767 Double Engine Failure.
 

Earlier this year a Boeing 767 suffered a double engine failure in the Pacific area.
Does anyone have any details on this incident? It all seems to have gone very quite.

I bet it did!

I hope it wasn't at night time, coz it's a real bugger in the sim when it happens. You can't see a bloody thing in the F/O's seat. Bit of a fumble in the dark to try and find the engine start switches and the APU starter.

But then again, that might just be the sim. Hope to god I never have to do it for real...

LMAO BusyB :) :) :)

FAA INCIDENT DATA SYSTEM REPORT

General Information
Data Source: FAA INCIDENT DATA SYSTEM
Report Number: 2001030400330 C
Local Date: 03/04/2001
Local Time: 15:30
City: KONA
State: HI
Airport Name:
Airport Id:
Event Type: INCIDENT - AIR CARRIER
Mid Air Collision:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Aircraft Information
Aircraft Damage:
Phase of Flight:
Aircraft Make/Model: BOEING B-767-XXX
Airframe Hours:
Operator Code: UALA
Operator:
Owner Name: UNITED AIR LINES INC
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Narrative
(-23) ON MARCH 4, 2001 AT 1530 LOCAL TIME, UNITED AIRLINES (UALA)
BOEING 767-322, N666UA, FLIGHT 42, (OGG-LAX), EXPERIENCED A POWER LOSS
IN BOTH ENGINES WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH 24,000 FT. THE FLIGHT CREW WAS
ABLE TO RESTART BOTH ENGINES AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS DIVERTED TO KONA
INT'L AIRPORT, KEAHOLE, HAWAII. THE AIRCRAFT LANDED IN AN OVERWEIGHT
CONDITION AND ENCOUNTERED A BRAKE FIRE ON ROLLOUT. THERE WERE TWO
FLIGHT CREW MEMBERS, TEN FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, AND 238 PASSENGERS ON
BOARD. NO INJURIES REPORTED. INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE CREW DID A
PRECAUTIONARY SHUT DOWN OF ONE ENGINE, AND DUE TO FUEL MIS-MANAGEMENT,
THE SECOND ENGINE SHUT DOWN DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

A couple more references:

http://airsafe.com/events/airlines/united.htm

http://www.thehawaiichannel.com/hon/...05-100302.html

Before anyone gets too excited about this incident, it should be noted that further investigation suggests that this was a fuel management problem which resulted in both engines rolling back. It does NOT appear that this was a wildly improbable event of both engines failing at the same time.

The NTSB released the following report on 14 March: http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2001/010314.htm



[This message has been edited by McD (edited 02 July 2001).]

This is more than a little worrying as I thought that even with fuel mismanagement (this early in flight could not have been empty tank could it?) then the engines would still be gravity fed from wing tanks aided by engine driven low pressure pumps even with tank booster pumps off or failed. I know there is a note in QRH saying that degraded performance at high altitude is possible with both pumps in one tank failed (OFF) but it is not required to open crossfeed until such degradation occurs. Somehow I have never thought of FL240 as high altitude. I know its not low but not that high either. Obviously rethink required.

That PROFESSIONAL of yesteryear, the FLIGHT ENGINEER, is certainly missed. How many times can the older guys remember WHEN the F/E mis-managed the fuel?

[This message has been edited by 411A (edited 03 July 2001).]

Ah but I seem to recall a Flight Engineer who managed his fuel imbalance by feeding all four engines off one tank. All four stopped when he forgot to monitor the situation and ran the tank empty. Even Flighty's can screw up you know...

**********************************
Through difficulties to the cinema

Well, only one time.......

Also remember the F/E feeding the fire on Whisky Echo.(1968, EGLL, 707, for us oldies)

[This message has been edited by Haulin' Trash (edited 03 July 2001).]

I'm suprised the press didn't pick up on the aircraft registration!

If I remember correctcly It was not a Flight Enginner who switched all the engines to one tank and probably fell asleep. It was a second officer (A retired captain who was operating FE panel.)

I am not making judgements, just making a point.

Well think about it Tunturi - If they shut the firewall valve to the wrong engine, all the considerations you mention are irrelevant!

Fuel mismanagement indeed!

I have no direct knowledge of this incident, the above is just a suggestion.

More NTSB "newspeak".

What do they require, abrupt stoppage to call it an engine failure? Both engines below generator cut-in speed for 30 seconds?

Any mention of RAT deployment???

If fuel mis-management was responsible that early in the flight, something is terribly wrong - and it was. Both engines couldn't have failed that close together due to mechanical failure.

Try water in the fuel tanks. But then, there is a cockpit accounting problem that needs addressing.

This whole thing reeks of more FAA & NTSB cover-up. Nothing new in that department.

Sounds like damned good airmanship in the recovery, however.

Mileshigh "Well think about it Tunturi - If they shut the firewall valve to the wrong engine, all the considerations you mention are irrelevant!"

Yes you are absolutely right BUT that is not FUEL mismanagement. Incidentally, anyone remember an Eastern B757 crew who shut down BOTH engines simultaneously using Fuel Control Switches instead of switching of the EEC switches as per the QRH drill that was in hand? Restarted ok and as a result EEC switches moved from behind fuel control switches to overhead panel. The switch designs are not even remotely similar.

Haulin' Trash - But I seem to recall in the Whisky Echo incident that that they simply never got far enough down the check list to cut the fuel? Saw it happen from West Drayton, and taxied past the carcass that same evening ... Sobering experience.

------------------
Feline
(I Sit, I Watch, I Smile)

Tunturi:

I belive the incident you are refering to was actually a Delta B-767, the shut down both engines (Accidently) by moving the fuel control levers to "Cut-Off".

The joke at the time was something about Delta's highly efficient Noise Abatment Procedure.

