Ouch!

Since only one airplane can occupy the same airspace at the same time, and thunderstorms rarely stay constant, the weather your flight experienced probably was, to some unknown degree, different than the airplane directly ahead of or behind you flight into Madrid.

Since you're not giving us any additional information (what did the crew know and when did they know it?) your story lacks context. There's always a first, and last, flight when an airport closes.

I've been the first guy to go around, been the first guy to refuse takeoff, last guy to land, and have landed when other flights have diverted/gone around. It just depends on the situation that I'm dealing with, and not what the guy ahead of, or behind me, is experiencing.

No, that just cannot be, the answer has to be that we are all irresponsible thrill seekers with a death wish suffering from get thereitis, that don't mind risking the lives of a couple hundred people just to demonstrate the we are the heroes that didn't divert that day, yes, that is it:ugh:

The nom de plume speaks volumes.

that should be perfectly repairable on a 9 year old B763, depending upon any damage to the landgear.

The "First Choice" one mentioned earlier was 15 years old at the time of similar damage and was repaired and back in service in 2 months including a temporary hangar being build to effect the repair.

Alright. I suppose I can expand on my thoughts , purely for entertainment purposes as what I say is not of any importance nor holds any weight of course. Allow me to indulge myself a bit. Some of you when asked to consider caution and not to be too gung ho in the face of an increased danger in proceeding further, are apparently personally offended.


I remember a certain Korean Airlines 747 landing in Kimpo in fog. If memory serves me they were advised that all other flights had diverted and a landing would be ill advised at that time. But they went ahead anyway. Killed about a dozen people in the ensuing crash and fire. The flight crew were uninjured and took responsibility by refusing to leave the aircraft. I tip my hat to them because that is certainly bravery of the highest order. To perish willfully as a way of taking full responsibility. Not something I could do. OF course they felt confident that they would be able to land safely. But confidence does not reduce any present danger. I just wonder, how much better it would be for all if a stricter guideline would be adhered to regarding when NOT to proceed with one's approach and abandon the landing attempt.

quote from wiki: Gimpo International Airport - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In 1980, a Korean Air Lines 747 landed short of the runway, ripping off all main landing gear, causing the aircraft to skid to a stop on the nose wheel and outer 2 engines starting a fire. 15 of the 226 total occupants were killed, including the First Officer and Captain, who refused to leave the aircraft after the crash.

further info:

ASN Aircraft accident Boeing 747-2B5B HL7445 Seoul-Gimpo (Kimpo) International Airport (SEL)

In my Madrid landing (was a Swissair Dc9 from Geneva to Madrid) it was late afternoon and I remember circling above Madrid. Dark clouds below while we were still in bright sunshine.

The captain came on and announced that all other flights had elected to divert but we will be making one attempt to see how it was. He warned of strong turbulence. And down we went through the clouds. It got so dark it was pitch black and at a few points lightning was striking close to the aircraft.

The turbulence was indeed as he said, very strong. There was a few down drafts as well as updrafts. I wasn't enjoying this and neither was anyone else I am sure. Finally , thank goodness a particularly strong updraft shot us straight up right back into the sunshine. The captain came on to say that conditions were too rough and we would be diverting to Barcelona.

Upon arrival at Barcelona I could see that the airport was literally swamped with aircraft. Almost all were just sitting there unserviced. We had our doors open. There was no ground service of any kind. We would not be going into the terminal. Two, almost three hours went by and finally we headed back to Madrid. The captain came on to reassure us that the weather was clear all the way, and it was. Very smooth flying as the storm had passed.

I actually had asked him while on the ground in Barcelona why he had made that attempt when everyone else had diverted. He didn't answer me (probably thought me a fool ) . I suppose he wanted to avoid just such a situation. A much longer workday, stranded at Barcelona without ground service. He felt the danger at Madrid to be manageable , at least for one attempt.

I felt that , given everyone else had diverted , and he knew that as he had said so in his announcement. That he should have diverted as well. No need to make an attempt.

We may have gotten over the piano keys even and then over-ran or any number of other unhappy possibilities given the atrocious weather. It was atrocious. A truly large thunderstorm right over the airport.

How many of you , honestly , would make such an attempt and how many of you would not. I want to fly with the would nots if I may, thank you.

