Hi Nitpicker330,

I do not want to put you down in any way.
In training in the sim we all follow the QRH and get responses from the aircraftsystems as they should do. In real life time this can be totally different as in the books or sim. A heavy damaged aircraft can and will respont totally different than in the sim. The only way to know what was selected with the flaphandle is the flaphandle itself: the reaction of the system behind it depends on the integrety of the systems in the aircraft remains.

Really don't know what happended, investigation will reveal. The only thing I know is that a 800 or 900 on contaiminated runways are hard to slow down due to aquaplaning and a relatifly heavy aircraft on only 4 wheels. (like a 321)

apologize for my English grammar

I mean slats and flaps could have gone up after the a/c came to rest uncommanded and no conclusions can be made looking at the pictures.

@The Ancient Greek.
While I hope you are wrong, I have to admit I think you have it right.

Captain apologises for error in judgement...
 

Whatever you think mate. :ok:

The court case is still ongoing, and pretty much indicates the underlying attitude of Boeing to "excellence" of their product, instead of rectifying the fraudulent components and suing the supplier, they dismiss the 3 QA staff involved in uncovering the fraud and the safety issue.

So far there have been now 4 cases of B737NGs with these fraudulent parts that have broken up in a similar fashion. Coincidence? Perhaps, but the first fatality will come back to haunt Boeing I suspect.

Boeing's "Lipgloss on the Pig" re core values and ethics following their past ethical misbehaviour appears to be just that; gloss.

Hi fdr

I saw that Dateline program and I was horrified to see that this current accident involved the same type of structural failure at the joints described. However, I disagree with your terminology of "Lip gloss on the pig". I suggest that the term "bovine excrement" should be applied to the quality management system used for these parts.

As SLF, I will in future try to avoid three rows of seats each side of these splice joints.

good for you:ok:

and better for me, as I can select those seats that you leave open.

Considering that most survivable accidents that have a percentage of fatalities; those that are killed are because they are trapped in the aircraft long enough to be overcome by fire and smoke. While those that survive with only injuries are those that exit out a couple of feet drop through the breaks in the fuselage.

Of course I will admit that "if" there is no fire, most of the severe injuries are those that are exited out through the breaks in the fuselage.

Those are the breaks

and I will take my chances with living and hope to get seated next to one of those break joints :)

There's been a spate of similar accidents to this one over the last few years and I wonder how many of them are due to low fuel quantity, so many companies compelling and even forcing their pilots to operate with minimum fuel.

Arrive at destination with min. gas and it's hosing down, either divert quick-smart or take your chances in the rain.

Be interesting to know how much fuel was left at the end of the landing roll if I can call it that.

Min fuel?
 

Due to high cost of fuel in Georgetown it is standard policy to tanker enough fuel to return to home base without refuelling. I doubt that this was a case of not enough fuel. However it may have made a difference if the A/C had only uplifted enough fuel in POS for a one way trip. Just speculating.;):suspect:

Funny you say that. Remember the 737 that broke into three pieces upon landing around this time last year in a Colombian island? The same thing has been said; low fuel on board (no fire) and shooting the 3rd approach (SKSP alternates are Panama City and San Jose, Costa Rica). The Colombian CAA has said the investigation is complete and that they will be publishing the report soon. The accident was classified as CFIT due to approaching in really bad weather and as a contributing factor the "black hole approach"; loss of height appreciation due to lack of contrast.

dhardesthard -
Due to high cost of fuel in Georgetown it is standard policy to tanker enough fuel to return to home base without refuelling. I doubt that this was a case of not enough fuel. However it may have made a difference if the A/C had only uplifted enough fuel in POS for a one way trip. Just speculating.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/wink2.gifhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/cwm13.gif

With 154 passengers the amount of payload capacity available for 'tankering' fuel, before reaching max landing weight, is very limited.

I'd estimate the amount of fuel they could 'tanker/ferry' before reaching max landing weight is probably less than 6,000 lbs. Six thousand pounds is maybe 200'/65 meters)(?) extra landing roll.

Usually the alternate for GEO is POS, so they would have had to upload round-trip fuel anyway. The flight time POS-GEO is around an hour, so we're not talking a huge amount to tanker over required fuel. That said, they probably land close to or at max landing weight every time in GEO anyway with that pax load. We always did.

