Admiral346;

"Line - swine"...LOL, and I most assuredly belong in that grand class - no test pilot talking here. Absolutely I get what you mean.

One item though...these charts aren't meant for line operations but are created as a baseline upon which factors emerging from abnormals are calculated. They represent the best the airplane can do and no I don't think I could slam an airplane on, not, at least, intentionally, as good as a test pilot who did it for a living. But, in contrast to previous manuals in my experience anyway, the information is there and not absent as it was from so many previous FCOMs and AOMs.

NigelOnDraft, yes, ok, and understand - thanks.

Going back to Rippa's earlier report of the press conference, how can an aircraft with inop thrust reverser (if that is so) be described as "in perfect condition of maintenance"?

Because reversers are not 'required'. They are available as a useful addition to retardation only, but not essential. No doubt the aeroplane was very well maintained. Most airliners are flying around with various items going unserviceable almost by each leg. It's a fact of life, and no big deal. A reverser U/S is just one of those things.
Until further information comes in, I suggest we don't go blaming this aspect. The important thing at the moment is to just establish exactly what happened with none of that daft speculation that took place with the Kenyan accident!

Dispatched according MEL

UTV news this evening stated definitively that the accident was caused by a “faulty runway” continuing to be used. – Great – who needs details – better still who needs investigators, their (usually) extensive experience base in piloting, engineering, aircraft status/performance, regulations, human factors, etc etc.; not to mention weeks or months (sometimes years) of work – We’ve got UTV.

Seriously, does anyone know about the touchdown (in ‘normal’ box for CGH or late) or the rumour about an attempted GA ‘on the ground’ – is it true or false? Was the runway contaminated or ‘just’ wet?

I can’t imagine the horror for relatives of the victims – especially those who witnessed it or the immediate aftermath – my thoughts are with them.

Runway was wet. Sao Paulo tower has a policy of "closing" the airport when the runway is contaminated (takeoff and landings are suspended). I had to divert sometimes becouse of that...The rain last days has been constant, but light, just like a cold winter day.

An observation regarding standing water at Congonhas.

The rain began on Sunday 15th and only let up this afternoon, the 18th. Prior to that, and throughout most of the time the main runway at CGH was being resurfaced, there was a long dry spell, no rain other than the very occasional drizzle. The runway was reopened around the end of June or a fortnight ago and this was the first real rainfall the new surface had seen. Presumably also the first opportunity to measure standing water.

On any new flat surface of that area, there are going to be places where the runoff is slower than others, and which the people who go out and measure depth will need a few heavy rainfalls to learn about and pay special attention to. Apparently, standing water was being measured regularly during this last rainy spell; I just wonder how thoroughly a team can actually take measurements between takoffs and landings at a very busy airport, and whether there might not have been deeper patches in spots they hadn't had time to check.

Added to which, the gunk of rubber accumulating for a few weeks on new, dry concrete and then loosened up by rain. According to the media there were numerous reports by crews to the tower at CGH that the surface was especially slippery. Rippa might be able to corroborate this or say the reports were nothing out of the normal griping.

As background, I live and work 2.8 miles southwest of CGH, at the top of a building from which I can see the runway and which gets pretty much the same weather. The roof leaks in heavy rain and the small pool does when over a certain level so I keep a very close eye on rainfall. Between Sunday and today there’s been about 60mm but I can’t recall any time during the three days of rain when the terrace was really splashy drenched. Granted, it’s drained but there’s hardly any slope. So I wonder how thorough that measuring really is and whether there are places it puddles but that haven’t yet been identified.

Thanks for the rain info gentlemen.

The comments on last years B734 overrun thread seem so much more prophetic now in the aftermath of this tragedy.

Interesting about the close for the contaminated case, but then as broadreach intimates concerning newly laid surface, long dry spell and expected build up of rubber deposits - followed by first rain........at least has the potential to be very nasty.

One of the many evening news brought a video of the accident, aperantly a surveillance camera from the operational side of the airport. The video shows two landings (first nomal landing and the second was the accident). I could see that the second Airbus was faster than the first one...and a explosion.
It will soon be at youtube I belive...

Rainboe: My point is that for anyone (let alone the airline head) to state without qualification that the aircraft was in "perfect condition of maintenance" is premature pending the investigation. If indeed TAM have also agreed that there was u/s thrust reverse, "adequate" might already be a more sensitive description of the aircraft's condition, particularly when an aircraft has suffered an overrun accident of this nature. Even better, why can't these people just say that every aspect of the operation will be investigated and leave it at that.
Incidentally, your own assertion that "no doubt the aeroplane was very well maintained" also seems to evidence the very speculation which you seek to discourage, unless your location is somewhere more relevant than Hampshire.

