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-   -   Air France A330-200 missing (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/375937-air-france-a330-200-missing.html)

Captain-Crunch 4th Jun 2009 08:36

rubik101,

Why do you keep saying the "B" word? There is no evidence at all of that. There is, however, evidence of severe convective weather on the route. There is, however, evidence of the aircraft being rather High in Coffin Corner early in the flight (FL350 candidate for jet upset.) There is radar evidence of an enormous mature cell (and almost all, mature cells have associated lightening contained within them whether or not a lightning detector on a spacecraft or a weatherman in Atlanta can see it is unimportant.) All of us who have penetrated them can tell you they are full of lightening, St Elmos fire, extreme turbulence, massive up/down drafts, ice beyond normal design limits... etc, and when you exit a big one don't just punch out at a 90 degree angle or you might break the wings off. It is my humble opinion, as a guy who flew before wind shear was even a word, that you should exit at a 45 angle to the cell wall.

Naturally, don't penetrate and you won't ever have to make that choice. But riding around on autopilot all the time pushing buttons does nothing to sharpen your hand flying skills for a possible situation like this when you will need it the most. I am simply appalled by the autopilot-dependent culture in many flight departments.

Crunch

Munnyspinner 4th Jun 2009 08:38

ADFS,

This is probably one for a new thread anyway and there is every chance this ppost will also be deleted. However, the seemingly arbitrary removal of perfectly reasonable postings speculating as to the cuase of this accident gives the impression that the mods are exerting editorial control.

It would appear, at the moment, that the wreckage trail is pointing towards a sudden and catastrophic failure in the airframe. The ACARS message indicates an sudden depressurisation but this may have been triggered by factors other than that which has been suggested by a senior AF pilot. A lightning strike that may also have disabled the radar and comms could caused a breach in the fuselage which would iniate an explosive decompression.

It is assumed that the crew were unable to broadcast any mayday and it was therefore a sudden event that caused the loss of A/C and all on board. If Comms were damaged by lightning the crew may have had no means to relay a message in any event. Even with the highest workload, there were three crew and it is inconceivable, in my mind, given their location over the sea and hundreds of miles form the nearest landfall, that communication would not have been one of the highest priorties, irrespctive of what else was going on. Only recovery of CVR will confirm actual circumstances.

Everything here points to a freak accident caused by a confluence of events - the perfect storm. The sooner that the variuos theories are ruled out and the causes are identified the better for everyone.

etrang 4th Jun 2009 08:40


the 'ACARS' messages we have indicates a slow but steady degredation of the systems over some 14 minutes (at least)
Why 14 mins? The first and last messages have been reported 4 mins apart.

MikeAlpha7 4th Jun 2009 08:42

ACARS
 
I have worked on installing the latest ACARS system in my airline and the amount of information that one can get from ACARS is mind boggling. In fact I would dare to say that is as good as FDR , but obviously lacks the CVR capability of recording voice.

ACARS works with VHF or SATCOM , there is also a HF data solution but it is not common and only few airlines use it.

As far as the AF A330 is concerned , I have no doubt that they had SATCOM as the postion of the A/C over the ocean was away from any ground base recivers . hence MCC or Operation Control could get all the messages from the stricken aircraft.

One thing that remains to be seen is how Air France has selected to operate the ACARS on this route. Transmissions using SATCOM are expensive, many airlines are selctive in the amount and the frequency of information that is transmitted by ACARS using SATCOM. Some configure the system to collect all the data and when they reach a VHF station , it dumps all that data to base using the much cheaper rate.

A very good question was raised about the G force . YES , ACARS can send this information as well and it will be quite helpfull in the crash analysis. Whether the G force was recieved by Air France or not is not clear.

ACRAS is the primary tool for Aircraft Tracking with many airlines operations control centers. However , again it depends on how the airline has configured the system. Obviousley it is a waste of money to send postion fix every five minutes (specially under SATCOM) , neverthanless ACARS is second best flight tracking system after Radars with an added advantage that a Radar has certain range while ACARS is not necessarily bound by range limitation.

.

Phalanger 4th Jun 2009 08:45


'There are five electricity supplies on the plane and they would all have to fail.' He said a bomb was the only logical reason for why the captain failed to send out a mayday call.

I wrote the same hypothesis at 0223 yesterday but that and two further posts were deleted. As will this one, I have no doubt.
Because the messages from the computer are relevant, not the chance of some occurrence. De-pressurisation was the very last, along with vertical speed. There was 4 minute spread of computer and system failures before that.

