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Fairchild Merlin twinprop disappeard off coast in Norway
Coast guard aeroplane. Three persons persumed dead.
http://www.aftenposten.no/english/lo...cle2496023.ece |
Aircraft owned by Helitrans and crew also hired by Helitrans.
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The Norwegian AAIB has commissioned the salvage ship Polar Prince and has commenced search of the ocean floor using an ROV.
According to aftenposten.no, good radar plots of the accident is suspected to help in locating the wreckage. (There is a SSR at an hilltop of approx 1000ft on Sotra island just to the east of the suspected crash site. It should have clear view down to sfc) MOD coastal radars are in the vicinity as well. The names of the crew was released today: Knut Brunborg (45), captain Jan Einarsen (60), captain. Inge Marius Vågsberg (29), first officer |
The wreckage has been found, a Norwegian newspaper reports.
Heavy damages indicates that the aircraft hit the water at high sink rate. The three crew memebers were found inside the wreckage. The CVR is also found. |
The wreckage was found at some 320m depth. It has been salvaged now, and is on its way to Bergen initially, then on to the Norwegian AAIB in Lillestrøm. Appearantly the aircraft disappeared from the radar screens as it was doing an F/O skilltest/typerating. The investigation will probably take some time, as it should to be thourough, and should porve to be interesting to read when it is released.
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The ship has been docked at Haakonsvern Naval Base for some time already. According to several media sources, the CVR was recovered with the wreck, and the aircraft did not have a FDR installed.
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Structure
It doesn't always work, but if I'm not flying, I try to sit nearest the tail.
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Would not have worked there.
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I knew Inge when he was at flight school, he was a very dedicated pilot and a great lad, He will be missed. Very sad news.
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The report is now ready and can be downloaded here: 2011/40 | sht
(Click on "Last ned rapport"). It's in Norwegian but contains illustrations concerning the deep stall. ENGLISH SUMMARY increased focus on flight examiners tasks.The flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was hired as a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins for the operator Helitrans. He was one of two candidates that were employed by the company in early 2008. They underwent ground school and flight training in co-operation with the Swedish Type Rating Training Organisation (TRTO) Trafikkhögskolan. Later it became clear that the Swedish Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) did not accept skill-tests limited to first officer duties on a single pilot certified airplane, as the Norwegian CAA did. The candidates did not possess the skills to act as commanders on the Merlin, and there was a period of uncertainty while the operator and the Norwegian CAA discussed how to conduct the skill-tests, in particular whether to use a simulator or an actual airplane. After several months the issues were resolved and an examiner was appointed. There was a limited slot on a Thursday and a Friday where the examiner, the instructor/commander and the aircraft was available at Bergen Airport Flesland. The first candidate performed the skill-test on Thursday. The weather was not suited for flying skilltests. It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. Turbulence caused the stick pusher to activate during the demonstration of slow flight. The commander decided to pull the circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SAS²) presumably to avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher. After the slow flight demonstration, the examiner asked the candidate to demonstrate a stall. The candidate found this exercise frightening as she experienced great difficulties, having to use all her available physical strength to regain normal flight with the engines on full power and in IMC conditions. The weather was similar on Friday with even stronger winds. The SAS² circuit breaker was not reset. This was confirmed during the start-up check. The examiner requested a similar program during this skill-test as he did the day before. However, when it came to demonstrating stalls, the examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate’s request. It was IMC. During this exercise the crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased, even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 – 400 ft during the period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000 ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured. The accident aircraft was used for coastguard duties and was modified with external sensors and antennas. The AIBN made a Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis in order to determine whether these installations influenced on stability and flight characteristics in the slow flight and pre-stall regime. It was found that the modifications reduced the overall performance, but did not result in any significant degradation of stability and control in this regime. There was no investigation as to any influence on the characteristics of a fully developed stall. The AIBN is of the opinion that this accident highlights the need for a change in the current training on initial stall recovery techniques, especially the focus on minimum loss of altitude at the expense of breaking the stall by lowering the nose and thus reducing the angle of attack. The AIBN has issued two safety recommendations to the Norwegian CAA; one regarding the conduct of skill-tests for pilots in a multi crew concept on single pilot airplanes, and one suggesting |
The AIBN is of the opinion that this accident highlights the need for a change in the current training on initial stall recovery techniques, especially the focus on minimum loss of altitude at the expense of breaking the stall by lowering the nose and thus reducing the angle of attack. http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/130711_...Techniques.pdf How widespread is the teaching that minimising height loss is more important than actually recovery from a stall by reducing the AoA? |
Trying to recover from a stall by increasing power is just plain daft, the person who came up with the idea should be shot..
Adding power in many aircraft types may actually result in an increased AoA, especially low wing types with underslung engines. I was always taught to get the nose down FIRST then consider adding power once the stall is broken. This is probably a result of the mistaken teaching of "stalling speed", a wing stalls at an angle of attack, (usually around 15 degrees) not at some magic speed. |
Pardon the ignorance of a long-retired pilot, but surely you don't practice stalling in IMC conditions?
