A preliminary report on this hard landing was released by the Portuguese accident investigation authority GPIAA . It's in Portuguese, and can be found here: http://www.gpiaa.gov.pt/tempfiles/20...70340moptc.pdf

I've just finish reading it and the key aspects are:

-The hard landing was in PDL on the 4th of August.

-First hard touchdown of 2,13G with the throttles in CL detent, then bounce to 12 ft, throttles to idle, the spoilers extended and there's a 4,86G impact on the runway.

- The aircraft flew 6 more sectors after this, then finally stopped for a scheduled A check.

Any comment on who closed the THR LVR ?
Any dual input ?

That's not clear yet. They mention the pilot flying was the captain but then just say the pilot changed the trust levers position to idle.

The Load 15 Report clearly shows the exceedence so I wonder then, what maintenance procedure permitted the aircraft to be dispatched again after a 4.86g landing?

For SA Airbus, if you bounce after touchdown with the throttles above idle, if the levers are then pulled back within 3 secs of touchdown, the ground spoilers will deploy in the air and the plane will drop hard.

According to Airbus, main causes for hard landings:
35% Late / weak flare
23% External Perturbations
20% Nose down orders
17% Retard during bounce*
5% Dual input

*17% of the 82 Hard Landings 1998-2008 were due to retarding of levers after bounce. That 17% accounted for 40% of total L/G replacements.)

The report says that neither the captain nor the line mechanics at Ponta Delgada knew how to interpret the data in the load report... then based on just a visual inspection, they decided that the aircraft was OK to return to Lisbon, and wrote nothing on the technical log. After arriving at Lisbon, a little past midnight, the captain asked for help to other mechanics to interpret the load report, but they were also unable to do so, and decided to pass the question onto the next shift. The next shift would start at 8 a.m., but the plane was scheduled to take of to another flight before 7 a.m., and unwillingness to delay it, resulted in the severity of the hard landing being only accessed the following night, when the aircraft would undergo a scheduled A check.

nnc0;

Are those stats published somewhere? Can you provide the source?
Thanks

Jazz Hands;
Funny thing...I suspected this all along so it's no surprise.

Link to the Report in English

What a c**k up! High hours for the co-pilot too, and both pretty experienced. Some sort of 'training' trip? (which would make it worse!). Says a lot for the airframe and nothing for engineering and flying standards in the company..

As I understand the situation, the software detected that a hard landing had been made. That information was available, but not immediately understood. :ugh:

So why can't the software be configured that it prevents the aircraft from taking off following a heavy landing (perhaps by restricting engine power to only that sufficient to taxi), thereby forcing an inspection and action by engineers before return to service or to allow a ferry flight? :ok:

May l suggest that, even in these times, the Captain should know.

And if he/she doesn`t then further training is needed.

A tad surprised VC that Marvel Comic graphics are needed.

Nobody questions the engineers, or atco`s, over their cockups.

Why is that ? Could it be that pilots - the biggest cost from yesteryear - are now prepared to fly for nothing ?

The fact that money up front can`t buy experience has been showing itself in the news reels.

Loss of pay, loss of pensions, loss of conditions, and the only other branch reliant on medical status isn`t interested.

Money talks.

And


Seems to be shouting something. What kink of 'logic' turns an aircraft into a brick while it's in the air?

A logic that expects and requires flight crew to retard the thrust levers before touchdown as per SOPs.

The point is that the MLG compression is latched for 3 seconds, and ground spoilers come when thrust levers are retarded to idle.

Since there have been other incidents during which flight crew have not retarded thrust levers before or at touchdown, but while in the air upon a bounce, the logic has been changed.

This entire sequence seems to me, on the face of it, what one would expect. The logic of the automation behavior is predicated on specific crew behavior; this specific crew behavior has not always occurred; the automation behavior has been modified to adapt to these rare instances in which crew do not follow SOPs.

PBL

Not true. Plenty of both have been sanctioned for poor decision making and rightly so.

In this case the Pilots should have entered the hard landing in the log, the engineers in should have asked the crew to enter the hard landing in the log.
I find it frustrating in our company how many crews think its acceptable to not enter a fault in the log and wait for the return base sector to snag it. It saves money for the company but can and does regularly come back to bite.

They knew they'd done a hard landing, why not enter in the log and leave the engineers to properly inspect the aircraft?

The AMM is quite clear on what to do in case of hard landings and how to find their severity from the report. The eng's can't be expected to know everything about every aircraft they look after but the should recognise when they're out of their depth and make the right calls before releasing the aircraft.

LR - it is appropriate to note that this 'experienced' crew did not maintain power after the bounce in order to cushion the return to earth as per 'normal'. Had they done so I guess the boards would not have popped at that height which might have knocked a few 'g' off the second go.

SOP certainly not, at most recommended procedure.

Keep some thrust as late as desired to control indicated airspeed and vertical speed with appropriate attitude.

Interesting to note that the A/THR didn't react to the decrease of IAS below Vapp during the flare. Rate of descent was still above 700 feet/min and pitch already at 7 degrees : Obviously some thrust was needed to help !

Another example of the poor A/THR response for a late wind change. A bit of thrust under manual thrust would have helped to improve the first touchdown and avoid what came next.

I'm slightly confused about this matter of the spoilers.

Having sat next to countless newbies on their first-ever circuits (base training, we call it here) I must have seen more interesting arrivals than the average but never, as far as I am aware, have the spoilers deployed in the air.

I always understood that they simply cannot.

CONF - you'll have to excuse PBL - he does not know much about swept wing handling:ugh:

fantom - I am not sure whether you are talking AB but if you are perhaps you didn't let Bloggs close the thrust levers on a bounce?