Yeah, it's not a simple photoshop - if you look at the right engine nacelle the lead (front) aircraft clearly has more intake exposed compared the trail aircraft. That's not to say you couldn't do it with PS, but the would be harder.

- GY

Try photoshop this:

http://i296.photobucket.com/albums/m...s/IMG_2617.jpg

or better still, this:

http://www.avcom.co.za/phpBB3/downlo...e.php?id=67070

Swartkops Air Show, South Africa 12 September 2009

f*king awesome! I havent been to a proper airshow in years.. I feel all fired up now!

Nice to see the old "Hazards' are still around as well!

And the "Hazards" are likely the real reason behind SAA handling skills! :ok:

Both Captains on these two aircraft are also aerobatic display pilots. Scully Levin, the lead pilot, turns 63 on the 28th of September, and retires from SAA this month. He is the lead pilot in both the Harvard display team and his Pitts display team. Pierre Gouws is the number two pilot and was the one doing the hard work during the B733F display. He is also primarily a solo display pilot in the L39 and Harvards.

SAA included Jet Upset training in the current secondary recurrent training program. I agree with Airbus that handling skills are under threat and at SAA it is only really the B737 pilots whose handling skills are generally up to scratch. Even the B744 pilots start to suffer from handling currency as they generally follow SAA's policy of autopilot in at 500 ft after take off and disconnect on short final. Throw in a visual approach to runway 21R at FAJS and that's when one notices how affected each pilot is.

I am neither an airline pilot nor have I read the whole thread. But with 36 years of flying over 90 aircraft types in harsh conditions, I believe I have valid and original inputs to enrich the discussion. I served among other positions as chief experimental pilot in a world renown organization, and was invited at NASA's initiative to fly the space shuttle initial tests.
In a NASA research report I read 5 years ago, 18 out of 19 B744 pilots of all experience levels failed to recognize important situations such as below glidepath on approach or PFD erroneous annunciations- in a simulator.
I read accident reports in which pilots failed to respond to simple problems, such as captain's airspeed indication error on B757 takeoff, leading to uncontrolled flight into the ocean 2 minutes later (3 additional crews repeated this in the investigation simulation), an A310 losing its tail due to captain's overcontrol following entry to wake turbulence after takeoff. Two MD-11Fs of one airline crashed and burned during manual landings with wind. Many "et cetera"s! Notably a different level of piloting was exhibited on the recent Hudson river landing. Here is my reading of all this:

1. Advanced cockpit automation poses serious challenges to the cockpit crew upon sudden or complicated failures. Pilots learn to rely on and trust automation, thus reducing their guard and proficiency. System redundancy, fail operate etc... offer improved safety and performance, such as CAT IIIb, at the cost of design and operation complication. CRM has added a measure of improved task management, but psychologists have gotten too deep into the cockpit, often complicating pilot life by adding tasks unnecessarily. There are moments when pilots are practically breathless, while aircraft automation can perform 95% of work idependently. Having flown years manually aircraft with poor inherent handling qualities, I can appreciate automation.
2. Due to market demand and growing aviation costs, quite a few pilots get to heavy transports, with private school PPLs, a few hundred flight hours in prop regionals, and a well written resume. Many therefore lack profound knowledge and experience of flight at aircraft envelope boundaries, more than 30 degrees away from the horizon or bank angle, flight near stall let alone spin, like many of us including the Hudson Airbus captain have. Those partially trained have limited ability to respond to unexpected flight emergencies.
3. Private schools tend to accept anyone healthy, capable of making the payments, and with security clearance. How many make personality selection, evaluating psycho-motoric, cognitive, and personality qualities? Vital for quality handling of complicated situations.


All these are key elements for the reduction of flight accidents by an order of magnitude. When incorporated intelligently they will reduce aviation cost, not increase it. Like anything done right.

Seems to me that the conundrum can be summarised as follows:

1. When systems are working 100%, fully automated aircraft are generally safer

2. However, when automation fails, lack of practiced manual flying proficiency by crews can lead to errors

3. Addressing the lack of proficiency requires increased manual flying which, inherently, and for 99% of the time, is less safe than using automatics

In other words, and if the statement in point 1 is accepted, in order to guard against adverse consequences of failures of automated systems, it is necessary to accept a greater amount of manual flying which is inherently less safe than automated flying - Catch 22.

