I always used to say that there were those who had already been off the paved surface and those who hadn't done it yet. I stopped flying ten years ago while I was ahead. I suppose it might have been skill but more likely it was just plain good fortune.

Jack

I have a feeling that this is going to start something.

It appears that to continue and take-off after having been off the paved surface was the reason for FR to sack the poor guy. After all he could just have returned, off-load the pax, call ops and Mx, have the AC inspected and have FR shout at you for being stupid to taxi onto the grass. But thanks to the great non-punitive system that would have been all.
No the poor guy ignored all this good airmanship and decided to continue.
I just wonder how FR makes sure that a pilot feel safe enough to return and not get the shouts etc. when some unintentional mishap occures?
What training and or culture is present to make this pilot loose all his good skills to not do such a thing. Or what selection/ training does FR provide regarding decision making?
Whatever the answert sacking the poor guy does not give the impression of a non-punitive or just culture within FR.

Nick

I have no personal knowledge of this case, but consider the following:

If the Captain had discontinued take off and returned to stand, yes the customers would have been delayed, yes there would have been knock on effects and yes, he would have got shouted at. No doubt he would have been subject to internal inquiries and possibly re training, not pleasant, but he probably would have kept his job.

But, apparently he didn't do any of the above.
He carried on not knowing if the aircraft had been damaged or if he'd damaged anything on the ground which could have been a hazard to a subsequent landing or departing aircraft, and that is at the least extremely unprofessional and at the worst unforgivable.

As a seasoned traveller with FRA, every other low cost airline and many other who aren't, I wouldn't have found it acceptable to be the on the next aircraft to land or take off not knowing the potential hazard left behind by this chap, and no other member of the travelling public should have to tolerate it either.

The larger issue is: How can a crew allow themselves to become so distracted and taxi off the pavement in a small jet as such...?

Obviously neither crewmember was paying sufficient attention during taxi. :ooh:

Hi Niknak

The fact that the crew should have done XXX is not the end of an investigation, but rather the start of one.

Obviously there are many escapes possible from an incident or an accident therefore we need to manage the risks involved, understanding these risks comes from knowing all factors involved. Without understanding there is not going to be much managing.

True the crew should not have done this, but I doubt that they would now claim that they will do it again, so they have learned. The question is have FR? They still have no idea why this qualified (by FR) crew made such a F... up. With their attitude they never will know and some day they will be too late.

Fair point Nick,

there obviously will be a UK AIB investigation into this, when they make their findings the press will pick up on it and FRA will make their usual excuses, most of which will make my points, i.e the Captain didn't do what he should have done and they did the only thing they could have done, i.e. sack him.

Because I know what goes on at the sharp end, it doesn't make me feel any better that he lost his job, but if it comes to a technicality, O'Leary's "yes men" are absolutely correct, the Captain didn't do what he should have done.

Sadly, however you look at it, FRA are right.

Unless he had a female FO on board that was highly distracting for him:E

The distraction was much more likely to be the rather questionable procedure of getting the Captain to review the Take-Off briefing during taxying. This entails a check of the Flap setting, the N1, the speeds and the initial SID, among other items, all of which have to be read directly from the FMC. My contention has been that this review of the briefing should be carried out by the FO but for some inexplicable reason it has fallen on deaf ears.
I now do the review when stationary, waiting for the tug etc. to clear the aircraft. If I do this on a line check, I will no doubt be criticised for non-compliance with SOPs.
It might have had something to do with the wind!

Hi niknak,

I think we have to agree to disagree then.

My view is that punitive action is not indicated here as the crew (at least I asume so) did not on purpose break the rules. Their actions therefore are te result of many factors, some of them are their responsibility and many are FR's responsibility.
A study I recently read (ERAA) indicated that wilfull misconduct (gross negligence) is only present in 0,6% of all incidents, and creates only 0,2% of all risk. Punishing crew will cause less ASR's to be written (ATC Netherlands) and therefore have a far greater negative influence on safety. So one must be very carefull not to let emotions rule. After all no damage was present, no passengers were hurt so only opinions were formed.

Nick

Nick,

again a fair point, nothing did happen, but if it had?

sadly, we live in a world full of litigation and if something had come about as a result of this incident, well... who knows??

Probably out of court settlements and no publicity, which benefits no one.

Careful - do we know the crew knew they had gone into the grass before taking off?

Maybe it was reported to them after departure from a groove in the grass.

i agree with Rubic
reviewing the Take-Off brfg on the roll, can and does lead to a loss of situational awareness.
After a complete brfg has been carried out at the gate before pushback,it makes sense only to review any changes.
a lot of the stuff on this so called final take ff brfg some airline SOPs require, are part of the before take off cheklist(on the buses atleast)
Other stuff like fuel state, a/c wt etc need to be moniterd on a continuos basis in all flt phases,which forms part of enhanced situational awareness.
SOPs cant replace true airmanship

This full takeoff brief should be done in the chocks in my opinion. You need two (or three) sets of eyes outside while you are taxiing, not someone buried on a screen down low reading off numbers and power settings. Almost everything but the flaps should be set prior to blockout and they will be double checked on a before takeoff checklist at most carriers. The old excuse for waiting until the last minute before takeoff for the brief was to get it on the 30 minute CVR tape. New CVR's hold a lot more data, I'm more interested in preventing the crash than documenting it (I realize others lean in the opposite direction). You can always give a quick verbal review of the brief and scan the configuration just before takeoff. There are a lot more runway incursions and excursions than flaps up takeoffs these days, taxiing is a very critical phase of flight in these times of busy airports.

Having watched the speed the FR crews taxi, I'm surprised this doesn't happen more often.

5 Required. . look at the FMC and check flap setting required ( or was it point at it ?)
5 Selected. . reach across and grab flap handle and check handle is in 5 detent
Green light. . look at (point at ? ) green light , and verify that flap position required is indicated
Of course this probably happened before this latest anally retentitive procedure, but I'm guessing it might happen again due to it.
All it takes is a narrow taxi-way ( Altenberg anyone ?) and an Aircraft a little "out of trim" on the ground (as some are) or a little crosswind, and woops there it goes again.
Maybe we should check these pretty green lights on the overhead too whilst taxying, just to be doubly sure. . . ?

If the facts of the matter as gleaned from posts here are correct, then this is a classic example of the well known decision making in a "double bind" corporate culture problem, which by coincidence was discussed a year or more ago.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...ht=double+bind

Nick NOTOC

there is nothing in the selection stage regarding decision making.

No doubt we will get another memo from the chief pilot followed by a ¨dummies guide to flying¨ SOP change that will probably not solve the problem that both captplaystation and rubik101 pointed out: to much reiteration and distractions rather than flying/taxing the bloody aeroplane :ugh:

Hi Wince and Nikak,


Oh dear! No proper training then, next question would be: why is that?
Let's do a bit of analyzing here........ Commercial pressure, insufficient training/selection, unclear and poor working conditions, fairly good pay and career progress.

Low level circle at Cork, Loadsheet error/tailstrike, loss of control, take-off after taxi mishap...etc....A commercial very successfull airline all focussed on profit/ cost control

What is the common denominator here?

Maybe something must be done to prevent FR becomming a very sad example in some future CRM course.

RyanAir
 

If any of the critics who have accused RyanAir management of using inappropriate pressure on their crews, to the point of having them afraid to bring safety issues to light, those critics and indeed the crews being bullied should all have the balls to go to the appropriate Aviation Authority with EVIDENCE.