TCAS is great but if there is a delay in reacting to the TCAS advisory by either plane, the Advisory can be reversed which can lead to confusion or disaster.
Best if these situations don't occur and seeing as traffic wasn't heavy at the time, it shouldn't have happened at all. Four warnings were received before TCAS kicked in..... |
pprnkof
"Those without fault shall cast the first stone"
Thats you so pprnkof. TCAS is great but if there is a delay in reacting to the TCAS advisory by either plane, the Advisory can be reversed which can lead to confusion or disaster. Best if these situations don't occur and seeing as traffic wasn't heavy at the time, it shouldn't have happened at all Four warnings were received before TCAS kicked in Every atco gets lots of these warnings every day-the system is not 'smart' and so does not know exactly what the controller is intending to do so it generates a lot of what are in reality false warnings. A well known factor is that if you have a system that generates lots of false warnings then a tendency can grow to where full attention is not given to these warnings. Thats a general comment and not specific to this case.We make decision calls ,hundreds of them everyday, just like this one-where our judgement tells us yes we can keep descending this aircraft and with a sufficeintly high rate of descent instruction given then it wont be problem. But humans are human and every single one of us will not go thru our chosen careers without making a mistake somwhere. The trick is to learn from these and make sure the reason(s) are understood to why it happened. You can bet your bottom dollar that anyone who has had an airprox learns a huge lesson and will carry that with them for the rest of the days. Your sum total of knowledge appears to be what you read in the indo yesterday. Journo digging are you. Ock1f |
ock1f
The only one throwing stones is yerself fella! Chill! And yes I am as prone to making mistakes as anyone, obviously. But what was your point? A resolution advisory by a TCAS II system, should be given an immediate, high priority reponse (if possible) and should always take precedence over ATC. By the way I'm not digging. |
From AAIU report:
Conclusions 12. All ATM safety defences, both human and electronic, were breached in this event. The safe resolution of this occurrence was ultimately resolved by the last line of defence, the aircraft’s on board TCAS RA, and not by ATC intervention. Which implies (if not states) that ATC was oblivious to the developing conflict. Whereas, also from from the report ATC transcript 19.49:55 Ryanair nine zero seven Shannon, correction to that, maintain flight level two niner zero on reaching .
RAD9 Ah negative, that call was for Ryanair nine zero seven. Continue the descent flight level one hundred, best rate till through flight level two seven zero please. 19.50:00 RYR Continue flight level one hundred, expedite through flight level two seven zero. Ryanair nine zero seven. 19.50:03 RAD9 Flightline one one seven four Shannon turn right ten degrees 19.50:06 FLT 1174 Right ten degrees flight line one one seven four. Ah zero one zero is going to be the (unintelligible)…. 19.50:12 RAD9 The controller corrected his error by instructing RYR to maintain FL290 17 seconds after confirming the descend instruction. Clearly he made an error but equally clearly he corrected it. Seem arguable to me that the conclusion doesn't adequately recognise that ATC error was corrected and an instruction given that woud have restored required separation at more or less the same time as the TCAS alert resolved the conflict in exactly the same way. |
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