the video seems to show alot of sand being kicked up


I offer this theory.

we all know that wake turbulence is at its worst when you are slow, heavy, clean.

it seems to me that there is indirect proof that the flaps/slats are up as the wake seems to be making more sand kick up than usual.

follow my thought?

This other video, perhaps, shows the details a bit better:

LiveLeak.com - Spanair Madrid barajas Accident 2008 JK5022 airport camera video show actual crash 2ND version

Any (subjective) comments on the attitude of the plane at that time? Does it seem a bit excessive to any of you for the last part of the rotation on those conditions?

What use is a 'config' button if it simply stays silent when you press it?

In my present type we do a config check at the start of each taxi.

Press the button- no sound- announce "Flap x config check"

The config could easily have failed!

On my last type (Embraer 145) She (the aircraft config aural)used to say
" take off- OK"

So you knew:

1. Config system working.
2. Take off config OK.

On my present type you press the button- hear nothing _so you know:

EITHER:

1. Configured or
2. Config system gone tits up!

When people talk a bout 'lining up the holes in the cheese'- this is one hole that could easily be filled in- permanently!

Below about 1 span altitude - vortex buildup is significantly less than
in free air due to ground obstructing the movement of air. This is why you get an induced drag reduction - or span dominated ground effect as it's called.

XPM

No more speculations. The accident is an exact copy of this. Even the weight is almost the same. I would pay special attention at a couple of things.
First at page 40 says:

Second.
Moving to pages 73. At chapter 3.-Conclusions, subchapter 3.1.-findings.
Point 7 confirms the roll inestability of the MD when close to the stall.
Points 8,9 & 10 talks about TOWS of the CAWS and at the next page, under chapter 4.-Recomendations:

I don't think at this point we can be accused of being "wildly speculating" any more. I think this thread is just analyzing, discussing, and expanding on the topic surrounding this accident, including using ficticious or unproven similar scenarios as part of these discussions. Each of us share his own opinions, views and experiences.

The outcome, hopefully, is a better understanding of these issues that may even contribute to avoid fatal events in the future.

I think we all greatly respect the victims and their families, and I don't think our discussion is in any way disrespecful. Others may think otherwise, of course, but my conscience is clear.

Boeing did react to the NTSB recommendations after the Detroit accident by issuing a recommendation to all operators of similar planes to test the TOWS prior to each take off. I also have the feeling they could've done a bit more given the somewhat "fragile" nature of the TOWS (i.e. little redundancy, hard troubleshooting diagnosis, subtle failure warnings, etc), but, realistically, if the TOWS system operation is tested prior to each take-off, the safety improves exponentially and is probably adequate.

I believe that, if Spanair had "known and interpreted" the recomendation clearly, it would've been a non-issue for them to comply with it. No operator wants to ignore simple-to-implement, almost "free", safety recommendations by manufacturers.

The "blame" is gonna go back and forth. Boeing is going to say that they were never "required" by a formal FAA order to implement the measures recommended by the NTSB and that they "fixed it more than adequately" by warning people to test TOWS more often.

Spanair is going to say they knew nothing about it and their procedures are approved by spanish authorities. I won't even go into how, even if the FAA would've made the recommendation mandatory, which it didn't, it wouldn't have had authority in Spain.

Civil prossecutors are going to say that Spanair should've known what the current manufacturer's recommendations were.

Spanish civil aviation authorities are gonna say that they leave on the hands of operators to implement whatever procedures they feel appropiate and basically just stamp an approval on them with little review on their side.

European authorities are going to say that the recommendations weren't mandatory.

And around in circles we go.

Lesson learned: from now on, probably, civil air regulations bodies in most countries are going to demand that the TOWS in airplanes with similar designs undergo a mandatory operational check prior to each takeoff, resulting in somewhat higher safety.

As we saw in LAPA accident, having a working TOWS doesn't prevent the accident, of course, but hopefully would help tilt the decissions of most pilots to abort the TO/correct the configuration under such circunstances.

Alas, the TOWS could fail from the time it is tested til the time the actual take-off happens. Testing it 10 minutes before TO doesn't guarantee they'll work during TO.

And if a pilot forgets to configure wings and doesn't follow checklist (Northwest), then chances of them skipping the TOWS test are also high.

In Spanair case, it looks at this point like they did follow the checklist, but missed/missread the flaps. They could've, just as well (but realistically less likely) have missed a TOWS inop test also.

So what is the "real" solution? How do we make sure the pilots read the flaps indicators and settings very carefully before each take off w/o significantly re-designing older planes to include near-infallible alarms or devices the inhibit the acceleration unless flaps are deployed during take-off or flaps that open automatically (and reliably) at certain speeds/etc?

Video
 

To PPPPilot and the rest
 

Well, a very cheap and cheerful but extremely useful modification would be one or two vidcams around the plane, with the ability to flip a screen from one to t'other; a wide-angle view from top of fin, and along the belly (and possibly looking inwards from both winglets, if fitted)...
Not only could a glance at a fin-top camera image before TO have provided a quick backup check of config, but in this day and age (mad rush to get loaded, leave gate and get airborne), be useful in other contexts as well... e.g. engine trouble, there'd be little doubt which one had surged.or taken a bird, looking straight into jet-pipe (and I believe that has been mistaken before with tragic consequences, equivalent to a surgeon cutting off the wrong (good) leg!)