This gives an idea...

http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/c...5u312781.shtml

Press release from IFATCA

18 July 2007
PRESS RELEASE
Air Safety Compromised in Brazil
IFATCA offers its condolences to the families of this tragic accident involving TAM, which
happened in Congonhas Airport in Sao Paolo. We received the news of this accident with horror,
but not total disbelief.
Following the mid-air collision in September 2006, this is yet another disastrous civil aviation
accident in Brazil in a short period. In both cases numerous warning signs, multiple risks and
safety relevant reports were ignored.
IFATCA has condemned the stance of the Brazilian Government to let the military FAB introduce
its so called Plan B. This plan was to jail leaders of the air traffic controllers’ association and
replace highly skilled and trained ATCOs by military air defense personnel who are neither
trained, nor qualified to control civilian traffic.
"How many more people will be killed before the Brazilian governments stops the FAB's live
experiments on the traveling public's safety?" says the President of IFATCA, Mr. Marc
Baumgartner. The Brazilian government has focused much energy in chasing scapegoats
instead of re-engineering the necessary safety oversight and risk assessment to prevent
Brazilian civil aviation from falling into deeper chaos. By delegating safety oversight, safety
management and safety provision to the FAB, the Brazilian government is endangering the lives
of the traveling public in Brazil. Warnings on the conditions at the airport in Congonhas have
repeatedly been ignored by the authorities.
"IFATCA urges the government of Brazil to stop the current repressive organizations of Air
Traffic Control and civil aviation in Brazil. Air safety is currently compromised and is a danger to
the traveling public, the Brazilian economy and the credibility of the Brazilian state as a great
nation of this world. Continuing to ignore internationally agreed standards on Air Traffic
Management and Airport design (layout) will only lead to further hardship and possibly more
accidents", warns the President of IFATCA.

Rippa, I believe the second video here may be the one you referred to. The first one shows the explosion just off the left side of the screen, but it clearly lights up the sky.

http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/SaoPaul...4-5605,00.html

BTW, a slight correction to some earlier information here -- reg was PR-MBK, not PT-MBK. Previously it was N454TA with TACA and VN-A168 with Pacific Airlines.

The shoddy job at Bristol spring to mind?

Yep, that the video...
TAM also lands at SDU (SBRJ - Rio de Janeiro) with the A319. The runway is shorter (1390 mts X 45 mts), but at sea level and has a great breaking action.

the comparison between the two videos doesn't really show a touchdown speed but it appears to show a substantial difference in the amount of water thrown forward by the wheels and/or thrust reverse.

On the second video, there are 2 different landings. Note that the first Airbus is already at taxi speed and clearing the runway, but the second one seems to be at full reverse, way faster and sliding to the left, into the taxiway F.
The first video is the accident in slow motion and closer (zoom).

Here's another video showing multiple cameras of the accident:
http://noticias.uol.com.br/uolnews/b...t2486u946.jhtm
(First they show a standard landing, and later the accident plane landing)

I'm from Brazil and the only thing I fly is flight simulator, but ísn't there a big difference in speed in the video ? It seems to me that the plane was at high speed (about +-80kias) at the end of the runway...

I know the 2nd reverser wasn't working (as stated here by Rippa, and reported by TAM in they press report). I also know that the runway didn't have the "grooves". But would the plane end the runway at high speed even without the 2nd reverser and the grooves ?

What may have caused this accident ? Certanly the pilot knew the plane was going too fast and wouldn't be able to stop, did he try to take off again ? Why didn't it work ?

I know I'm just speculating on this, but at first I thought that the plane was trying to stop and somehow wasn't able (because of many factors, including 2nd reversor, wealther conditions, weight, and many more). But after seeing this video it's clear to me that the pilot KNEW that the plane would not be able to stop a long time before ending the runway...

Why is the NTSB going to involve themself in a South American airline crashing at a South American airport, flown presumably by a South American pilot flying a European jet?

There was a lot of debate about whether a given jet has certain penalties on wet runways, whether with spoilers, reversers or whatever.

I don't see the point of such debate, unless the Captain used less than conservative judgement (ignored major penalties in the MEL) when he/she accepted the aircraft for the flight, given awareness of the very short runway, the status of thrust reversers, autospoilers, anti-skid etc, or should he have delayed the approach, possibly finding a nearby alternate airport (within fuel range) with a longer runway? When the landing gear are extended on many planes, an antiskid light is sometimes displayed, telling you that you need to go fairly easy on the brakes. No sweat with a long runway if you land in the touchdown zone.
About two winters ago, I told Dispatch that we would only operate with part of the flight release 'tanker fuel' (for cost) to an airport in the 'remote Midwest' with short runways (less than 8,000'). There were scattered patches of melting snow.

National Public Radio (US) today stated that the flying pilot tried to attempt a takeoff just after the landing. The press might have received totally inaccurate information. Few members of the press have a Private Pilot's license, and not many understand the factors involved with any takeoff or landing.

Ignition Override;

re, The debate is valuable if for no other reason than it puts information in front of a very large community many of whom may be professional airline pilots flying the same equipment. Such discussion clarifies these matters, hopefully reduces misunderstandings and may put knowledge in a pilot's hands with which to handle future circumstances.

The "debate" (don't think it was quite that) isn't about searching for answers to this accident - not at all, at least that certainly isn't my own interest; - there's investigators for that and most here know enough to wait for their work to unfold. But the interest in these circumstances is clearly very high, almost certainly for the reasons given. We cannot possibly surmise what was on the Captain's mind at this point, if ever, but sufficient research can be done regarding the planning stages of the flight to hopefully gain valuable insight.

There would be no reason not to assume that the crew was as conservative as was demanded by the situation, a situation with which we may be certain they had seen many times before.

The media speculation we see is standard fare, much as the "expert" with the PPL. It soon goes away, leaving the investigators to their sad tasks and the families to grieve in private.

finfly1;

re, Although I cannot point to the direct relationship, likely it has to do with ICAO Annex 13 which provides for varying levels of official status for foreign investigative bodies. The aircraft is certified in the US and this may be enough to provide the connection, or they may be invited for certain expertise on a consultative basis. The Canadians have vast experience with "contaminated" runways (CRFI, for one tool), wet or snow-covered and may also be part of any investigation.

finfly1

While there is intense competition between the aircraft manufacturers across the Atlantic, there is thankfully enormous co-operation between the accident investigation bodies worldwide, and as others have posted there are pockets of expertise scattered all over the world.

Furthermore this accident, like all others, will be looked at by manufacturers and regulators alike to see if lessons can yet again be learnt for the benefit of the flight crews and hence the passengers at large.

I thing the answer is easier then that.

According to Annex 13 the representatives from the accident boards of the followin countries should be invited to any accident investigation.
1. The country where the accident happened (obviously)
2. The country where the aircraft was registrated.
3. The country where the aircraft was built
4. The country where the engines were built

MJ

The two components of wet weather friction on runways are skid resistance and macrotexture. This runway lacked macrotexture because the grooving was not yet done, which would have increased the risk of aquaplaning when there was water on the runway. But it may also have lacked wet skid resistance.

In some cases of new asphalt surfacings, but not all, the wet skid resistance may be unexpectedly low for a short time (Low here is defined as the skid resistance level which would trigger an investigation for higher-risk sites).

Some research has confirmed the suggestion that these “early life” phenomena can be attributed to the presence of a film of binder that can adhere to the surface of the aggregate for a significant period of time (until the traffic wears it off).

The binder film appears to have several effects, of which the key one for this wet runway is:
(i) It prevents the microtexture on the aggregate particles making contact with the tyre, resulting in lower wet friction at higher speeds than would normally be expected.

The fact that the runway was wet for several days leads me to also speculate about some slight emulsification occurring of the bitumen. Depending on the properties of the bitumen, this could also lead to either more of this binder film or even another film on the surface. Accentuating the problem. It would be nice to see some [accurate] wet weather skid resistance measurement results on the runway.

Assuming that in the second video the film speeds are the same, the speed (in frame) would appear to be over 3 times higher, and it looks as if a single reverser (No 1) is in use.

Does no-one have the relevant Notams for the day in question?

Dreadful to watch.

