put a newly qualified driver of today in those cars, would they cope ? Probably never get it started.

Throttles have gone drive-by-wire like you say, but so have brakes. Anything with regen braking (all hybrids, EVs) has to be brake-by-wire. No real feel of the braking system (I think just a spring - sound familiar?), and sometimes significantly different response. Not everyone likes it, some may think it's dangerous. People are still buying hybrids and EVs...

Gear sticks are disappearing from the centre, replaced by paddles on steering wheel. Straight from the Stigs, that one. High/fast end now, but trickling down.

Steam gauges are on the way out from dashboards, it will all go digital screens - again it's on the high end now, but coming down.

And then of course there's the Drive Director - bringing with it the "children of the satnav line" who will happily follow the directions, without engaging eyes or brain, off-road, into rivers, off cliffs, etc.

I see plenty of parallels with aircraft there, drivers buying the cars hasn't stopped the process of change, nor has it necessarily controlled it better than airlines buying planes. Look at BMW's iDrive - yet somehow they still sell cars ?


Or he sues suspicious spontaneous acceleration, that made the industry jump!
Or his relatives sue because he's dead. Funny you raise that one - I think it proves how much things have changed in car controls.

In probably the most (in)famous case, a police officer driving an unfamiliar car couldn't stop it when the accelerator jammed. He couldn't put it into neutral. He couldn't turn the engine off. Why ? The only realistic conclusion is that he simply couldn't figure out how to.

The thing had no clutch pedal [you know, I hate that, I think it's a dangerous loss of a redundant control system, but guess what - I'm probably in a minority...], the auto mode/gear selector apparently has odd gates/detents to get past to get it into neutral, and there simply is no ignition key to turn off.


It's easy, not expensive and enhances safety.
Take a look at the 777 artificial feel yoke systems. Engineering masterpiece - quite possibly. Easy? I don't think so. Cheap ? probably not.

Enhances safety ? - Opinion. It would be nice if there was a clear signal in the safety stats yoke vs. sidestick, either way, to settle it - but there isn't.

You think that if Boeing could find any statistical support for sidestick a/c being more susceptible to LOC than yoke that they would keep it quiet so as not to hurt Airbus ?


I cannot cite one incident where a tactile control would have aggravated a situation, but there are a few where their absence raises such suspicion.
Look at the odds!
Tactile control is not necessarily the problem. The yoke looks to me to be inherently much larger and in a position more prone to accidental impact than the sidestick. That in itself is responsible, as a procuring cause, for many deaths to date. How many deaths is the sidestick responsible for as a cause ? I don't know. I do know that, again, we're in a percentages game, not absolutes.

It may well be that "tactile control" is never an aggravating factor, but that doesn't mean that a yoke must be safer than a sidestick.

Keylime 4th Oct 2012 04:39


Too many have paid with their lives for long lasting ignorance....
No worries, the automation will save us. Well, most of the time.

FERetd 4th Oct 2012 09:15

Better or Worse?
 
infrequentflyer789 Quote:-" Even if you were Boeing or Airbus, and worried about maybe being the next Betamax..."

The old Betamax and VHS debate. One technically superior to the other and one marketed much better than the other.

How this analogy fits in with Boeing and Airbus rather depends on one's point of view and preference.


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