I'm not saying this was the case here but.. Isn't it known that under stressful situations people sometimes fail to convey their sense of danger to others? Wasn't that cited as contributing to Avianca Flight 52 running out of fuel..

Avianca Flight 52 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pilots thought they had made their situation clear but they had never actually declared a fuel emergency.

In our situation, it was very interesting to hear the de-brief. It seemed that because the cabin crew scenarios are almost always run the same way - an escalation of events leading to an evacuation - that it had become almost second nature to them to go into evacuation mode a little too quickly. This wasn't about blame, it was pure training, and they found it very useful to reflect upon the actions and the speed at which they escalated the situation, even though in the scenario there was more than enough time to follow the correct procedure, which was to inform that flight deck. But no-one did. We had been monitoring their actions ourselves, as it was just a simulation, as we found it interesting to see their decision making process. Absolutely no gripe with the cabin crew, the problem is with the "set" way they are trained - afterwards the cabin trainer asked the crew who had made the decision to evacuate. Everyone looked at everyone else, those at the back said they'd seen those at the front opening doors, so had followed suit, and those at the front, on reflection, without the pressure of the situation, said that given the scenario again they would have checked with the flight deck, because it wasn't a life threatening situation and there was time.

It was really done as a "food for thought" exercise and to ensure people were thinking for themselves and taking a moment to consider the situation rather than rushing into procedures. Procedures that are always done the same way in the simulated exercises.

Thank you for that background info AB Girl. :ok:

The set -escalation of events always leading to an evacuation- way of training had engendered an "evacuation bias" in the CC.

Which caused them to evacuate prematurely rather than following SOPs and communicate with the pilots before doing so.

Interesting and entirely logical conclusion.

I don't think it's as simple as that, 411A. There are undoubtedly SOME cabin crew trainers in the company that bring their own brand of bitterness and inflated sense of self importance to the classroom but there are also SOME flight crew trainers that appear to hold the belief that cabin crew should be seen and not heard. This then filters down through rank and file and from what I can tell, has done for so long, it's almost expected.

Going back to the mock up scenarios, I was involved as a "passenger" in one a couple of years ago that ended in evacuation. On the call to evacuate, the flight crew gave the call as per company SOPs, "Evacuate, Evacuate...Hazard on left!" At the initial words, "Evacuate, evacuate..." the crew were up and shouting instructions and as a result, both I and the Captain sat next to me only heard "Evacuate....Left" Even knowing the SOP's we both instinctively went to the left before correcting ourselves. On talking about it outside the mock up, the Captain agreed that passengers would probably also instinctively go to the left and that maybe it would be better for the SOP's to be amended to use only positive commands, such as "Right side only", in case part of the message was lost in the confusion. When we filed back into the mockup for the debrief, I raised this question very politely, pointing out that it was only on hearing it from the perspective of a passenger that the possible problem became apparent. I was given very short shrift by the flight crew trainer and basically told that that was the flight crew SOP and who was I to dare to question it. When I looked towards the Captain who had agreed with me, he suddenly appeared to lose the power of speech and gazed at the floor. If it had been the Captain raising the issue, would he have been dismissed quite as quickly?

Ironically, I would say that the airline involved in this incident is one of them, or at least it was when I worked there. Respect for rank and seniority was constantly drilled into us with no detriment to CRM. But it seems that that's not fashionable in these supposedly enlightened times where CRM seems to be perceived by many as "lets all get along and have a lovely time" rather than as effective communication between the cabin, the flight deck and the ground.

Yup, the 'lets all get along' scenario will many times result in botched up actions.

Also this is a very large trouble-prone idea.
IE: Specific doors are to be identified for evac use not just a casual reference to the left or right side of the airplane.
SQ and SV did this many years ago...and it worked perfectly, and our small airline does the same.
FD crew are told to identify the specific doors to be used and SCCM's are trained likewise, if an evac is necessary.
It is no good having pax slide down, only to be greeted by a burning or still-operating engine, close by.

JL,

Very good suggestion re terms used.
I'd suggest you keep pushing your point at work - but, of course, not to the detriment of your career :ok:

Our procedure was never say evacuate until you say which exits not to use. Once you say evacuate nobody listens any more.

