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Dangerous landing at JFK Airport | Video | 7online.com
The ac's first transmission after being told the crosswind was too high was "we cannot accept 22 if we do not get 31r we are GOING to declare an emergency" The plan was to bring the ac overhead the airport and vector him for an ils to ry 31r. The time spent bringing the ac overhead was not thought to be an issue because at NO time prior the ac's declaration of need for 31r was there any mention of fuel issues. The above link is the local news story of the event. Please remember that atco's in NY DO NOT make rwy selection decisions!! All runway selection decisions in NY are made by FAA management in very close coordination with the AIRLINES. (The users make every decision about runway selection!!) It is all about capacity. Controllers vector where they are told to vector. |
Seems we dont know all of the story... I agree the pilot sounds stressed but just what was going on in the cockpit? If he had screwd up on his fuel calcs then that is bad and he deserves disciplinary action, if he had an emergency which has not been made public then perhaps that mitigates him. However if it was just a case of he spat his dummy (pacifier) out of the pram because he could not have his choice of runway for a routine landing he deserves sacking and not employing again.
Seems like very poor communication from the pilot to ATC... why did he (the pilot) not tell them the nature of his emergency? Surely that helps an appropriate response or is the ATC supposed to be gazing at a crystal ball along with watching the aircrafts progress on the radar screen |
From FAR AIM Chap 6 - That's an American regulation by the way!
Section 3. Distress and Urgency Procedures 6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications a. A pilot who encounters a distress or urgency condition can obtain assistance simply by contacting the air traffic facility or other agency in whose area of responsibility the aircraft is operating, stating the nature of the difficulty, pilot's intentions and assistance desired. Distress and urgency communications procedures are prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), however, and have decided advantages over the informal procedure described above. b. Distress and urgency communications procedures discussed in the following paragraphs relate to the use of air ground voice communications. c. The initial communication, and if considered necessary, any subsequent transmissions by an aircraft in distress should begin with the signal MAYDAY, preferably repeated three times. The signal PAN-PAN should be used in the same manner for an urgency condition. d. Distress communications have absolute priority over all other communications, and the word MAYDAY commands radio silence on the frequency in use. Urgency communications have priority over all other communications except distress, and the word PAN-PAN warns other stations not to interfere with urgency transmissions. |
You can bandy about ICAO regs and RT standards and poor shows all round, however, what is the point of even posting this?
All I've read is drivel about "how great I am when I fly into JFK...", "this is not how it should be done...." and the gut-wrenching comment from protectthehornet about pilots showing ATCOs who is boss..... (sir, you may have a well respected career as a pilot but get over yourself) [I will wait with baited breath for your sidekick P51guy to show up] Apart from a very short mp3 and some website that shows "live" traffic, no one has a notion about what really happened here. Give it a rest! |
Too many times I have seen pilots bought up in airlines unwilling to state their case with sufficient force to ATC to achieve a safe solution. This Captain did the right thing - when it gets to the point where you have to direct the course of action, then you do so - and simply tell ATC what you are doing (not following or waiting for vectors.).
This flight DIDN'T end up the same way as Avianca Flight 52 - and that, at least, is something to be applauded.
Originally Posted by Wikipedia
On January 25, 1990, Avianca Flight 52 had been in a holding pattern over New York for over one hour due to fog limiting arrivals and departures into John F. Kennedy International Airport. During this hold, the aircraft was exhausting its reserve fuel supply, which would have allowed it to divert to its alternate, Boston, in case of an emergency or situation such as this one.
Seventy-seven minutes after entering the hold, New York Air Traffic Control asked the crew how long they could continue to hold, to which the first officer replied “...about five minutes.” The First Officer then stated that their alternate was Boston, but since they had been holding for so long they would not be able to make it anymore; the controller then cleared the aircraft for an approach to runway 22L. As Flight 52 flew the ILS approach, they encountered wind shear at an altitude of less than 500 feet (150 m) and the plane descended below the glideslope, almost crashing into the ground short of the runway. As a result, a missed approach was initiated. Air traffic controllers had informed the flight of wind shear at 1,500 feet (460 m). At this point, the plane did not have enough fuel for another approach. The crew alerted the controller that they were low on fuel and in a subsequent transmission stated “We’re running out of fuel, sir.” The controller asked the crew to climb to which the first officer replied “No, sir, we’re running out of fuel.” Moments later, the number four engine flamed out, shortly followed by the other three. With the aircraft's main source of electrical power, its generators, now gone and with only battery power remaining, automatic load shedding would have caused many non-essential electrical systems to lose power and the cabin would have been plunged into darkness. Within seconds, the aircraft had lost thrust from its 4 engines, causing it to plunge into the small village of Cove Neck on northern Long Island, in Oyster Bay; 15 miles (24 km) from the airport. |
This flight DIDN'T end up the same way as Avianca Flight 52 - and that, at least, is something to be applauded. Long nigth, ****ty weather and they kept requesting "Priority" due to low fuel. Then after holding for a very long time they got cleared for the approach on the fumes, got off the localizer/glide slope as they had no flight director or autopilot, then had to execute a go-around and flamed out and crashed on downwind. We were the last aircraft to land that evening, the airport closed when we touched down. |
JFK ATC
Jfk atc need to get over them selves.
Inbound JFK after 14hrs. "enter the hold". "For how long I ask". Twenty minutes is the reply. " No problem" I say. I have ten minutes holding fuel then I am off to La Guardia.. "HOLD" . Ok, I got it the first time, just letting you know where I stand. Eight minutes and inbound....... Just checking, any improvement??? Loudly: HOLD. " Ok, Diverting to La Guardia." Errrrr... Ummmmm... #@$#@ You are cleared for the app, fly heading 250, etc. And the Speed bird behind me had the same thing. Either they can accept you, or they cant, why play games?? I did not declare low fuel or anything else. All of a sudden, they can accept me?? Please, they need to plan better. And dont get me started on Ramp Control. See you all tomorrow, Sir O |
atc took way too long and sometimes you have to remind atc who the boss is. It's hard to judge without seeing and hearing the entire communication between the controller and AA crew, but as other posts have alluded to the AA crew's actions were less than professional. Stating that they're turning contrary to the controller's instructions is very dangerous. In my opinion they should have given the controller chance to vector them for 31R. |
By definition ATC are in charge. The buck stops with P1. |
Only until the commander decides to use his authority to override them. The buck stops with P1. |
I agree that responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests with the Captain, but if s/he disregards ATC, then they have to answer and justify their actions to the authorities. |
Could you put up with a question from an SLF member:
Is the 767 in any way unusual in terms of the maximum crosswind component that is considered safe...or was there a whole queue of planes with a similar problem and this was just the first crew to make a fuss? Bob |
By definition ATC are in charge. It's Air Traffic CONTROL ATC is certainly doing an important job, but they are not managing the jet, only keeping hard objects out of the way.. |
Is the 767 in any way unusual in terms of the maximum crosswind component that is considered safe... |
Nice analysis with a shoutout to PPRuNe today on Paul Bertorelli's AVweb blog:
After the emergency was declared, the controller evidently thought it was a “gentleman’s” emergency in which he would be allowed to vector the airplane back around for 31R in a more less orderly fashion. The Captain, on the other hand, clearly understood that under emergency authority, he could do what he needed to and seemed to inform the surprised sounding controller of his maneuvering plan. He told ATC—he didn’t ask, he told ATC—to clear the runway. American Flight 2 was landing on it. This is about as compelling an example of execution of command authority as you are likely to hear. Any of the AA Skygods:) know what crosswind limits are in your manuals for a B-762? |
A T Control
Heard once after a request for a deviation (in either direction) for thunderstorm avoidance had been denied.
"Say XXXXXX Centre, tell me, Am I up here 'cos you're down there-or are you down there because I'm........" The response was a deviation approval. S |
From FAR AIM Chap 6 - That's an American regulation by the way! This publication, while not regulatory, provides information which reflects examples of operating techniques and procedures which may be requirements in other federal publications or regulations. It is made available solely to assist pilots in executing their responsibilities required by other publications. |
Is the 767 in any way unusual in terms of the maximum crosswind component that is considered safe...or was there a whole queue of planes with a similar problem and this was just the first crew to make a fuss? In addition, eye balling a visual without G/S on 22L (from the tape) or possibly without PAPI lights, an extra couple of feet high over threshold adds a lot of extra meters at the very end which might not be there if they screw up the visual with strong crosswind and tail wind component. The landing was safe in the end, good for the commander if he deemed this was required. But now he is on the ground, he is paid well for providing the answers to his actions as the captain/commander. |
The focus on the unsuitability of runway 22L is on the crosswind for obvious reasons, but could the tail wind component have been a factor in the decision? Perhaps an aircraft problem that made that runway with that wind limiting (u/s antiskid, spoilers, something else?)
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Think the pilot needs to learn to count too....
''I've told you 3 times I'm declaring an emergency''.........from what I heard he told the controller ONCE that he would have to declare an emergency IF he didn't get 31 and then he did declare when told to fly a heading......So he only declared once even though he was NEVER told he wouldn't get 31. Unprofessional, dangerous and with complete disregard for the safety of others in the vicinity...should have the book thrown at him...... I understand the pilots responsibily for his craft and all on board but I can't believe any professional pilot could condone the manner in which he reacted without even giving atc the chance to give himwhat he wanted.... |
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