Visible from inside?

Over 4000 hours on the mighty triple seven and I can tell you that if I'd heard a loud bang with yaw then seen lots of status messages related to the same Engine then I most certainly would RTB all things considerered.

For gods sake it's a TWIN.

In my experience with the 777 if the CMC/ACMS told you something was wrong it usually was......unlike the AB. :{

We are not TEST PILOTS people and our Passengers deserve our good judgement and experience and this doesn't include RISK TAKING.

4000 hours and flying another type "twin Boeing jet", I fully agree with nitpicker330.

Why take any chance? Was commercial pressure a factor? SAT phone with direct connection to Maintenance control and/or flight ops can be helpful, or not.

At the end of the day, it's you the crew sitting up here with your passengers who makes the call.

And yes, I wouldn't mind explaining that in the office later on. Probably easier that trying to justify the other option (possible engine failure 1/2 way through the cruise in the middle of no where).

But hey, no judgment to the crew, I wasn't there. They landed safely after all.

Nitpicker, nowhere does it say there was a yaw, just a loud bang. That could come from a bird strike, tyre etc, not necessarily from an engine.
In recent years there have been a few cases of pieces falling off aircraft and none crashed. In many cases it was only discovered after landing at destination.
I wasn't there so cannot judge without all the FACTS.

Generally on the 777 if the TAC failed it was from a stall/surge on one of the Engines confusing the system so it shuts down!! Therefore one could possibly assume that there must have been some sort of Yaw during the "bang" event.

Bangs are NOT normal and one followed by a lot of Status messages should lead one to consider all is not well with your donk!!

TAC disconnect
 

Generally you are right but the TAC will also disconnect if an engine thrust data is lost. Engine EPR blanking in combination with some of those other status messages just might add up to that situation in which case no yaw.

however in principle I'm with you in that 'if it looks, feels and sounds like a fish.....then it's probably a fish' BUT i was not on the FD

I would have thought that all the 'experts' on this thread would have been aware that 'THRUST ASYM COMP' means the system has failed - not that it has operated as the reporter at Flight Global seems to think. :ok:

Lots of armchair theorists here.

Has anyone thought about the weather in DME? March can be pretty nasty.

Has anyone considered the option of continuing with enroute diversions available on better/cleaner runways if DME was contaminated?

There are a heap of variables here, and a lot of people who seem quick to jump in and condem.

If you would have done it differently, great. BUT you weren't there, neither was I.

-400 rated not 777, but looks like C1 EEC right engine failed then C2 struggled with the EPR possibly due to missing ducting, corrupted data I'm outta here resulting in EEC R which means N1 mode? no A/T therfore no TAC? Is there any action required for the left engine in this case? On the -400 with an EEC failed we have to drive all the remaining engines into N1 mode by turning off the EECs.

Speaking purely as an interested observer in all things PPRuNe, if those sitting at the sharp end are unable to agree about actions to be taken when fault advisories are annunciated from a FD, then does this not suggest that there is something wrong with the 'system'? If the end always justifies the means, then it would appear that the pilots made the correct decision, however had the same event(s) a decidedly different outcome, what course would discussions have proceeded along then?

sAx

It would have been much the same. 1 would have done this, 2 would have done that etc, etc.

sAx, there's more than one way to skin a cat.

...and more than one way of getting it wrong! My main point is that if events can rapidly degenerate to a total loss of control, why take the risk? As I implied, if this had produced a worse outcome, would you have agreed with the pilots decision to continue? What price skinning of the cat then?

Hold on. Who said anything about a loss of control! This was a series of STATUS messages (see previous posts), nothing to do with control OR engine failure.

Did you previously work for the News of the World?

But the status messages refer to an abnormal situation, therefore it is prudent to presume that things could deteriorate. It is up to the flight crew to correlate all available information. Based on the limited and incomplete information we have got right now, I won't judge the crew.

Yes the situation could deteriorate, but only as far as the loss of the use of that engine which is not life threatening. However this engine stayed running and there wasn't any indication that it would do otherwise.

IIRC another major European carrier had a very similar event coming out of China. Due to an unexpected increase in fuel burn by one engine they ended up not having enough to return to main base and diverted to somewhere in Europe only to find most of a reverser and all of the 'c' duct were missing on the higher fuel burn engine.

I guess different pilots have different thresholds for diverting but I can tell you that on a four engine boeing I have never diverted for a status message and I would be surprised if my 2 engine colleagues would have in this case. Of course the nature of the route, available diversion airfields enroute and the severity of the failures encountered play a part in the decision making process.

No yaw, no indications of engine vibration or loss of thrust. A shortish flight, with a route over land with good available diversion airfields enroute and no high msa's and a chat with engineering who have access to real time engine data the pilots can't see. I'd have a hard time criticizing the actions of this crew.

Obviously, a selection of messages peripheral to the No. 2 engine means that something potentially very serious is wrong in that area, affecting multiple components. Also, there is no way of determining possible collateral damage. Clearly if a sizable chunk of engne cowling has detached, there is no way of assertaing what else it hit on the way out and probably no way of being certain of the affected phases of flight to help hazzard a guess at what may also have been exposed.

