Definately. It is much more in the commercial interest of the project in the bigger picture, to investigate openly, identify a shortcoming in procedure or pilot decision making (if that is what it was -I have no knowledge), and then make a corrective action plan for that. The alternative being the whole aircraft has a dark cloud over it, which is perhaps undeserved.

There are a number of historical incidents of demo flights gone wrong, and it's appaerently just been easier to blame the pilot (particularly when he cannot defend himself). The demo flight is a less than ideal situation for safety. Operations outside the "normal" procedures of commercial transportation, and making the most of the plane's performance to impress people - a challenging combination....

Not the First
 

Interesting perspective on the dangers of flying in this area.

Mt. Salak: An airplane graveyard | The Jakarta Post

(Not a pilot) As asked on another forum: Were the two planned flights that day to use the same flight path? Was the cockpit crew the same for both flights?

Finally, how close is the fatal flight path to the successful flight path?

Sukhoi Superjet-100 hits mountain top
 

It has been a very long time since I piloted a plane, but was happy to find this forum. I live about 13 km NW of the point of impact. I can see Mount Salak on a clear day and perhaps could see the site with binoculars. I came across the forum, because of my problem to understand the coordinates given by search personnel on the local TV (61 seconds!?) in one of the coordinates. Using the decimal conversion proposed by another poster, which look to be correct and fit fairly well with a report from one of the search pilots who gave the altitude as 5,800 ft. Java lies E-W, with a chain of volcanic mountains along the island. Here in West Java Mounts Salak I (7,287 ft), Salak II (7,153 ft) Gede (9,705 ft) and Pangrango (9,905), all lie to the south. Flying from on the north coast to Pelabuhan Ratu, a small fishing village on the south coast would only take a few minutes and I suspect that was the plan. On the return the pilot had requested to descend from 10,000 to 6000 ft and that was before passing over the above mentioned mountains. Yesterday afternoon in the town of Bogor (400 m asl) it was overcast and I did hear an unusual sound above, but paid little notice because there is a nearby airfield. It is probable that the mountains were entirely covered by cloud. What I cannot understand is that, with a navigator on board, why the request to descend was made so soon. I also assume that he would be aware of the MOCA (at least 10,000 ft?). Also surely a new aircraft would have a ground proximity warning system. Would this help? Perhaps not if you fly into a vertical mountainside. Regarding the weather, Bogor is known as Rain Town and has the national record for lightning strikes. Although we used to have a dry period of several weeks or even months, we haven’t had a long dry period for a couple of years (climate change) and often get heavy rain especially in the afternoon. I can’t remember when I last saw the mountains. Retrieval of the remains will be an enormous problem and I guess it will take 6-8 hours on foot to reach the site from the nearest road.

Definitely the same pilot, co-pilot and navigator according to the reports. The flight paths may have been different. Also, even if not, the cloud cover probably increased from morning to afternoon.

Still no comment on their web site...

Sukhoi Company (JSC) - Main page

Disclaimer: I have no experience of airliner crashes at all.

But, it strikes me as slightly strange if this was CFIT and the aircraft impacted a virtually sheer cliff at normal cruise speed that, according to a number of comments, there are pieces of wreckage large enough to be mistaken for the aircraft 'breaking in two'.

Surely if it impacted a cliff as above it would be such an intense impact it would virtually disentigrate?

Just one for our ATC colleagues, if I do request a descent to below MSA in an area, what sort of response back would I expect ? Just a clearance without comment ?

Padre describes the area quite well -

the weather is NOT "unpredictable" - it is all too predictable

often nice clear still mornings then around 11:00 cumulus starts to bubble up - you can pretty much guarantee rain and thunderstorms around Bogor starting at 13:00 - 13:30 clearing round 16:00 throughout the year - except maybe for a few days in June/July

For a long time Bogor was in the records as the thunderstorm capital of the world

Looks like he clipped a ridge coming off Gunung Salak - a couple of kms further north and he'd have had a lot of clear air under him but ..........

Most ATCO's would give you a big "unable" due to terrain, but that is in countries with proper ATC - which is definitely not Indonesia. The Jakarta controllers seem as though they willfully try to kill you just for fun.

Extremely poor service from the controllers in this part of the world, just a matter of fact unfortunately - and pretty unsurprising considering the overall safety culture of the Indonesian aviation industry. Bad English and complete disregard for established safety procedures. With the drastic increase in traffic these days, it is downright dangerous.

But with that, it is still no excuse for a pilot loosing SA and descending below MSA. Although, in this case, I think it was probably more a case of trying to showboat to the VIPs and pushing the envelope a little too much. The aircraft was circling the mountain, so I am sure they were aware of the terrain. They got too close to it, visual illusion looking past the ridge (it is all jungle covered after all), or got caught somewhere outside the performance envelope of the aircraft due to weather or disorientation.

Hopefully we will find out.

does anybody know what egpws/taws is installed? If there is an inhibit function?

If the mountain is 5300ft high, I wonder how they hit it after only being cleared 6000.

Edit: I misread something. Peak was over 6000ft, makes sense now.

The aircraft wreckage was found by a helicopter the following morning (May 10th) at about 09:15L (02:15Z) on the slopes of Mount Salak at an elevation of about 5300 feet MSL.

<snip>

The Air Force said the aircraft impacted the edge of a cliff (top of the cliff at 6250 feet MSL) about 1.7 nm from Cijeruk. Approximate final position of the aircraft is S6.7045 E106.7373.

I'm guessing it's a very steep and long drop.

Mount Salak has two craters, Salak I is 7,254 ft (my earlier post was slightly in error) and Salak II 7,153 ft. The first SAR helicopter pilot reported the wreckage at 5,800 ft, but that may have been below the point of impact. I think the top of the ridge in the photographs is around 2,000 m (6,600 ft).

Sickening image. Just below the ridgeline and not far from safety on that pass. However, why were they there in the first place?

Purse speculation of course, but possibly descending in order to maintain VMC for some sightseeing? With ground below in sight - or perhaps through a hole?

Indeed, although I am sure we wonder what aspect of commercial jet operation is served by demonstrating to the prospective customers sightseeing manoeuvring close to mountains, especially as they were probably focused on the Champanska instead.

But by all accounts they weren't sightseeing because they were in cloud. And cloud, and by the sound of it rain, in close proximity to mountains, would typically mean turbulence, surely the last thing to expose the journalists etc on a jolly to.

I have done many demo flights when working for aircraft manufacturers. There is a tendency for the VIP's on board ( most of whom know SFA about aviation) to want to see the aircraft do manoeuvres that are outside of the normal civil operating envelope. Pressure can be put on the crew to demonstrate the agile manoeuvrability as the aircraft has low fuel and payload. Most of the time it is pulled off without consequences. This could well be one of those times it went wrong.

Please forgive my speculation, but would it not be fairly easy for the GPWS/TAWS to have been MEL'd at some point on this sales excursion, particularly since the aircraft isn't engaged in public carriage? That would also explain the picture of the aircraft's overhead panel, taken on the ground some time prior to the accident, with the TAWS - Terrain button clearly indicating "OFF".

I know it's quite a logical leap, and I'm not at all familiar with this particular aircraft type, but is "GPWS/TAWS switch OFF" part of a normal on-the-ground procedure for anyone here who flies modern jet aircraft? I'm trying to remember if it's ever been a part of my flow/checklist on anything I've flown, but I'm drawing a blank

(edit: The photo in question, TAWS switches on the left hand side, close to the top)
http://i966.photobucket.com/albums/a...rgoatp/web.jpg

with some image enhancement, the initial impact witness mark appears quite flat relative to the steeply rising terrain, the sweepback angle of both wings apparently evident with foreshortening of the starboard wing "shadow" compared to that of the port.

Further up the slope, displaced slightly to port side of the nominal flight axis, what appears to be a tail-cone, and further up the debris field foliage discolouration roughly consistent with the symmetry, shape and size of the tail surfaces.

Discolouration to trees and ground cover appears to start at POI, and continue to those on the apex of the ridge, once again the center-line of this runs towards the top centre left of the image.

Two features which appear to be heavily damaged tree trunks to the centre right, one is above the POI, the other below.
There is heavy scoring of the surface below POI (landslide) which continues out of frame.

Concerning the TAWS - I could imagine that it shows FAULT because the IRSs are not aligned - I wonder whether the TERRAIN button is actually a terrain inhibit switch?