I'm sure he has also flown those same number of years without a bomb on his aircraft. But there has been system failures before, as well as bombs. So you must look at just the information on this crash.

ByteJockey 4th Jun 2009 08:51

@BOAC, I can't remember where I saw it, but there was a report that other flights were in the area at the time, both ahead, behind and parallel - if memory serves, one was a DHL freighter. The report also said that none of the flights that might have heard from AF447 picked up anything. It does seem a little puzzling that the crew sent out an ACARS message but no radio traffic was heard, although the fact that the first ACARS message was sent on the hour suggests it may just have been a SOP-scheduled message.

AMF 4th Jun 2009 08:58

For you Airbus 330-200 drivers out there (or anyone else who actually flies for a living at the higher flight levels)....

FL 350 and still heavy with weight of 8 hrs of fuel plus reserves remaining for the trip.

Autopilot disconnect (for whatever reason, the ACARS says this was the first event) , now hand flying in Alternate Law. No overbank or (my understanding) buffet protections. Moderate, or possibly severe turbulence in the mix if that's what kicked off the Autopilot in the first place due to pitch or roll overlimits. Now your prime consideratoin is to keep the aircraft within the aerodynamic buffet boundaries.

Have any of you hand-flown an Airbus (or other aircraft heavy with fuel) at those flight levels even in smooth air? What about in rough air and may have to maneuver...or outside forces are doing the maneuvering/airspeed fluxuations for you and you're fighting to stay withing the (small at FL350) flying envelope/Q-corner?

The problem with > moderate turbulence when you're high and heavy isn't about shearing off parts of the aircraft that in turn cause it to come down, it's about being able to keep it flying especially if the Autopilot gives up due to conditions exceeding it's capability to keep up with changes of axis/and or airspeed and suddenly hands control over directly to the pilots, where that pilot may have little or no experience controlling his wallowing aircraft in that high-altitude, small margin for error realm of fight on a good day, let alone a dark and stormy night.

Perfectly good airplanes have succumbed to the Laws of Aerodynamics with no faults, structural failures before the fact, lightning strikes, b-word events, etc. etc. etc. in the mix. Just because in normal conditions we don't run up against the boundaries of those Laws doesn't mean they disappeared...they're still there waiting to bite. And we are paid NOT to run up against those boundaries and avoid situations where we might, and this is what we routinely do as professionals.

Take a jet aircraft and put it high, heavy, and run it through rough enough air and the Laws of Aerodynamics are waiting. I assume they still teach these things for those that haven't experienced it. They really aren't kidding.

MikeAlpha7 4th Jun 2009 08:59

It seems many people here are looking at the weather as a probable cause.

I have flown the A340 (but not A330) for many years in similar tropical weather on the other side of the world , Africa , Far East and India where the same weather pattern exists.

Towering CB's , Massive CAT's , rain and precipitation of huge magnitudes are quite common. No pilot in his right frame of mind will attempt to penetrate the worst of such weather and in this day and age , the pilot has plenty of information and warning to prevent him from going through such weather.

If , and I say a BIG IF , weather is considered as a major factor , then surely there must have been a failure in the cockpit mainly the weather radar, that sent the crew into a very active cell. OR , the radar failed to pick up these activities !!!!

Our old A 340's ( no more flying) had a problem with weather radars. If I can remember rightly , we had problems with the shallow band of vertical coverage of the radar. It could not pick up the significant weather when it was tilted beyond certain degrees , up or down. Apparently it was a software issue , which was supposed to be fixed in the newer generations of A340 and A330.

OleOle 4th Jun 2009 09:08

MikeAlpha7

does the ACARS "know" whether the SATCOM uplink is working, and would it buffer the mesages if it "knew" the link is unservicable for the moment and sent them at a later point in time when it "realises" the link is up again?

Or in other words: If messages are received during a four minute period of time by the operator, does that necessarily mean, the technical incidents which triggered the messages did happen also within a four minute period of time?

Can messages be lost during transmission, such that the message set received by the operator is actually only a subset of what was sent by the a/c?

Probably that kind of questions is what people in Paris are trying to sort out in the the moment.

Fly747 4th Jun 2009 09:08

Punch through!
 
Quote;
"I still think people are losing sight of the fact that when transiting the ITCZ, sometimes there is NO ideal way through. You've gotta punch your way somehow and that route depends on what looks better on the radar and outside."