Conditions change rapidly. I always said that it does not hurt to "take a look" as long as you always leave an escape and alternate plan. Staying within regs of course.

Air Japan/ANA incident at NRT
 

Armchairpilot certainly watches a lot of Nat Geo!

Sure looks that way.

decision making one pilots model .. weather.
 

Before departure, is the destination (and alternate) within forecast weather limits at the proposed time of arrival ? answer yes .. despatch.

Answer no ? when are the conditions forecast to improve .. consider delay.

Destination out of limits, alternate (and now a second alternate) OK, depart and check weather en route for destination, still below limits continue to alternate no approach.

Destination within limits before final approach fix WITH NO APPARENT SEVERE WEATHER HAZARD OBSERVED, an approach may be made initially to FAF, if still within limits, continue (maybe) to minima.. land/go around as appropriate to the conditions, if go-around, check fuel/scare factor and divert.

The critical factor is "extra" fuel, that is your thinking time.
Something else worth considering is planning to your "1st alternate" and making the original destination an alternate.

Had an experience where destination was forecast to be unusable due high winds, checked the weather en-route and it was as forecast, decided to divert at top of descent, 1st alternate not available due lack of ramp space (all the other diversions) second alternate likewise !!... third alternate was fine though.

food for thought at least.

I wish people had to prove that they have a pilots licence before they could post on this forum. The amount of absolute rubbish spewed by "armchair pilots" is nauseating.. :yuk:

Well, no actually that isn't the answer at all.

The PPrune community never seizes to amaze me, I would have never imagined that I had to explain that I was being sarcastic on that post:eek:

Being told how to do our jobs by a guy who's not even a pilot and then trying to explain to those too stupid to understand satire, irony or sarcasm are good reasons for us not to venture into the lair of R&N, where the basic premise of 'professional' and 'pilot' seems absent. I'm sure some people comment here just to increase their post count because they certainly have nothing to add to the discussion.

EXLEFTSEAT,

I appreciate your attempts to edit the original title and understand it is a limitation of the forum software. Thanks.

Anyway, back to the ANA 767...

What to do to help prevent this type of incident becoming what Narita becomes known for?

This is weird. I think there should be a forum non-pilots....maybe Jetblast?

Narita airport should be moved to somewhere where there is no wind. Or build huge walls around the airport so that no wind blows across the runway.

:cool:

yeah, you've not really understood what i'm getting at either.

i was responding to (i think) fratemate who thought they'd add the nationality of the pilots when it was unnecessary, that's all, regardless of whether you came to their 'defense' or not.

Simple solution for Narita's crosswinds - put the entire airport on a rotating table and pivot the runway's into the wind for each takeoff and landing.

Viola, no crosswinds.

Now if we could just get guys to resist pushing forward on the yoke during bounces. :sad:

even simpler solution .... complete the originally planned NE-SW runway .... stopped by the protestors / land sale those decades ago.

A 3000m perfect circle of asphalt would also work.

Someone else can figure out how to light it, drain it, plow it and route the taxiways.

And only 39x more asphalt to lay if I pi-r-squared it correctly.

The Americans carried out experiments on a circular runway back in the late 1940s. They used a circular automobile test track which, I think, was somewhere near Detroit. DC-3s flew from it and also a DC-4 I believe.

Of course, this solved all sorts of problems but generated just as many others.

I have a vague recollection that the final stopper was the high side loads operating on the undercarriage.

Whoa.....talk about thread drift. Get back to the topic at hand shall we. Anyone with any ideas as to what the Dfdr says wrt the 767 landing.
Taken it was hard ..:cool:

SARCASM ALERT!
 

我々日本人 (We Japanese) pilots are the safest in the world. We are まじめ、(honest and diligent). You 外人 (foreign) pilots are all cowboys. Wearing white deerskin gloves is very important, maybe as much as as is our ANA procedure. This incident is Boeing's fault :=.

Your Prune name suits! :O

Capt Bloggs,

;)

People keep assuming the pilots push forward after the bounce. I am not so sure this is the case. I was once on the jumpseat for a very heavy landing into Heraklion (though no airframe damage) and there was a very pronounced nose down moment after the initial touchdown. The handling pilot swore he did not put in a nose down input (not did he flare, but that is another issue) and later we figured it to be the following:

Big bounce on main wheels --> main wheels are behind the CG --> a nose down moment as a result.