I see that both the TAWS switches are showing FAULT, which is a normal indication when the airplane's on the ground and not ready to fly. I was referring to the TAWS - terrain switch, which is clearly indicating OFF in white as well, that being a selected position. Or at least, I'm fairly confident in saying that the SSJ likely follows the standard amber=fault, white=selected button philosophy as do similar aircraft like Airbus and Embraer.

I've been racking my brain but for the life of me, I can't remember "GPWS/TAWS switch OFF" being an SOP for anything I've flown before in any normal phase of operation.

Is it possible that if they wanted to get up close and personal with the terrain in order to "demonstrate" the aircrafts capabilities, the crew would want to inhibit the TAWS/GPWS in order to silence the warnings ?? Of course more likely to select that option temporarily in the air which would not explain the prior posters overhead panel question.

That may well have been the case also, rmac, which is just as bothersome. Of course, it is far too early in the process for this little bit of speculation to have any weight to it. We don't know if the switch being like that is normal on this aircraft, and we don't know what the switch selection was on the accident flight. All we know is that these unfortunate souls ended up where they did, and with the aid of a modern GPWS/TAWS, that should not have happened.

GPWS/TAWS switch OFF
 

...and does the EXT PWR being AVAL/ON indicate anything to those leaping to conclusions?

AS ALREADY STATED, it indicates that the plane is on the ground. And AS ALREADY ASKED, is turning the GPWS/TAWS off part of your shutdown SOP? Because it hasn't been on any of my equipment.

Perhaps rather than failing to read posts before ridiculing them, you could draw on your years of experience and tell me if that's normal, particularly in light of the fact that the plane ended up on the side of a mountain. It's an honest question; I'm certainly no Sukhoi driver.

edit: The file name of the picture includes the string 20120509, which of course suggests it was taken the day of the crash. And after a quick review of my old books, I indeed can't find a reason to actually change the position of the GPWS/TAWS switch on those aircraft unless it's broken or there's some reason you don't want to hear it - not as part of a normal shutdown/startup procedure. Again, there's no guarantee that carries over to Sukhoi procedures.

Cockpit switchology not that automated?
 

I flew the A319/320 for five years and when I first saw one of the Sukhoi cockpit pictures - front panel displays, sidestick etc I was struck at how similar the planes cockpit ergonomics look. Then I looked closely at the overhead panel switchery (?) and I am surprised at how manual many of the systems seem to be - needing four battery switches etc. Seemed on close inspection to be a bit of a throwback on the Sukhoi for systems that on the A320 barely need looking at/attending to. Anyone familiar with the Sukhoi systems versus Airbus? As advanced? Not so? Cheers -

Dreadful business for sure.

Not that unusual, the A310/A300-600 has three battery switches (because it has three batteries). Maybe this a/c has 4 and each one can be individually switched for MEL relief etc

http://i966.photobucket.com/albums/a...rgoatp/web.jpg

The 3 swiches top RHS of panel, marked ON OFF, is this real, on a brand new aircraft ?.

Same swiches for sale here, just over $3 each.

Toggle Switch 20A 20 Amp 125VAC Heavy Duty On-Off: In Stock Buy Now | West Florida Components

http://www.westfloridacomponents.com...off-switch.jpg

I bought similar swiches recently for £1 each in UK, for use on a model railway. Instantly recogniseable, hence this post.

I would expect top grade electrical switchgear to be used on a brand new multi $million aircraft.

A very sad event. The above has certainly nothing to do with it, but I think warrants attention.

@Flying Lid, maybe it's a similar perspective question to the half-full glass of water. Maybe you got yourself a good deal for your model railroad switches.

—Then again, how well do the switches work for your railroad?

I agree with your sense of irony, however. But, culturally, we do have trouble living up to the KISS ethic. Our culture likes smooth and new; but our culture is not necessarily sane.

Probably for a retrofit feature or maybe a temporary installation for test equipment?
I doubt those will be seen on production aircraft.