If Eastern had a similar one, I don't remember it.

(Yes EAL had one incident where they shut down one engine on a L-1011 due to loss of oil pressure/quantity, then the same happened to the remaining 2 engines. They re-started the first one and limped back to MIA.
The reason was a wrong oil seal, or the seal installed the wrong way...)

UA had a 747 incident years ago: They lost 3 of the 4 mills and glided into Japan or somewhere. Forgot the exact reason, but fuel managment was probably a player.
(The captain was not in the cockpit at the time.)



------------------
Men, this is no drill...

All interested parties;

The dual engine failure referred to was the result of a botched crossfeed operation that left all pumps off and both crossfeeds closed. Both engines rolled back to a sub idle condition before suction feed commenced. The RAT deployed as advertised and the plane diverted.

The plane in question was extensively test flown and performed as predicted. When the manual says suction feed isn't guaranteed at high altitudes or high fuel flows, you had best believe it!

Contributing to the problem was something called "fuel weathering". Apparently "new" fuel contains a good deal of entrained air that makes suction feed less reliable.

A good refresher for all of us. Suction feed isn't a right, it's a privilege ;-)

GreenArc

tunturi - "gravity fuel feed...FL240...not high"

As a sideways flier I'm not too familiar with the info available in the modern electric jet QRH or aircrew manuals, but am a little surprised at the rather vague note about 'degraded performance at altitiude'. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/eek.gif

In the old bucket I am familiar with, advice is quite specific - "If fuel load blah1.. FL200", however - "If fuel load below blah2.. FL100".

Yep, FL100!!

The difference? - fuel at 'blah2' has further to travel, the engine driven pumps have to 'suck' harder, but it also does not have the benefit of the partial pressurisation created by the RAM effect in the tank vent system.

Think altitude, think bernoullies. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/cool.gif

Keep thinking mate. - its healthy.

PS. not in the QRH - "If fuel load below blah3.. (should never happen in theory)..Get out the ditching drills cause fuel won't flow uphill!!!) - so watch those bank angles. :)

[This message has been edited by OilCan (edited 04 July 2001).]

Greenarc -

That makes perfect sense. The FAA finds no significant value to CRM, so such things are destined to happen.

Towerdog: I bow to your superior knowledge..I would have put money on it being Eastern as I thought I was very up on it at the time,just as well I didn't then http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/redface.gif
But it was as a direct result of QRH action on EEC failure. Yes I also remember the Tristar incident ...very very lucky boys.

Oilcan:
The Boeing QRH really is that vague, nothing like your very specific manuals. Basically the QRH drill I am referring to covers one or both booster tank pumps failing in one tank. It does not recommend opening crossfeed but simply warns against problems at "high altiude". Crossfeeding drill specifically states to open cross feed
valve(s)but of course that is because you definitely want to feed both engines from the same tank and not to prevent flameout due to lack of boost pressure as such.
As I said I had just never considered FL240 as being "high"..I don't know why but I just hadn't. Now I do, although I see this incident happened at FL290. Incidentally, it is very easy to depart with crossfeed valve(s) open as switches can look very "neat" on the panel in this condition. First you'll probably know in fuel imbalance warning soemtime later (due difference in individual pump design pressure tolerances).

Edited for spelling and note to Towerdog

[This message has been edited by tunturi (edited 05 July 2001).]

On the Eastern incident -

Eastern had some labor negotiations going on. The seals were left off all three engines.

The G-ARWE problem was caused when the check captain in the jump seat helpfully silenced the u/c warning horn when the No 2 thrust lever was closed during the engine failure drill. The f/e (I think) was reaching for the u/c horn cutoff switch, but as it was cancelled already he hit the fire bell cutoff which I think is close to the u/c horn cutoff on the panel. So, he never progressed to pulling the fire handle because the fire bell never rang (it was cancelled at the instant it would have started to ring) and the engine fire checklist was not read.


------------------
--

Feathers

With fuel panels, alway do something good before you do something bad. Any change in fuel panel feed or switches should be coordinated with the other pilot.

Roadtrip,

Your post reminds me of something my old 727 FE instructor (yes, many years ago) drilled into our brains: turn something ON before you turn something OFF (Of course this doesn't ALWAYS apply, which is why the "do something GOOD" saying is probably more appropriate ... but you get the point)

The other one was: if you flip a switch, confirm the action i.e. make sure that the switch did what it was supposed to do.

No finger-pointing here ... just passing along two common-sense principles which can help prevent systems switching errors.

Tunturi

You may like to get your QRH out again if you are still on type. As someone else has mentioned earlier high trust settings are also a factor and climbing thru FL290 will be full rated climb thrust. Compound that with the nose up attitude and suction feeding is sounding marginal at best.

Subsequent to this Boeing issued a bulletin to instruct us not to crossfeed in any other situation than cruise. Going a bit far for a cover up I feel but I have been wrong before.

:)

Ttree Ttrimmer:
"Tunturi
You may like to get your QRH out again if you are still on type."

OK. I have done and I quote for Eicas "FUEL SYSTEM PRESURE" "Thrust from affected engine may deteriorate during climb at high altitude. If required thrust cannot be maintained open crossfeed valve" (or valves if two fitted.
This covers failure of two pumps in one tank or indeed all pumps failed and is nothing to do with crosfeeding as such but same principal would apply. Incidentally crossfeed is opened for a single centre tank pump failure but this is only to prevent imbalance building up in wing tanks. So what am I missing here? Don't see what's different from what I said. EXCEPT that I am looking at a 757 QRH, is the 767 that different? Even if it is it doesn't change my original comment on not believing FL240 was classed as particularly high in these circumstances and Boeing give no guidance at all on this except for the bulletin which you mention.(yes I now know the incident occurred at FL290.
:confused: