American MD80 rough landing CLT/leaves debris!
 

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Rough landing leaves debris

Officials reportedly look into crew fatigue and dense fog as possible
factors in plane's scary arrival in Charlotte. On Sunday, an American Airlines flight scraped a wingtip and partially veered off the runway while trying to land.

Federal aviation officials are investigating why an American Airlines plane
landing in heavy fog Sunday night in Charlotte veered partially off the
runway and then scraped a wingtip, as frightened passengers gasped and
braced inside.

The impact left parts of the wing and debris on runway 36C, but planes
continued to land for another 11 minutes until the runway was closed for
planned maintenance about 11 p.m.

Officials couldn't say whether the debris posed a danger to the other
planes. It wasn't clear how many more landed, but an airport spokesman said it was "a handful." Charlotte/Douglas International wasn't alerted to the incident until about 2:24 a.m. Monday. Airport officials said the debris was cleaned up shortly after the airport received word from the Federal Aviation Administration.

The weather, possible crew fatigue, the plane's alignment for landing as
well as its equipment are also under review, according to reporting by the
Observer and the Wall Street Journal.

None of the 110 passengers or the crew aboard American Flight 1402, inbound from Dallas, was injured in the rough landing.

"It was just shaking, just jarring," said Randall Calvert, 40, of Charlotte,
who was returning from a company Christmas party and sitting in the 15th row of the plane, near the wing.

"You know how it feels on a roller coaster when you're going on a bend and all the G-forces are going one way. Everybody in our area thought it was about to roll over."

Calvert said he couldn't see out more than 20 feet because of the fog. He
also said the plane didn't feel level as it came in for the landing.

At one point, he said, it felt like the wing hit something. "It clicked or
did something, then it flipped like the other way."

Passengers gasped, and a few shouted.

Then came sighs of relief - and applause for the captain.

The ordeal lasted less than 10 seconds, Calvert said.

Kathleen Bergen, a spokeswoman for the FAA, said airport personnel found
debris on the runway, and that the damage to the McDonnell-Douglas MD-82 aircraft "was substantial."

Bergen didn't know Tuesday night what type of debris was found, or how large it was. Airport spokesperson Haley Gentry was also unable to describe what was found.

Investigators are reviewing what, if any, role fog played in the incident.
Visibility was limited to about one-eighth of a mile at the time, and the
same fog bank caused hundreds of flight delays and some cancellations Monday in Charlotte.

"While weather certainly is something that the (investigators) will
consider," Bergen said, "aircraft are equipped to land in those conditions."

Officials are also looking at the actions of the flight crew and American
Airlines' communication process after the 10:49 p.m. incident.

Bergen said airlines are expected to promptly report incidents if an
airplane is seriously damaged or someone is killed, but there aren't set
timeframes in other circumstances.

It's common protocol, she said, to consistently sweep airport runways and to stop using runways altogether if debris is reported. "If an airplane blows a tire or if a pilot reports seeing debris ... anytime something occurs, or
there's a suspicion, we should stop using the runway and we would go out and sweep," Bergen said.

American Airlines declined comment Tuesday, saying it's awaiting a report
from the National Transportation Safety Board.

The Wall Street Journal, citing investigators and airline officials, said
the flight's crew was told by air traffic controllers on Sunday evening that
the plane was slightly off-course as it approached for a landing.
Controllers asked the crew if they wanted to make another attempt at
landing, but the crew declined, according to the Journal.

The newspaper reported that the crew then decided to shut off the autopilot shortly before landing, believing that it was not working properly.

The Journal said investigators also will look into whether crew fatigue
might have been an issue. The crew had been on duty about 14 hours before the landing, according to the report.

Rough landing leaves debris - CharlotteObserver.com

AA had another low viz incident in Denver a few years back taking out some approach lights. 14 hours of duty is a VERY long day. Just had one myself with no fewer than four CAT II approaches the same day.

4 Cat II approaces in one day at age 65?
Where do you fly?

11 hrs. 3 hr difference between departure and arrival time zones.

A cat 3 approach to the vis they were requires a go around if loc and gs parameters are not met. Autopilot and autoland is required. Handflying to a landing is not allowed. An RJ took off when AA was on a 2 mile final so can't see how the loc and gs signal was protected as required for their approach. AC are required to hold short before the end of the runway short of the gs antenna if cat 3 approaches are in progress. Lots of blame to be passed out on this one.

Visibility can change rapidly particularly with fog banks as we all know. If the runway was unprotected and they continued manually it is perfectly possible, that the approach may at the critical point have been legal to CAT 1 limits rather than as reported above. Continuing when visual reference is then lost has been a factor in a number of recent incidents.

If we line up the holes in the swiss cheese in one possible scenario: The crew are tired, weather is marginal CAT1, the auto-pilot does not perform as advertised, they take over manually and lose visual reference below decision height. If in doubt go-around is almost always the learning point from these incidents.

Source: http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4243a3f8&opt=0

Looks to me that they experienced localizer deviations probably caused by the departing traffic. Usually they are strongest, when the aircraft is passing the far threshold, getting close to the antenna (line of sight to the approaching a/c's position).

As the Wx lookes CAT II to me, it is perfectly fine to switch off the autopilot after having established visual references to the Rwy and to land. You are vulnerable to spacial disorientation though, especially coming from an offset position and likely in a bank.

Factors for the incident might be a breach of procedures by the tower (not enough protection), physiology (disorientation) and human factors (target fixation). I stress "might be".

And, p51guy , is just simply wrong. Maybe in your plane/experience that might be the case.
But all CAT III I fly are manual. Autopilot use is forbidden, and my aircraft does not have autoland capabilities, yet is certified CAT IIIa with minima 50'/RVR 200m.
I have to fold down and use that headup guidance thingy though.

Nic

admiral

in the USA, virtually all major airlines CAT III procedures are autoland/autopilot not hand flown. I can only think of one or two that use your method.

We still manually land Cat II, as long as rvr is 1200 or better.

With autoland Cat II becomes 1000 rvr minimum.

All Cat III's are autoland. 727's still use manual throttles.

.

Remind me not to fly with your outfit! Only wish I knew which one it is/was....(Hopefully not Microsoft Flt Sim!). It's this kind of attitude that leads to the sort of problems that we are discussing. Manual Cat 3A (with HUD) when fresh and full of the joys of spring? Maybe; But at the end of a 4 sector 14 hour winters day/night? Don't think so, somehow.The macho days are over, Guys!

Phantom Driver,

Some operators of B-737 NG are hand flown CAT III using the HUD. The Captain flies the plane all the way to touchdown not the autopilot.

erm...WHAT? i don't know which B737NGs you're talking about but since the NGs are equipped with 2 A/Ps and A/T and do auto-lands really nice why in the world would someone fly manually? besides in my outfit it's not allowed and we are VERY close to boeing procedures.
and the newest deliveries even have a stunning 3-axis-autopilot which after just 40 years of development does some crab on x-wind landings!

People do sometimes jump in with both feet. I suspect Admiral346 was previously a cruise captain on the A340 600, should not be too difficult to work out who are the only people to fly these aircraft in Germany. That he is a captain now on a smaller aircraft which does manual CAT3s is also reasonably obvious. Why do some people feel the need to rubbish other posters without thinking?

Hand flown CAT IIIs
 

Just talked to a client who flies a falcon 2000. It is cleared for hand flown CAT IIIa using the HUD. It hasn't got the capacity to do an autoland !

Just checked the FAA website and if wx is below 800 and 2 no aircraft is allowed in the gs critical area at the takeoff end of the runway if a cat 3 arrival is inside the OM. Departing an RJ on a 2 mile final is violating that restriction. Autopilot to an autoland was required but the controllers screwed up too. Hope that helps at the hearing.

CAT 3
 

Only because you have never done it does not me it is unsafe...:ugh:
I am sorry, but it has nothing to do with macho behavior, it's just the only way this Aircraft can perform LV app...and Has been doing so for 17 years:hmm:

Cheers Micky

P51 guy
 

you are right as you usually are. let me add something as a precaution for all pilots.

when you are conducting a coupled approach or an autoland approach and the wx is 800/2 or less...ADVISE ATC both appch and tower that you are conducting an AUTOLAND or COUPLED approach. Say: verify critical areas protected.

and if you crash and atc screwed up...at least you will look good at the hearings.

I've spoken with tower controllers who have told me that they often do not protect the critical areas of gs/loc...so be careful

I have NEVER been impressed with CLT controllers of any kind and Ihave flown there ALOT.

.

Fair enough; Unfortunately you do not care to mention which aircraft you are talking about. At the moment. we are discussing scheduled airline operations, subject to a myriad of international rules and regulations.

Sure, any competent pilot on a good day should be able to keep the needles centred all the way down to 50' DH/200m RVR. My point is, do you really want to be doing this on the last approach of a long duty day/night? Asking for trouble IMHO, which is why the vast majority of airlines that are serious about Low Vis Ops mandate autoland, with very strict criteria about when a GA should be conducted.

Yes, it's an expensive business keeping crew and aircraft qualified, but we owe it to those people riding down the back (and that includes you and me). Also to stay out of the newspaper headlines!

PTH, this might have helped this crew out a lot verifying ILS critical area was clear. I hope they change the localizer limitations to glide slope requirements because of this. Obviously if the RJ took off at the end of the runway while they were inside the OM violated cat 3 rules. They had 2 miles clearance.

CAT 3
 

Sorry you are right there...It's the CRJ...(100-900) fitted with HUGS can perform CAT 3a approaches RVR 200m DH 50' and Low vis T/0 down to RVR 75m.

And trust me I know what it feels like flying a CAT 3 after a 4 to 5 sektor Days with Duty times up to 12-14h.

I take your point that it seem's a little crazy flying a Cat3 with out Autothrottle and Autoland (The CRJ has none), but the system is quite cleverly done and highly accurat. And like I said it has prooven it's worth in the last 17 Years...
But I am the lucky one as I just have to sit and watch People like Nic have to do the buisness...:E
You should ask him what he feels:ooh::bored::uhoh::yuk:
But this is a little thread drift...Getting back on Topic, where they acctualy flying a Cat3 app?? or a cat1 app with minimum weather?
That might be the reason they disengaged at 300' because they could see the lights? Especally considering that this was at night?

Good night

Micky

Per the Ops Specs American Airlines 737-800 are hand flown by the Captain via the HUD for ALL Cat III operations.

RVR being 1400 ft meant they were doing a cat 3 approach. A manual landing is not authorized. Hopefully the controllers not giving them a protected ILS inside the OM will take some of the blame off of them. They will have to take some of the responsibility of course.

Halfnut: thats quite interesting! do you know why? :confused::ok:

Not correct p51guy.

Ops Specs alllow RVR down to 1200 to be flown as a coupled approach and a manual landing. A CAT II. An autolanding is recommended, by the FCOM, but not mandatory.

Below 1200 a CAT III approach is required to an autoland.

protectthehornet is absolutely right. When the weather is below 800/2 you should (must) verify that the critical areas are protected any time you are flying an ILS approach.

Trusting an FAA controller to follow the rules is really not an option. After they screw up and cause a mistake, rather than face punishment or loss of their certification, they merely claim a stress related disability and get paid for an unlimited time, while they recuperate. And, during their stress related recovery, they are not required to speak with anybody about the investigation of the event they caused.

Jurassic Jet

AA's 737-800s do not have autoland capability. Hence the HUD and the hand flown CAT 3 landings. Most guys I've talked to say it's kinda fun and the HUD expanded LOC pretty much keeps the aircraft dead on centerline.

