Sallyann1234,
One of the most sensible comments I've seen.

. . but, of course, we'd all like to know wot did it. My tuppensworth is that we never will.

Was the aircraft operated inside the environmental envelope for the whole sector? or will that be in the final report.

Still Smilin'
 

Sallyann1234 wrote: "There are much more likely events to worry about."

I'm still smilin' because my last trip was in a 767, but I would be a bit puckered had it been a 777. Those of us who fly/flew airplanes take risks every time we walk out to the flight line. If we knew what the problem was, we could compensate and the risk would be lower. Checklists and mandatory flight procedures come about because of lessons learned from previous problems. But, in this case we don't know what caused it and don't know what to do to prevent a repeat. A checklist wouldn't have helped this crew because of the short time available to do anything but avoiding certain flight regimes might have helped minimize risk. I'm still smilin' but as each day goes by without a definitive report, that smile becomes more forced. We can deal with the known. It's the unknown that is most likely to cause us problems.

I know what you're saying Ed, but there are aircraft in regular airline use with much worse safety records than the 777.

What you are saying is that you would prefer to take a bigger known risk than a smaller unknown risk. That might be human nature but it sure ain't logical.

if he quits--
 

he can come to ryanair---

Stator Vane #107

Beardy would snap the guy up think of the free publicity.

i doubt that Peter would want to return to the RHS though on Virgin PP1. :ugh:
Virgin don't take DEC's

Seen a few people resign from a good job in a fit of pique - silly.

Smilin ed

The operative word is "obvious". I would be more concerned if a major and definitive cause was apparent such as gross negligence in an SOP for instance. I do find it reassuring that so much has been ruled out!

I do take your point, however, that until a specific cause is found then there is always going to be a doubt. It may be a computer fault, maybe not (I would be somewhat anxious on a 777 flight fearing that the flight crew had just seen the blue screen of death on their displays just as the undercarriage was lowered.) Maybe a fuel contamination or freezing, maybe not. I beleive that the Accident investigation people know thier job and will track down the probable if not definitive cause.

We Don't Know What the "Unknown Risk" Is
 

Sallyann1234 wrote: " What you are saying is that you would prefer to take a bigger known risk than a smaller unknown risk. That might be human nature but it sure ain't logical.


But, we don't know what the unknown risk is. Test pilots get paid more than most because they take on unknown risks. Once those risks are defined, they become less to be feared. Until analysis of the BA038 accident is complete, we won't know what to fear

Dream Land
PPRuNe supporter

Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Planet Earth
Posts: 1,040


Froze up?
Agree with most that it would be instinct to take over control and shove everything forward, will be interesting to see what actually happened, the crew deserves all the benefit of doubt here, selecting less flap was brilliant thinking, hardly the sign of freezing up. :mad: Best wishes to the crew!
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At what altitude and airspeed was the decision made to select FLAPS 20?

If you can't answer that question you can't evaluate if it was an appropriate, or inappropriate, decision.

Quite.
But unless you could quote the speeds relevant to the flap selection and stall speeds, and the acceleration/heightloss relationship, there is no point suggesting it was anything other than an inspired guess.
In fact, it worked, so it all worked out OK, but let's not pretend there was an evaluation of the aerodynamic factors involved in any detail. What if the sink associated with the flap retraction had caused an earlier contact with terra firma? You would all be criticisizing such a subjective and wrong decision.

He guessed.
He guessed right.
He'll make a fortune from the Clifford Industry.

PoodleVelour
 

The reason I am responding to your post is not so much to answer you as to ensure the media are clear that your post is based on a lack of understanding. Please accept my apologies for that term because it is not meant to be insulting.

On the subject of inspired guesses versus the evaluation of the aerodynamic factors involved as mentioned by the above poster.

All Pilots with any experience are well aware of the drag factors evident in the use of Flap 30 or 25 (40 to 30 on 737, or whatever for a given Boeing model). They do not need to get a calculator out to work out the advantage the reduced drag will provide - they know it will will work to their advantage.

To suggest that "he guessed" is incorrect - he didn't guess, he applied his significant expertise and experience as a Pilot and Commander to ensure the best outcome under difficult circumstances.

It has been said before but I think it is worth repeating here. Such scenarios are not trained for, double engine failures yes, but at altitude. Double engine failure when fully configured on short final is the stuff of nightmares - it may seem as if this crew pulled a rabbit out of the hat, but no this crew acted correctly as a result of their training and experience.


Regards
Exeng

I thinks it quite obviouse he didn't freeze, and i think the media and public in general were surprised that F/O was flying at all, it should be the Pilot flying not the Co Pilot!!

I myself am a FO on the A320/21 and am surprised when i pop back to use the facilities and get asked things like, "so, when do u finish your training? or how far away are u to becoming a Pilot? or hearing a little kid ask his dad, "is that a pilot?" to which dad replys "No, thats a Co Pilot"

It doesn't really matter all that much, but i dont think the public and media realise that Capt flies one sector and FO the other is the industry standard practice.

I agree with you, I thought it was a configuration change that was made after the engine response problem.

Just out of curiosity and in no way a slight on the crew but,

could the Flap setting that helped them clear the fence have been arrived at by simply trying to initiate a Go Around?

ie 'Go Around Flap (up 1 notch) '

Then when the a/c did nothing, they still had the GA flap set?

Cheers

S.D.

Flaps 20 was NEVER selected.

A key point that seems to have been missed in this discussion:
The outcome of the pilot's actions or inactions were successful. No lives were lost and injuries were minimal.
Any other combination of actions may have led to a more catastrophic crash. It is not possible to know.
Further more it is reasonable to say they were in all likelihood at least an averagely competent crew. Therefore their actions may well represent the most likely response from an average pilot given the same circumstances. ie most of us would react the same way, in spite of what we may like to think.

On three-engine aircraft it is common to raise the flaps a little bit after loss of a second engine. If on final this is a memory item, on the MD-11 at least.

Perhaps the captain had some three-holer time......

Listen to yourselves...bunch of aviation geeks commenting on details which are yet to be confirmed!?!

Get a life and wait for the final report to be published.....