Auberon:

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Make of this what you will, but AAL 2 is scheduled to take 5 hours, 35 minutes, arriving at KJFK at 17:35 local. According to FlightAware, on May 4 AAL 2 was in the air for 4:48, arriving at 16:56.

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That doesn't give us all the facts. Perhaps we will never know.

What I do know is someone circulated the recording, and then pilots (and controllers) on boards everywhere like this one parsed every word and nuance and relished in speculation. Such is the way of today's world.

A key point of importance in this debate has been the fuel status of AAL 2. While these data are not dispositive because they do not display the expected in-air time planned for each day, they do suggest that the in-air time for AAL 2 on May 4 (4:48) was well within the normal range of times that this flight had experienced over the preceeding months.

See: FlightAware > History > American Airlines #2

I'm given to wonder whether, in the long run, this incident, and the resultant public discussion, couldn't prove counter-productive. If the pilot is found to have exceeded the "extent required" part of the above mentioned 91.3, and gets even a symbolic rap across the knuckles, might that not make the next guy hesitate to be as assertive? (When a moment's hesitation might make all the difference.)

These days of MGT watching every ounce of fuel you take off with are having an impact, this should be taken into account when vertually every flight as I have come to understand into JFK ends up landing with close to minimums onboard.

This incident aside, the overall trend to carry less and less fuel is going to bite bad sooner or later.

And, dispatching with rock-bottom reserves when JFK has one runway closed and presumably winds were forecasted to be near limits for landing to the southwest is just asking for trouble.

I have always felt that places like the 3 New York airports and ORD need "bad traffic" reserves when the weather is good. But, that is not the way today's breed of "greens" think.

it is important to know the details of the FARS the FAA long ago set up a blame culture, a punitive culture and started a war between pilots and ATC ...it is not for safety....however every letter of the law must be read...

I wrote those things not to criticize or anything but to inform, as to to reality, you are right, it may make someone too hesitant to act correctly in the future..:(

Just so as people realise that flight, and therefore, fuel planning has moved on let me state what is blindingly obvious to anyone who has operated a commercial flight since the price of avaition fuel went up to historic highs.

Regardless of how long your flight is scheduled for, you will be given a navigation log, on the day, that calculates how much fuel you will burn for that individual flight. This will take into account forecast winds for your airborne period and how heavy the aircraft is based on latest estimates for passengers and freight. It will have a fuel factor for that particular airframe and specific engine combination. If you get more passengers or freight at the last minute, you will have to recalculate the predicted fuel burn. This will effect your contingency fuel, which is either a fixed amount, for short flight, or a percentage of planned fuel burn for longer flights.
The company will have standard figures for fuel burn taxying out, and an amount for diverting if you don't make your planned destination. Is it a standard day or do you expect "surprises"? Finally there's a final reserve requirement figure of 30 minutes, below which you shall not go without declaring an emergency.

To boldly state that as the flight was only airborne for 4:48, with a scheduled block time of 5:35, and to make of that by insinuation that there were therefore 47 minutes fuel left untouched, so why the urgency, is a statement of such arrogance, I am completely stunned.

Perhaps you're not too familiar with required fuel reserves on a U.S. domestic flight either.:)

See: Federal Aviation Regulation Sec. 121.639 - Fuel supply: All domestic operations.

Here's a discussion of fuel terms and reserves from an FAA bulletin:

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviat.../info08004.pdf

Anyway, I've listened to the tapes for approach, tower and ground for AAL 2 and there is no mention of fuel state in the final ten minutes or so of the flight. The final controller was obliging as they asked for minor vectors to avoid buildups. And ground held traffic once the emergency was declared. The controller asked if they required further assistance when the AAL '76 turned off the runway, they said they did not and that was it from what I could hear.

Tower Dog, I forgot you were both a Sky God and an American pilot when I made my earlier query. Have you heard anything more on this incident?

>>>To boldly state that as the flight was only airborne for 4:48, with a scheduled block time of 5:35, and to make of that by insinuation that there were therefore 47 minutes fuel left untouched, so why the urgency, is a statement of such arrogance, I am completely stunned.

I wouldn't be too hard on the fellow, as he's a probationary member, and it's apparently his first post on PPRUNE. Perhaps the concept sof "scheduled" (what rez is showing) and the "actual" (influences by the varying jetstream winds) are foreign to him...

SD, words of wisdom. It's been a long day at the office.

Ab, of course, you're spot on. I don't operate into the US and therefore I'm not conversant with FAA rules, just CAA, JAR, or EASA or whoever's making the rules in western europe this week. I just go with the rules of my own operator, and appropiate regulatory authorites (with a good dash of common sense as well!)

I just got VERY annoyed at a newbie's posting, making 2 plus 2 into whatever he wanted to, with all sorts of underlying implications. I merely wanted to make the point that the fuel on board ANY commercial operation will have lots of different components.

The very bottom line is that the pilot in charge wasn't happy with what he was given by ATC, challenged it, took what he believed, at the time, to be appropiate action, and landed safely with all on board safe, and the airframe undamaged.

Nubboy

....are you therefore suggesting that he had exhausted the diversion fuel and the final reserve of 30 mins (or, having just read Airbubba's post, the appropriate amount of fuel for the above) necessitating the declaration of an emergency (after one missed approach)??

Obviously the captain knew he was disrupting traffic flow when he declared the emergency and thought it was necessary to complete his flight safely. He has already explained why he did it through reports to the FAA and company. We have not seen those reports yet but we will. He used his judgement to handle the ATC problem of not landing with winds beyond the x-wind component. Being vectored to another landing was not acceptable to him so he did what he felt he had to.

As mentioned in an earlier post, said flight blocked in with 6.5. Not really enough to manuver, get back in line, wait for runway change, etc. in a 767.

Sounds like it could have been handled better by all parties, but "bottom line", everyone arrived safely. If mishandled any more by either flight crew or ATC, would have been front page news.

Quote: 'I suspect the captain of AAL 2 sensed a "Long Island Tour" because of the heading assignment when a short circuit downwind, base, and final, in visual weather conditions, would have complied with the declared pilot's (read priority aircraft at this point) plan.'

Aterpster,

You are most certainly correct that he sensed a Long Island Tour BUT this is exactly one of the reasons why i posted earlier the gross lack of CRM from the Captain.(Poor RT is part of it).
He ASSUMED and did not COMMUNICATE his worries which lead to a dangerous decision.(and lets not start talking about the possibility of a dangerously low fuel level as if that were the case ,i hope he would have elected to land on 22L even if the winds were a tad stronger than his sops).

ATC did react to his distress cancelling the initial approach clearance(Poor RT by ATC there,should have said some like,clearance cancelled,maintain runway heading,vectors 31L) by instructing the crew to maintain runway heading,(rather than telling to continue approach)this is a radar vector which should have alerted the crew that a contingency plan was in progress...

The captain did a one man show obviously.:hmm:

I re-read my post, and I don't see where I did anything other than point out some facts that hadn't been discussed so far. Yes, I am aware that scheduled block time is not equal to flight planned flight time. And yes, unfortunately I didn't spring forth fully formed with 182 PPRuNe posts to my name. But thanks for the warm welcome. :ok:

Maybe not. It didn't get the IMMEDIATE response AA2 wanted in this case.

Slack RT is almost cultural for Americans, as is spelling and slack English in general. This is where it leads.

Imagine being a non-English speaker and reading the transcript translation of this event - it'd read like many of the African and Mid-East accidents and incidents we westerners laugh at, rife with non-standard RT and short-cuts, non-usage of callsign and general mis-communication.

"We're going to the left and then we're coming around"??????? :rolleyes:


1) That is ONE choice, but two options. You should be precise when arguing semantics! :p

2) The PAN call is for an URGENCY phase, not an emergency.

And it's "Lite" too in the US but that doesn't make it "Rite." Some terminology becomes "standard" because of frequent use, like "charlie, charlie" or "FULLY ready" (A Brit favourite).


If they find flying a visual approach to be challenging, maybe they should consider a career change.

de facto
Dangerous decision? It appears to me both safe and smart if his fuel situation was as reported 6,500 lbs. The tower told him to fly runway heading, which would have put him right in the middle of traffic departing. The departure runway in use was 31R, 31L was closed for construction. All SIDs are LT direct CRI or OGY. AA was not given any traffic after he made his left turn off the approach to 22L for his visual to 31R for the simple reason there probably was none. The tower gave fly runway heading because it was probably the only thing he was permitted to give.

Has time been cut out of the audio recording? It's not clear the tower was given time to agree 31 could be used. Sure they said maintain runway heading but would they do that anyway while checking 31 was ok?

There is a lot of history of NYC ATC driving pilots to act like this Captain, mostly because of the traffic load and bureaucratic procedures. In the early days of the 747, a Pan Am flight landed at EWR and, after clearing the runway, had one engine running and the APU wouldn't start. IIRC, for either delays in the hold or a missed approach, they asked for clearance to EWR and got a 120nm routing for an airport 20 nm away. I've been on the shuttle several times, as a B727 S/O where the pilots had to be nearly as forceful in getting a landing clearance. I vividly remember one instruction, the Captain didn't like the tone of, he, in a sweet Southern accent, told LGA tower, "please, you will not speak to my crew like that and you make requests to us, not demands."

One thing I find interesting on this thread is how many think ATC is "in control" as one put it several pages ago. I find this attitude very common among airline pilots and the "younger" generation. This is most emphatically WRONG! They coordinate traffic, provide advice on how best to manage traffic, but they don't run your plane. Yes, 99 times out of 100 times, I agree to their requests and comply, but reserve judgement on the advisability of their plan. No doubt, this crew tried to go along with JFK ATC, but when it was no longer possible, in the race to see who was in command of AA 2, the Captain rightly won.

There have been many threads hereabouts on "why some pilots question ATC when given a descent clearance 200 nm from destination" or "would you land in VMC conditions, if no contact with tower". In all of them, I sense of pilots unsure of who is in command of their planes, a very dangerous attitude in my most humble opinion.

Who would have been "in the klink" if AA 2 followed the ATC instruction and landed with considerably less than the 45 minute final reserve? Not the controller.

Also, JFK ATC is now populated with a large group of brandy new, fresh out of OKC controllers.

Then again, I was taught by old, crusty airline and military guys who demanded "unquestioned" authority.

GF

You can listen to the unedited audio here, AAL 2 checks in at about 7:30 into the 21Z tower archive:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kj...2010-2100Z.mp3

As you know, the PAA Sky-Gods had a horrible safety record before CRM and Hart Langer's remake of the training department. Of course, in those pre-CNN days, you could crash on Pago Pago and there would be an article on page 17 of the New York Times a week later.

Still, I can see your point, the pilot in command job has kinda morphed into being the whipping boy in the modern swiss cheese model cockpit.

I'm sure we will hear these AAL 2 tapes in training in years to come with a 'facilitator' asking 'what were the threats and how did they manage them?'