My 2p worth.

I think we operate modern aircraft much closer to the edge of the performance envelope than we used to with first or second generation jets. Modern jets fly higher, further, carry more payload, for less fuel than ever before. The whole sale installation of computers and the increase in computing power has made this possible. The aircraft need to be flown with much more accuracy than ever before to achieve the required performance, where 1 or 2 knots could make all the difference.

This step change in aircraft performance has, however, not been followed up with a change in pilot training. Everything is fine while the computers are working correctly, however its only when things start going wrong that the pilots realise just how close to the edge of the performance envelope they are. And being able to handle a big jet aircraft at the edge of its envelope while stuff is going wrong around you is not something civilian pilots are trained for.

It is the training that needs to change not the aircraft.

When I converted to a 3rd generation jet about 3 years ago, one of the first things the instructor said was "its impossible to stall this aircraft". Well tell that to the crew of the Air France 330. That phrase still plays on my mind every time I look at the Unreliable Air Speed QRH checklist.

Why would there be no need for training in hand flying above FL 300?

In AF447, the PF was given the aircraft, as the computer gave up, to hand fly at about FL 350 (from my memory – can’t easily check at present).

Nothing in the thousands of posts on the various AF447 threads, nor anything in the BEA reports AIUI, shows that PF (or PNF for that matter) had ever hand flown at high altitude, for real or in a simulator, at Mach 0.8 or 0.82; nor at slow, close to stall speed at high altitude; and certainly not at a high AoA in a stall.

PF’s movements with the side stick shortly after the incident started caused the PNF to try to persuade him to use less coarse movements and be gentler, which again suggests little or no training in hand flying at high speed and high altitude.

The graphic on one of the AF447 threads shows SS movements described by some as “mixing mayonnaise”, and included pitch commands as well as roll. People have speculated why he ever commanded nose up in the first place, to climb from FL 350 to about 380 – but a very early poster suggested it might have been inadvertent, while trying to do coarse roll inputs. Nobody made a better suggestion that I saw.

PF’s references to “crazy speed” and his persistent holding nose up suggested to some that he confused mach buffet with pre- stall buffet, and high noise with high speed rather than high AoA, which kept him thinking all the way down that he had an overspeed problem.

In my own limited sphere of aviation, I have long been concerned at accidents that happen because “we” thought we were training people well enough, but some accidents showed we were not – people had forgotten, or not known in the first place, things we thought we had taught well. To that, I fear we can add things people thought did not need any tuition – like what being in a fully developed a stall is like, and how to recover from it by hand flying, in an “unstallable” airliner.

(no experience of flying airliners, but interested in safety and training in GA, particularly gliding.)

Very funny! :ok:

For those who might actually have serious doubts regarding a pilots ability to "hand fly" PRNAV, RNAV1 procedures or RNP1 route segments with or without FD guidance:

It's really not that challenging folks. It's just basic instrument flying proficiency. You control bank so as to control heading so as to control course so as to keep the CDI centered. You control attitude and thrust so as to control altitude and speed. Basic stuff learned in the beginning. It's not that demanding. If you maintain your skills that is. When over reliance on automation takes hold, then confidence in your own abilities decreases. Greater reliance on automation results. The insidious cycle of over dependence is perpetuated. Pretty soon even experienced and formerly skilled pilots find themselves rationalizing their dependence on "the magic" as being "normal". A great many airlines and other organizations actively support these excuses with policies and directives encouraging or requiring such reliance. An ill advised approach and a case of throwing out the baby with the bath water in my considered opinion.

It's been my personal experience as an instructor and former check airman on bizjets that hand flying these procedures is one of the few opportunities available to exercise the instrument scan and aircraft control skills associated with basic instrument flying proficiency. The airline arena must surely provide even fewer opportunities.

Sim time doesn't cut it. Owing to cost and scheduling considerations, sim time is cut to the bone and practicing for a few minutes every 6 months is entirely insufficient to maintain basic skills. This can only be done in the airplane on regular flights. In any case the bulk of sim time is reserved for operations which either cannot be done in the airplane or would be highly cost ineffective.