Not to say it will happen like that every time, many factors I am sure can influence it, but I would not automatically assume that so many pilots push forward on the yoke after a heavy landing.

I'd like to give them the benefit of the doubt but a replay of the video shows more of a 'skip' than a 'bounce'.

If he didn't flare, then the elevator would have been in a fairly neutral position, which would have led to the nose dropping rapidly after T/D. Also, the oleo travel was probably taken up pretty quickly, leading to the undercarriage/airframe combo acting as a rigid object from an inertial point-of-view.

Having worked in Japan for several years I can tell you that ANA pilots are the worst. Unable to think outside the box, inflexible, lack of common sense, etc. I avoid Japanese carriers all the time. Too many incidents with ANA lately. The 737 upset, the AJX 767 that flew through the thunderstorm on approach to NRT a couple months ago that was hit by lightening, several tailstrikes, all the ANA planes that land during typhoons while all the other carriers divert, and many more. Must be something in their culture.

Pelican
 

Nice analysis/contribution. Thank you.

I agree with Fullwings. The aircraft was airborne again when the nose went down. That didn't happen because of the C of G. Fair enough, if you just smacked it on, that the nose may then also smack on shortly after because of the C of G position, but in this case, the aircraft went flying again before touching down the second time nose-first.

For what its worth, it was an autoland attempt.
The airplane experienced a massive tailwind gust just before minimums and pitched down to pick up profile. The A/P was disconnected below minimums to pitch back up for the flare and was too late. Rest all on video.
Of course this is just what the lil birdie tells me...
;)

This is an example of little or no flare followed by the nose gear arriving...very different IMHO to the ANA pilot created creases.

Decent flare there.
High autobrake setting could have contributed to the high rate of derotation after mains touched down resulting in the high(and double!) nosewheel impact.
Just my thoughts here..

Stunning first post Ricejet. You appear to know a lot when you actually know nothing.

Well,did you ever fly an aircraft with autobrakes?

"Stunning first post Ricejet. You appear to know a lot when you actually know nothing."

I think 6 years flying at AJX, living in Japan, being Japanese, gives me a fairly good insight. Whats stunning is thinking you can evaluate someone's knowledge, or lack thereof, from a single post.

That sounds like an over-reliance on automation or late transition to the level of automation appropriate for the conditions.

Ricejet: "Having worked in Japan for several years I can tell you that ANA pilots are the worst. Unable to think outside the box, inflexible, lack of common sense, etc. I avoid Japanese carriers all the time. Too many incidents with ANA lately. The 737 upset, the AJX 767 that flew through the thunderstorm on approach to NRT a couple months ago that was hit by lightening, several tailstrikes, all the ANA planes that land during typhoons while all the other carriers divert, and many more. Must be something in their culture."

I don't agree. I have worked with Japanese high tech companies for more than 10 years, and have spent much time in meeting rooms and labs with my Japanese colleagues. While the outcome in terms of development results and delivery performance has always been admirable in the long run, getting there was hard work and sometimes frustrating. I have experienced many instances where the Japanese team had in our eyes simply forgotten all common sense, where the team would happily stampede into the wrong direction, where things were neglected that a second year engineering student would consider basics, where production and quality control procedures were installed that had no fail-safing (poka yoke) whatsoever and no failure mode analyses were carried out.

Reading about nuclear accident investigations in Japan paints a similar picture of inflexibility, group-think, naivite, over-reliance on automation and the inability to imagine that things sometimes do not go as planned.

If these kind of cultural issues were also prevalent in the airline industry, you'd expect planes to be dropping out of the skies like those of some other Asian airlines in the 80s and 90s. But when you look at statistics, Japanese airlines have been really remarkably safe since the early 70s, and even more so after JAL123 where Boeing and JAL maintenance shared the blame. The picture remains the same when you look at glitches that could have ended a lot worse. Admittedly, there were some maintenance issues at JAL a few years ago, and the ANA 737 upset raised and the recent spate of tail scrapes at JAL and ANA raised some eyebrows, but the overall frequency of such glitches does not appear to be higher than in other airlines that have a strong safety culture and excellent track record (CO, DL, BA, LH to name a few).

I don't know what they do differently than the rest of the technical community in Japan, but I'd sure like to know.