I believe the autoland capability was an option, AA chose not to go with it. I believe DL's 737-800s have both the HUD and autoland.

I do know that we (AA) are not authorized to autoland if there is a note on the Jepps stating that the localizer is not usable on rollout, which is indicated on the CLT 36 approach chart.

73

I once tried that on a B737NG simulator and works perfectly. Anyway, the incident in question happened to a MD80 and i don't think it was HUD equipped.

Yes at 1200 rvr they could have done a cat 2 approach. Then an autoland wouldn't be required. We usually brief the approach we are doing and stick with the procedures for that approach. A cat 3 would require an autopilot go around if localizer limits were exceeded. A cat 2 approach would of course allow a hand flown landing when VMC. Company sops don't want us to switch procedures and call outs during the approach. Cat 2 has a DH at 100 ft usually. A cat 3 doesn't. If they had caught the localizer on roll out not usable maybe they were doing a cat 2.

my guess is this

the approach was not going well, drifting off localizer perhaps...but then the pilots saw the runway and ''went for it''. But as we all know, there is many a slip between the cup and lip.

Did they over bank to get to the runway and drag a wingtip along the runway lights?

Of course if they had ''gotten away with it" without damage and an on time arrival, no one would know except the captain and the f/o.

There are pilots who are not experienced and pilots that are very experienced...there is also the rare pilot who thinks he is the later but really the former. Granted, if the plane is one second away from burning up in the sky...you go for it...but that lucky attempt usually uses up all your luck for a career.

still not as bad as delta landing on a taxiway!

Um, the FAA site and press reports indicate it was an MD-80 type.

shore guy

I think that the subject was slightly changed along the way...just talking about which planes do what methods in low vis landings

I do agree with protectthehornet's post 3 up, except for them "drifting off the localizer".
Seems to me, they had the (or both) autopilots coupled, and the signal got bent by the departing aircraft. The a/p kept them dead on a bent signal, causing a sverve or something, and as they saw at least something of the Rwy, lights or whatever, they tried to recover.
It can be very disorienting to fly in fog with little reference to the ground. (Believe me, I get the feeling regularily doing my manual HGS CAT IIIa).

It's just a guess, though. We will see what the report says...

Nic

PS.: Hey Micky, should I be speaking Dutch...?

The Horizon Dash 8s have hand flown Cat 3 with manual landings. These are flown off the HUD.

admiral 346 may be quite right about a bent localizer course...

I also think that glide slope extension may not have happened...but we shall see

It always amazes me to find the runway after any sort of ILS. I am reminded of the fine film, "the High and the Mighty"...at the end, the DC4 breaks out of the clouds at night over San Francisco bay...and there ahead are the approach lights...in the film seen so much like a Christian Cross...redemption at the end of a glidepath.

Never take any ILS or instrument approach for granted.

(in "the high and the mighty", the DC4 has an engine dislodge from its mount, causing a fuel leak on a HNL to SFO flight...at night...the captain, who had been going a little crazy wants to ditch, but the copilot (john wayne) slaps some sense into him and they go for the runway...landing with some 30 gallons of avgas)

I hope you see the film some time.

I have the film on my computer, and the book in the shelf, along with the others by Gann. Great story, and I also appreciate a RWY appearing out of the haze at the end of an ILS, every single time.

Nic

As to the ILS critical area, does anyone know where it is on this runway? It is entirely possible that its on the other side of the runway and therefore the controller would have been perfectly legal to launch those jets before American landed.

The ILS critical areas must be maintained in order to provide CAT III beam quality to ILS point D, a point 3,000 feet down the runway from the threshold toward the LOC.