I've got a simple question?

How realistic is it to expect aircraft crew (both cabin and flight deck) to determine with absolute certainty that a fire (and where there is smoke there is combustion of some type) is not potentially immediately catastrophic?

To comment "it's a knackered fan" in 20/20 hindsight is not at all relevant to making a prudent real time decision. Had this been a fire similar to the recent one on the Russian airliner how would people react to the quick decisive decision of the cabin crew saving scores of lives potentially?

However having a passenger or two run thru the blender would have been a major screw up....so who in there right mind orders an evacuation without informing the flight deck directly for both their own safety and to make sure the eggbeaters are off....

The CC always has the right to evacuate without command in a crash that is unexpected. The cockpit crew should always be in command in a landing situation on the runway.. Sometimes evacuation is not neccesary so the cockpit after landing should determine what procedure to use, not the CC.

While a lot of this discussion is 'useful' it is not relevant to this topic and more suited to the 'Safety' forum. Coming back from cloud-cuckoo land, let us remind ourselves of the actual situation. Aircraft on stand, engines shut down, APU power (possibly GPU? as well?) and 230 passengers standing, retrieving overhead items and disembarking via Door 2L onto a jetway. APU then shut down, so possibly a/c semi-dark on emergency lights?

So, all this guff about passengers arriving at 'burning' or 'running' engines, or 'meat grinders' or 'still airborne and opening doors' etc etc is NOT RELEVANT TO G-BYAT. In the circumstances, apart from the risk to pax from slide use and apron hazards (while there was no actual need) there was no hazard in ordering an evacuation and those risks would equally have pertained if the evacuation had been ordered by the flight crew. If we are to discuss this sensibly we need to understand the situation in the cabin properly - and we STILL do not know 'the truth' about what the SCCM did or intended to do (or why, really), nor what actual response she was getting from the Captain other than an apparent lack of two-way communication.

I suspect there were issues on both sides of the flight deck door here. Things could obviously have been done better. Perhaps one day we will find out what really happened? In my opinion there is undoubtedly more to this than meets the eye.

So - lessons learnt? SOPs reviewed and reinforced where necessary? Recurrent training has a new topic which will certainly revitalise what can be dull hours.

This subject has been raised many times. As a member of the Flight Safety Committee of two airlines, I raised the purely hypothetical scenario of an aircraft stopping in a hurry after some sort of failure or emergency and the cabin crew, upon seeing the smoke or flames outside the aircraft, then initiating an evacuation. If they manage to contact the Pilots, all well and good, but if not, consider what would happen if the captain then decided to taxi the aircraft clear of the position it had come to rest? Increase in power to move might very well ingest a fwd chute and the fan thrust would almost certainly rip any rear chutes from the aircraft.
Raising this scenario at several meetings was met with, 'This is the industry standard and considered best practice when it comes to initiating an evacuation, go back in your corner and be quiet'.
One day, many casualties will result from just such an event and the Industry best practice will be altered.
I have absolute faith that the CC who initiated the evacuation was doing the right thing, under present regulation.

We have this covered in our standard procedures, wherein, in the event of the scenario you described, the Captain (or another FD crew member upon direction of the Captain) shall make an immediate PA announcemet (once the aircraft is stopped) to the effect of...'Cabin crew, stand by for further instructions, cabin supervisor, report to the flight deck.'
In this way, we hope that the unpleasant situation you have described, can be avoided, as much as possible.
I expect you are quite correct.

rubik - it has (in my world anyway) always been a given that a crew would check the door lights after an abort before moving off so your 'scenario' should not occur, plus it is to be hoped that the c/crew would NOT pop the slides unless the engines were stopped AND it is 'normal' for the pilots to make some sort of call to the c/crew after an abort, normally 'remain seated' or similar while the situation is assessed.

Also in reality we are moving into an 'event' which has a low statistical probability of occurrence and these are often taken as 'accepted risks' in our business. Never-the-less, as I said, a good topic for refreshers. I agree with the first part of 'This is the industry standard and considered best practice when it comes to initiating an evacuation, go back in your corner and be quiet" but whoever this discussion was held with needs a little 'education' over the second.