Is that conjecture, rumour or fact?

I think you'll find there were four crewmembers in the cockpit.

To all those who persist in "blaming" the individuals, with an air of "anyone with that experience would surely notice..." or "not do that" :ugh:

A relatively quick read of the report will reveal that this type of accident (and similar incidents) is far from rare, and affects numerous experienced pilots.

Yes - it is surprising that such things are not noticed, but the facts are clear - they are missed, and without analysing and putting in place steps to try and prevent them, they will continue to do so.

Only comment would be it was back in service ~8 months after the event - given the time to analyse / investigate aircraft, plan what to do, ferry to Toulouse, repair and back in service, it does not seem a massive task?

Appologise, my understanding over the sequence of events was faulty.

The reason TOGA was not selected before the first rotation was that at that point the crew did not realize there was a problem.

THIS however:-

Has more errors per word than just about any post in History.

There were four crew, not three, the erroneous figures had nothing to do with 300 vs 500, and how the hell does writing off the aircraft effect the number of fatalities (which was zero)?

Could you please supply the cost/benefit analysis you must have access to to make this claim?

2 cents
 

7700, Can you explain if Airbus has it so wrong, how the crew of the 757 out of the Dominican had the same result with one pitot tube inop?

There are good indications on the fd when more than one pilot is trying to operate the controls at a time, I don't think this issue was even a slight factor to this accident, been in the bus 13 years. :ok:

TAM was not related to flight control feedback.

Instead of crying out loud against Airbus' automation philosophy I rather would demand an accelleration alarm, giving clues to an aircrew when an aircraft is not getting speed fast enough. This is missing in Airbus and Boeings alike, only seeing it rarely on top-end business jets - where there is never lack of accelleration anyway.

It would be dead simply to imply such an acceleration alarm, be it based on FMGES performance data base or with the RIPS or ROPS or other systems.

Please not another lady shouting at me at the most inappropriate moment!

There are way too many systems shanihaniganging between me, the aircraft and basic airmanship anyway.

It is somewhat inherent to the Airbus fraction that after each incident, especially those involving an Airbus, they are demanding even more automation and protections to help the already implemented automation, just a much as the involved pilots.

To me, Jazz hands has got it dead right:

This statement could be enlarged to the whole Airbus design.

Sure enough it is not the principal factor leading to the MEL incident. However the MFF concept with models with such a variety in performance, number of engines, fuel tanks, system and checklist variations simply increases the risk of a stuff up. The statements of the pilots concerning the acceleration feel is quite symptomatic.

The MFF concept is very integrated in the Airbus philosophy, therefore my criticism.

If you do not know anything, please do not post!
If you have flown an A340/500, do post.

This thread is probably started by some one having a grudge against Emirates to re-open the deep wound just about to be forgotten.

It is more than 2 year old history and any legal documents would be buried deep into the sand dunes.(2 years max safe keeping).

The rumor came from the epic-centre of the volcano in Dubai.

2 operational crews, 1 observer in cockpit.

Strangely, airmech had a better infor/rumor than the pprune here with rumors more than facts. That was 2 years ago.

Needed a longer runway? - Aircraft Engineers Bulletin Board

May be the engineer (airmech) is more down to earth (ground engineer) than the crews dreaming (flying) in the sky.

No,

Two operating crew, two augmenting crew in the cockpit. Would you like their names?

One of the problems associated with putting such an alerting system in place is that they would still require a human input into the system so that the nominal acceleration rate could be computed. It would still be possible to mis-program the FMGC to the point where the alert wouldn't be effective.

The best SOP I've seen to prevent such gross errors is an independent check by two or more crew members, where both do the calculation independently. In addition to comparing their computed results, the crew also must compare the calculated TOW with the one on the operational flight plan. Discrepancies must be investigated and resolved prior to takeoff.

Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wow

Which is also true of the "MFF" on various Boeings. Presently flying 6 variants of 777 with different weights/speed limits/engines and vastly different takeoff and landing speeds to boot.

Then there's the 757/767 rating and 737 variants.

Before I get flamed, I'll acknowledge the general systems commonality, but I don't believe that's an issue in this or similar incidents.

When you're tired, the obvious suddenly isn't so obvious after all.

You can drop the 'wow' - as we speak, just about every Emirates captain, and every FO as well, is clocking ~98 hours per month - and that's after "factoring".

Being SLF, I may be asking a stupid question, but what about a system that measures the position of the landing gear oleos and sounds an alarm if there's a significant discrepancy from the weight entered by the crew?

Try that in a mostly shorthaul environment - thats Nigeria!

Chu Chu,
In this event the erroneous weight was entered in the Electronic Flight Bag not in the Flight Management and Guidance System.

Acceleration?
 

It appears here that the problem is using a derived figure to calculate thrust based on aircraft mass and runway length.

Surely it's easier to enter known figures - runway length and local windspeed and direction - and let the thrust control system manage the accelleration to achieve a takeoff in the available runway?

This will handle all sorts of situations, such as mistaken TOW as well as factors such as rainfall.

but since when you are 100% sure that nobody will ever make a mistake in correct Rwy length ?
Besides the wind will certainly not wait for you to do a TakeOff in order to change itself..:ugh: