Another impressive video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1PY_7GNfIw

I'm a massive fan of airbus but one of the things i would say about it is that it is quite easy to float it prior to touchdown (320). This is mostly alright, but on shorter runways with a tailwind and a wet runway things can become dodgy quite quickly. While i think the Airbus 320 is a great aircraft, I think other planes, like the 37 would be more suited for this particular airport.

Here you can hear ATC coms just before the accident (in spanish) http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mh...2008-1530Z.mp3

It seams they asked for rwy 02 due to reduced visibility which was worse for rwy 20 approach. On final the wind is reported form 190 with 10kts and the runway was wet.

Lots of the contributing factors for an overrun got together...

Overruns happen to every plane, don’t blame airbus on it, at least before we know what really happen, besides knowing some of the factor normally present on overruns where there we have no more information.

A320s fly on a daily basis to LPHR in the Azores, which has only 1585 meters available for landing. Sure not a lot of terrain around and its almost at sea level, but you can’t say airbuses can’t do short runways. You just have to follow the operations procedures.

I agree with you, I know several of them and enjoy El Salvador a lot, I remember the famous TACA pilot that dead sticked the 737 onto the levee in New Orleans. :D

At a glance, looks like a great place for the folks from Naverus to build an RNP/RNAV approach.......

http://www.naverus.com/

Communications
 

flyinGuppy, thanks for the link that you sent, is it possible to know in some way how official is that? http://archive-server.liveatc.net/mh...2008-1530Z.mp3
Because according to that recording the pilot made an IFR approach to runway 20, made visual contact, asked the particular 02 runway after that because of the conditions, circling to land, recived report of wind from 190 at 10 kts. and was specifically advised of the wet runway conditions.

I may recall the news that day, there were actual passengers on board that confirmed that the pilot made previously an approach attempt, and then the second one to land, with the consecuences we now know about.

Thanks for the link flyinGuppy, and as you say, whatever the aircraft technology, it does not look too good with a 10 knots in the tail on that specific WET WET WET runway ...



???
So I need to learn something as well , and I'll be more than happy to !
Because to this day, except from the rudder pedals inputs, I know NOTHING from the PF flight control inputs ...
Dream Land ... you tell me !?

Looking for previous posts
 

Sorry guys, was trying to get a copy of my post #61, does anyone have a copy? Also, some other previous posts in this same thread, please let me know how I could get them.
:confused:

Read in the news (Proceso Digital, Honduras) that Palmerola would be open to commercial flights in 60 days for airliners that used to land at Toncontin. The reason for the delay would be some work that has to be performed to get Palmerola ready for international operations. In the meantime, these flights would be sent to San Pedro Sula.

Does anyone know for sure if an airport can be changed from a military landing field configuration, and then fully certified to ICAO standards in just 60 days?

C212-100
Not sure if "alarming" is the word to use in flight safety or investigation work, but "interesting" might do...:)

All 3 were on wet runways and the first two had difficulties with spoilers, reverse and braking. The TACA 320 appears to be in forward thrust and except for #5 on the starboard wing, the spoilers appear to be retracted.

Manufacturers resolve the problem of spoiler/reverse deployement in the air in different ways - for the DC8 it was the nose oleo compression that deployed spoilers, (reverse was always available). Not sure what it is for the Boeings.

The Lufthansa A320 accident at Warsaw was brought up in the Congonhas thread with regard to the availability of spoilers, reverse and braking. After the Warsaw accident, Airbus changed the software "on-ground" logic such that partial spoilers would be available with an initial compression of one main-gear oleo. Previously, until both oleos were "on-ground", the spoilers would not deploy and system logic prevented auotmatic-braking and reverse, (manual braking was always available). Config 3 landings were Airbus-"recommended" under these circumstances after the accident. In the data we examine however, we see very few Config 3 landings.

If I recall correctly, the Quito accident appears to have been caused by damage to the oleo position sensors which prevented the ground spoilers from deploying which in turn prevented the availability of reverse.

The DFDR will tell the investigators the usual things about touchdown speed, g-loads, oleo compression, spoiler/reverse positions, thrust-lever position, brake-pedal deflection, brake pressures, anti-skid operation etc etc. The initial interest will likely be around such systems and their performance.