3-7-5. PRECISION APPROACH CRITICAL AREA

a. ILS critical area dimensions are described in FAAO 6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems. Aircraft and vehicle access to the ILS/MLS critical area must be controlled to ensure the integrity of ILS/MLS course signals whenever conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles. Do not authorize vehicles/aircraft to operate in or over the critical area, except as specified in subpara a1, whenever an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS outer marker (OM) or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway.

PHRASEOLOGY-
HOLD SHORT OF (runway) ILS/MLS CRITICAL AREA.

1. LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREA

(a) Do not authorize vehicle or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM when conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles, except:

(1) A preceding arriving aircraft on the same or another runway that passes over or through the area while landing or exiting the runway.

(2) A preceding departing aircraft or missed approach on the same or another runway that passes through or over the area.

(b) In addition to subpara a1(a), do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the middle marker when conditions are less than reported ceiling 200 feet or RVR 2,000 feet.

2. GLIDESLOPE CRITICAL AREA. Do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway when conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles.

b. Air carriers commonly conduct “coupled” or “autoland” operations to satisfy maintenance, training, or reliability program requirements. Promptly issue an advisory if the critical area will not be protected when an arriving aircraft advises that a “coupled,” “CATIII,” “autoland,” or similar type approach will be conducted and the weather is reported ceiling of 800 feet or more, and the visibility is 2 miles or more.

PHRASEOLOGY-
ILS/MLS CRITICAL AREA NOT PROTECTED.

c. The Department of Defense (DOD) is authorized to define criteria for protection of precision approach critical areas at military controlled airports. This protection is provided to all aircraft operating at that military controlled airport. Waiver authority for DOD precision approach critical area criteria rests with the appropriate military authority.

NOTE-
Signs and markings are installed by the airport operator to define the ILS/MLS critical area. No point along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft is permitted past the hold line for holding purposes. The operator is responsible to properly position the aircraft, vehicle, or equipment at the appropriate hold line/sign or designated point. The requirements in para 3-1-12, Visually Scanning Runways, remain valid as appropriate.

REFERENCE-
AC150/5340-1, Standards for Airport Markings.

LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREAS. The latest edition of Order
6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems,
describes localizer and glide slope critical areas which shall be
marked and protected from parking and the unlimited movement of
surface and air traffic, to ensure the continuous integrity of
the signal received by the user aircraft.

a. The entire length of the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft shall be clear of the critical area when conditions are
such that the area must be protected. An aircraft with its
longitudinal axis aligned with the edge of a critical area is not
considered to be violating the critical area.

b. The worst case alignment of an aircraft for critical
area considerations is with its longitudinal axis perpendicular
to the runway (e.g., an aircraft departing the runway after
landing or taxiing across the runway).

c. The airport authority which controls ground traffic
movements must assure that appropriate controls and devices are
correctly located, and specific holding instructions implemented
when necessary, to protect the critical areas from ground traffic
approaching or departing an active runway if the critical area
dimension exceeds the distance of the normal runway holding
position marking from the runway centerline. Also, procedures
must be implemented to determine when an aircraft is clear of the
critical area when exiting the runway. Taxiway centerline
lead-off lights, where installed, shall be color-coded as
alternating green and yellow to denote the critical area. For
taxiways not equipped with centerline lights, a "Critical Area
Boundary" sign may be installed on the back side of the ILS sign
to indicate the critical area boundary.

d. Where the standard critical area has a significant
adverse impact on a specific taxi route, etc., it may be possible
through operational constraints to provide relief on a case-by-
case basis (e.g., considering the varying size of aircraft).
Mathematical modeling techniques are readily available to
facilitate this consideration.

REFERENCE-
FAAO 6750.24D

Looks like the controller definitely didn't protect the critical area.
Any bets as to who gets hammered with the mistake?

Jurassic Jet

That note on the rollout for a CAT approach has always made me shake my head. We autoland in CAT2 or CAT 3 conditions and rollout is used.

HUDs are really great and I applaud the use of them along with the manual flying required. Like the Jamaica landing incident today we will just have to wait for the final determination to see just what happened.