I have to disagree with Farfrompuken's comment above. In extremis if there is no way through then you have to divert or go back if you can't go around the storm. That is what we are paid to do if necessary.

jauh 4th Jun 2009 09:09


Presumably any TAT anomalies could affect the ADC and ultimately the flight control system. However many of these systems have internal monitors, data cross comparators and validation routines which could eliminate erroneous information, although possibly degrading control system performance.
Not when your ports are frozen over and only to a degree - remember Aeroperu 603? Granted, that was a B752, but you can only do so much with conflicting info... I had mentioned pitot-static failure before AF did, purely based on ACARS messages, but nobody paid any attention to it...

REO 4th Jun 2009 10:18

AMF, aggree with your view
 
As an ex 340 "operator" and now a happy -400 "driver", I must aggree with AMF's post...
Put all that together, and now add "dual input" as both guys upfront grab the stick, as the autopilot kicks out, and try to correct the jet upset!!
As you know, "dual input" doubles, or cancels out the actual stick position

A bad day for all.

RIP.

AIEXPATS 4th Jun 2009 10:28

"advisory regarding cabin vertical speed"
 
For the A330/340 rated - a question.
This will be the next A330/340 sim LOFT session once the facts come out!
Is this "advisory" an ECAM message also?
Looking at all these ACARs messages prior - what electrical power losses would cause the Controllers to default/fail?
If for example all power is removed - does the system enter in FAILSAFE closed position for the valves (operating the Ditching Valve)?
Is there an situation you can think of where the Outflow Vlv/s would not close fully to control the cabin altitude - perhaps causing this vertical speed advisory?
Meaning if the sequence of events, ECAM warnings, etc. has the 3 cockpit crew dealing with all the previous issues, now comes an eventual CABIN HIGH ALTITUDE.
The next problem for the Crew would have been a "controlled" expeditious (2-3000 ft/min) or maybe even an emergency descent (shy of MMO with Speed-brakes)?
As we know that would make it extremely difficult to avoid and very easy to literally drop right into even more severe weather and the eventual turb., icing, spacial orientation and performance issues.

dougydog 4th Jun 2009 10:36

AMF,

How much above `optimum` do you think he was at the time?

On the 767 entering an area of severe turb you are recommended to be 4000` below optimum for max comfort away from stall mach buffet etc...What is it on the 330?

I remember in the early days of the 76 some of the older chaps would go as high as possible- sometimes 4000` above optimum- used to feel like being on a knife edge. Doesn`t happen on my flt deck I can tell you!!

Knutsford 4th Jun 2009 10:36

The "failure" of the Captains TAT probe would cause a double ADR fault.

The result of this is the disconnection of the autopilot and a reversion to Alternate (2) Law.

This was quoted in an earlier post as the first two symptoms transmitted via ACARS.

As I understand it, the health of the said TAT probe is not monitored, so this would not be evident.

fireflybob 4th Jun 2009 10:42

Until they (hopefully) get the FDR and CVR who knows?

However we do have a proven a/c (ok yes there have been a few incidents as with any type), an experienced and mature crew who presumably were well familiar with long haul ops across the ITCZ and the hazards associated with large CBs working for an established company with a good track record.

My opinion on the scant evidence we have so far is that something happened extremely quickly - no distress call was apparently made.

So if I was a betting man I would go with the bomb theory. I just hope and pray they get the recorders from the ocean.

jauh 4th Jun 2009 10:53



I had mentioned pitot-static failure before AF did, purely based on ACARS messages, but nobody paid any attention to it...
Wow maybe you should contact BEA and tell them you've figured it all out already.

Iced up pitot/static probes on a modern airliner at FL350, lets get real please.
Well, what will knock off a/p, switch the opmode of FbW and lead to a stream of ADIRU failures? If you're gonna dismiss ideas, at least do that constructively...

BOAC 4th Jun 2009 10:54


Originally Posted by etrang
Why 14 mins? The first and last messages have been reported 4 mins apart.


11:00 p.m. local time — The pilot sends a manual signal saying the jet was flying through CBs — towering cumulo-nimulus thunderheads.

11:10 p.m. — A cascade of automatic messages indicate trouble: The autopilot had disengaged, stabilizing controls were damaged, flight systems deteriorated.

11:13 p.m. — Messages report more problems: The system that monitors speed, altitude and direction failed. The main flight computer and wing spoilers failed.

