I asked this question much earlier in this thread, and I do not think anyone answered it. How unusual, how rare, is it to have a transport aircraft take off before sunrise on an unlit runway?
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I believe it's illegal.
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chickenlittle
Great post! :D
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FAR Part 121 carriers Operations Manuals typically allow a takeoff at night with "inoperative" runway lighting, provided adequate visual reference is available, and leaning heavily on Captain's discretion. In other words, if something bad happens it's his fault.
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121.?
huck. far part 121............?????
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It's not a reg (I don't think). It's part of the flight ops manual written by the airline and approved by the FAA. It is as binding as a regulation for that airline's pilots. I don't have a copy of Comair's FOM, but I do have another....
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Huck:
I must disagree with you about your interpretation of the regulations regarding takeoff/night/unlit etc. While many FAR 121 0perators ( this is the US federal regulation codes for most airlines in the USA...scheduled air carriers ), have a sort of waiver allowing for instrument takeoffs without certain lighting systems, including runway edge lights as long as adequate visual reference exists, IT IS NOT A WAIVER OF regulations clearly saying you need runway lights (or authorized flare pots) for takeoff at night. The time of the comair crash was legally not day and runway lights WERE required. Over the years there has been much confusion about the above. But seldom do pilots check the legal time of sunrise prior to takeoff...could there have been enough light to THINK that it was daylight? we will probably never know...at least till the same day this year, with similiar wx conditions etc. how often does it happen? or how often does it kill people? |
Just as a little heads up folks, Mr Chickenlittle has started 2 lovely little threads in the ATC forum on this subject, and isn't exactly forthcoming in entering into logical discussion with some controller types who are questioning his "interpretation" of the transcripts. I really wish he would try to answer his critics rather than run away again.
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But my original point in asking the question was to better understand how unique the experience of a takeoff roll down an unlit runway must have been for this crew. Even more disturbing, the runway lights of the correct intended runway 22 were lit. And these lights were passed very early in the t/o roll, early enough to allow for a throttle back and a re-evaluation of just what was happening had those lights registered on this flight crew.
Lots of clues and cues were missed by this crew, and they have paid for their mistakes dearly, one with his life and one severely disabled. The culture that allowed this happen must be what is closely studied and remedied. |
I believe FAR 121.590 is the relevant FAR, which reads in part:
(2) For an airplane carrying passengers at night, the pilot may not take off from, or land at, an airport unless-- (i) The pilot has determined the wind direction from an illuminated wind direction indicator or local ground communications or, in the case of takeoff, that pilot's personal observations; and (ii) The limits of the area to be used for landing or takeoff are clearly shown by boundary or runway marker lights. If the area to be used for takeoff or landing is marked by flare pots or lanterns, their use must be approved by the Administrator. |
On a related point;
We've all been puzzled about why the pilots tried to takeoff from an unlit runway. I found this Reuters article dated from August 28th, the day after the crash (meaning it could have incorrect information): http://www.topix.net/content/reuters...58380536564416 It says in part: Instead, the Comair jet, bound for Atlanta before dawn on Sunday in a light rain, took runway 26. That runway is half as wide and half as long as runway 22 and was unlit, Hersman said in a media briefing. One possible explanation involved a temporary advisory to pilots warning of lighting outages on the longer runway that expired the day before the crash, aviation sources said. However, the co-pilot of the ill-fated Comair flight flew into the airport on Friday night when the top half of the runway, where planes begin their takeoffs, had been dark. Aviation experts said he might have been unaware the advisory had been lifted and mistook the dark runway for the correct one. Question, is anyone aware of a notam or temporary advisory indicating lights were out on the top half of 22, on the Friday preceeding the Sunday accident? The facts from the article may be wrong, but could come close to explaining the fateful decisions made that morning. Holes in the cheese lining up (i.e. additional confusion), as some have said. (edited to add the following comment) Due to the taxiway arrangment on that Sunday, the runway numbers for 26 would have been behind the aircraft when it turned onto 26, as shown in photos in the original accident thread. The runway numbers would have been behind the aircraft on either runway on that day. If the above information about runways lights for 22 is true, then it seems to me that 26 would have looked almost the same as 22, except for the compass heading. |
Originally Posted by BoeingMEL
(Post 3075256)
er..fair comment fox niner... but how often did you get as far as cranking up the APU? And then lining up on the wrong (and unlit) runway? And then attempting take-off without that last compass/runway check?
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flight safety is quite right about the FAR 121.590.
Hold West...this may not be as nutty as you might think...the plane may have been empty, ferrying to a new trip...pilots may have been told initially that a flight attendent was already at the new airport and off we go into the wild blue yonder...only to get a message from the company that the f/a was somewhere back at the ranch...rather than land and have to get redispatched, a quick go around was much easier on the paperwork and reduced the cycles on the plane by one. Airline flying is like making sausage...if you saw it being made, you might stay on the ground (round?;-0 ) |
So, if you can post your garbage on more than one forum, I can cross-post my reply. Moderators, trim us both out if this is bad!