I can't believe it!!!

lomopaeso claims to be "able-bodied" and willing to jump out of any opening to escape, yet on the AA B-767 evacuation thread lomo professes to prefer to wait for the airstairs, a limo to the terminal, and a hot cuppa...give me a break...

misd-agin
 

Looking at the arial shots of the crash site on avherald the A/C seems to be less than 200ft/65metres beyond the end of the paved circuit. This could have been the DIFFERENCE that I referred to because of the tankered fuel. Again just speculating. Using your figure of 6000 lbs, that is a lot of weight for a 737 that is close to MLW into Georgetown for that particular landing.

not withstanding.
 

whatever the landing weight, whatever the tanker fuel, if the landing is legal, schedulable with the normal landing factors applied, the role of the crew is to deliver the aircraft at the scheduled weight to the TDZ. If conditions are such that they are unable to achieve those conditions they divert.... or they run off the end of the tarmac as demonstrated.

Correct there Teddy.
I was on a refresher course the other day where the matter of landing accidents was raised, and that these accidents are now more prevalent than controlled flight into terrain.

Our SOP's have gone exponential over the last 10 years but the latest amendment is to actually check the performance if the RWY LDA is less than a certain length, depending on type.

preliminary findings?
 

GUYANA-Pilot error

I know pilots 'are people too', but IF this is so, is it even possible for two airmen in what appears to be a fairly routine approach to not notice high speed and ultimately audible warnings? :confused: Surely there's more to it?

Pilot error?
 

How about a flap 30 landing after a long float resulting in a very late touchdown and subsequent overrun of the R/W. When the fuselage broke, a cable or rod activated the flaps and slats to retract.

IF it is pilot error what would interest me is why an experienced Captain could make such an error. Fatigue for instance?

That means nothing in the real world and is there to cover management if lawyers get into the act. Most of the over-runs seen on accident reports published on Pprune were on runways that were well within legal performance limits. The problem has always been the press on regardless mentality of some pilots linked to reckless flying, overconfidence and occasionally ethnic culture that relies on a personal Deity to save the day.

Centaurus

A little harsh but correct.

It's a little like automation. It aint the tool that's bad it's the interface that needs work.

Nevertheless PPRuners have a way of polarizing around human perfection and fouled up technology.

Something that is not normally trained for is a go-around after touchdown. One large American carrier is to begin training this on their 737 fleet. While not prohibited (most airlines teach only to stay on the ground after reverser deployment), very few pilots have been trained on this procedure and therefore not confident in doing it. Just think of how many overruns would have been eliminated with a go-around after touchdown.

One could never build performance charts for this event due to the number of variables (touchdown point, excess speed) so I am assuming some sort of guidelines are established beyond reversers deployed/stay on ground.

And, almost every overrun is preceded by a unstable approach.

GO AROUND!!!!

The industry should be much more concerned about overrun accidents than they appear to be. There have been enough ‘non-fatal’ close calls to statistically warrant the real big-one.

Its good news that some parts of industry are taking this seriously, but is even more SOPs really the answer. Cross checking landing performance before each landing surely is a must before every landing – airmanship / professionalism. These checks are not just the cursory review of what the dispatch computer printout forecast, the task has to be an active assessment / reassessment of the actual conditions at the time of landing. Most operating regulations require this – “the Captain has to ensure that the conditions are sufficient for a safe landing”.
Checking the landing distance margin available (percentage of max allowed landing wt) provides a guide to the level of braking required. It can be a baseline on which to judge any tolerance to an error in runway conditions reporting – ‘runway is wet’, but the aircraft could still land if it were flooded (recent storm / poor drainage / slippery surface).

Or going around at 500' if not stable...... or, if you've not touched down by the end of the touchdown zone/markings...GO AROUND.

Don't ask for a "long landing" even if the runway is 4000m long...... it starts to establish in the mindset that it's "ok" and then you do it one day on a runway that isn't quite as long... and it's wet.... and ungrooved.... Why do people land long on purpose? To save 15 seconds :confused::confused:

It seems impossible to imagine that a crew flying a 4 year old modern jet transport could, apparently, make such a fundamental error as to not select flap/slat and then ignore all associated warnings resulting in an over-run. Incredible. The ONLY reason I can think of is fatigue or perilous fuel state.

Final report will be very interesting.

A4

Taking off after touchdown.
 