Certification of the aircraft assumes that for a wet or dry runway, reverse is not required. However, in determining the minimum landing distance required for the configuration and conditions, the lack of available reverse thrust means an additional distance should be factored into the calculations. I assume that TAM's MEL refers to dispatch with an u/s T/R as requiring reference to additional landing distance required?
If the weather reported in an earlier post was correct at the time of landing, then the correct landing technique should have been as follows:-
correct land flap setting, approach speed close to Vref, firm touchdown on the touchdown point (and on centreline), immediate deployment of speedbrakes/spoilers, immediate application of wheelbrakes (auto or manual),selection of available reverse. The retardation should aim to bring the speed close to taxi speed before encountering the rubber deposits at the reciprocal touchdown point.
It is the task of the investigating authorities, to determine whether or not the above techniques were not used and if that is the reason for the overrun.They may determine that other factors such as runway surface condition or precipitation/contamination were causal factors.
Too many overruns are happening because of inappropriate technique. Perhaps the professional pilots amongst us, should ask their simulator instructor to allow them 5 minutes to practise a landing on a short runway in conditions such as turbulence with moderate rain. It is the best place to hone such skills - unfortunately simulator sessions are all-too-often box-ticking exercises with no time for developing basic skills.

Seems as it may not be a over run as in failure to stop, but perhaps a failed attempt to over shoot. Would explain your high speed observation BOAC. From Avweb for what its worth

A320 Crash In Brazil Prompts Calls For Change
Thousands of runways around the world have inadequate overrun safety areas, the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations said on Wednesday, a day after a TAM Airlines Airbus A320 crashed in Brazil, killing at least 189 people. The crew had been trying to land on a wet runway at Sao Paulo Cagonhas Airport, and took off again when they were unable to stop. The airplane cleared the airport fence and a highway but crashed into a gas station and a building before exploding into flames. The 6,362-foot runway has often been criticized as too short. Runway-end safety areas should be established at all airports with airline operations, IFALPA said, with an overrun space at least 800 feet long or an arrestor system that could halt an errant aircraft. This week's crash is now the worst air disaster ever for Brazil, superseding the death toll of 154 in last September's crash of a Gol Airlines 737 that collided in midair with an Embraer Legacy business jet. The NTSB has sent a team to Brazil to assist in the investigation.

Wonder what remarks the investigation into the 737 incident in March last year had to make re the over run.

> In some cases of new asphalt surfacings, but not all, the wet skid
> resistance may be unexpectedly low for a short time.

This appears to be well known for roads - particularly by motorcyclists. Some documents on the web suggest it can take upto 3 years for the film to oxidise and be worn off on a road. I would hope technology is more advanced for runways.

Daftest related story: the report in Emirates Today which says EK is not changing plans to serve Sao Paulo, which misses entirely the fact that EK would actually be operating to a different airport. :ugh:

One notes the following:
-It is apparent that the speed was high near the usual turn-off with high reverse on No.1 showing.
-It is thought a go-around was being attempted. There cannot have been much runway left from the point where of usual turn-off, therefore not much time to allow for transit of No.1 from high reverse to reverse idle to forward idle to power up.
-The evidence shows there was a marked swing left off the runway. If indeed a go-around from a short runway landing was being attempted, it seems highly possible only high power from one engine (the right) was likely to be available whilst No.1 would still be transiting or increasing power. At the sub-V1 speed at the time, this would be an undoubtedly doomed scenario with an uncontrollable swing.

I think the maintenance state of the aircraft is totally irrelevant anyway to the cause of this accident. Even with both reversers functioning, it is highly unlikely that a go-around from landing deep on a shortish runway and in reverse power will be a successful alternative.

Of possible relevance, and for info please
 

How long does it take to clean a runway landing sections (each end) of rubber deposits? Is it an expensive operation, and is expertise generally available around the world.

And has this cleaning been done on the main r/w at Congonhas since the accident? (I presume the r/w is back in use)

There are a lot of black and slippery (when wet) runway ends in Europe, especially at certain Greek islands, which have concerned me in recent years.

I concur, although judging by the 'speed' of the first a/c I would guess the viewpoint of the camera is well over half-way down the runway, so I would think the 'g/a' theory not likely since reverse is still 'in' on No 1 at that point - and up to 'off-frame'. I think the first may even have been beginning the turn-off at the end of frame, and it certainly did not appear to have any reverse spray at all in the whole visible run.

The concentration on serviceable reversers IS relevant since in all my 737 flying, landings on 'slippery' or 'contaminated' runways are not allowed with one locked out. If you aquaplane, it is only the reversers that will stop you - for a while.

So - was the runway 'slippery when wet'? Was it 'wet'. Was it 'contaminated'?

