however the Acft still departed after the last time of departure allowed by the regulators approved company operations manual, so why all the debate:rolleyes:
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How about the ATCo |
The Ops manual I believe has a 30min daylight cut off included 'to allow for visual manouevering in the event of an engine failure'. In this case the visual manouevering option was not needed as the flight was light enough to meet SID climb requirements OEI. The flight passed the SID set HDG point well before ECT.
This 30min cut off rule was originally written to cover turbo prop scenarios which lack OEI performance to climb out of the Queenstown Basin. |
In this case the visual manouevering option was not needed as the flight was light enough to meet SID climb requirements OEI. The visual maneuvering option is required because if they lost an engine say....just as they crossed the golf course and began their visual climb to Tollgate, they need the visual maneuvering option to either; A) maneuver visually in order to reach the required height at Tollgate and therefore be capable of going IMC and maintaining the SID gradient, or, B)maneuver visually in the figure 8 to return to land. |
Take off from Queenstown is limited to 'day light' only. Once airborne the crew were flying a published departure procedure (SID) which required own terrain clearance the set heading point (TOLLGATE) after which continued flight IMC is allowed provided published climb gradients are achieved. In this case rumour has it the flight crew determined they could meet the minimum required SID gradient OEI, hence the decision to depart. Providing the flight crossed TOLLGATE before daylight ends they were quids in.
The CAA 30 minute rider reflects that Queenstown is a daylight operation only so should a return be necessary there will be time to recircuit before daylight ends. In this case the plan was in the event of an engine failure at V1 to continue on the SID, climb out of the Queenstown Basin and depart for an alternate. It could be argued that climbing out of the Queenstown Basin is a much better option and more professional that circuiting amongst the mountains, regardless of the time of day. To add to this I understand climbing out of the Queenstown basin is supported by Pac Blue ops managment and is the company preferred option. |
framer:
Whats the 12 mile limit? I thought BN FIR and ML FIR started hundreds of miles out.....does it not apply there? Where domestic ATC ends and the FIR begins is a separate matter from what constitutes international airspace. |
That's very interesting....enough said
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Queenstown CAA action
Interesting that the CAA are taking any action when one of their own inspectors involved in the investigation has verbally supported the pilots actions. This is well known among a number of the Pac Blue pilots.
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CAA inspector
Not too many inspectors would be comfortable standing up to the CAA management and putting principles ahead of job security. But perhaps they should shut up if they are not prepared to "put up".
Most of the inspectors are well thought of and I have no axe to grind in that respect. |
Saskatoon, commanders are authorised to "vary" SOPs in some circumstances, such as waiting for a rain shower to pass. It might have been legal for this commander to depart during that shower, and thereby satisfying the 30 min requirement but would that have been prudent? I would have thought that any reasonable flight ops manager would listen closely to the circumstances of the situation and make a judgement on whether the actions were reasonable, and it sounds like Pacific Blue did this - and found that they were reasonable. The ops manual may be written in black ink on white paper, but the world is not black and white.
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COPILOT, ATC, AIRPORT MANAGER etc....
44 Dangerous activity involving aircraft, aeronautical product, or aviation related service (1) Every person commits an offence who— (a) operates, maintains, or services; or (b) does any other act in respect of— any aircraft, aeronautical product, or aviation related service, in a manner which causes unnecessary danger to any other person or to any property. (2) Every person commits an offence who— (a) causes or permits any aircraft, aeronautical product, or aviation related service to be operated, maintained, or serviced; or (b) causes or permits any other act to be done in respect of any aircraft, aeronautical product, or aviation related service,— in a manner which causes unnecessary danger to any other person or to any property. "unnecessary danger" is going to be interesting to get the legal opinion of a departure without incident, given the definition of the term danger in common use, and also the fact that the NZ CAA deems that the potential risk is so low that their regulation on this matter were not breached. Would the fact that the PIC feels compelled to his course of action by the company (if it is the case :O) negate "unnecessary" danger, or perceived passenger expectations? The NZ CAA is not the only NAA that is acting in a manner that raises the question of the safety merit of retribution vs regulation. |
So has the pilot been stood down?
Is the company supporting/defending him? I heard it was checkie, is that correct? |
If the CAA approved company SOP says takeoff must be in daylight (30 minutes before twilight), then simply put this is violation of the AOC.
Why is there a discussion on whether or not this is violation? The only way you can string out this debate is to investigate whether this violation was necessary for purposes of maintaining "safe operations" or was it just to placate the latent commercial pressure we deal with everyday you step into the flight deck? |
Saskatoon, commanders are authorised to "vary" SOPs in some circumstances, such as waiting for a rain shower to pass. So the question then becomes "Did breaking this well known and easily understood SOP increase the safety of the flight?" The ops manual may be written in black ink on white paper, but the world is not black and white. I find it hard to see how you can argue against that unless you start pointing the finger at management and undue pressures to get the job done. Personally, I think that is what needs to be done. |
Well my fleet manager once said to me "I would like to see the principle of the SOP obeyed if not the letter". If the principle of the 30 minute rule is to allow for 'visual maneouvreing below MSA in the case of an engine failure on departure', and it can be demonstrated that the commander did allow sufficient time for this then why would an authority prosecute for not observing an arbitary limit that took no account of the actual conditions?
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That'll require opening a can of worms leading to more complicated scenarios injected into the currently varied SOP. You'll need to involve safety inspectors, meteorological experts and a host of lawyers to determine that. May lead to global change of the definitions of "twilight", "VMC" and "safety". Thus, making everything as clear as mud!
Guess if the airline had already implemented RNP procedures, this incident and its associated negative publicity would have been averted. |
I'l preface this by saying that I don't think any criminal charges should have been taken against the PIC. It should have been tea & bikkies and a slap on the wrist but........
If the principle of the 30 minute rule is to allow for 'visual maneouvreing below MSA in the case of an engine failure on departure', and it can be demonstrated that the commander did allow sufficient time for this then why would an authority prosecute for not observing an arbitary limit that took no account of the actual conditions? The chances are incredibly small that an engine failure will ocurr before the required height, but the company have assesed the risk and decided it's not one they want to take and written that into the ops manual. Over the decades it's become obvious that if airlines leave every judgement call up to the PIC they will get all sorts of results, if they set some boundries (30 mins) they can get better outcomes safety wise. If our ego's are such that we think we're above that in non-emergency situations then we really shouldn't be in the left seat. My opinion only. |
PS .
and it can be demonstrated that the commander did allow sufficient time for this |
Viewed from a distance the authorities in the antipodes seem to be sending a clear message that safety cannot be compromised. The Tiger grounding and prosecution of the Pacific Blue captain are clearly intended to encourage others to behave. 'Pour encourager les autres' as one might say in Toulouse.
We can all sympathise with the guy not wanting to get stuck overnight in Queenstown. Not a bad place to get stuck having said all that, particularly if you like Japanese people. But having landed there in the dim and distant past I can understand the reason for the SOP. |
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