Given the infomation presented thus far, choosing to continue was a very puzzling decision.

Nice try, but I 'm sure since your able to be as selective, that a degree of intelligence lurks behind your keyboard. The point highlighted was in reference to the likelihood of another potential outcome. I had (un)reasonably concluded that you might have been able to understand risk. Clearly not in your case! As to your latter point (re:NoW), I was never in possession of the necessary eloquence to ascribe to such a fold.

Something we do every day :) The assesment of risk is subjective. As I've said previously, I know what I would have done but that's not relevant. The risk was assessed by the crew on the day using information from various inputs and a decision was made.

Me neither. I was going to be a diplomat but failed the :mad: exams :}

No, it is fact based and thus objective. The response to risk is subjective.

It seems to me that some incredibly clever men - the engineers and designers at Boeing and Rolls Royce - put an incredibly large number of hours into coming up with a system that would give crews fair warning of a technical situation requiring crew action. Those same smart people, with a commercial product to sell to airlines - airlines with a primary mission of getting passengers to their destinations safely and if possible, without UNNECESSARY delay, came up with a system that advised crews of any degradation to their aircraft's (usually triply redundant) systems that did NOT require crew action.

During my training on the 777, it was stressed that we should not try to outguess the systems - and definitely not act upon any status message. Status messages are just that, STATUS messages, which, translated for those who need translation, means "a syatem (or systems) is (or are) not operating at 100%, but we, the men who designed this aircraft, after many hours of careful consideration and with many, many hours of deliberation - and much, much more information than you, the operating crew (and the Monday morning quarterbacks) can ever hope to have available to you - have come to the conclusion that those systems haven't degraded to the point where crew action is necessary".

If a crew found themselves departing their home port bound for an outport that provided less technical support or spares than the home port did, (or if the problem seemed to indicate that the aircraft might be AOG for as considerable time), it would be entirely reasonable, if, after consultation with maintenance and operations, the crew elected to return to base. In such circumstances, that decision would be primarily commercial, and I can see no problem with that.

Like 99% of others who've posted here, I don't have all the information on this incident, but from the limited information I've seen here, and with 12 years as a captain on the 777 behind me, I can't see that the crew did anything wrong.

I am not technically competent to be able to question the decision making process behind any PF/PNF on any given day, however I do wonder had there been a negative outcome, would the decision to continue have received similar support. Whilst response to such questions are axiomatic, it is difficult to comprehend how interpretation of the same 'system event' reporting degradation in control logic on a modern aircraft, would have some continue and some return.

sAx_R54

Personally, I’ve had a single medical assessment that was interpreted differently by two aviation doctors leading to two diverse assessments. I suppose if more doctors were brought in, there would be even more opinions leading to different outcomes. How can one set of ‘numbers’ lead to different interpretations in an applied science?
In the spirit of education (mine!) as a young pilot I would present various scenarios to the Captain . Invariably, the answer would be “well, that depends ….” What followed was a long discussion on what would encourage the best outcome for my contrived scenario.
Every pilot will accumulate as much information as possible before deciding on a course of action. Unfortunately, most decisions have to be made despite the lack of the information available to those reading about it! The course of action becomes a continuing re-assessment depending on the information as it becomes available. What you’re reading in these threads are the assessments of each individual based on their own experience as bits of information become known.

I believe that it was a piece of the inner honeycomb structure in the tail cone of the engine that departed the engine, and caused some minor damage to the thrust reversing system.

As has been pointed out by a number of posters in this thread, the status messages were just that - status messages - not warnings or instructions to land the plane immediately, and the crew acted accordingly. Also, MCC were well aware of the situation and monitored the aircraft the whole time to a safe landing.

No-one was in any immediate danger, and the crew, together with MCC did a superb job in handling this minor incident in a professional manner.

Enough said..!

I agree with wizofoz - and I wouldn't be surprised if MCC and the crew had a fair idea of what sort of failure had produced the symtoms.
Off topic slightly (and no implyed criticism); when I used to fly this route there actually weren't many airports between Moscow and Tbilisi that weren't NOTAMed unsuitable for various vague reasons. In fact sometimes the dispatcher issued an ETOPs OFP. Has this changed?

@CanadaKid @Desert Dawg Your final points are well founded. So this tale at least has demonstrated that the end does justify the means, as no harm resulted and all was well.

Therefore considering the points made in the #1 post, the material facts (hopefully not from the NoTW), suggest these in conclusion:

So had these items been MEL, I wonder how many would be happy to set take-off thrust and race towards the horizon of V1, safeguard in the knowledge that advisory only annunciations would continue after they had climbed above 400ft!

Inspiring safety?? Maybe!!

Thanks to all for your considered comments.

The problem with this - in ANY airplane - is that the information available might not reveal the complete picture. Having met Murphy on several occasions, I can tell you that I would have not continued the flight (based on the limited info given).

