ChristiaanJ Had the sun been down for a while, then why couldn't the pilots tell the difference between blue and white lights?

I am not a perfect pilot, but there are some mistakes that should never be made!

Another big question!!! IF IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE, WHY DOES IT STILL HAPPEN???

I think it is time that Situational Awareness is re-addressed.
There have been times when I have flown with guys who have left it to the computers and ended up completely lost.

Could there be another Cali around the corner?

Nice site! Mind you, I questioned it's accuracy when the FDX landed on I 95 :eek: . In fairness though, all the other 29 arrivals had their noses bang on the 29 CL, unlike the incident CO a/c which does make that adjustment to the right and is shown as being lined up on the taxiway.

Complex FMC inputs are discouraged below 10,000ft aal...

Yes, best to keeep your head out of the box down low, besides, even if you do cut inside the course on the rnav approach you will 'reintercept' the final.

here is quite similar incident with totally different acft and cerw. their were not the first and unfortunately probably not the last.
fly safely

Similar to the above, it is rumored (though unconfirmed) that since the CO 757 was kept in service, that data on the FDR was overwritten by subsequent use of the aircraft.

Earthmover I agree with you but I think we may be talking about a different incident. The one I am talking about was a 737.

Thank you, Lou; you have put this very well. We have all "been there and done that" and ultimately, given the nature of the job, it's a case of "there but for the grace . . . "

I find these madcap rushes to premature and ill-informed judgment of someone else's misfortune to be unpleasant and unecessary; particularly so when offered by people who should know a good deal better. I don't include the 150/172 spamcanman in the latter - his supposed level of experience does not qualify him to make any useful contribution in this regard.

Ernest Gann,
Looks not TOTALLY dissimilar.
Onviously it's still a not totally uncommon occurence.

IMHO, these guys should have been hauled into a room somewhere ASAP, given a beer, and asked to recall as closely as possible what they did, and what happened in their opinion.

They were lucky.... nothing was on that taxiway.
Next time, somebody will meet a fully fueled LearJet halfway down the taxiway, and the resulting fireball will make ALL the papers....

If these guys could tell in all honesty what happened, without their names being mentioned in the official reports, and without their career being affected, we might learn something.

But then pigs might fly.

I am a PPL, but am also an anesthetist. It occurs to me that there should be a simple way to use a GPS-oriented system to ensure takeoffs AND landings on the correct runway, at least at airports that are designated for jet service. We have similar "goof-proof" systems up and running in the operating theater, inspired by lessons learned from our aerospace colleagues. I do know that there is a lot of "clutter" and distraction prior to takeoff and landing, but perhaps a simple system could be designed to prevent these situations from arising.

Ok guys, you've all been very understanding to the poor pilot who made this mistake. Now how about giving worldpilot a break?
He's said he retracts what he said, so try accepting his mistake.

So actually assuming that a pilot cannot rely on tower for watching that the correct runway (or any runway at all :}) is being used, what measures can be put in place for this situation? RAAS - how widespread is it?
My feeling is that at decision height a missed approach should have been executed given that the pilot was not visual with the area on which he wished to land. Given that the runway could not be seen, an alternate runway could have then been used or land off instruments. Thoughts on this?

I'm not familiar with ops on this scale so please excuse the lack of knowledge.
--Rob

averow,
As far as I know, such systems already exist.
But getting them qualified, certified, installed on all aircraft, and integrated in the SOP is another story.

Same way as some of the <"goof-proof" systems up and running in the operating theater> that you mention will not be available in small country hospitals for a long time yet.....

Even today, is everybody equipped with EGPWS and TCAS?

Ok, from an engineer's point of view, I'm asking myself on how to prevent such incidents in the future. The only times I have seen a cockpit of a commercial airliner at night was in simulators (EDDF for example), so I'm trying to imagine.

From what I read here, 29 seems to be used if the crosswind component for a landing on 22 would be too high.

What I think contributed to the problem is that:
-The crew were rather busy with the "wind problem"
-They're coming after sunset
-They're flying a visual approach to runway 29
-So they have to find the runway among thousands of lights (taxiways, the turnpike, whatever). A runway that doesn't even have an ILS (probably because an ILS approach would interfere with KLGA approaches), no touchdown zone lighting and no approach lighting whatsoever.

So why does a runway, that is mostly used in adverse conditions, even lack a simple approach lighting?

SailorOrion

I suggest adding to contributing factors:
-Short final approach
-Clearing the New Jersey Turnpike at about 100 ft. altitude, then having to get down near the beginning of the runway which is not probably more than 500 feet or so from the Turnpike.
-A big question is why did they make a quick correction to the right as they were crossing the Turnpike to align themselves with Taxiway Z, rather than continue straight and land on 29?

Maybe that's why there is a displaced threshold on 29..

SailorOrion

Blimey Nerik, I didn't know it had happened at LGW twice.

So we have a regular-ish occurrence of aircraft landing on taxyways. So what's the common denominator folks? Incompetent pilots? ... Hmm. Or is it human factors combined with poor airport markings/design/procedures?

Somewhere in the depths of my mind I seem to think it was Air Malta.....prepared to be shot down though

KM, 737-200, 20 October 1993.

Sailor Orion
 

Sailor Orion


If you don't respond to this I will think that either you are not reading this post or it has been electronically masked .

You asked about ILS on runway 29/ engineering standpoint and all that bit.

While there is NO ILS on RW29, RW 11 has an ILS which also project a BACKCOURSE which would allow line up on RW 29...WHILE not certified as an instrument approach, it would certainly do to help pick out the runway (29) from all the lights in New Jersey on a VMC evening.


Indeed the backcourse of an ILS is even more sensitive at the threshold than the front course for left/right orientation. (no glide slope of course).

And of course 11/29 is the same piece of concrete...(just for those who don't understand such things)


ALSO Sailor: The 29 runway does have REIL lights (runway end identifier lights) and while not a full ALSFII, they are quite helpful.

IT IS my considered opinion that since PAPI is installed on 29, but on the RIGHT SIDE unlike any other papi/vasi at EWR(all to the left of the other runways) , the pilots went to the right of the PAPI (perhaps not briefing this aspect of 29) and that could only lead to the taxiway.


Having flown circling appchs to 29 at EWR in evening hours, I can tell you that there are lots of lights all over the joint including the freeway which almost always causes some degree of confusion.

LOL! We couldn't fly it that was followed.