On the aviation herald link it says: "The coordinator of the rescue operation said, that the aircraft appeared relatively intact from the air however has received substantial damage after leaving a trail away from the crater down the slope". It seems that the impact (?) image only shows a small part of the puzzle as we did not see the plane yet, if the report is correct.
Crash: Sukhoi SU95 over Indonesia on May 9th 2012, aircraft impacted mountain
(SLF speaking)

Same manufacturer probably attaches an appropriate piece of paper to the switch and sells it for $50 as 'aviation grade' ;-)

But more interesting though - the sign above the switch reads 'SDU mode' where SDU stands for: Sistema Distancionnogo Upravleniya – fly by wire control system.

Presumably this aircraft must have been some kind of prototype version with the ability to change the FBW mode.

I was just about to post the same thing - the FBW system is something where I would not have fooled around with dodgy switches :uhoh:

I think people are reading too much into the overhead panel picture. The plane is clearly on the ground with the engines off. Unless the overhead panel design philosophy is 100% at odds with every other recent design, (possible...it's Russian! :\) the TAWS switchlights being pushed IN would seem to indicate they are selected to their normal position, ON. This appears to be the logic on the rest of the panel. The OFF light simply means the TAWS system was not operating that that particular moment, irrespective of switch position. Similarly, note the L & R Pack and Gen switchlights. They are all pushed in for normal position, ie ON, but have OFF lights illuminated due to lack of bleed air source and generator output w/ engines shut down, respectively.

So I don't think TAWS was *selected* off in that photo. Whether the OFF light represents an abnormal condition on the ground on external power, I have no idea. It's possible that TAWS is inhibited with weight on wheels, or the FMS/GPS was turned off at the time. It's also possible that there was no database for Indonesia installed or even that TAWS was inop on the demonstrator. Point is, it's impossible to tell from that photo. I suspect we'll know the answer very shortly as Sukhoi is no doubt very anxious to clear the air.

Edit - didn't realize this was my first post :E. Hi, I'm Sam. E170/190 CA in the US. Long time lurker, first time poster.

That's a very good point, JungleBus. My first assumption was that the buttons don't actually stay stuck out or pushed in, just white = selected. I personally can't tell the difference between the physical position of that button and any of the others that indicate "OFF". Of course, it's also odd to me that the ground power is in use but all of the batteries are switched are off, but as I've said, I really don't know the first thing about this plane. It's just that with the exception of the batteries and the one TAWS light, everything else looks set up exactly as I'd expect for an airplane under ground power that isn't ready for start yet. I would think the FAULT lights are a perfectly normal indication if the system isn't up yet, just scratching my head about the OFF one. Also wouldn't have a clue why the SYS button wouldn't be OFF too if it's related to inhibit logic, but as I said, not my airplane.

I'm a few years removed from the 170/190 series, and now I'm trying to remember if the white indications for buttons on that panel are for selected positions, or if they're more general than that. I know amber = isn't working right, I just don't quite remember the switch logic for white. The overhead panel on the Sukhoi just looks so much like an Airbus, that's what I defaulted to in my head.

Good first post, JB. Thanks for the added perspective!

On 737 it is normal when leaving the aircraft unattended to have Batt Sw off & Gnd Pwr in use. Then, when the GP is disconnected (or becomes accidentally disconnected) no need to do anything to avoid arriving in the morning to find a flat Batt.

Anyway,forget all this switchology discussion, all said & done, TAWS is there to save you if all the rest goes wrong, not to enable/facilitate you fooling around below MSA in the mountains in cr@p wx.

Without wishing to prejudge, I think the cause is going to be a whole lot simpler than anything technology based.

The debris pattern in the the hillside is consistent with an impact like this (F-4 into a concrete barrier)


I was trying to explain to some non aviation people today that the hope of finding victims remains intact after a high speed collision with a solid object are remote.

The forces involved in an almost instantaneous stop from cruise speed are tremendous, most people can't comprehend that.

Oh yeah, duh. I guess that would be perfectly normal for the battery under those circumstances. That just leaves the one light that's got me wondering.

And I agree with you 100% about TAWS being more of a failsafe than a license to be reckless. I'm just wondering if that button showing OFF is a normal indication on this a/c, or it's indicating that way because the pilots had it switched off for some reason or another. It's certainly too early to try and throw either the pilots or anyone else under the bus, I'm just looking at something that doesn't quite add up with my own meager experience.