PJ2

Just a minor correction.

According to early Accident Information Telex by Airbus, the A340-600 in Quito did get spoiler deployment, but did not get autobrake or reverse thrust.

The sequence was as follows:

- Very hard touchdown (~1100ft/min)

- On-ground-Condition initially fulfilled -> Spoiler deployment. With the thrust levers in idle or reverse, spoilers remain deployed, even if WoW-signal is subsequently lost, e. g. during a bounce.)

- A wiring loom at both main landing gear bogies failed, severing the wires that transmit WoW signals

- Abrupt bogie derotation caused all four main gear front tyres to burst

- loss of WoW signals prevented reverse thrust activation.

- I'm not 100% certain what caused the autobrake failure. Autobrake is initially triggered by the same signal that is used for spoiler deployment, but, unlike spoilers, autobrake operation may depend on a continuous WoW signal. It may also turn off if tyre pressure is too low, although this is not mentioned as an arming condition in the FCOM.


Bernd

An English translation of the exchange audible on liveatc (two recordings there) is now available at:

http://avherald.com/h?article=4077cedf/0016

Servus, Simon

I believe Airmalta have similar approach into LICR reggio Calabria Italy

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cjc1p...eature=related

Quito - look at the braking available after you have blown the front tyres, and the implied deceleration thereafter.

Congonhas - note the procedure changes introduced by Airbus via EASA into the FCOMs with regards to spoiler deployment or not after landing. Not seen the new knowledge requirements yet for groundschool training.

TGU - first impression (is that the right word when looking at the crumpled fuselage?) makes me think that the aircraft did not fall off the runway at particularly high speed. The spoilers may retract below a certain speed on the ground during landing roll out.

The AA touchdown "early" - please remember why the threshold is displaced and what for. The arrows are there to displace the threshold for obstacle clearance purposes associated with those hills a bit further up the approach. The use of arrows and not X and the runway's PCN number indicate that it is ok to touchdown prior to threshold, if you really want to. There may be other reasons why it is not a good idea. Oh, yes, I remember, a busy European airport had a 737 lined up and they gave another 737 landing clearance so it did over the top of the one on the runway. The investigation report's main conclusion was that displace thresholds were a good idea as they gave more vertical clearance in this situation.... another great investigation there then :ugh:

I have more to add, but that is all I am allowed to say for the moment.

Discount.

No such thing.


Thanks for the translation Simon.
From what I can see, there is nothing like a ''direct'' approach in Tegucigalpa, except maybe in case of severe visual conditions
At 1527 the crew elected to discontinue (early in the procedure) the circling approach for Rwy 20 due to low clouds, decided to climb back to 8000ft to start again an approach with the idea to later circle for Rwy 02 this time.
Nevertheless, the crew looks concerned by tailwind component:
''We request approach to runway zero two and if possible, winds is five knots''
Could it be the 5kt tailwind a TACA operational limitation in TGU ?

Bernd, thanks for the correction and input.

1100fpm...wow - was there any 'g' reading available from any preliminary report?

It's a wonder such a long fuselage didn't break over the wingbox/gear station...

The point is well taken regarding the stopping effectiveness of four flat tires. It's certainly a point of consideration in any high-speed reject.

This is a video of one TACA Airbus 320 landing at Toncontin.
(Please note THIS IS NOT actual flight 390 that crashed).
http://www.revistero.com.mx/videos/video/NSRdOBEvlA8

Do you see how flat and low he actually gets over the runway edge?
Do you see some dust cloud raised on the edge of the runway when he overflies the edge?
Do you see how long he lands maybe almost in front of the terminal?
Do you see tire smoke that signals actual tire contact?
Do you see the spoilers being deployed and since no sound is available how about reverse timing?

After all these questions, then another question comes to my mind for TACA flights arriving at Toncontin:
Could this be normal procedure on the Toncontin runway when dry, and even the same thing when it is wet?

Let's pray your not a trainer, no disrespect intended.

try with LESO, LEPP, LECO and GCLA