Again according to my own personal observation and experience, those who regularly utilize their basic instrument skills tend to be among the more proficient pilots overall. They handle the airplane with greater precision and smoothness in all phases of flight. While any reasonably tech conscious trained individual can memorize rote procedures and learn which buttons to press in order to cause the automation to execute programmed procedures, not every individual has gained sufficient overall and recency of experience at using lesser levels of automation to develop or maintain the required level of proficiency. Losing use of the autopilot should not be considered to be such a big deal as so many seem to think.

While mastery of the automation is also necessary in today's flight environment, it does not stand alone as a method of safely and efficiently conducting flights. Whether it's fly-by-wire or not, inappropriate automation dependence will continue to be a factor in accidents unless attitudes are modified. Nor are these skills mutually exclusive. In fact they are complimentary. A more balanced approach to the use of automation is clearly necessary given the evidence I've seen.

It should go without saying that proficiency at all levels of automation use is the ideal. As pointed out by others, the appropriate level should be utilized in consideration of workload and weather. Whether it's a nice day in ideal conditions or a tight approach in crap weather at the end of a long day, the situation demands some command judgment in selecting which level of automation is most appropriate. I'm just advocating for basic proficiency being one of the things considered when deciding.

Opinions may vary, but I like to think that most pro pilots believe as I do that better pilots produce better results. And just as an aside, I consider myself to be just as vulnerable to the insidious effects of automation dependence as anyone else. It takes considerable introspective awareness and self discipline to keep stock of and maintain one's own skills. It doesn't help when the system works counter to these objectives by encouraging complacency.

Automation
 

I personally feel that a lot of sensible things have been said on this thread. All accidents are being blamed on automation and lack of flying skills when the actual reasons for the accidents have been failures that went unnoticed.
Incase of the Turkish Airlines, the malfuntion in the Radio Altimeter led to the Auto throttle failure which should have been monitored especially when there was a training Captain on board.It was a failure to monitor the Flight Mode Annunciators.Also probably lack of knowledge. The event lasted a long time with the speed decaying.
The stall recovery procedures, wind shear escape manouvres, EGPWS Warning ,TCAS manouvres and upsets should be mandatory procedures and included in Simulator checks. The simulator time needs to be increased and taken more seriously. I have observed that a lot of times the crews reduce their 4 hour slots to practically 03 effective hours especially during graveyard shifts in order to get back to catch up on sleep or make it the nearest bar for Happy hours!These 4 hours were good enough in the old times when all the above manouvres were not included. Also hand flying approaches during line checks and inflight monitoring by Instructors and Examiners is not a bad idea ...although an unpalatable one for a lot of us.

Denti and Westhawk,

So you may be flying manually but you still have "computer" guidance then!

Presumably you are both flying Bizjets?

Actually, just a normal 737NG. And of course you have computer representation for RNAV navigation (actually, for everything except an ILS), hardly possible to do it raw data if it's not an overlay procedure. But that is not the point, the point is that it is perfectly possible to keep your basic manual flying skills up while doing your everyday job.

westhawk explained it very well. Automation is good as long as the pilot doesn't need it because of his lack of basic flying skills. The only way to maintain those basic flying skills is to practice them in the airplane when conditions are right. We all know the sim check is filling the squares with 10 minutes at the end to play.

I always flew up to 10,000 and down from 10,000 manually and so did most of my FO's in a 757. If you give up your basic skills to let the autopilot do it for you, you have given up as a pilot, and have let your employer take over your career for good. Don't let that happen to you. Yes, they can hire cheap pilots with low experience to fly with automation but what happens when the automation fails? How many more examples do we have to show everybody?

Denti

Thanks for the explanation as it is now clearer what you mean. The problem is there are some big jets that do not have that presentation and there are also a lot of procedures that have no overlay.

pulling back on the yoke during the stall
 

on the matter of why the AF 447 Crew as well as the Buffalo crash Crew desperately and incessantly pulled back on their yoke in a stall rather than simply jamming the yoke forward as they should have and as one is taught in the primary aspect of flight training, I offer this to ponder:

During my initial training, I was taught to recover from the stall by pushing forward on the yoke. Back then, in the "practice area" in the good old Skyhawk, you weren't "busted" for losing some altitude in order to recover from the stall. The objective was simply to recover before hitting the ground, of course minimizing the altitude loss, but that was secondary in consideration to breaking the stall. But throughout my decades of advanced initial and recurrent training, in order to comply with "training objectives" or "practical test standards" or pedantic check airmen and examiners, I was admonished not to lose a single foot of altitude during a simulated stall, for fear of "busting the ride". Certainly if I am on short final or immediately after departure, not losing a single foot in a stall would be of the essence. But when one is at altitude, then I would rather lose a few thousand feet if necessary and break the stall rather than hopelessly yank back on the yoke in the desperate hope that I might somehow maintain my altitude with application of power alone.

We are thus creating pilots who in real scenarios revert to simulator mentality of desperately trying not to lose a single foot, or achieving some other arbitrary standard of measurement rather than simply use up some of the ample altitude they have and trade it for airspeed in order to egress from the stall and recover. The objective has become "don't lose a single foot" during the check ride and don't dare "bust an altitude" in real life, rather than reinforcing what should be the real objective, which is to stay alive at all costs, and in the process, try to minimize damage to equipment if that is possible.

Just my thoughts. In any case, though there has been much success in increasing safety due to automation, the pendulum needs to swing back the other way a little, and allow pilot involvement in the art of flying airplanes once again. It's essential, because as we all know, that when the s**t hits the fan, then the Autopilot and Autoland and computers by the dozen are of very little help.

dc10

Howdy. 447's pilots were familiar with a "recovery" at the time they crashed, that was from "Approach to Stall". This does NOT involve PUSHING FORWARD on the 'YOKE' (Stick). Neither does it require "PULLING BACK" on the Stick. Required is "Maintenance of Altitude." Clearly, the pilot pulled back on his Sidestick, it is in the report.

Why? There are reasons NOT addressed here, that may have played a part. It is not completely understood, and especially in light of the minimal data released, an open mind might be a handy tool.



Why this is yet unclear is a mystery. These pilots were not familiar, nor had they been trained, to recover from STALL in this aircraft.

And that is for the most part, irrelevant. As per rudderrrat, an uncorrected ROLL may have led to a spin, and an even earlier demise.

This accident happened in a sequence, and focusing on downline issues is not helping understand what happened in the 20 seconds surrounding the loss of autopilot, (and AoA Vane #1?)

Is it absolutely necessary to keep up the comparison to ColganAir?

Well I think one of these systems must be in order on the new computerized third generation aircraft being flown by the new third generation pilots. :ok::E

http://t1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:A...CpYsGa026Epifg

Good points dc10.

In addition to the "don't lose any altitude" mentality imposed during sim training, the stall recognition and recovery demos also tend to be under what I'd categorize as "overly favorable circumstances" to begin with. First, they're usually performed at 10-15K' and at light "training weight" where engine thrust to weight ratio invariably allows the airplane to be "blown" out of an incipient stall with the nose up 10 or more degrees. Typical pilot response times to first stall warning indication are very quick when the demo is fully briefed and hands are tensed on the yoke and T/Ls, ready to react. It seems to me that real world stall events aren't so well planned!

The induced drag associated with flight at or near CL max is easily overcome in a lightly loaded jet at low altitude. This is highly unlikely to prepare a pilot for a more real-world incipient stall event, let alone a more developed stall or while at at max cruise altitude.

Unfortunately, the sim probably won't have reliable data for AOA beyond critical values so training in that regime would be impractical. But I think that after practicing the demo at low or mid altitude, it might be instructive to try
it again at near maximum altitude, perhaps while simulating a climb into warmer air or an increasing tailwind component with the AP engaged and "nobody minding the store". When the AP lets go, you'll see your trade of altitude for airspeed or you'll see something which would be marked as a failure to recover. Either way it would be most instructive. I thought this matter should have been settled following the Pinnacle "four-one-oh-it dude" episode.

The forgoing represents my personal experience at each of the major bizjet training providers in three different types. I'd be interested in comparing how airline sim training treats stall demos.

westhawk

chrisN.
l`m surprised that nobody picked up on what you said, l suspect because of the reference to "mainly gliding".
We are talking about hand flying skills after all.
You will know of the K23 - for others, a first solo glider advertised as being unstallable - and the problems caused by pilots going on to fly "gliders" that could and would stall.
l don`t want to make a big thing of this but there is a connection.

I think now we allow some altitude loss to recover from a stall that doesn't involve wind shear near the ground to do what we did 40 years ago and lower the nose and add power. It is so simple and works so well.

40 years ago this accident wouldn't have happened because we all knew how to fly. Now It is a different story.

Overrun, yes, and there are other examples.

Another thing that strikes me about AF447 training for (lack of) is push for stall recovery. In gliding, we realised that for donkeys years we had taught that push means nose down/go faster, pull for nose up/go slower, for probably 90% of training flights for the entire sortie; and even for the stall/spin awareness training flights, only a tiny proportion of the time was showing that in a stall, pull does not yield nose up.

There is a move towards demo and practice on every pre-solo flight that when too slow, pull keeps nose down; and then push will get the aircraft flying again.

Clearly, if AB330 is believed unstallable, and training for it never goes there, only other training if any will have any chance of teaching F/Os about this. Will they recall it in a high stress situation? There is enough evidence that too many ATPL’s. at many levels, not just low hours, have not known or recalled it - Colgan, Staines Trident, and various others. The training for recovery from approaching stall described by others on these AF447 threads included TOGA power and not losing “a foor of height” – but only in lowish altitude recoveries, where air is dense, TOGA gives a lot of extra power AIUI, and it can work.

I too don’t want to make a big thing about gliding read-across to CAT. But human factors read across all accident scenarios, in aviation and elsewhere. We humans don’t always work perfectly. The right training, and frequent reinforcement, can overcome many of our deficiencies. If we don’t get that training, is it a deficiency in the trainees, or in their training organisations (and those who lay down what the latter should be doing)?

Chris N.
(written before I saw Bubbers post)

bubbers nw6231 did happen 40 years ago and the pilots pulled back on the stick in a stall just as on AF447. It wasn't an A330 though it was a 727.

This point comes up again and again in various posts, in an attempt to explain why stalls are not trained in the simulator. But I keep asking myself, is it really a valid reason?

Yes, I understand that no one has ever test flown the big jets in stall regimes and the exact numbers are not available. But we know what should happen, we know the direction where thing should be going when the pilot just keeps pulling the stick, and we can replicate this behaviour in a simulator. Yes, it will drop at a somewhat incorrect speed, some nasty effect may be overlooked, some extreme situations like going down at 60 knots with AOA 40 degrees will not be covered. But that is not the point - the idea is to provide the pilot with a training/evaluation tool that responds to clearly incorrect inputs (stick back) in a generally realistic manner (airspeed drops, cabin shakes, controls don't work, aircraft goes down) and requires basic corrective measures (stick forward) to fly again.

Wouldn't such a crude tool be better than having no tool at all, relying on mantras that "this aircraft cannot stall", on "computer protections", and a manual stall recovery procedure that is never trained in realistic conditions?

I agree ap08! :ok:

And said as much further down in the post you quoted from IIRC. :cool:

As a cross country glider pilot I have experienced the great contribution to our sport made by the significant numbers of commercial pilots flying in our ranks.

Maybe this relationship could work both ways.

I agree, and yet disagree with all of this, these "modern airplanes" are designed to be "flown" (operated) at the highest level of automation as is consistent with the phase of flight, to be monitored and managed.....however when the wheels come off, then the workload is increased exponentially....so while the regulators are finger pointing at the pilots, they also should be looking at aircraft design and redundancy....it amazes me the long list of inop systems that arise on the status page after what should be relatively benign failure....these didn't use to affect the aircraft handling, but now.....????:ooh:

What really interests me in this discussion is what the button-pushers are going to do when, one night, they turn up for work and are presented with an aeroplane that they might actually have to fly because it has no working autopilots or FDs for example. (This has happened to me but I only had to do 5 sectors at night before it got fixed).

They then consult the MEL looking for an excuse not to go and discover that the MEL says they can go.

The passengers want to get to their destination.

The management want the passengers to get to their destination.

So are you now going to admit that you can't actually fly the aircraft to any competent standard and refuse to go?

If so, how can you call yourself a professional pilot?

I know that if you are using at least one of the usual modern-day excuses not to practise your basic art such as "the passengers won't like it", then some of you are quite likely to end up in deep sh*t one day. You are fooling yourself if you think you can ace it when it all goes wrong and your entire poling experience actually consists of 250 hours on a Cessna 150.

Most of all, speaking as a professional pilot who stayed alive and never hurt a passenger for half a century, how can you actually live with yourself?

I couldn't and I never did.

JW411, reminds me of a time when I was stuck in an airliner on the tarmac for 3 hours somewhere in China. The captain repeatedly said he couldn't continue to our destination due to weather issues. An irate passenger starts screaming in the cabin threatening to sue the airline for potential losses to his business schedule. So the airline organises another captain who promptly announces he is able to continue. I was paxing as part of a delegation and it wasn't up to me to decide whether to go or not.

At least I survived to tell the tale. Should I criticise the first captain for being a coward or the second captain for being a fool ?

If you remember the date and time and origin and destination, then one might try to look up the weather and see if it was bad enough to delay the flight. Otherwise there is no way to answer your question...

The remedy
 

From a local field known for airplanes with wood, fabric, and tailwheels:

Lee Bottom Flying Field is announcing the first ever "Teach an Airline Pilot to Fly" Day. Held everywhere in America, on September 17th, this day will be an occasion where taildragger pilots nation wide share the knowledge of basic flying skills with their airline buddies.

After years of making it impossible for airline pilots to keep their flying skills up to par and encouraging the expansion of 141 schools with their process-over-skills approach to flight training, the FAA and NTSB believes airline pilots are "forgetting" the basic skills they once had or were never taught. This day was created to address that concern.

If you know an airline pilot who has forgotten more than the FAA or NTSB will ever know, please show your concern for them with this gift of basic flying skills. Your contribution will go a long way towards saving these wayward aviators.

(Note: FAA regulations may prohibit you from participating in this event. If you are not an FAA certified flight instructor, you may not be smart enough to demonstrate basic flying skills to another pilot. Although, despite having forgotten everything he or she ever knew, if the airline pilot is a certified flight instructor with a distant tailwheel sign off, the flight may be legal.)

You as a paying passenger should not have a worry in the world that the crew are highly qualified to look after you and should have no concerns.

Nowadays, I think we are involved in a lottery and I am very happy that I have discovered the joys of cruising on large ships.

Let's face it, we didn't lose too many Titanics!

Did we?

After many years of flying Twin Beaches, twin Cessnas and dozens of other aircraft single pilot with no autopilot IFR being dispatched with a B737 with no autopilot and an FO to handle the radio and checklist was a cakewalk. From what I read here it can't be done any more. Tell me this is not true.

Automation and Handling
 

Just for the record, I have 13k+ hours, mostly military and shorthaul plus training with a major airline. I converted to the B757 virtually at its introduction and was delighted to find a flight director which was actually of benefit (as opposed to the extraordinary instrument which used to dance all over ones AH). My colleagues and I were extremely skeptical of a TV presentation as opposed to the old steam driven panel but we were converted almost overnight.
At my next sim check, the awful truth struck home. F/D was turned off and A/T was available only at the training captain’s whim. Bearing in mind that these had only been an occasional addition up to the conversion (only 6 months previously), the abrupt degradation of my (and the other crew member’s) skills was an appalling eye-opener and one which I have impressed just AS HARD AS I CAN on the younger generation I have had the honour to try to teach. I have always begged them to turn off both F/D and A/T at least once a week (captain permitting –and I hope he would) and also to practice non-precision approaches as often as vis permits. I know that modern teaching rather sidelines NDB’s etc, but there are plenty of strange (to our Authority) parts of the world where such approaches are very necessary. Without an instinctive knowledge of how to conduct (and maybe even, heaven forfend, actually FLY) such an approach, disaster will soon bite your b@m!
Happy handling, Prober

@bubbers, of course you can still dispatch a 737 with an inop autopilot. You just can't enter RVSM as you need automatic altitude holding capability. So everything up to FL280 (in europe) is fair game.