Attempting a take-off after touching down is going to be a can of worms. The decision has to be very critical. You are going to have to reset the flaps to a take-off setting, change the stabiliser setting, retract the speed brakes, set the new take-off power setting and now have new V1, VR, V2 etc speeds. I cannot see this being approved by the authorities.

dhardest - it's already approved and in the flight manuals/SOP's for every airliner I've flown(6+).

Rejected landing after touchdown, or similar wording, describes the procedure.

Try go around flap setting with Vref. Will work with almost any aircraft.

Vref40=V2flaps15 so no problem

Because the mission has to be completed on the first go... ego... or not up to the task. The fatigue card is thrown out on the table way too many timesl.

Flew through Kingston today, and i saw 2 Caribbean airlines 738 vacating rwy there. both times, i was paying attention on the flap setting before and while they were vacating the rwy. and ofcourse, both times these were fully retracted before even getting to the runway end.
maybe a little culture thing with them ? not speculating anything, but after reading this thread and getting all the input of retracting flaps and so and so, my best guess would be this. too early retraction. misjudging the roll out speed, and maybe skidding off.
thought to share the info, (making a new account just to reply)
sad :ok:

Captjns,

What exactly do you mean by this?

Seems that if he's described as experienced that he must have been up to the task thousands of times before.

It is my opinion that fatigue factors are not taken seriously enough!

Well... (AA1420 in Little Rock AK. AA in Kingston, Jamaica, Air India Express in Mangalore, India). Many accidents resulting in overruns or excursions have resulted in unstablized approaches. Would you agree if a missed approach or go-around had been executed I/A/W company SOPs these incidents may have been avoided? Let's face it sometimes egos take over where commen sense should.

As for There are training and checking departments within airlines that are inadequate within themselves that pass crewmembers' PCs and LPCs. (Take the crew of the Q400 in Buffalo for instance. Weak captain that was pushed through the system after a number of failures during his entire career even before joining the airlines. There was the F/O who was either unprepared, undertrained, or not of the proper mindset for flyng in cold weather adverse conditions). Also weak F/Os are afraid to speak up too. With that being said, they are part of the problem and not part of the solutions

As for Some crews who should have been responsible take required rest on layover don't. It's a fact of life of the airline industry.

Should a LOI to violate arise due to improper operations then the "Fatigue Card" is thown onto the table (EK flight from Melbourne that experienced a tail strike on deprature due to incorrect data being entered in the FMC.)

Yes we are trained in Rejected Landings.

Quite simple really.

Apply TOGA ( t/o Warning will sound, ground spoilers retract and autobrakes disarm )
Leave the Flaps
Accelerate to VAPP ( Airbus ) VREF ( Boeing )
At VAPP/VREF and TOGA thrust Rotate
After Airborne and positive climb it becomes a normal Go Around ie "Go Around Flap 3" ( or 2 ) Followed by Gear up etc .....
Or for Boeing 737 "Go around Set thrust flap 15" Followed by Gear up etc...

However, once Reverse Thrust is applied a full stop is mandatory.

You wouldn't happen to have any examples to back this up, would you?

Go-Around after Touchdown

Go-Around after Touchdown

If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and touchdown occurs, continue with normal go-around procedures. The F/D go-around mode will continue to provide go-around guidance commands throughout the maneuver.

If a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection, auto speedbrakes retract and autobrakes disarm as thrust levers are advanced. The F/D go-around mode will not be available until go-around is selected after becoming airborne.

Once reverse thrust is initiated following touchdown, a full stop landing must be made. If an engine stays in reverse, safe flight is not possible.

From the Boeing FCTM

Touch and Go with good old Sabena;

Recognised Liege there.

I think the talk about training for go-arounds after touchdown is a slippery red herring. You need to look at the likely circumstances in which such a procedure might be performed. We're not talking about base training.

A pilot who has not performed a go-around despite an unstable approach in bad weather or who touches down long despite the runway being wet or of marginal length is already of a particular mindset. He or she will be desperate to finally get on the ground and will therefore almost certainly initiate maximum reverse thrust as soon as the main wheels touch down. If he or she is not of that mindset the chances are they will have already performed a go-around or baulked landing.

One only has to look at the incident in Mangalore in India to see the dangers of attempting a go-around after touchdown if reversers have been deployed.

Flaps and slats put to rest.
 

The aircraft was properly configured for a 30 flap landing!!! After impact the cable from the flap handle to actuator, did not break, but was under 7 times normal tension due to the bent fuselage, this resulted in an up selection to the actuator, somehow there was enough residual Hyd. psi to retract them. Beleive it!