By the damage inflicted to it, would it be safe to assume a runway excursion on a rather low forward speed? Lets say, below 100kt?

The wx conditions at around the misshap time:
SYCJ 300600Z 00000KT 9000 BKN015 24/24 Q1008 NOSIG
SYCJ 300500Z 00000KT 9000 -SHRA FEW014CB BKN015 25/24 Q1009 CB-NE-ENE NOSIG
SYCJ 300423Z 00000KT 9999 TS FEW015CB SCT016 CB-NE-ENE NOSIG

Seems they were trying to stop it until the last moment

I strongly doubt that..

Short runway, gets shorter when wet.
 

Operated in/out of Georgetown for 6+ years in the B-707. As previously mentioned, the ILS was "intermittant", often going OTS in bad weather. Had the runway lights stolen ( copper $$ ) twice. So, security no so secure.
Short runway, often wet, ILS untrustworthy, lighting probably works, in a very black hole in the jungle. Fun times.
I have to say though, I worked with some of the nicest, giving people I ever knew ( Guyanese ).

Shell Management...
 

Yes - you're spot on - it's definitely an identical set of circumstances and clearly no lessons have been learnt... :ugh: Pillock.

Many here are mentioning the ILS, funny enough I am unable to find any chart for the said ILS (neither for 06 or 24) on my jeppview software, properly updated. Gone for good?

There are four IALs available: two RNAV (24 and 06) and two VOR (06 only)

Didn't take long
 

'Maybe it says something about the quality of the pilots / planes in those regions'

Not sure what Ross M meant, but i wondered how long before this kind of insinuation would come out.. funny didn't hear this when AF overran in Montreal, Iberia in Colombia or somewhere down there with the 340, when EK did a great deal of damage in JNB or AA in Kingston recently, etc., etc.

Come on guys.... it may well be human error, but lets not regionalize it.

I do agree from first-hand experience that there seems to be an inordinate amount of credit given for smooth landings as an indicator of good performance in the region, and i agree with other commentators that this certainly would not have been an occasion for such a landing if the weather reports and assumed runway surface condition is correct...

B738 landing distance with all flaps up

Includes 305m air distance from threshold, max reverse and max manual brakes

Dry RWY 1225m / 4020ft

Medium braking action 2340m / 7670ft

Poor braking action 3090m / 10200ft

Problem with flaps, distant/bad weather alternate, checked the books and decided that they can just make it. Got caught between assumed and actual
braking action or by some of the adjustments for speed/weight/slope of the
basic distance, another 100-200m.

How is the that going to happen? You've shut down the engines and pulled the engine fire switches, therefore there's no hydraulic, nor electrical power. The flaps can't just magic themselves up. Maybe some further reading required of your FA friend.

Internal culture.
 

As ZQA commented

I do hope they can stand an audit. Most of the trainers and fleet managers from the old BWIA along with more than half the line pilots plus the same with the ex Air Jamaica pilots who were merged had to find new homes, mainly in the UAE, UK, US and India.

From my NG Cockpit Companion, the horn is activated if flaps up through 10 and thrust levers are set for landing. From my memory the horn is loud enough to wake the dead.

It's a sad day for Aviation in Trinidad. No hull loses from a national carrier in history. A sader day for the crew...
This could happen to anyone so think about that before you hang anyone out to dry.

@Reverse flight.
Plus GPWS yelling "too low, flaps!!"
I doubt the approach was made without flaps, unless pilots were totally deaf.
If memory serves me, policy on flap/slat retraction was "clear of runway, with aircraft under control". I dont think both conditions were met.

But they could have had a problem - we do not know!!

I doubt anything aft of the fuselage fracture would be still controlable from the flightdeck.
It is possible to retract/extent flaps/slats with the electric pumps but when the electrical wires are severed between flightdeck and pump it will not be possible.
This of course goes for all other systems which are controlled in similar fashion.

Caribbean fleet changes
 

Just following up on some comments made about the airline's training, I note that in the days leading up to this incident, the carrier added two more 738s (one brand new, 9Y-SXM, from Boeing, and another, 9Y-JMF, which was delivered from SNN on the 28th), with a third, 9Y-JMC, to be added imminently; I know it's not a large airline and presumably this addition of new aircraft would have put a lot of pressure on the airline's training dept.

Do we know anything about the experience of the crew involved in this incident?

Mere speculation, but could there be any conceivable malfunctions causing inadvertent flap retraction just about touchdown? That'd explain a lot of the inconsistencies.

? What is the " emergency evacuation" this does not exist... evacuation checklist are read and do items on back of QRH, not some magic button that starts the process.

If time allows verify flaps are at 40 etc etc..

If the hydraulics fail the flaps/slats lock out not retract.. that's why we have hydraulic fuses

Flox- you have the estimation for their required landing distance flaps up with poor braking action at well over 3000 metres. A quick look at the reported runway length of 7540 ft makes it something that was never going to happen.

I thinks they already selected flaps up during the landing roll and when finally stopped obviously not able to select flap 40 again. To me more interesting, did they use reverse untill 60 kt, were they braking from the beginning till the end, and what was the AB setting? That's probably something we'll read in the report...

The reversers seems open = have been used intil the crash.
But when they been opend is so far unknown.