@Prober, flying a non precision approach is nowadays exactly the same as an ILS, both in presentation and basic procedures on the 737. Read up on IAN which i believe is also standard in the 748 and 787. Apart from that i can't agree more. Regular manual flying is the only way to keep basic flying skills up, and i'm grateful that my companies OPS manual recognizes that and promotes raw data manual flight.

Sadly most airlines now aren't in favor of pilots flying without the FDs and A/Ts...the SOP is to use the automation to the fullest to achieve the most economical and efficient operation. God forbid if there is a FOQA and it is found that the pilot had been operating non SOP by not using the automation to the fullest. Most chief pilots are now yellow bellied fellas who are not going to risk supporting any line captains who run into trouble with their f/os inadvertantly making some excursions ( whether related or unrelated ) through not using the automatics.

I may have mentioned this before.....

IF you hire people with no experience at all in airplanes, you CAN train them to very high standards. The military does it all the time in some countries. Some airlines do it quite well.

BUT:
If you chose your candidates based on intangibles such as docility (ie doing what they are told and not being a s*** stirrer), who their parents are, ethnic background (OUR airline is piloted by kids from OUR country), or a past that involves no problems at all - in other words, the candidate has never learned risk assessment

AND:

You train (and haze) them for 300 hours in a 172, put them through an intense GROUND school, and then stick them in the right seat of a B777 or other large airplane.

Do not allow them to make cross wind landings.

Use a fear based program so that they are terrified of making mistakes, so much so that when they near Captain upgrade they decline landings.

Give them 10 years of twiddling the heading knob on inter-continental flights hand-flying perhaps 5-6 minutes on each of their legs - maybe an average of 3 per month. You figure how much actual flying time that gives them.

Fire them if anything happens.

Never let them fly with the autothrottles off.

THEN:
Upgrade them to Captain and give them an equally well qualified FO.

What do you think is going to happen the night an engine tanks on a winter Pacific Rim flight when the only en-route alternate is some windswept, desolate, and forbidding ice-covered Siberian "airport"?

The only option is to continue to destination because neither pilot can hand-fly the aircraft. Don't think it hasn't happened.

@Plectron

you got it!

... and this will be the only good reason to get rid of us (or at least one of us) and to remotely control/monitor the airplane from any GCS (Ground Control Station).

A/T and A/P on??? Oh, no, for the last 24 yrs, for some funny reason, the A/P disengagement seems to trigger the A/T disengagement. :ok:

Trying to solve the problem not blame!
 

Having just read the whole of this thread, I must say that a few years of stick and rudder commercial flying would be so advantageous for all pilots before jumping into a modern airliner.

I myself have been flying the stick out on the dark continent for several years and I am currently (and still) attempting to make it into the airline industry, mainly for stability and the better assurance of a paycheck each month.

Many pilots out here (and other places similar) manage to fly unautomated machines into some of the worst weather on the planet without the aid of WXradars and other equipment and encounter problems and emergencies frequently. NDB approaches are common for annual checks and I myself only the other day did a couple because I felt like it.

This is not an ego post or looking for sympathy but to show there are still pilots carrying out this work before making the 'jump up'. It is not directed at anyone either.

I find it shocking that worldwide there are programmes inplace putting fresh pilots from school into the RHS of a automated jet. I remember the day I got my CPL and being told its a license to learn. Well there hasn't been much learning for many pilots in that case (in terms of stick and rudder). :eek:

However some of us stick and rudder guys are frowned upon when applying for jobs in the airline field as we don't have '1000 hours on type' or '2000 hours greater than 20 tonnes'. I actually find this quite insulting. By the end of say a TR course and eventually been released to the line, there is little differnce between someone like myself and a newbie CPL aprt from one thing. My manual skills and will be much more honed and refined than the latter, and when s**t hits the fan, I know which one I would trust more.