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Pardon the ignorance of a long-retired pilot, but surely you don't practice stalling in IMC conditions? Also, it's been at least two years since the FAA have been leaning away from the "min height loss in a stall" technique, and quite rightly so in my opinion. |
Pulling the c/b on the SAS illegal, who are the geniuses that invent this type of training, this airframe requires the SAS system for a reason, what a waste of life.
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Lowering the nose does not break the stall. Moving the control column forward to reduce the angle of attack does break the stall.
If you doubt this then re-read that CAA Notice. |
The candidate found this exercise frightening as she experienced great difficulties, having to use all her available physical strength to regain normalflight with the engines on full power and in IMC conditions Staggering.I feel with the Kid, probably just out of training and not knowing what to do and how to stop the checker. :{ |
The commander decided to pull the c/b.............hopefully the Norwegian C.A.A. will now have an opinion and act on this now flight tested procedure!
I believe there were several other incidents where this pulling a c/b unauthorized has not worked out as expected. I recall seeing a picture of a brand new A340 wrecked and it said it was because of pulling a c/b unauthorized.. by a delivery acceptance crew member. |
Account of the accident itself (Google translate and som editing):
LN-SFT took off from runway 17 at. 1009. The flight began, commented candidate 2 that it was windy. When the plane lifted off the runway (rotated) the stall warning came on, and the commander commented that the candidate 2 was a bit abrupt with a stick. After the departure step LN-SFT straight to 4 000 ft before it turned right and continued rise in the west. LN-SFT was given clearance to operate in 6,000 ft, 10 - 20 NM west of the airport. The entire flight was recorded by radar. An altitude of 5900 ft was reached at. 10:13:40. The plane was about to cross the coastline on their way west. 1/1/13 Approx. 12 NM west of Flesland flew LN-SFT only a 360 ° turn (steep turn) 4 on the left. In the turn commented commander hill upon which candidate 2 replied: "Correcting. Wow. Correcting. It was violent. Correcting. "To this the commander commented:" It is not easy to fly it here, the plane is so short, "and added that it was difficult in the pitch plane. Similar variations in height were commented on in the subsequent turn 360 ° to the right. The examiner, however, was satisfied with the results and requested that the candidate went on to demonstrate slow flight at 125 kt further west. When the rate was stabilized at 125 kt asked the examiner if the rate was reduced to 115 kt and flaps and undercarriage should be lowered. The commander said he would take care of the flaps and undercarriage. The plane started so in a gentle curve to the left. During the turn commented commander and candidate minor corrections for altitude and speed. Shortly before the plane was again on an easterly course said the examiner: "When you get to 090 then - unless you have the height and 115 kt, take him out to stall, first Indication - and so with recovery and facilitate call-outs in connection with it. " For this, said the commander: "Then I can take the throttle so you do not overtorque the engines, you just tell me max power - also gear up, flap up. " The commander added: "So just to stall warning. You do not have to stall out. Just say max power, gear up, flaps up " Candidate 2 thought a moment that the exercise should be done on course 190 °, but this mistake was corrected and the aircraft continued to course 90 °. Approx. at. 10:24:40 commented the commander: "OK, then you stall - you have the correct height - minimum altitude loss. "Three seconds later came the sound of" stall warning "and candidate 2 said: "OK, max power." 5 seconds after the "stall warning" came the sounds, an increase of engine sound. 10 seconds after the "stall warning" came the shouted examiner "Check speed! check the speed! check speed - gear up! "and later" What are you doing on "and "Get him out of it!" To this the commander replied: "It's hopeless. It can't be døne. " "Stall warning" sound continuously for 51 seconds before the recording was broken in the plane hit the water. In the period sounds consistent sound from both engines. 16 seconds after the sound of "stall warning" came on, said the candidate 2 "gear up" followed by the sound of a handle was served. Soon after came the sound signal "gear warning", and this sounds the rest of the recording. Radar data (see Fig. 1, 2 and 3) shows that the LN-SFT before the crash was an easterly course for about. 5800 ft and with a ground speed of 140 kt until noon. 10:24:40. Approx. 8 seconds later began the flight, so to rise. At 10:24:51 did a 25 ° shift to the right until it reached a maximum height of approx. 6,200 ft at. 10:24:56. Then, the plane lost altitude and made a 55 ° shift to the left. From the plane began losing altitude, until it disappeared from radar at approx. 700 ft elevation, it was 33 sec. By comparing the radar data with information from cvr shows that it was about. 14 seconds from the stall warning came on and to the plane began losing altitude. After the last shift on the left continued LN-SFT in a north-easterly course of approx. 60 °. First, ground speed approx. 110 kt, but pretty quickly it went down to approx. 60 kt and further to 50 kt. The plane had a ground speed of 50 kt when it disappeared from radar. Despite the commander's response to the examiner that it was hopeless (see Section 1.1.14), recordings from the cvr shows that the crew did not give up attempts to get the plane under control, for example, by raising the gear. There does not appear that they tried to take in the flaps in an attempt to restore control. Whether this had had a effect in the extreme position of the aircraft is not known. |
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