Obviously the enquiry will hopefully have all these answers but I think it is important to lay this 'reversers don't matter' trend here.

I think Rainbow has hit the nail on the head. From the video the speed is so much higher than the first landing aircraft that I struggle to believe that he had any retardation.
With the No 2 locked out, if he had selected reverse and then changed his mind and decided to go around, I assume you would immediately get thrust on the No 2 engine whilst No 1 is still in reverse. (I know you mustn't make a go around decision after you've selected reverse thrust)

I'm not an Airbus pilot, can you move the thrust levers out of reverse before the reverse doors are closed, or is there some kind of lock?

Excelent post Rainboe.
There are two golden rules when it comes to approach and landing.
1) Once a go-around has been initiated, don't revoke your decision.
2) Once thrust reversers have been deployed, go-around is not an option anymore.
The one reverser in transition and the other at g/a thrust can definitely explain the large change of ground track in such a short distance.
Initially it reminded me the Girona accident. A lot. It was then a suspicion that reversers had been deployed and a go-around was attempted afterwards. We know now that the collapsed on landing nose gear, broke the thrust control cables, causing the left engine to advance to full thrust !
There is always a reason for such a deviation from the centreline or extended centreline. Sometimes it is obvious, some other times...not. We'll see.

This link,as previously posted
http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/SaoPaul...4-5605,00.html
loads a page with two embedded video players. The second video player from the top titled "VEJA TAMBÉM Outros vídeos que podem lhe interessar" has a 31 second clip that shows the following:

A male reporter with playback of two aircraft traversing the screen.

The first aircraft takes about thrirteen seconds to move from the right to left side of the frame.

The second aircraft does the same in less than three seconds.

The video playback speed is virtually identical in both clips of the runway. Note the timing of the blinking lights on the buildings in the background.

I would welcome an input from an AB driver on the system but I would assume the same safety interlocks are in place as on the 737?

I really do think this 'g/a' theory is a red herring, certainly in the part we see on the video.

Firstly, on the 737 the throttles are 'locked' when reverse is deployed so they cannot be advanced until the reversers are 'stowed'.

It follows (737) that g/a thrust cannot be applied until the reversers are both stowed.

There is no sign of cancellation of reverse on the video.

If we are to blame the engine handilng for the swing, is it not far more likely that 'firewall' reverse thrust was being applied on number 1 as the run continued, thus causing control difficulty on a less than ideal surface?

Are we now agreed that reversers ARE important stopping mechanisms on slippery surfaces - or is the AB MEL different? I shudder to think of new pilots thinking it 'doesn't matter'.

Regarding the runway, Rippa in #126 suggests it was 'wet' but not 'contaminated'. Was it 'slippery when wet'?

I am sure the interlocks are there in pratice i.e. what you get. However, the physcial interlocks asre just with the rev lever selected the thrust lever can only go in the rev range.
AB you can select GA Power on both from full Reverse in 0.25s just by shoving everything forward... However it will give you idle in that engine until the reverser buckets are stowed. With 1 Rev locked out and below VMCG this will naturally make your eyes water :eek:
I am sure AB MEL says Wet Ldg Perf affected...
How could they know? It was a new surface and had hardly ever been 'wet' before?

I was under the impression that 737 thrust reverser interlocking only applied on individual engines. I'm not sure whether you can have one still out of forward idle and one at GA thrust- it's not exactly something you get any practical experience with! A lot of reports appear to substantiate that a go-around was being attempted and the plane was at high speed. It reportedly crossed the major highway (a bit like the M1 next to East Midlands) without touching it and impacted the building more or less directly. A significant left deviation took place, stronger than I would have expected from asymetric reverse only. I can't help thinking they were in such a deep hole they took the only way out they could possibly see- to try and get airborne again. But that is moving into an area I don't like- a bit too speculative maybe.

The runway surface was new, not yet grooved, with a rubber deposit and wet, so the runway surface condition is likely to have played a role.

However, the runway had been re-opened a fortnight or so ago, and it had been raining for the last few days.

So it seems unlikely this was the first A320 landing in exactly those conditions. In other words, there must have been concomitant factors.

The BBC have inferred that - since the aircraft appears to be travelling faster than other aircraft along the part of the runway covered by the video - it was therefore a "fast landing"

Brazil jet in 'fast landing' film

Surely the video doesn't tell you much about speed at the threshold - and instead implies lack of retardation?