11:14 p.m. — The final message indicates a loss of cabin pressure and complete system failure — catastrophic events in a plane that was likely already plunging toward the ocean.
Purely based on what we have on this thread, the first possible indication of 'difficulties' at 11:00?

deltayankee 4th Jun 2009 10:54


My opinion on the scant evidence we have so far is that something happened extremely quickly - no distress call was apparently made.
I am not convinced that this opinion is the only explanation. Several posters have already expressed that in the case of extreme trubulence and/or an upset they would be busy trying to fix it and not make distress calls a priority. Just a few posts back someone pointed out that when you are in the cruise with headsets off you might not be able to find the hand mike. And frankly at three hours from the nearest land I don't see what an urgent distress call could do. It is different close to landing where you need ATC help.

Klauss 4th Jun 2009 11:02

Where
 
Hi,
does anyone know where the accident happened (lat/long) ?

Hand flying: rarely done at altitude, but not a problem at all.

ITC: seemed stronger 15, 20 years ago, but still well worth keeping an eye on.

Radar: can be difficult to interpret. Remember, radar shows essentially water.
Water falls down when the sun goes down (mostly). What remain are weak
echos of possibly still strong turbulence.

Satellite-pics: not available in real time in the cockpit. Don´t know if
they were available to the AF-Crew before departure.

Best, Klaus

MartinM 4th Jun 2009 11:09


Purely based on what we have on this thread, the first possible indication of 'difficulties' at 11:00?
I believe that the problems already started earlier. But during this 4 minutes, there was the total loss off control. The cabin VS warning would light up if the pressurization system is not able to maintain indicated cabin altitude, this either to a high rate of decent or ascent. I haven't ever stressed the A340 Level_D Sim that way. So i cannot really tell you how much V/S (positive or negativ) is necessary to force it. I recal some earlier statements, +/-1800. Well. I guess that was the moment were the aircraft was falling out of the skies and the reason why V/S was exceeded and why the cabin V/S popped up.

11:14 IMHO was the moment when the aircraft on its way down from 35'000ft broke up in parts. Thats when there was nothing to comminicate anymore by ACARS

ACARS unfortunatly is not telling us what happened in the minutes before loosing control.

Cheers
Martin

eazyflite 4th Jun 2009 11:10

Airplanes on the same Track?!
 
I am wondering about that there is no discussion about that within 2hours more than 5 Airlines flying on the same track through or better to say around the tropical system eg. IB there were scheduled 10min later. How they did manage the circumnavigation around the storm? Or did they delay the departure? Was there no air to air talking?

Gergely Varju 4th Jun 2009 11:11

About 14 minutes between messages theory: If there is a problem, a long typed message isn't priority, and it is sent at 11:00, which would make it even more likely that it is something sent on regular basis. If there would be problems at this time, when they have time for typed messages, they would have time to decide deviate, return, etc. with many options. And if things would get worse (slowly) in the next 14 minutes we would have reasons to expect to see more communication attemtps, etc.

Why no MAYDAY or PAN-PAN message sent to ATC? We don't know the exact reasons, even if we assume they could contact ATC somehow, and the storms didn't make it impossible, their radio was working, sending such messages are urgent if you expect ATC can offer some assistance.

DVD 4th Jun 2009 11:11

To eazyflite;

From what I hear in another spanish forum, the IB flight was just a couple minutes behind the AF in the same track, although I think they were I little higher 370, they didn´t go thru the TS, the deviated a lot to avoid it, and the ride was quite smooth....

