It will be a pleasure to buy it
 

...shall hunt down your web site

Peter's book
 

Me too!
Where can it be ordered?

me too- BTW I flew with your father on 707's a looong time ago - how is he, is he still around?

For the book try Peters website = his name dot com or google it.

I look forward to reading you book too Peter. I'm sure your book will be a "laster" and through the years will sell consistently as it is the type of book most aviators and some other curious folk will be very interested in. After all, you will forever be etched in Aviation History and held in such high regard.

Also, it is the kind of book that all aspiring/new pilots coming into the aviation world wil want to read.

I'm sure most Libraries around the country would also want to stock it.

Sales may take time to gather pace, but I'd be surprised if it didn't sell well into the thousands. Aviation disaters are a global subject/interest and all English speaking countries for starters are potential markets.

Further out, next christmas should be a great time for ramping up Sales. There are alot of retired pilots, ex Military guys, aviation enthusiasts that would love getting your book as a gift.

In the world of the internet and very quick word of mouth and easy global courrier services, good things can surely happen for your book.

I take note though, that you have written this book for your Children first and foremost.

Best of luck with everything,
JJ

Regarding all this back-and-forth about autopilot and having control, let me see if I've got this straight:

- AP was engaged on approach, FO was PF from 800' onwards
- Due to worsening situation, FO did not explicitly disconnect the AP - entirely forgiveable in the circumstances
- FO had hands on the yoke at all times and as soon as the AOA looked iffy provided corrective action

So, the PF was hands-on-yoke, monitoring AOA and providing corrective action, which sounds pretty "in control" to me. Far more importantly, the AAIB considered he was in control and his captain also considered he was in control. At the end of the day that's all that should matter - anything else is just nitpicking to the level of those complaining that Sullenberger and Skiles didn't hit the "ditch" button, even though the structural damage rendered the effectiveness moot.

Great result, and what a thoroughly good bloke to boot.

Seat 30k
 

Bill G Kerr:
Yes, I've tracked him down. He's made of Australian stuff, and he's OK. :D

Peter ...

After the accident, what happened with all the pax / you and your crew ?

Did they open the survivors reception centre you hear about, by old stand C18 ?

Well done again !

Your Great mate!
 

You see, Peter even cares enough to track down an injured PAX, as an Aussie myself I am sure he would appreciate the thought. V Australia have 777's I am sure that the Aussies would love to have Peter as a 777 Captain fly the Pacific for them.
Come on Aussie come on!

Good one Pete!

Tima9x

TIMA9X
Yep, application in and talking to the CEO; also being helped by another pruner not too far away on this thread. :ok:

Sorry about the brick hut.
 

I spent quite a few Hatton Cross restaurant breakfasts at the engineering base wondering why they built that brick shed that took off the u/c just where they did. I guess if I had said anything at the time no one would have listened to a 16 year old engineering apprentice. I'd like to see areas before the threshold reserved and clear.
Looking forward to the book Pete! Hopefully one day you will feel like giving a talk about your experiences with an audience of friends...

Posted in memory of KL who sadly died recently after a very long struggle, an engineer at BA who I had the great privilege of working with.

Not all that long ago a Captain lost an engine over the Midwestern US, (one of three). Fortunately an additional Captain was aboard, and between the three crew, the star crossed DC-10 crashed short of Sioux City, but on the airport. Many died. Acclaimed a hero, Captain Haynes humbly said, "too many died.....so many". He went on to retirement and travelled widely, speaking to many many people as the hero he was.

Without available power, Captain Burkill and F/O Coward brought a two hundred ton glider safely to rest at the threshold of his cleared r/w.

One person was badly hurt, has recovered, and the rest are safe and sound. Both equipment failures (another thread), with dedicated crew and quick thinking action.

Captain Haynes had some time to plan his controlled crash, Captain Burkill had forty seconds, with his F/O at the controls when things went quiet.

I can understand a few in the flying community picking nits about 038, but I am astonished that Captain Burkill isn't enjoying the same attention and plaudits as Haynes in the public arena. I am drawing a blank here; both heavies were even BLUE for goodness' sake. Sully had far longer to set up.

