Originally Posted by Organfreak
apparently some Airbus crews need to read and understand their FCOMs
I am not sure that Airbus want crews to understand the aeroplane so much as just do as they are are told. This may be great for selling product, but does not produce the best pilots. |
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Instead of shock tactics, how about Airbus remove the handle that startled pilots grab on to: the sidestick!
If a Boeing pilot gets a shock and yanks back on the prong, at least his oppo will shock him with a "WTF are you doing?!" as he gets hit in the guts, instead of "hmm, why is this aircraft suddenly climbing?? Hey Capn Bloggs, are you pulling on the sidestick or is the aircraft doing it by itself??". :} |
Bloggs
1) If you are right why did the FAA certify the plane ( + A320 family) as safe?
2) How come the other 60000 operational Airbus pilots are not complaining about the sidestick? |
1) Because they thought it was
2) Because it hasn't yet happened to them :ok: |
Originally Posted by Clandestino Originally Posted by DOVES You loose the manual cotrol of throttles under 50 'R.A. Originally Posted by Clandestino Originally Posted by DOVES The autothrottle is excluded by removing the Flight Director/s Some (again including Asseline) have criticised the "both F/Ds off" logic as non-intuitive. |
2) How come the other 60000 operational Airbus pilots are not complaining about the sidestick? After some years on A300 I flew A340 and A320 family, before I came back to A300 until my retirement. So I had the great opportunity to compare both flight control systems for years. From the LH seat as well as from the RH seat. I have to say I felt much more comfortable on A300 (Yoke). Especially on gusty approaches as PF and as well as PM. But let's come back to the topic. This accident would not have happened in a conventional plane like A300. Why? In a stall one would feel very soon what to do with the aileron, because stall is sooner or later accomplished by a wing drop. The aircraft will start to roll. On AB FBW aircrafts, the FCCs will maintain a constant roll rate commanded by the stick, e.g. the pilot doesn't feel/see the aileron deflection, the FCCs will do the job! Stick neutral doesn't mean ailerons neutral, they may be somewhere to maintain zero roll rate/wings level. So AF447 went down like a leave in autumn. Most of the time wings level. The FCCs did a great job (sarcasm:cool:), as designed. Again, never ever would this accident have happened on 747/767/757/A300 and so on. |
Difference between an operator and a pilot:
An operator will have no use of the information that "stick" or thrust lever position might provide him with. By knowing how these controls are positioned, the pilot will know why the airplane is doing whatever it is, and what it is most likely to be doing soon after. |
This must refer to the Bangalore crash. PF wanted autothrust in speed mode, but left PNF's F/D enabled. PNF noticed the mistake and pointed it out, but neither pilot corrected it. PNF (check captain) probably wanted to teach PF a lesson, but underestimated the danger this put them into.
Some (again including Asseline) have criticised the "both F/Ds off" logic as non-intuitive. Besides the fact they were descending in "open descent" mode away from the FCU set altitude...when they finally went TOGA, it simply didn't spool up in time http://flightsafety.org/ap/ap_jan94.pdf total confusion....automation mismanagement....lack of experience and understanding of operational procedures... |
total confusion....automation mismanagement....lack of experience and understanding of operational procedures.. |
Before yo’alls go back into endlessly repeating what has been babbled on the other zillion AB threads, there’s time to tell that ol’AB joke again, at least we’ll have something to lol:
There’s that AB pilot in divorce talks with his wife, when she snaps at him: “By the way honey, I always faked my orgasms”. The next day he’s in his retirement meeting and the CP tells him: “By the way Joe, the sidestick was never connected”. Take a break guys, reports have become food for the grandstand and the lawyers. |
SLFinAZ,
Indeed, jcj - Rockhound's 'pilot' was talking out of his seat cushion. Actually he was entirely correct. So...in the early stages of the upset the statement is entirely correct... The pilot in question was advocating this method of recovery for the last two minutes of flight, i.e. when AF447 was deep into the stall. |
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
(Post 7285494)
Instead of shock tactics, how about Airbus remove the handle that startled pilots grab on to: the sidestick!
If a Boeing pilot gets a shock and yanks back on the prong, at least his oppo will shock him with a "WTF are you doing?!" as he gets hit in the guts, And are we conveniently forgetting the several Boeing crews that are at the bottom of the ocean precisely due to a "yanks back on the prong" and stall ? Or are they maybe just guys who happened to be at the pointy end of a Boeing and not actually "pilots" in your definition ? instead of "hmm, why is this aircraft suddenly climbing?? Hey Capn Bloggs, are you pulling on the sidestick or is the aircraft doing it by itself??". :} |
Airbii are fine as long as you adjust your thinking to their philosophy....little bit different, but this old dog managed to, so quite sure anybody can...