Other (very delicate) question that comes into mind is does EK put any whatsoever pressure on their crews to bring an aircraft back into base? Having worked for various US and UK companies I have always felt a certain vibe from engineering to bring the plane back to base... :suspect:

Several status messages on the right engine. Yeah that will be the old 2m squared of engine cowling missing problem, there was a company notam about that couple months ago.

MCC monitoring real time
 

Anybody who fully trust MCC's analyses of the real time readings from their onboard maintenace computer probably live in an unreal world!

Read this from another thread :

Having said that there was no reason compelling reason for the crew to make an ATB to SVO. However I am confident the crew would have consulted MCC and Dispatch for all the relevant information and would have in their heads plans B, C and D in case something really went wrong. Multiple status messages are real cause for concern but no need for immediate crew action. However the crew had better brush up on their systems information/knowledge to be prepared to deal with highly possible inflight failures associated with those status messages. To just pay little attention them just because no pilot actions were required for status messages would be plain foolish.

They heard a loud bang "during takeoff". Pieces from the aircraft were recovered within the airport perimeter showing that they heard the bang before they had traveled 5 miles or 2 minutes. And they can't return to the airport to assess an obvious problem? It would have resulted in only a short delay. But I suspect that they wouldn't have departed again in that same aircraft.

Closer to the truth than you might think! Not that uncommon for bits to come off and damage wiring to (in this case non-critical) components.
When I worked there my experience was that the company was fairly supportive when dealing with events.

The frequency of bits coming off may be one thing, the potential for a rapidly degenerating condition may be another. It is clear from reading many of the threads in this Forum SpainAir Madrid, AF447, BA038, AA Kingston JA, Fedex Tokyo,that there are many unknowns and fewer known unknowns for even the most experienced and competent of pilots. Many of the 'nervous chattel' seated towards the rear of the composite/alloy matrix tube are not aware of this and instead think a system operated and managed through several dependencies e.g. ATC, Re-fueling, Maintenance, Engineering design and construction, cargo handling, weather forecasting and not least the peak of the ice-berg, those who release the parking brakes, would do nothing but apply the precautionary principle, where there is the remotest doubt about any unknown.

From my analysis which is restricted by cursory knowledge of aviation, rapid degeneration can give a pilot(s) an extremely narrow window in which to make the correct decision and execute a recovery plan. Thread drifting slightly to illustrate this point (see T-Tail deep stall - Deep Stall), the pilots had less than 2mins to act upon the information they were receiving and make the correct decision. Sadly, they were unable to so by the time the CVR stopped recording.

So for the avoidance of any doubt, the packed sardine like 'chattel' in the rear, would rather not be used as flying guinea pigs and would prefer a firm 'decline' from the twin peaks in front, where there is any doubt in data emitted from these highly contiguous systems. Whilst this is easy for me to say in the anonymity of the PPRuNe Forum, I recognise that those that have a passion for flying heavy metal would like to remain employed and not have to succumb to the wrath of their managers. However they (you) should not be afraid to stand by that which you believe is correct on whatever day you choose to exercise such judgment. The 'chattle' in the back will appreciate it as they will have survived to join the contiguous aviation system on another day and more importantly so will your family, who will be spared the rhetorical management line, of what a great servant to aviation you had been.

Apologies to those who think I have spent in excess of my $0.02c.

Any pictures?
 

Browsed briefly through thread - didn't see any link to picture(s).

Are there any out there? :confused:

Which is a good reason to work in the West and belong to a strong union.

You don't stop on a dark one lane road at night for every noise you hear in your car.

Decision making involves assessment and balancing of risks.

Armchair quarterbacking may be fun but it has no validity

Once upon the pilots use to contact engineering with satcom ,
now maybe , same machinery, is used by management to contact pilots.

Premier league would be a more appropriate analogy than NFL from these shores, so maybe midfield maestro!

No pilot would have accepted the plane for flight dispatch in the same condition that it landed. And no pilot aware that the status annunciation related to a 3.7m2 piece of missing aircraft would have continued the flight. So if that is correct, the question remains as whether safety was compromised to satisfy the bean counting champions of Smithsonian economics.

Sax,

I disagree.

Yes a chunk of reverse duct had fallen off.

But the aircraft was airborne, and at some point was going to have to descend and land. That descent and landing were not going to be any more risky in Dubai than in Moscow.

Therefore, the only saftey related question was, was it any less safe to cruise for five hours before making the inevitable descent and landing?

The damage was done, parameters were stable, and there was no sign that the situation was deteriorating. What is it you envisage might have happened in cruise that might have led to an unsafe outcome, bearing in mind the aircraft had numerous diverion options en-route HAD anything gotten worse?

Which ones are the diversion options/ alternates on this route? Is the route going through Kazakhstan, or Iran, others?

Down through Azerbajan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE.

Non-Etops, so never more than 420NM from an Adequate, though in this case, never more than 45 minutes from a company designated Alternate.