theballetbrusque 4th Jun 2009 11:14

Alternate Law
 
ALTERNATE LAW If Multiple Failures of Redundant Systems occur, the flight controls revert to Alternate Law.
The ECAM displays the message: ALTN LAW: PROT LOST
Ground
Mode
The ground mode is identical to Normal Law. Flight
Mode
  • In pitch alternate law the flight mode is a load factor demand law similar to the Normal Law flight mode, with reduced protections.
  • Pitch alternate law degrades to pitch direct law when the landing gear is extended to provide feel for flare and landing, since there is no flare mode when pitch normal law is lost.
  • Automatic pitch trim and yaw damping (with limited authority) is available.
  • Turn coordination is lost.
  • When pitch law degrades from normal law, roll degrades to Direct Law - roll rate depends on airspeed.
Protections
  • All protections except for load factor maneuvering protection are lost.
  • The load factor limitation is similar to to that under Normal Law.
  • Amber XX's replace the green = attitude limits on the PFD.
  • A low speed stability function replaces the normal angle-of-attack protection
    • System introduces a progressive nose down command which attempts to prevent the speed from decaying further.
    • This command CAN be overridden by sidestick input.
    • The airplane CAN be stalled in Alternate Law.
    • An audio stall warning consisting of "crickets" and a "STALL" aural message is activated.
    • The Alpha Floor function is inoperative.
  • The PFD airspeed scale is modified:
    • VLS remains displayed
    • VALPHA PROT and VALPHA MAX are removed
    • They are replaced by a red and black barber pole, the top indicating the stall warning speed VSW
  • A nose up command is introduced any time the airplane exceeds VMO/MMO to keep the speed from increasing further, which CAN be overridden by the sidestick.
  • Bank angle protection is lost.
  • Certain failures cause the system to revert to Alternate Law without speed stability.
  • Yaw damping is lost if the fault is a triple ADR failure.
ABNORMAL ALTERNATE LAW Abnormal Alternate Law is activated if the airplane enters an unusual attitude, allowing recovery from the unusual attitude.
  • Pitch law becomes Alternate (without autotrim or protection other than Load Factor protection).
  • Roll law becomes Direct law with mechanical yaw control.
  • After recovery from the unusual attitude, the following laws are active for the remainder of the flight:
    • Pitch: Alternate law without protections and with autotrim.
    • Roll: Direct law
    • Yaw: Alternate law
  • There is no reversion to Direct law when the landing gear is extended.

eazyflite 4th Jun 2009 11:23

to DVD
 
well, also a lot of Flights ex GRU were flying the same Track, if they were all deviating the TS, it seems to me either the WX Radar was U/S, or maybe the Pilots felt into sleep. Nobody would fly into the red Patches. Nobody could overfly the TS. (Tops up to FL500)

nyt 4th Jun 2009 11:26

overspeed?
 
For what it's worth, "Le Monde" claims through a unnamed source that the plane was overspeed and that an airbus directive will be published ASAP regarding speed management in rough weather.

carzerdan 4th Jun 2009 11:28

One a/c pack trip off limits for A330
 
Please, can you tell me what is the FL limit for an A330 with one airconditioning pack trip off?

Do you know how much would be the cabin rate change in that condition, at FL 350

Another question: does de ACARS send message if the A330 is losing power in one or two angines (eg. due to ice build?)

Hard turbulence, with ice build up is a very bad scenary. Is is not?

Cheers, Carlos

NARVAL 4th Jun 2009 11:41

I take the liberty of posting my previous message again, if I may...
Although the initial failure report in the automatic message seems to have been about electrical problems (I do not know which) and the "tree" of possibilities of systems degrading from there is a vast one, I have kept in mind since the sad news ot the accident the following facts:
the A330 is a beautiful aircraft but it has shown, again and again , very susceptible to probes icing, with the deicing system on auto (numerous reports). This leads to very rapidly presenting the crew with a very lame aircraft to say the least (I give you a factual example below, recent, on an A330, without comments). This has happened at high cruise altitudes, with no ICE alarm, with the heating on AUTO, and out of clouds in some cases...
"Light tutbulence. The speed indication on the right PFD falls suddenly from 280 to 100 knots in red tape for a few seconds Almost immediately the speed on the left PFD falls to green dot minus 15 knots with a speed trend of minus 50 knots. Red alarm A/P OFF ADR
DISAGREE, IAS DISCREPENCY, ALTN LAW PROT LOST, REAC W/S DET FAULT.
Then amber alarm RUD TRV LIM FAULT.
Then STALL STALL STALL with Toga Lock indication.""
The crew changes flight level, the captain pilots with the stand by instruments,
The speeds become normal again.
The status after that:
amber crosses on PFDs
W/S DET FAULT, ALT LAW PROT LOST, ADR DISAGREE et F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT (2
NOGO).Plane in Alternate law
This shows how an unconfortable event (loss of airspeed indication) that would have been minor in, say , an A300, becomes a major headache in those very sophisticated cockpits. Just for information and not saying that is
a possible explanation...but lose electrics, and apart from dealing with retrieving the generators, you may have that kind of thing loaded on top...
This failure has happened not once but at least four times in the previous year on the fleet.Why do heated pitots ice? In non severe icing conditions, and even out of clouds?I have flown a lot and I would have said that was impossible but the facts are there. It is a documented fact at least on this type of aircraft.We learn from facts and this could very possibly have a direct bearing to this tragic accident.

