From Avweb today

Four Swiss Controllers Convicted of Manslaughter
In the continuing fallout from a 2002 midair collision in Swiss-controlled airspace in which 71 people died, four air traffic control managers on Wednesday were convicted of manslaughter, Reuters reported. The judge said the managers were responsible for ensuring that at least two controllers were on duty at all times, and the collision could have been averted if any one of them had acted to prevent the second controller on duty from taking a coffee break. That left just one controller working at the time of the collision. The lone controller was later killed by a Russian man who lost his wife and two children in the crash. The four managers, who are employees of SkyGuide, an air-traffic company, were given suspended prison terms and fines. Francis Schubert, Skyguide's interim CEO, said the company has "learned the lessons from this tragic event and has done everything to ensure that an accident of this kind cannot happen again."

Controllers indeed. Snitty note sent to AVweb.
One expects this from the "regular" media, such as Reuters, not from AVweb.:mad:

Access to trial judgement
 

Would appreciate help with: how/when I can get access to an english version of the trial judgement. Need to study the possible implication for ATS staff and providers.
Thanks

Songbird:

"The confidence in Skyguide as an organisation may be low, my confidence in the Swiss courts is very, very high."

I suspect you might not have been following the "Swissair" trial, then?

Collision avoidance by change of course?
 

@radicalrabit

A change in course by both aircraft may well have prevented the collision, but not necessarily so. The Ueberlingen collision itself can (in part) be taken as an example for this:
The TU154M e.g. did change its heading twice prior to the collison. Once to the left, then to the right. This can be seen on the reconstructed flightpaths in Appendix 1 of the accident report and is mentioned in the report.

Interestingly enough, the cause of the second change in the TU154M heading is not explained in the investigation report (at least I was not able to find it).

@Fangible

If TCAS is treated as such an important device that its advisories are never to be contradicted, one would ask, why TCAS is not redundant on aircraft and why it was (is?) possible to operate an aircraft for up to 10 days with TCAS failure.

As Brazil (Gol/ExcelAire) has shown, TCAS only works with operational TCAS devices on both aircraft.

Redundant : TCAS is a last minute device , that cannot be used to determine target levels of safety.Also too expensive ,well over 100.000 USD per unit .

10 days : Too long , we all agree and some would even like this on the MEL. But strong opposition from Airlines .




I have opened a separate Thread on TCAS to continue this interesting discussion , but which is outside the Ueberlingen Trial.

One of the main points for us in this trial is that Peter Nielsen has been rehabilitated by the Judges. That is good news send around by the Judiciary. For once : :D

hey we are law students participating in an international law moot court competition. We happen to have a case identical to that of the ueberlingen collision (same facts just made up countries and services) and we are so lost in all the terminology about ATC and TCAS and STCA etc etc. If someone could help us out with a few clarifications it would be greatly appreciated. One more thing, what is the difference between ATM and ATC? I mean, does ATC fall into the sphere of ATM? Cause we are reading the ESARRs and they keep talking about ATM while in our case the company that is like skyguide was providing ATC services? Thank you so much all in advance and anyone who could possibly help and is willing to, are welcome to send us a private message :)

My guess is that ATM is similar to a business strategy that companies like Skyguide employ to provide an adequate, safe, and profitable service. The definition of ATC is the day to day services provided by air traffic controllers from facilities called ARTCC's, Towers, and Approach controls.

carpediem . A bit complex to explain ATC in 10 lines .It takes a good year of training for a controller to get throught the stuff.
Short version :
ATM is Air traffic Management , it comprises Air traffic Flow management (ATFM) and Air traffic services (ATS) which itself contains Air traffic control ATC, plus the Weather services (MET) and Search and rescue (SAR).

ACAS is ICAO generic name for TCAS which is a brand name, it is airborne collision Avoiding system, An airborne system providing resolutions advisories (RAs) to pilots aimed at preventing a collision.

STCA is Short term conflict alert , a ground based ( i.e for ATC) system warning controllers when aircraft are on collision course and are about to loose separation ( normally 5NM and 1000 ft )