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A340 zoom-climb inquiry backs shock tactics
1.- Retard throttle 2.- trim up a little 3.- Don´t disconnect the AUTOPILOT!!!! It´s basic, come and fly the LR60, overspeed is everyday issue = Plenty of rocket power in the back. |
Infrequent Flyer,
My post was half-tongue-in-cheek (don't the smilies work on your computer? :} ), but since you mentioned them... are we conveniently forgetting the several Boeing crews that are at the bottom of the ocean precisely due to a "yanks back on the prong" and stall |
OrvilleW wrote:
They are charged as professional pilots to mantain complete discipline and situational awareness in the cockpit at all times. when the **** really hits the fan, regardless of training, discipline and focus we don't really know how we're going to react. Most of us probably will react appropriately. Some however, and sadly, cannot. It's part of the "human equation" I suppose. |
Originally Posted by qquantum
(Post 7284068)
SLFinAZ – you sound like the NTSB.
As expected, the BEA Report is comprised of carefully crafted smoke — placing blame on the pilots of course — and distraction from the real issues of airplane design and regulator oversight failure that truly were the causes of the accident: In all, a "politically correct" report that omits analysis of significant factual information, 1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode, which the pilots seemed not to notice, as they made no mention of it; 2. The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection — again the pilots seemed not to notice, as they made no mention of it; 3. The inexperienced FO, who was flying, made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), which was not noticed by the more experienced FO, as he could not see the opposite control stick in the darkened cockpit 4. This drastic control input caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim 5. Examination of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data, (Final Report, Appendix 3) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation. Conditions of high altitude stall and reversion to Alternate Mode have been very rarely encountered in airline operations, leading to a degree of complacency Two possibilities: 1. Crew was abnormally (in)competent - and that's the cause. 2. An averagely competent crew will turn uas + alt-law in cruise into a stall with an unacceptably high probability (say > 1 in 100). Cause - who assessed that risk (if anyone) and did they get it right ? Design Flaws 1. Failure of the FCS to remain in the Normal mode (with envelope protection) resulting from the loss of a single parameter (pitot‐static airspeed). If the design had incorporated synthesized speed – from GPS, IRS – which would be accurate enough – the pilot would not have been placed into needless to say, the presentation of angle of attack (AOA) information (now planned for inclusion on Airbus airplanes) would have eased the burden on the pilot. 2. The design of the primary flight control controller such that it is possible for a pilot to make a sustained incorrect or dangerous input, without the awareness of the other crewmember(s). Assessment of whether input is incorrect or dangerous is dependent on diagnosis / awareness of situation, which was not present. Pull back into stall happens on other control systems (see Colgan, Ethiopian, Birgenair etc.). Common thread is not control type but the lack of diagnosis of stall. It can be readily appreciated that an FCS control design in which both controllers move in unison at all times (as in Boeing, MacDonnell Douglas, and most other airplanes) would have enabled instant detection (tactile) by the senior pilot (along with the probability of a sharp rebuke) and subsequent recovery of the airplane. There are more Boeings at the bottom of the ocean due to this issue than 'buses. now, however, the required technology has been available for several years, and because tactile communication between pilots is of such vital importance, parallel control should become mandatory on all future sidestick designs. 3. The ability of the FCS to allow the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) to move to a configuration that renders the airplane essentially unrecoverable, without appropriate warning to the pilot. Further, when AOA becomes greater than 30°, or Speed is less than 60kt, auto THS trim is turned off. 4. The FCS design which allows the primary stall‐warning sensor to be declared invalid (when it is still capable of providing a correct indication) based upon another parameter (speed), of questionable validity. SW computer ceased warning because its input AOA went "invalid" - airspeed did not factor (except at the ADIRU). When the senior co‐pilot took control (although the junior FO did not relinquish it) and pushed forward on the stick in an attempt to recover, the stall warning again sounded – leading him to believe that his control input was not correct, thus causing him to release pressure on the stick to get rid of the stall warning. By the time this warning issue occurred the crew had already ignored 1min of stall warning and had got to AOA > 40deg. They were far beyond where any sane test pilot would go in conditions no test pilot would test in. Had they started looking at an analogue AOA gauge at that point it would have been pinned at max and appeared "stuck" anyway. It's an interesting design issue, it's unlikely to be specific to the 'bus, but it's IMO academic for 447, by that time the outcome was already decided. |
Originally posted by kcockayne Investigators are "mindful" of the repercussions which could occur to their national flagship manufacturers & airlines if they publish anything which pins the blame too firmly on the manufacturers or the airlines. It is my suspicion that may be what happened here. Originally posted by Rockhound For the last 10000 m of freefall, the last two minutes, only test pilots might have pulled off the sort of dramatic, aggressive effort needed to save the plane. That might have involved throttling back one engine to force a wing drop, to drag the nose out of its 40-degree up angle into a dive. |
Originally Posted by deggers316
(Post 7286019)
"Which accidents were those?"
yes waiting for that reply too..... "Contrary to any stall recovery procedure, the control column was initially kept backward and gradually increased over the next 17”" "when the stick shaker stall indicator started, the pilot-incommand stated that it was fictitious" Ring any bells ? |
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