Air France Safety report
 

From Aviation Week & Space Technology.
"Air France underwent an extensive review of its safety operations following the 2005 crash landing of an A340 in Toronto. The report was highly critical of its safety and pilot training standards."

Also: An internal report from 2006, which has been obtained by SPIEGEL, had complained about a deficient culture of safety at the airline. The report said the company lacked "a clear and objective view of performance in the area of flight safety."

Damaging Industry Report: Air France Airbus Jets Have Above-Average Crash Rate - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International

Has this report obtained by Spiegel been posted anywhere?

This article was mentioned in the AF447 thread. It is a load of bull - the fatal crashes are too rare an occurrence for the stats to have any statistical significance. What would be more informative is to calculate all safety related incidents of AF relative to the other airlines, but who has these stats? The regulator only probably as these rarely get reported in the media.

8 accidents out of 10 caused by human error is par for the course AFAIK.

This needs to be split up

- AF above average crash rate
- AF Airbus above average crash rate
- Airbus above average crash rate

I know it is highly sensitive and political but needs to be addressed.
Just as the widespread complacency problem at legacy carriers.

Air France Airbus safety record
 

Before getting worked-up about this:

- their last (and only previous) fatal Airbus accident was the A320 airshow crash in 1988, in which 3 died and 136 survived, despite the plane coming down in a forest;

- in the Toronto accident mentioned in the article, everyone got out alive despite a post crash fire - and the causes of the crash were not in any way related to the aircraft being an Airbus, could equally have been a Boeing.

See Aviation Safety Network for a list.

Not saying all is perfect at AF (or anywhere else), but to suggest it is an Airbus thing just seems like muckraking.

Looks like the post is about Air France, not Airbus.

Well, while we're on the subject of Air France, would anyone care to comment on the sort of corporate safety culture that would permit a 747 to depart Jo'burg for a night flight across Africa to Paris with wx radar(s) inop. Inevitable consequences of course, as they subsequently flew into a CB; injuries resulted in an en rte diversion.

The report on this incident (some years ago) was posted by somebody a while back in the AF 447 thread; surprisingly very little comment afterwards. Flying the Airbus at night on standby instruments in alternate law is bad enough, but in the midst of thunderstorms it then becomes Mission Impossible.

My question, which still remains open, is-how come the a/c ended up where it did when others ahead and behind were deviating. The 330 radar (if working) is pretty good. Maybe Air France MEL's are different.

Or, just as likely the operating/flying philosophy. Does anyone really believe that the Concorde crash was actually caused by a piece of metal from the DC-10?

What is clear to me, is that there will be another French BEA cover up that blames anything but Air France culture (maintenance or flt ops) and Airbus. The easiest scapegoat will be the pilots who cannot answer for themselves.

Wouldn't be my first choice, but I've had many very nice flights on AF, and would fly on them again , if neccessary.....

Likewise, however....it appears to me that AF has had the most hull losses in the last few years than any other European carrier.

Having lived and worked in France, it is my opinion that 'Hofstede’s Power distance Index' is relevant to the discussion. I would bore you with details about France having the highest PDI of the western world, and indeed much higher than South Korea.

Much was made of this cultural phenomenon in the case of Korean Airlines sting of mishaps in the 80's/90's.
PDI is a good indicator of how likely a subordinate is to disagree with a superior, i.e. quality of CRM.

The Toronto crash stank of bad CRM, and this 447 crash is starting to look that way too.

Look at the number of flights heading in the same direction that day that didn't fly through the storm.

AF needs to seriously examine the effect of their national culture on their flying culture.

Since 1st Jan 2000:
AF 3
IB 2
BA 1
FR 1
LH 0

(Again relying on Aviation Safety Network's database)

Aeroflot is harder work, but it looks like 2 + 1 (the 1 being the Aeroflot Nord 737 at Perm, Aeroflot-Nord being majority owned by Aeroflot but having a separate IATA code)

I don't think you can hold BA's hull loss against them, as it was for still not properly understood reasons caused by the aircrafts design......

Sure. And Ryanair's multiple bird strikes/power loss on approach could presumably have happened to anyone. Also AF Concorde - runway debris / aircraft design vulnerability.

Hofstede’s Power distance Index'
 

Hofstede’s Power distance Index' Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions LOL Hogwash, psychobable, old (and young) wives tales, a bit of truthful observations, and poppycock. Next up: Phrenology!

LockedDoor
 

Not to many design events in the B777 ! :)

.... and the one in LHR is very much RR related too.

I concurr that between AF and other european carriers there is a gap and that within AF the incident rate between Airbus and the 777 (now talking only fbw aircraft) is quite apparent ....

Only if you believe the initial tank penetration was an unsurvivable situation. Not many with Concorde experience do.

Perhaps it's the same sort of corporate culture that permits a B747 to operate from LAX to LHR (and other similar flights) with passengers and with 1 engine inop?

I know, I know, incoming, you just don't understand, the CAA approved it, it's not the same, how dare you.

But it is, isn't it, really? Safety is an absolute, not a matter for graduated risk-taking using "judgement". I've transferred bits of 100+ people from a hot mountain-side into plastic bags after a pilot took a finely-judged risk with a fully-serviceable aircraft, and I don't want to do it again.

Errr but it isn't the same. Is it? They departed LAX with all engines operating, lost one and still had the capability to lose another and land safely. Somewhat different from departing with zero serviceable radars and intentionally flying blind into an area of known CB activity. One scenario involved thinking ahead and having a 'get out' option at all times. The other didn't.

Oooh no, not again please!