Well, starting to play the game a bit here, I can see your statements are utterly incorrect as you try to shade the controller's actions at the critical moments.
Originally Posted by chickenlittle
(Post 3093041)
At 22:25 CD transmits "Say again, please" to Eagle 882, while Comair is rolling on the wrong runway. He is NOT doing traffic count as the FAA is telling us.
Originally Posted by chickenlittle
(Post 3093041)
At 22:30 [1005:37], CD is probably looking at the radar scope as he is talking to Eagle 882 and giving him a frequency change to center.
This is 16 seconds after he cleared Comair for takeoff and he hasn't seen him rolling on the wrong runway. He was supposed to scan his runway when he cleared him for takeoff and should have noticed him on the wrong runway. As to the "scan the runway" issue, I personally scan the runway before I issue the takeoff clearance. That clearance was given at 1005:17, while the aircraft was stopped on the taxiway short of runway 26, according to the FDR. Note too that the distance from the correct and incorrect runway positions is very short, and on the same sight-line from the tower - take a look at the sat pictures or airport diagram. Again, if the controller scanned the length of runway 22 at 1005:17, he would have seen an aircraft on more-or-less the right part of the airport, still on a taxiway, and no reason to withhold takeoff clearance. The critical moments where the controller could have possibly had an effect on the outcome were between 1006:00, when the aircraft completed its turn to line up on runway 26, and about 1006:24, when the aircraft passed through 100 knots, and (my assumption) probably could no longer have stopped on the runway, and thus an accident was inevitable. V1 was not reached until 1006:31, but that was calculated for the longer runway length. The controller thus had about 24 seconds to notice the aircraft starting a rolling takeoff on runway 26. I have no idea what he did during this 24 second period, and the tape is silent. If he says he looked down or turned away for a while to perform other duties, there is no reason to disbelieve him.
Originally Posted by chickenlittle
(Post 3093041)
It's odd that a station agent for American Eagle saw Comair on the wrong runway
Originally Posted by chickenlittle
(Post 3093041)
That means that CD pulls the hook at 1008:30 CUT. That is about 2 1/2 minutes after the crash.
Originally Posted by chickenlittle
(Post 3093041)
What could he have been doing for all that time? Maybe he took the clipboard over to the radio to change stations.
Originally Posted by chickenlittle
(Post 3093041)
He tells the crash crew that the aircraft is off the approach end of runway 8. That is the departure end of runway 26. 80 plus 180 degrees is 260, BUT then he tells the crash crew the aircraft took off of runway 22.
Bergquist rambles on with many more baseless assumptions that he does NOT have the background knowledge to make. They depend on the layout of the tower cab, among other things, and we don't know anything about that. None of it holds water. Any response there, Chicken-man? |
I think Mr Little doesn't want to discuss "the facts".......he just wants to shove them down your throat.
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All pilots are capable of making mistakes that end in tragedy.
Instilling the discipline and "excellence" takes time and effort by many. It also takes money. To all pilots out there...every takeoff, every approach, every landing demands your highest level of skill and attention. Being laid back might be a warning you are about to be Laid to rest. ANything short of your highest level of attention is shortchanging aviation. However, we should demand the same from everyone in aviation. Especially the FAA. There are warnings for flights at too low an altitude...there should have been a warning for wrong runway operations. I am guessing another accident in the unwarned regime may happen. Anyone out there thinking along these thoughts should post their scenarios. |
By far the most effective 'warning' for the money: another body in the tower cab.
We'll never danger-proof the world, folks. The trick is to minimize the danger in the most cost effective manner. |
NTSB (according to Kentucky.com news source) released the following overlay of CVR transcript and a timeline graphic here in PDF format.
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Interesting overlay... the FO comments on the lack of runway lights just as they are coming upon the lit runway 22... obviously, plenty of time for an abort. If only...
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NOT the controller's fault!!
Those of you who continue to put blame on the controller need to think about some things: First, regionals still operate into uncontrolled airports--no controller to blame in that scenario. Secondly, during many operations (low vis, night, etc.), controllers are not able to see the aircraft unless they have ground radar (very rare).
If there is any chance, due to runway/taxiway geometry, that finding the correct runway entrance is a little more difficult, then the crew should be even more on guard, using every means available to identify the runway--and they had two, probably 4, depending on the Nav Display selections, right in front of them--HEADING INDICATIONS!!! This was simply disgusting pilot error--stop trying to deflect the blame from these guys. Maybe the FAA should make age 40 the max, then you young know-it-alls could really get in the left seat quickly and exhibit the undoubtedly flawless performance of youth. |
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