:D

bear

I agree entirely, I think there has also been a distinct lack of appreciation of the pilotage shown by my erstwhile colleague in Ryanair, who sucessfully (except once again from an insurers viewpoint ) converted a single engined go-around he was handed by his colleague , into a deadstick landing on a not terribly long runway.
Well done Fred :ok: Glider pilots Eh ?

Playstation,

Thank goodness the 'good' engine chucked it more or less straight away..............otherwise?

Land the f$cker!:ok:

Come on, be fair all round. Haynes didn't just lose one engine of three, the shrapnel took out all his hydraulics to boot. He didn't make a "controlled" crash - he had no control surfaces. That they made it back to anywhere near an airport, let alone a runway, is amazing. I fully expect that Haynes would have traded all his engines for working control surfaces on that day.

[just to be clear, none of the foregoing is intended to diminish the achievements of BA38 crew].

Ken (if I may foreshorten you ;) )
Lots more to say on that one me old mucker, I understand that cojo, who was PF ,said "go around flap 15" or such-like, entirely correct as regards Boeing /RYR after an eng failure on app (although I believe that both would allow that in a time /height limited situation a landing would be an acceptable alternative)

I believe the Capt possibly thought " Oh Alfred Hitchcock" (or something ryhming with) & would have possibly taken the opportunity to put the thing on the ground given the impressive flying display nature had afforded him.
However, by this stage our steely young chap in the RHS had done all the good stuff & skyward they went.
No doubt one could analyse the cost/benefit of the energy they gained by pushing TOGA & launching skyward followed by sudden silence & the need to aggresively change to an attitude required for a no-engine landing fairly far down the RW vs a slightly more forward thinking " Oh Sh1t" that was a LOT of birdies , one is gone , maybe better to land , approach.

All I will offer here, is my profound thanks that the "live" engine didn't function for an additional 10 seconds or so more . . . that would NOT have been helpful.
As always, some hindsight employed here, but I feel, had I been PIC , that G/A call may have been responded to INSTANTLY with " I HAVE CONTROL", followed by a landing, but then again, I am now guilty of what I accused you of on the BA038 thread, who knows EH? Good weekend me man :ok:


P.S , I didn't at any stage mention that the copilot was Dutch, and that his dad was on here instantly shaying how good he did, did I ? ? :D

Count me in for a book. As a simple SLF, I think I would pick 'Peter':ok: as my crew if the same thing were to happen to any plane I was flying in.

Book...ing?
 

Dear M'day38,

Please print sufficient copies on your 1st run to allow for me to purchase 2 x copy please.

In the 35 seconds or so from recognition of any abnormality to impact, you and your crew performed commendably. The action taken in this hectic period was remarkable. The raising of the flaps to F25 in that time frame is quite amazing, and the benefit is identifiable; BA-038 missed a lot of frangible and non frangible objects that would not have otherwise been the case. The trade off of F30 v F25 is highly dependent on the energy transfer available, and on analysis, you guys did the right thing.

In all honesty, I think BA and the BA-038 passengers and crew could not have asked for a better performance than was demonstrated on the day. I remain thankful that my 777's (PW's & GE's) apparently weren't susceptible to the same anomaly.

The problem facing your flight and the timing of the event is fortunately rare, so much so that it is not even in general terms trained by any civil organisation I am aware of, so you and your crews actions stand as an example of the ability of the human to adapt and react in a time of critical stress and uncertainty, where heuristic based solutions are not readily forthcoming due to the nature of the abnormality (see refs).

With respect to S.F.L.Y. and similar viewpoints on this forum, your responses have been refreshing and thankfully tolerant. Given the process you have had to endure since the event, tolerance is an attribute that could be reasonably seen as being diminished, yet that is not the case. Your actions stand in the full light of day, and do not cast any shadow of doubt on the performance of the crew.

If any criticism is felt to be forthcoming from this open forum, be assured that such views only reinforce the fact that the event you experienced was remarkable, and that the remarkable outcome stands in mute testament to the crew's performance.

"Character is like a tree and reputation like it's shadow. the shadow is what we think of it; the tree is the real thing".

Abraham Lincoln (1805 -1865), Lincoln's Own stories



Cheers,

FDR
Warm Springs

References:

Paul Anand, "Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk", Oxford, Oxford University Press 1993 repr 1995 2002

Clemen, Robert. Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Decision Analysis, 2nd edition. Belmont CA: Duxbury Press, 1996.

De Groot, Morris, Optimal Statistical Decisions. Wiley Classics Library. 2004. (Originally published 1970)

North, D.W. (1968). "A tutorial introduction to decision theory". IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics 4 (3): 200–210.

Peterson, Martin, An Introduction to Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press 2009.

Raiffa, Howard Decision Analysis: Introductory Readings on Choices Under Uncertainty. McGraw Hill. 1997.

Robert, Christian (2007). The Bayesian Choice (2nd ed.). New York: Springer.

Shafer, Glenn and Pearl, Judea, editors. Readings in uncertain reasoning. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1990.

Smith, J.Q. Decision Analysis: A Bayesian Approach. Chapman and Hall. 1988.

Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes and Sidney Siegel (1957). Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford University Press.

F. Bacchus and A. Grove, Graphical models for preference and utility, Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-95), pp.3-10, 1995

C. Boutilier, T. Dean and S Hanks. Decision Theoretic Planning: Structural Assumptions and Computational Leverage. JAIR 11:1--94 (1999)

C. Boutilier, R. Patrascu, P. Poupart, and D. Schuurmans (2006). Constraint-based Optimization and Utility Elicitation using the Minimax Decision Criterion, Artificial Intelligence 170(8--9), pp.686-713.

A. Doucet, N. de Freitas and N.J. Gordon (eds), Sequential Monte Carlo Methods in Practice, Springer-Verlag, 2001.

Itzhak Gilboa, Theory of Decision under Uncertainty Series: Econometric Society Monographs Cambridge 2009.

G. Lankriet, L. El Ghaoui, C. Bhattacharyya, and M. I. Jordan, Minimax Probability Machine, CS- Berkeley, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 14, 2001.

R. Mateescu, R. Dechter and K. Kask, Tree-Decomposition Approximations for Belief Updating, American Association for Artificial Intelligence, 2002.

Matthijs T. J. Spaan and Nikos Vlassis. Perseus: Randomized Point-based Value Iteration for POMDPs. JAIR 24, pp.195-220 (2005). [Partially-Observable Markov Decision Processes]

J. Pearl., Direct and Indirect Effects, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2001.

Roland W. Scholz (ed), Decision Making Under Uncertainty, Advances in Psychology 16, Elsevier Science Pub 1987 (2nd Ed)

Xavier Boyen and Daphne Koller. Tractable inference for complex stochastic processes. UAI-98

RR TRENT in B777
 

"I remain thankful that my 777's (PW's & GE's) apparently weren't susceptible to the same anomaly."

lets wait and see...

There is a common thread between this accident and other earlier ones and that is the lack of awareness in the cockpit of what is happening with the largest flight control on the aircraft.

On Boeing 75,76 and 77 aircraft the control column and rudder pedals show you what is happening to all the flying controls except the stabiliser that goes on it own merry way with the only indication a small green indicator out of the pilot's field of view.

When flying the classic 737 I always found that the clanking of the stab trim wheel was a good indication of something happening when the autopilot was engaged that might need my attention, whether it was a minor jet upset or lack of power on the approach. When I converted onto the 767 the ability of the stab-trim to wind on loads of stabiliser without any obvious indication to the crew was, I thought a retrograde step.

This isn't the first time that a proper stab trim wheel would have alerted the crew to a problem (still engaged A/P and falling AS) and increased their awareness of the situation.


It is a shame that Mr P A Sleight & Mr R D G Carter didn't add another Safety Recommendation to the Accident Report: Bring back the Stab trim wheel to increase aircrew awareness of what is happening with the Stab Trim during all phases of flight.
They might also have added another. Double engine failure on finals:...........G/A flaps. We could call it the PB recall item. Well done mate, it wasn't just you that was able to speak to your wife afterwards.