I believe there's still concern in some NTSB quarters that some of their recommendations are not taken seriously enough by the FAA; one example being those after the post 9/11 Airbus vortex wake/fin failure incident..

Rananim post 1867
I'm retired a while now, and a long way back to McDiesels, but was not the windshear/loss of performance after V1 procedure along the lines you mentioned?
I seem to remember part of the procedure was to ensure that the flat/slat handle was actually physically in the 15 degree detent. ( Good hard rattle of the handle and lock)
Also, not sure about DC-9 30 series, but MD-80 series does have auto-slat as I recall, (except in up-retract mode?) Oh dear its been a long time!

The unfortunate thing is that it sounds cheap and cheerful in theory, but then you have to factor in the number of DC-9/MD-80/90/717s currently in service, of which a significant number are well past their median service life. It's not just a case of fitting cameras too - you'd have to retrofit a sturdy area to the airframe to attach them, they'd have to be reliable enough to deal with the rigors of extreme temperatures and moisture levels, and you'd still have to plumb the camera output back to the flight deck and affix a suitable display.

These costs add up, and on this particular model there's a perfectly good gauge telling you the surfaces are deployed - and it seems like there's an equally good 'killer items' check that should be performed before the take-off roll that should maybe considered mandatory on this, if not all types. At the end of the day, a pilot under sufficient pressure could still miss the camera as a final check, so really you'd just be providing another backstop.

Having said that, the ease of switching some aircraft systems into 'air mode' does trouble me, and I wonder if a non-functioning configuration warning system ought to be a no-go item. However, as an admitted non-pilot I wonder how practical that would be.

there are a couple of things to think about...ZAGORFLY

IT IS A HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK THAT CAUSES A STALL (exceeding the critical angle of attack = stall)

AND YOU CAN'T SEE ANGLE OF ATTACK...what you are seeing is pitch attitude. (naval aviators might even say "deck angle")

I encourage all you non pilots to read: "Stick and Rudder" by wolfgang langweische. And all of you pilots who haven't read this book, why not?

You will learn about angle of attack and relative wind and all sorts of nifty things.

There was nothing wrong with the engines that caused this plane to crash...a multitude of things came together...including IMHO:

poor training of mx people (by this I mean not understanding that the RAT probe being heated on the ground was a symptom of plane being in "air mode")

poor cockpit discipline (checklist, concept of killer items...and my favorite, muscle memory...holding flap handle until gauge reads properly and not letting go until then)

hiring a copilot with very low flying time

not following boeing procedures (to check takeoff warning system prior to each takeoff)

and it all comes down to NOT SPENDING ENOUGH MONEY TO FLY RIGHT. (right as in correct, as in "straighten up and fly right")

The big problem is all of these things came together on the same day, same flight and a tragedy resulted.

Those who do not remember the past are destined to repeat it.

(by the way, if you want to "see" the slats/flaps, just stick your head out of the DV window prior to takeoff and look back at the wings)

Since the flightpath relative to the ground is visible in the video, it is possible to construct a flight-path vector (at least approximately) for each frame. So one can make a pretty good estimate of the angle of attack, based on the video images and some simple geometry.

E.g. this picture taken from the video shows the aircraft shortly before impact, with the aircraft slowly descending:

http://www.flightglobal.com/assets/g...x?ItemID=25191

The angle of attack shown in that frame would have been slightly larger than the pitch angle.

sevenstrokeroll;

Excellent summary of the real truth; - thanks for posting.

Contrary to almost every opinion and speculation here, it wasn't "slats" or a failed TOCW system that "caused" this accident.

"No slats" was the result of an earlier series of commissions/ommisions, some with antecdents that were years in the making, most occurred in the hours and minutes before the accident. I agree with you that we cannot discount low-time/inexperience. Whether it is a factor may or may not be determined by the investigation; it depends on how far the judges are willing to go I guess but it would be both a shame and wrong to stop at the cockpit door.

Any other attributed "cause" is a form of tautology and not a solution to why this aircraft crashed. The key is, why did this crew not extend the high lift devices? The rest are details. The pilots failed. Why?

.
The fuselage angle relative to the runway is 23 degrees.

.

Because I was issued a copy of "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" by H.H. Hurt.:) It was also good gouge for the (recently bankrupt) Delta interview.

Sadly, as you speculated a couple of weeks ago, it does look like the Northwest Romulus crash has been repeated.

@zagorfly

Most take offs on A300 are slats only.

Because I was issued a copy of "Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators" by H.H. Hurt.

Airbubba, though not a pilot nor even an aspiring one, I have read Stick and Rudder and consider it a classic for any literate person, right up there with Hound of the Baskervilles and Wind in the Willows. Nathless I must inquire if Aerodynamics is better, supercedes, improves upon, or was just there first, or what? If better than Stick and Rudder, how do you know if you didn't read it?

Not wanting to argue, just to inquire.

To bounce off the ground, the wing Lift has to be close to the acf Weight.
(or the gear needs a high spring constant). None of these were the case here.

My interpretation the information given;

They did not rotate late, according to the FDR/CVR they rotated at the correct Vr.
Having no slats/flap, the acf was not able to lift off, so they continued
the TO roll (in a pitch) for about 10 sec and gained enough speed to lift off.
Chord dominated ground effect helped them lift off, but this effect will disappear of around 20' AGL on the MD80. Also there will be an increase in induced drag (span dominated). So, after about 4 sec, the acf entered a stall. The rest is in the video.

XPM