Will 9/11 Security rules kill pilots in an accident?
 

Schiphol crash pilot's death draws cockpit door scrutiny

The last 3 or so weeks, we've seen a number of aircraft fires (on take off, landing, on taxi/push back).

Scenario: A hard but otherwise survivable accident -and the cockpit door is jammed. Stunned by the impact unable to move and rescue crews unable to help :ugh:

Altlantic Airlines Bae 146 at Stord.

4 (1CA 3PAX) persons killed by fire, fwd pax door and service door blocked by rocks, they could not evacuate via cockpit due to security door which was locked, aft exits not available due to fire in mid cabin.

Pilots had allredy left cockpit via the windows, the commander tried to climb back in via the window to open the cockpit door but failed.

Is there any reason why it is impossible to have forward escape panels on commercial aircraft ie left and right of flight crew, or even some kind of pop out/breakable glass.

The secure cockpit is now a neccisity in my view and it's removal would make pilots feel quite vulnerable, post 9/11, (again in my not expert opinion.)

What options are there? The above named incidents are catastrophic, more so beacause these were totally preventable deaths (the flight crew) and/or would usually be considered minor and totally escapable, Rest In Piece to those aviators and passengers

All aircraft have emergency escape windows operable from the inside.

As to 'stunned' crew and access from the outside then a sturdy fire axe verses aluminium is not a bet I would take.

In the Schlipol incident the impact profile of tail first, rotate then cockpit probably killed the crew via the impact.

B737 FO sliding window CAN be opened from the outside. alas axe versus air plane fuselage or window - don't think that works.

An impact activated switch which on activation cuts the power to the solenoid arming the door switch.Something like raising the guarded switch.Only that it is impact activated.AND then maybe pilot+evac command switch activated too.Simple as that...
The trickiest of soloutions lie in the simplest of forms....

Helios Airways near Athens August 2005
 

The pilots lost consciousness because of depressurisation. The door prevented entry of any cabin crew (on portable bottles) until shortly before the a/c ran out of fuel:(

All post 9/11 cockpit doors on aircraft I have flown (inc. 737) had/have a ***** to allow ****** to ****** an ******, thus gaining access to the FD even if both pilots are incapacitated. I do not believe the locked FD door was a factor in the Helios accident.

(edited so that Daily Mail readers can relax once more)

I expect the locked door was a major factor in the Helios, I believe it was considered likely that the cabin crew had spent their time trying to open the door. They probably forgot the code. I find a lot of cabin crew forget the code under normal circumstances, never mind in a serious emergency situation.
I don't see the need to have a door code anyway, the deny function should be satisfactory to prevent entry unless the crew are incapasitated. Then they wouldn't want to deny.

Ref the Helios accident,

IIRC cabin crew and a passenger were observed in the flight deck attempting to revive the pilots using the pilots oxygen masks. They were unsuccessful as they were unaware the flight crew oxygen was switched off due to poor pre flight checks. The door was not a factor.

Ref the Turkish Schiphol accident,

Regrettably the flight crew were killed by the nosewheel entering the flight deck on impact.

All commercial jets have doors that deenergise with loss of ac power, have (simple) normal and emergency access codes, automatically unlock with depressurisation and an alternative escape path. It's just a question of where the biggest threat to the safety of the a/c lies.

I dislike locking the door but right now aircraft are safer that way, if a little less sociable.

Don't get me started on not being allowed to have my wife on a flight deck jumpseat though........:ugh:

On the Helios, as I understand it.The cabin crew had only just managed to enter the flight deck minutes before the engines ran down due to lack of fuel.
I imagine, if they had entered the flight deck much earlier, the outcome could well have been different.
With regards to the oxygen being switched off. On all the 73's I fly, The oxy tank is located in the forward hold and can't be turned on or off by the crew.
Pull out the mask and put it on, the rest is automatic.
The switch that killed them all was the presurisation, being in manual and not automatic.
I have also flown a number of types with locked doors. None have had more than one code option. The doors remain locked untill all electrical power is removed, and they don't open on depresurisation.

Patently not true. Please refrain from taking the CNN POV.

You will find that when on battery power only this door solenoid is deactivated anyway, so i guess that after a major impact where IDG are lost if door doesn't open it's just because of major airframe deformation.

However in the 737 (that I fly) apparently there is a CB for this door system in the E&Ebay as well.

BALLSOUT: it was a little bit less than that, but not much less dramatic and still 100% fatal. I dont know which would have been worse, unable to get in, or stuck helpless for 10 minutes/ :(

Re: Helios SKYbrary - B733, Helios Airways, Athens Greece, 2005 (HF LOC)


That scenario is something to consider though (i'm getting a bit off topic) but we need to have a procedure to empty the air in the cabin, coupled with an air quality monitoring system - in conjunction with better scrubbers and filters.

Regarding the door, I believe the simplest and safest would be dual system where the door gets an unlock request and waits for an override for the pilots before it responds and opens.

So if there is no conscious pilot, then the door will open.
There could be a 'duress' code, where the door wont open at all when it receives that code.

Or a 15 year old son? Eldar Kudrinsky

Gary Lager,
Not so on anything I flew after 911.
May I politely ask that you remove your posting?

Basil - the CDLS systems are designed, as should any decent security system be, with the assumption that baddies will know how it works. That is why there is a ***** and ample opportunity for conscious pilots to deny entry to Terry Taliban who might have knowledge of such an *******, which varies between aircraft and airlines.

happy? :rolleyes:

I heard a tale a couple of weeks ago of a captain and F/O who inadvertently locked themselves out of the cockpit of a Boeing on the ground at a quite famous northern airfield.

It seems that repeated attempts at resetting the system by depowering the aircraft did not work and so it was that it didn't move again for 2 days.

How very embarrassing.

It's done this way on 737. I found out while reading some manual downloaded from internet.

:eek: OMG!! TERRORIST!!!
(just some gentle ribbing at Basil :P)

How exactly, would one write that up on an incident report?

Details, please! lol

This is not a problem because pilots have an alternate way of getting out and once main power is removed as stated earlier the door is not locked. The door being as it is now is a wonderful deterent to hostile passengers. You know they can't get in. Let's be happy with the security improvement. Never will we let 9-11 happen again. Always make sure your FA's know the code so the Athens incident never happens again.