So to sum it up I completely agree that more effort needs to go into manual flying training and personally believe every pilot should go and actually FLY for a while before hitting the big birds . If your company doesn't allow this then next time you find yourself on leave, why not go and rent a 152 (maybe take the wife or kids too for fun) and go get some stick practice. If the airline doesn't want to be responsible then YOU must be. At the end of the day if something goes wrong up there you might find it could save your life and everyone elses.

This is just my opinon and not intended for any slanging matches. :ok:

Jw411

Good point

I once showed up late for an early EDI-CDG-EDI as I 'd crashed me car.#

Our illustrious Capt (I was a humble FO) said 'no worries, we ain't going anyways as the AP is u/s' "anyways" he says " you've been in a crash"

We flew the sectors by hand and it was no problemo (ERJ-145)

Jack - I suggested that many times- politely phrased, of course. Something like: Next time you go on vacation why not go to Arizona or Florida and get a check-out in a C180 or a 310 instead of buying another $15,000 watch or treating yourself to all that expensive "entertainment" on overnights? You might just save your job or even your life some day...

Zero interest. They thought I was out of my mind.

This problem is not really as hard to solve as some believe, except getting the airlines to go along with it and to put up the cash to fund it.

TacomaSailor is dead on correct. As an IT professional for over 30 years, I've participated in automating a number of different physical processes (including some aviation processes), and his description of skills erosion due to automation could not have been stated more succinctly, and this clearly applies to aviation as well.

Pilot's are being trained to understand and respond to the automation system's hardware and software that they manage, but not enough training is being provided for the pilot to understand and correctly operate the "physical-ware" the automation is controlling. In my opinion if you don't understand and can't operate the physical-ware, you don't really understand the automation system controlling it either.

The solution lies is the airlines owning a very small fleet of low cost (to acquire and operate) suitable aircraft, where line pilots can hand fly and practice various hand flying skills such as stall prevention, stall recovery, upset recovery, and high altitude work to name a few. These aircraft could also allow some basic interaction and failure mode training between various on-board automation systems and the physical-ware of the aircraft. This would keep the hand flying skills current, and unexpected systems and physical-ware interactions specific to a type could then be practiced in that type's sim. In other words, the low cost aircraft would focus training mainly on hand flying the physical-ware and some basic automation failure interactions, while a type's sim would focus training mainly on that type's specific system failure modes and aircraft interactions.

Getting the airlines to go along with this kind of solution and funding it is the hard part of this solution.

Aviator Jack
Great post.

The last thing our recruiters want is actual 'stick and rudder' guys.

In fact, the less their pilots fly the plane, the happier they are.

Remember this at your interview.

Flight Safety is correct. The automation is not understood. The FOs are landing in crosswinds, albeit using "outside procedures", with the Captain's acquiescence IF an autoland is made. The fact that the autoland feature is for low visibility and NOT strong & gusty crosswinds is not part of the "briefing". It isn't really necessary to say that that point will clearly be made by Boeing at the hearing.

Barbiesboyfriend,

If and when I get that interview, I will pledge not to touch a thing and in the event of an emergency let Mr Airbus (example, could be any manufacturer) take over my human and bush pilot instict to save my own bacon.

OR I could send a robot/android, a physical replica of myself of course, to do the interview for me. Infact I think I might stand a better chance that way.

A friend gave me something to think about last week. Burn all your logbooks, paperwork and change your name. Apply for a cadet program and then you might be in with a chance! :ok:

AJ, I retired 8 years ago at 60 and it wasn't that way then in my airline. We handflew a lot to be proficient at our jobs. We knew we couldn't trust the autopilot so when it threw us the airplane in a bank 100 ft above minimums we were not surprised but just recovered and landed the airplane. If you maintain your flying skills life is good, if you don't, good luck. Air France and others apparently don't agree with that logic.