2 excellent posts. I do, however, think that 'opherben's' last para "All these are key elements for the reduction of flight accidents by an order of magnitude. When incorporated intelligently they will reduce aviation cost, not increase it. Like anything done right." has, sadly, some rather large obstacles to overcome within the mindset of current airline managers.

...because size of their bonuses is not linked to long term business viability but to short term fiscal results. Therefore doing the right thing would make them financially worse off. Tempora! Mores!

Alpagueur320,
Good on you but I think maybe you have missed the point here, caused by the thread drift no doubt. This was meant to be about long haul flying where a pilot may only get two landings a month and those being at say LHR and HKG during rush hour. Add to this a company requirement to use automatics wherever possible and certainly in busy airspace after an all night, 13 to 14 hour flight. I think it is just not always possible to do a reasonable amount of safe hand flying on those type of ops. What are your thoughts on long haul flying in this regard.

Alpagueur320

Good for you but do you do this in an RNAV / RNP environment as well?

I have a dream - a dream in which each operator is responsible enough to purchase an FNPT kitted out for their long hauls (be they Airbus, Boeing or other),and for their short hauls for that matter. My dream continues with those operators being responsible enough to get all crews into that sim a day or two before the start of their trip and sit them with a training captain and review all possible approaches and the diversions in varying automation levels. That same airline would take this training into account for the total FTL and would also remunerate.

My dream is safe, my dream would (I am sure) get quite a bit of support from crews, my dream would cost money, I think my dream is dead. :{

RIX

Have to agree with you RIX. Five will get you ten that the commuters among our ranks would complain about having to leave home 48 hours earlier to complete an "unnecessary" duty - and the bean counters would probably soon convert any such duty to "home study" on your PC, as they've done with so much else of our licence renewal process already.

But on what yardstick are you measuring this enhanced ability? I find it difficult to believe that just because you fly a taildragger makes you better at the problems encountered in flying a 747 in challenging conditions. What I can see is that if you regularly practice manual flying or with reduced automation on your current type you will be better placed for the time it all goes away when you wouldn't want it to. Having just experienced my first winch launch I can accept that glider pilots are probably better at recovery from unusual attitudes!:)

It was actually an A 300 and the First Officer handling but that doesn't change the fact that many in the industry were ignorant of the fact that control reversals could overstress the flight control and that rudder limiters did not protect against this. Not sure if regular hand flying would have helped but rather knowledge of the problem and incorporating into the training programme. Also mentioned was the contrast between the 757 loss, the MD-11's crashing in windy conditions and the A 320 ditching. Rather controversial maybe but surely the latter was an exemplary demonstration of decision making and teamwork rather than pure handling skills. This is not to take anything away from Capt Sullenbergs skill as I rather imagine his ability is of an order above most of us but rather to contrast the different scenarios mentioned.

Alpagueur320

Wow you really have big ones, so much better than all those "old" captains you used to fly with. I wonder what your FO's think of all your hand flying as they try to monitor you, do the radio and tune your aids, or do you do that as well being such an "ACE"!:ugh:
If you want to do all that "hero" stuff do it in on your own and without the paying public behind you. Manual flight 99% of the time is that because you do not understand or know how to use your systems?

Alpagueur - I'm with you my friend. Good Posts

Alpagueur320

You seem to be missing the point ACE. Those accidents were contributed to by a lack of MONITORING what the aircraft and other "ACE" was doing. Your FO should not just be turning the heading bug and clicking the radio switch he should be monitoring you, then perhaps you might not one day fly through the localiser. Personally I would not want you to do that on the ILS25R in HKG.

There are old pilots and bold pilots there are NO old and bold pilots! Take care as I think your ego has a hard time fitting in the cockpit.

And why were they not monitoring Iceman ? - could it be that they were so reliant on the A/T doing what it was supposed to do that it and the speed didn't even feature in their scan. Is that not what we call 'over-reliance of automatics' ?

More Shiv comming
 

Guys, just wait for a few more years, when FANS B will be implemented...
Then, actually I think we b OBSERVERS only!!!
:mad:
My father was navigator until FMCs replaced him.
My best friend was F/E, until EICAS/ECAM replaced him.
I was a pilot, until another box replaced me.
:mad:
By the way - the technology is there (Global Hawk). What we are still missing is general acceptance by the SLF... But it's coming!
:mad:
Any ideas for a different job? With this useless skills?
14500 total, 7000 wide-body command
:mad: