Actually, I feel more comfortable in an aircraft in those conditions rather than on the road. When you see a vehicle with hazard lights on(barely) in this region, you don't know if he's stopped on the shoulder or barreling down the road, or shoulder, at 140 KPH.

Assymetric

There is a considerable difference between the distance a transmissometer can report in fog and the useful distance in front of you that a tug's headlights will illuminate.

I suspect the tug driver was referring to the latter.

Rumour from a normally reliable source at an adjacent Emirate that the crew have already been sacked. Anyone know the truth?

I would hope not.

dontdoit,

Not true!

Will they be sacked?

Suggest you wiki 'reliable' and find yourself a mate that is not so 'normal'! :hmm:

Another exemple where the TO runway was not properly identified! Is it too difficult to press the LS push-button to check you're well on the LOC?
Will people ever learn?

FBW; Since no one knows if the Departure RWY has/had a working LOC or not, I have to say that it just shows what limited knowledge you display regarding LVTO requirements...

Arna330: Why? I didn't say you need it! But if it's there, why not use it? 31L in OMAA has an ILS;
Who said it was U/S? Anybody got a Notam about that?

"will people ever learn..."
 

A better question would be what is the rational limit for operating?

If you are the manager, then 0m... unless they conduct a THA.
If you are the passenger, then.... 0m.... unless they understand THA and very basic physics.

If any of the stake holders (other than the crew) are under any illusions that LVTO (and as an aside LVOPS in general) are risky, just do the maths on the energy level of the aircraft on a takeoff. The A330 on a short run to the UK form the pit is going to have about 22TJ of chemical and kinetic energy around V1/rotate... and is assumed that no failure occurs above 80/100KCAS going through to V1, hopefully. That appears to be enough to spoil your day if as has been commented "people will never learn..." and some form of badness occurs.

badnesses... wrong runway, ie SQ6, offset, AUH (SQ at SYD landing... :)) birdstrike on roll... engine fail, incapacitation, loss of visibility etc. etc. etc. etc. Can the crews be trained to cope with these events? probably. (I recall getting loss of viz above 80, critical engine fail at V1, and a second engine failure at rotate, with limit XW and yes/maybe, in a sim you can probably make it... wouldn't want to verify that scenario in a real aircraft. In the real world, having loss of viz in a LVTO is very unpleasant, about as much fun as a brown out on an assault landing...).

The current viz criteria for LVTO may sound reasonable, but if you are entering a runway in a right turn, the visual segment is such that the LH guy (Capt) gets to see zip in limit conditions. Not the case at AUH for 31L... but a factor at CKS/SQ6 and also in Basil's well rendered war story.


LVTO are critical ops, no question, yet they are treated as mundane technicalities by all other than the crew in general. I would doubt that at AUH the crew were as unconcerned as the rest of the system is, but there is always different ways of approaching the task at hand.

Report will be interesting.

In mean time, a great reminder of what should be seen outside on a line up, and to support such operations with a LLZ/PVD etc. counting the lights to verify the legal viz could protect more than the legalities, it may even save some "frangible" light pedestals and bulbs.

"History is the witness that testifies to the passing of time; it illuminates reality, vitalises memory, provides guidance in daily life and brings us tidings of antiquity" Cicero (106 BC- 43 BC), Pro Publio Sestio

FBW truly hope you are not one of these "it-will-never-happen-to-me" CRM case studies. No one knows what happened exactly on that takeoff and in which conditions it was performed. No one knows, except those in charge of the case, what went wrong and at what stage the "error", if any, occurred. What we can do, as professionals, is learn by this experience and share our own thoughts but I believe that judging people without having any clue of what happened inside that cockpit is purely a nonsense.

Cheers.

"it-will-never-happen-to-me" is the last thing I will say and think. I just observe and try to do my job with the high standards I've been trained to; but believe me I have seen and see in the cockpit nearly every day I fly very few people Identifying seriously and propely the TO runway; yes, in Asia, training standards are getting very low sometimes...Young FOs and Capts on big aircraft more and more...
On the other hand, that's true, we don't know all what happened that day in AUH.

Cheers,

Wow, such an astute observation. But with people in Europe and the rest of the first world having sch a headstart in aviation, folks are still taking off from taxiways, landing on taxiways and planting aircrafts into the sea. Well one would think that with that great headstart and such high standards ( by iference ), there would have been ZERO accidents/incidents.:ouch::rolleyes:

A HUD with FLIR would have prevented this.

Whilst I fully agree that the runway should be properly identified, can you please clarify three points for me?

(1) A low visibility takeoff may not always be made from a runway with a radiating CAT II/III localizer - so what would be your procedure in this case?

(2) Exactly how do you identify the runway properly? The RAAS may tell you that you are on the correct runway but you may still be on the edge lights... Also, you may not see the runway ID numbers as you have lined up further down the tarmac.

(3) How does being a young pilot on a big aeroplane equate to lower standards? Surely you mean a less-experienced pilot on a big plane?

*Any tips for a young, self-confessed less-than-perfect skipper would be much appreciated, thanks :ok:

:suspect:

-1 and 2 :CL rwy markings ; CL rwy lighting, different spacing that edge ones (see before), rwy identification number, rwy QFU (alignment) (wouldn’t have helped in AUH case), LOC centered, if there is; taxiway CL leading you to the center of the rwy…
Of course you might not have everything that day BUT if you have NONE of these it’s really not your day…

3-Yes, you’re right, I meant a less experienced pilot or Capt on a big plane; some countries have very high training standards, and some very fast developing countries don’t;

Guys, your tips, experience and comments are welcome as well.

Aeroflot begs to differ :rolleyes:

There is there is a limit to the stupidity the Airbus systems can save you from.

of course i was not there and i am in no way being judgemental, but i have always been taught to verbalize with the other person i am flying with. ie, turning on to runway, runway clear, lined up, rolling etc... 99.9% of the time most of that is just noise and a waste of time but it just keeps every one sharp...i expect the other person to look, think and react if he/she thinks i am missing something...

FBW390,
Pushing the LS is not the procedure or the SOP and neither is taking out runway lights either. The point is, some runways in the network of airlines have an off-set LOC of 3 degrees like JFK rwy22R, (LOC 222 and rwy 225), and so the LS button is not a good idea to try and follow when it is offset behind you, although all the lights are good for low viz.

Low viz procedures are meant to balance out, as much as possible for all departures, as there is a lot to be remembered and followed and the idea is to keep it simple as possible given the conditions.