Shaka Zulu 4th Jun 2009 11:42

@ carzerdan: can't comment on the pack off max alt for an a330. I know on the 777 if the pack trips off during flight and after appropriate checklist remains off there is no operational limitation. If it is an ADD on the ground than the MEL will give a ceiling restriction for 1 Pack operation.

Cabin Rate will not change IMHO.

ACARS will send a message when it senses abnormal N1/N2/EGT/Oil pressure/Vib/Temp readings (and many more) during any phase of flight.

@ nyt: overspeeding a modern jet is very easily done. The wings are supercritical (another word for extremely slick in layman's terms) and we fly reasonably close to Mmo (max operating mach number under normal conditions). The aircraft however is tested well beyond this Mach No. I know for my aircraft type Mmo is 0.87, the a/c has been tested to M0.95 and it doesn't need any other checks until M0.91 is reached.
Has to be quite an extreme upset with no flight crew actions to get that carried away.

Of course in a vertical up/downdraft situation with no autopilot and 20deg nose down in the coffin corner we are in a WHOLE new ball game.

@ all: long briefs by dispatchers have been removed from most big airline ops. Personally we get a range of maps/charts given to us and it is up to us to decide on the best course of action/possible re-route if it looks bad. Personally it has happened to me that the ''planners'' routed me through an area of possible severe turb for the sake of a 20min quicker flight time.
Although tempting from one angle and sometimes lightly pressured in the current climate and the ''cost is king'' mantra these days, it is easy to accept the routing. We all know that 90% of the time these areas tend not to be that bad. Gladly I did decide for a re-route that day.....

@ all: TAT probe icing is very incipient and extremely hard to diagnose when you haven't been confronted with it before.
(I've had it happen to me but the post will get too long)
BUT: if it happens inside towering Cu/Cb, IMC, Auto pilot disconnect, A/S and Alt anomolies and severe turb....
well that's a situation I rather not contemplate being in....

Roller Merlin 4th Jun 2009 11:42

Reported today in The Age Newspaper, Melbourne:

Pilot saw 'white light' where Air France flight lost
June 4, 2009 - 8:22PM


The captain of a Spanish airliner claims to have seen "an intense flash of white light" in the area where Air France Flight 447 was lost, the El Mundo newspaper said today.

The co-pilot and a passenger on the Air Comet flight from Lima to Lisbon also saw the light, it said, adding that a written report from the captain has been sent on to Air France, Airbus and the Spanish civil aviation authority.

"Suddenly, we saw in the distance a strong and intense flash of white light, which followed a descending and vertical trajectory and which broke up into six segments," the unidentified captain wrote.

The Air Comet flight's position at the time was at seven degrees north latitude and 49 degrees west longitude, whereas the Air France flight was estimated to be on the equator and 30 degrees west longitude, El Mundo said.

"Given the coincidence of time and place, I bring to your attention these elements so that they may be, possibly, useful in casting a light on the facts," the captain wrote.

The Air France jet went down on Monday during a flight from Rio to Paris with 228 people on board.

Air Comet is a Madrid-based airliner that mainly flies long-haul routes between Spain and Latin America.

AFP

Rananim 4th Jun 2009 12:01

Practically impossible to say anything constructive with what is available but surely speed(low or high)must figure highly.


For what it's worth, "Le Monde" claims through a unnamed source that the plane was overspeed and that an airbus directive will be published ASAP regarding speed management in rough weather.
This must be their starting point for this investigation..As you approach rough air,you reduce to Va which puts you halfway between low speed and high speed buffet on the speedtape.The higher you are the closer these two will be(hence the reason for flying 2k below opt alt when turbulence is expected).So less margin to counter any speed excursion caused by turbulent air penetration.If you lose electrics concurrently,then you will have to rely on standby ASI which will give IAS only,so one of the first things a pilot should mentally check approaching rough air is the IAS equivalent of Va in case he has to fly it manually.The key is accepting alt excursions and concentrating on att vs speed.CWS R and CWS P are recommended but of course you need the AP.As with so much in flying,speed is often the killer.

All comments made with reference to Boeing aircraft.I cant comment on how the scenario plays out in a scarebus.But a plane is a plane is a plane.

vetles 4th Jun 2009 12:01

not overspeed
 
In response to nyt regarding overspeed?

" For what it's worth, "Le Monde" claims through a unnamed source that the plane was overspeed and that an airbus directive will be published ASAP regarding speed management in rough weather. "

I believe the point was that the A/C might have reduced its speed too much:

"The first thing you do when you fly into turbulence is to reduce speed to counter its effects. If you reduce speed too much you stall," retired pilot Jean Serrat explained to AFP."

Crashed Air France jet flying at 'wrong' speed: Report- Politics/Nation-News-The Economic Times

averow 4th Jun 2009 12:16

Very interesting point. One could envision such a system being created, then acquiring mostly benign information up to the point of the very rare catastrophe, at which point the parameters we really need (when reconstructing events or faults in a post-hoc fashion) are not acquired due to electrical catastrophe on the vehicle or in the immediate environment of a thunderstorm.

NASA was able to glean a lot of information after the Columbia and Challenger accidents from data telemetry but those were obviously densely instrumented vehicles with dedicated data acquisition facilities groundside. The bandwidth and storage issues with trying to do the same for hundreds of routine passenger flights would be staggering IMHO. :cool:

Farm gate 4th Jun 2009 12:23

A330 probe icing and it's affects
 
A previous poster stated that probe icing in the A330 was not likely. I have experienced what i think now was TAT probe icing in the A330 whilst deviating around a CB. The TAT increased by 30 degrees C, the FADECs limited the amount of thrust available and the VLS and MMO limits moved towards each other limiting the range of speed available. Last year two A330s operated by an asian carrier suffered air conditioning pack shutdowns within an hour of each other within a couple of hundred miles of each other. The failures, i understand, were blamed upon a large increase in the TAT, the aircraft were deviating around a typhoon at the time.

OleOle 4th Jun 2009 12:25


I have been talking with the captain of the IB flight that was 10 minutes behind the AF. Here you can find my conversation. Apuestaforo - Ver post - Accidentes aéreos
Interesting. When the IB 10 minutes behind reached TASIL everybody was allready calling out for the AF, so it must have been clear quite early that it was missing/lost.

Wiley 4th Jun 2009 12:27

Whilst I agree with Klauss' comment that hand flying is rarely done at altitude, I can't agree that it presents "not a problem at all".

Even for a pilot with high handling skills - (a descriptor that I think, if we were being honest with ourselves, very few of us, in these days of maximum use of automation, would lay claim to) - flying at high altitude, even if not in Alternate Law, can be a very mushy can of worms, even in smooth conditions.

In an area of severe turbulence, hand flying at high altitude is not something I'd like to have to do, particularly with such a narrow speed band as the unfortunate Air France crew presented with.

fireflybob 4th Jun 2009 12:28

2 or 3 days ago on BBC Radio 4 they were interviewing someone (can't recall name etc) from one of the organisations who have previously recovered FDR/CVRs from the ocean. Whilst admitting that the recovery was challenging he was confident that recovery was not only feasible but could and would be achieved. At the end of the interview anyone listening would be left in no doubt that recovery of the recorders was a certainty.

On a slightly different tack who has title (legally) to the recorders? If the official body deemed that recovery of the recorders was not possible and would not be pursued, could others parties do so and if they did are they legally obliged to hand them over to the official investigation?

md-100 4th Jun 2009 12:33

I guess if FDR/CVR cannot be found.. maybe a new rule for the future could be a mandatory use of ACARS reporting problems with a lot of parameters.... (like a limited online FDR/CVR)

theballetbrusque 4th Jun 2009 12:51

Relevant? Media Idiocy.
 
Air France flight 447 delayed by bomb threat
By Editing Staff http://forums.canadiancontent.net/ar.../phpjVxnci.jpg
Media sources have learned that Argentine media reported on May 27 that an Air France flight traveling from Ezeiza Airport in Buenos Aires, Argentina to Paris, France, was delayed after the airline reportedly received a bomb threat, just days before Air France Flight 447 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean.

According to momento24, on May 27, authorities boarded Air France Flight 415, a Boeing 777 en route to Paris and searched the plane for a bomb, but found nothing. They were acting on a threat that had been phoned in. The search lasted for nearly two hours and none of the passengers were evacuated from the aircraft. Air France issued a statement saying the threat was later proven to be "false" and that the plane had only taken 32 minutes to search, and was then allowed to proceed to its destination.

Air France flight 447 delayed by bomb threat


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