rabbit

yes, I agree with you too.

p51 guy...to me it looked like there was no hesitation a foot or so off the water, the descent rate was constant from 1000feet or so to touchdown...sure we all hope that things would work out that way for us.

sully is thought of as a great guy. I flew with him about 20 years ago on the 146. i thought he was a bit arrogant.

and quite frankly, I think LGA was possible...but he was the guy on the spot and didn't kill anyone...so, good on him!

He probably could have landed downwind at LGA but if he had been short it would have been bad. He was there and had the eyeball view out the window to judge it best. PTH's add 10 knots to guarantee a full flare is what what I would have done and he probably did too. It is only the last foot that hurts in a crash.

I guess the APU was running.

At least at some early point in the report it mentions so.
So they were good on power and hydraulics.

Btw. Question for the A320 guys: Total electrical loss in an A320 any chance to get at least the slats out?

Both slats and flaps available in position 3, a normal certified landing configuration.

BTW: APU cannot supply any form of HYD pressure. Bleed air and elec yes, hyd no.

Sincerely,
FD (the un-real)

Then what's the Blue ELEC PUMP and the Yellow ELEC PUMP PBs for?

Blue ELEC pb - to manually override the pump and select it OFF.
Yellow ELEC pb - to engage the ELEC pump, mainly to pressurize the system on ground.

FD. (the un-real)

My mistake, the Blue Button is indeed an Override Off switch - it's been a while.
However, as long as there is AC power, the Yellow ELEC PB will pressurize the Yellow system in-flight.
I think I remember the Blue auto pump is inhibited on the ground, but will automatically provide Blue pressure in flight, with green being pressured by the PTU from Yellow?

My point was, if you have APU, you have hydraulics and a flyable aircraft - except for the small fact that it's going down due to lack of engines....

-Edit- I ought to learn how to spell.

True. My point - not that you need to be educated, simply for other's better understanding - is that you do not need APU to have a flyable aircraft.

Each of the engine driven pumps supplies 3000 psi down to about 7% N1 - under normal circumstances after engine shutdown at gate this corresponds to about 1% N1.

If either of Green/Yelow systems is pressurized the other system is pressurized as well through PTU.

Blue system is normally pressurized with the electric pump, which loses supply under EMERG ELEC. But, under EMERG ELEC, the ram air turbine comes out and pressurizes the blue system. The emergency electrical hydrogenerator is energized from the BLUE HYD pressure that had been provided by RAT.

APU cannot deliver any HYD pressure. What it can do is supply both AC busses, providing electricity to BLUE (and YELLOW if needed) ELEC pumps. The greatest benefit of having a running APU under dual failure scenario is the bleed air needed to attempt restarts and electricity to power all flightdeck instruments. The redundancy design of HYD system is such (good) that APU is not needed for flight controls.

Yours,
FD (the un-real)

PS: The BLUE ELEC will automatically run on ground (pre-takeoff) after engine start. No irk here, just to make sure nobody gets confused.

One thing not mentioned here is quite simple to put into practice.

Boeing, for instance, publishes a flight with un-reliable airspeed table.

The table gives pitch information for various phases of flight.

No green dot necessary.

I write the pitch and power down for each intended take-off, initial level flight, and power off descent condition.

This is technique only and not an Airbus vs. Boeing wind up.

It 's also a great pitch vs. power table for sim rides.

Well sorry p51guy but that's a statement of plain ignorance from someone who's never flown the type. Upon what knowledge can you base such an opinion? From commentary on the Airbus here?

Some prefer steam and have the opportunity to choose it. I thoroughly enjoyed my many years on the DC9, DC8, & B727, and found the transition to glass on the L1011, B767 and to autoflight on the A320, A330 and A340 to be transparent to the task of flying the machine. One learned one's airplane as thoroughly as possible and one flies it in all regimes.

I fully realize and understand the many legitimate critiques surrounding automation; part of it is training, (when management thinks the airplane will "fly itself"), part of it is our own fault for handing over our responsibilities to the autopilot and not practising manual flight, part of it lies with pilot associations for ineffectively resisting such trends and part of it has its origins in ergonomics.

But the "automation" issue is a far, far different kettle of fish than "competing with the computer".

When you enter test-pilot territory in any machine, you are far beyond those boundaries which all airline pilots cannot expect to be and unexpected things can occur. The Airbus is not unique. These are facts about any airplane, not just the aircraft you and PTH are, quite frankly, strongly prejudiced against.

Boeing is building an aircraft far more sophisticated than the 25-year old Airbus entries and I expect the B777 uses the same C* laws, necessarily, as any fbw design would. You're free to bid whatever airplane makes your day and we all have our favourites, but if you're going to make critical statements about a design you need to back them up with knowledge substantiated in reality of the airplane itself and not outlandish hyperbole such as "competing with the computer". Such a view is unfounded, and, for example, is unsupported in the outcome of the Hudson ditching.

If debate is desired, the final report should provide information on how close to Vs the aircraft was, not an estimate from a distant video of what the descent rate was, (PTH: " the descent rate was constant from 1000feet or so to touchdown").

I suspect the outcome with a B737 or DC9/MD80 would have been the same with a similarly experienced crew who kept their heads and cockpit discipline and kept flying the airplane as deep into the touchdown as they could.

If you're making the broader observation, now about twenty years old, claiming that pilots are losing their abilities, thinking and handling skills, that is an entirely different conversation and one with which I concur, but that is stating the bluntly obvious -this fact was apparrent in the late 90's. It is time for solutions from us, as a pilot group, and not merely tut-tutting the Airbus yet again. While perhaps not a reality in the MD80 design, automation is indeed a reality which all future entrants must come to terms and it is up to us, with our experience, to find ways to intervene in the present trends.

Besides, where has it been demonstrated that the ability to stall the airplane at will has prevented an accident? Cali may come close, but the B757 design at the time did not retract the speed-brakes when full thrust was applied and that, not the ability to fly the airplane "to the stall", was, once the airplane was up against the hills, a factor in that accident. The design has since been modified.

Contrarily, in the latest CFIT at Islamabad, it is my contention, based upon nothing more than my understanding of the A321 autoflight system (none of us have seen the data), that this CFIT may not have occurred had the crew executed a maximum-effort escape maneuver upon first EGPWS warning.

Such a maneuver permits full back-stick and a bank angle of 60deg while climbing at TOGA thrust. The escape rate-of-climb would be nothing short of spectacular; indeed it needn't be, given the design specs of EGPWS systems, but the airplane will stay a few knots above the stall and adjust pitch accordingly to do so, regardless of the full back stick pressure; the MD80/B737 series will not, not without risk of stalling and instead the QRH escape drill directs the crew to "respect the stick shaker", but in truth you will never know how close you are/were until the airplane flicks. While perhaps not a panacea, the design is at least an improvement in the trade.

So...a question for you:

Yes, the control laws do not permit actually stalling the airplane (beyond AlphaMax) in AlphaProt, but then your argument becomes, "How much more energy can one extract from the machine if one were permitted to take the airplane into the stall?, and What difference would such difference make?, and finally, How do you train for such a maneuver?" If you and PTH are going to have any credibility when critiquing the Airbus design (while leaving the Boeing solutions aside), you can start with that question.

I am neither pro-Airbus, nor pro-Boeing, (but I'll admit to being a bit "pro-Lockheed, :)) . I don't care what non-fliers think about either design. But pilots should be open to discussion and not merely feel free to make statements about designs they don't have direct experience on or knowledge of, not, at least, without being open to challenge.

As a pilot speaking to other pilots I think it is important to understand designs from a basis of wide comprehension, from which critical judgements may then be offered. Anything else is mere prejudice and we all know where that gets us.

FWIW.

PJ2

noperf;
Before making such statements, I think a bit wider knowledge based upon some research is in order. Airbus has had such tables and drills in place since early 1997. I am unsure of when Boeing brought them out as I was off the B727/B767 by then.

"Green dot" speed is Best L/D and has nothing to do with "unreliable airspeed".

Airbus published in the A320 QRH the Unreliable Airspeed memorized items, checklists and pitch-power tables shortly after the second unreliable airspeed accident, (Aeroperu 608; Birgenair 301 was the first, both in 1996). Both accidents occurred darkness - no visible horizon.

PJ2

Hey! You can add my name to that list !!

PJ2

I don't know about anyone else, but I have learned alot here re: AB and fbw. Mostly from you. I've tempered my attitude and actually see the deal in a much different light.This is a philosophy of controlled flight I still don't ken, but that is not the aircraft's responsibility. I was projecting my ignorance onto the airframe and computers. Sully didn't make a big deal out of skipping the flare part; I too saw the vid and said to myself, pull, turkey. From a survivability standpoint, I am not convinced the flatter entry didn't save some lives. Better a skip than a plant sometimes, no?

PTH

Howdy. I used to live in the little town next to Sullenberger's. I thought maybe I might buy the Groceries at the Danville Raleys this weekend, figured I might run into the man, shake his hand or something, you know? I've met Yeager, what a letdown. I think Sully has to be more personable, and I'd have the Exacta. Then it's Hoover. Alameda is right on the way. Want to go with?

bear

DC-ATE;

I KNOW that!...LOL. Were you feeling left out? :)

The fact is, autoflight and its interventions is here to stay. Our aircraft are far safer for it - that is a fact, not an opinion, but there are warts on it, just like there are on all airplane designs including our beloved "cable-and-pulleyed elevators" DC8.

If we're going to alter the trend that automation and software interventions may be causing...I say, "may"..., then we have to know, and not just offer opinions which are just so much talk-no-action. You can disagree all you wish, but relevancy and the ability to effect change then becomes an issue and the goal is awareness and change, not winning the debate, whether such is perceived as A vs B or whatever.

There is a problem. We are still crashing airplanes. Why? It is hopelessly irrelevant to claim that it is "automation" that is doing it, first because such a claim is merely the mirror we are gazing into when we talk, for are we not all pilots first?

The case for "automation taking control away from pilots" is specious and, in itself, unworthy of serious discussion. But the effects of autoflight upon those who fly is a serious discussion which ought not to be clouded with ignorance.

I know, DC-ATE...Don Quixote all over again. :} But the key is, a pilot is a pilot is a pilot, period; do your job and stop excusing ourselves or confusing competence with lack of operational authority.

The present autoflight solutions do not take that away such authority and to think it does is a very important misunderstanding in the discussion.

Our collective informed input into the design process is critical, for if we don't do so, we hand over even more of our pilot heritage to the software designers.

That is the entire point here.

PJ2

One of the problems I see nowadays, is that "pilots" don't get a chance to be pilots with all the automation thrown at them. They don't get the chance to find out what "piloting" really is. It's just a sign of the times unfortunately. Just another example of "change" that is not, IMHO, better.

As I've often written here.....I'm glad I'm retired !!:)

Edit: forgot to add re. ...YES!!

bear;
Frankly, when I first stepped into the A320 cockpit in 1992 I felt as though a "muslin veil" was between me and my airplane. I was experienced at glass and FMS use from the B767 and L1011, (brilliant airplane, perfect blend of automation and bread-and-butter solutions) but this was really different. The training was pretty tattered around the edges - good but not deeply knowledgable. When I got to fly the airplane, it was a non-event. I really liked the solutions to the problems of daily operation, (ILS intercepts, too high on the approach, flight-path-angle solutions, warnings and especially the ECAM which I thought was exceptionally well-considered but not perfect). I always thought there was too much programming of the FMS for good SA and that there was far too much talking and "process" when dealing with a complicated failure, (dual hydraulic, emergency electrical config, etc) and I know very well that with a rapidly degrading Airbus, the circumstances can be extremely demanding, perhaps too much so. Self-diagnosis was still in its infancy - perhaps the B787 will be better, leaving the crew to "bread and butter flight", just as it should be.

The key, at least for me, was to disconnect the airplane when up against one of those (at the time, frequent) moments when we didn't know what the autoflight was doing. We didn't call her Capricious Christine for nothing. Handflying the airplane including manual thrust was like flying the DC9 or any other B&B airplane...it was a non-event and entirely transparent to the task at hand.

The area you may be struggling with may be those black swan areas of software and airplane design where airline pilots almost never-in-a-career may find themselves. The boundaries of controlled flight are not areas where airline pilots ever expect to be; since the jet-age began in the late '50's, it has been a By-the-book industry and those who go beyond for whatever reasons and sometimes not through their own hand, pay the price whether it is turning off the yaw damper at high altitude, (a form of automated intervention which no one seems to claim "interferes with the pilot's control of his/her airplane) and watching dutch roll unfold, to climbing their aircraft to its absolute service ceiling and watching as the speed bleeds back and the engines flame out and suffer core-lock, to ignoring perfectly serviceable cockpit warnings from tested systems such as EGPWS and TCAS.

Put succinctly, the boundaries of software-initiated interventions do not limit the pilot from doing what she or he can do with his/her airplane until the very limits of controlled flight are reached. Why then, is that so unusual? Why is it even controversial? In philosophy, the argument resembles the "how many angels on the head of a pin?" argument. I say this not in debate but in recognition of the millions of hours of successful, unremarkable flight that all designs have amassed without incident or fatal accident.

I have experienced enough failures, one or two quite serious, in operation in the Airbus product to know it performs very well providing one knows one's airplane, just like any other aircraft. Of course, my experience is only that and cannot claim by itself to reify a trend, but it does somewhat mirror industry experience.

I believe that skills and familiarity with autoflight's operation and handling, in and of itself, can (and should) be placed within a different cognitive category than the cognitive skills required in manually flying an aircraft. This isn't the place to pursue that discussion, but I believe this is not a technical matter but a psychological one. I think we are examining the wrong areas using the wrong tools in search of a solution to "automation's interventions" and the sense that we are competing with the computers when flying our airplanes. I have been wondering if the Islamabad accident may be the very case in point which may best illustrate this, but we will have to wait for the data before theorizing further.

If however, as the article states as it 'quotes' those who have listened to the CVR, that heading was used to turn left and nothing further was done in terms of disconnecting everybody and flying the airplane in an escape maneuver, then they may have been stuck in frame of mind where "automation solves all problems" and not "psychologically" sitting in an airplane with a mountain ahead of them. If so, I think this may be a key to delineating some solutions to the human factors issues which are often expressed regarding automation's veil.

Just wondering...

PJ2

PJ2

Part of ignorance is fear, who wants to cop to that? That should be mitigated by a thorough knowledge of the a/c, as you say, and why Sully was so cool on the Radio.

"we'll be in the Hudson". Crap, that sounded like he was talking to a friend, "Meet you at the Pool Hall." Not trying to keep everyone alive when something happened that had not happened to anyone before, (in an Airbus).

It didn't hurt that he flew and instructed in F-4's and owned a business consulting re: Airline safety (isn't that what you do?).

The Pinnacle RJ was two immature idiots trying to climb to a risky and prohibited height. They fell 40,000 feet with engines frozen for the same reason 737's did with Frozen Rudder jacks. What did they know of core-lock? They were too brilliant for that. I've a new respect for AirBus, I still wish they wouldn't just plant the Tail on the fuselage with parts from "generic stores". Oh well, they don't answer my calls. I'll have adjusted to fbw just in time for the Dreamliner, but already I don't like those wings. I've designed and used Two Phase materials for fifty years, and Resin, not even elastomer/Carbon, is meant to be that "structural". And the rippling that FAA accepted as a repair? AirBus will be well rid of me, I'm thinking about changing rides.

respect, bear

bear;
No, they didn't answer mine either. When I had the opportunity during my 1992 course to ask why the FMGEC did something, the response was, "Thaht eez the way the ahrplane is designed", - literally. I could see what was coming.

kindest,

PJ2

"Your understanding of the aircraft is not required, but your compliance is to be desired". Many French in my very large family. Don't question a Frenchmen when he is doing his work, and if he senses criticism, you may never speak with him again. It is their way, and I am used to it. It has not stood in the way of wonderful relationships, and complete acceptance. One nephew was initially impossible. Once I dropped my stubbornness, he dropped his, but mine dropped further, oh well. He is a brilliant businessman, You may know him, or he you, eet eez a petit petit Monde, mon ami.

take care

PJ2

As I stated my post was not a Boeing vs. Airbus wind up.

Pitch and power or pitch and no power tables are available.

I was just pointing out a possible use for them.

bear;
Indeed. And yes, experienced, to a much lesser extent, those aspects of French life primarily through this airplane, and, curiously, philosophy; I love Derrida's work. What more can one say without being declared "slightly off", (or much more...) by the analytical philosophers? More could be said, but...
Fair enough. For me that's not the way the post read but then, no "reading" by another is innocent. Thanks for the response.

PJ2