In a nutshell...
 

...here's the account in Flight of what happened.

http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2006/12/19/Navigation/195/211163/Airbus+urged+to+fix+A320's+electrics.html.

The AAIB says events like this have occurred seven times now. Good crew action meant no-one came to grief.

The total, unrecoverable loss of comms in this event is the most unnerving bit. The copilot never lost his displays although the skipper was down to standby instruments. But the decision they had to make was: what do we do since we can't say who we are and the transponder is out as well?

They decided to stick to flight plan route and destination, and fortunately they were able to get the standby squawk to work, but chose 77 (rather than 76).

It does look as if Airbus could usefully do some tweaking to its electrical system. The AAIB certainly thinks so.

I think they could looking at the diagram in the AAIB report. The emerg gen should power the ess T/R and thus the DC ESS bus and the AC Ess bus once on line. Something to try in the sim.

NF,
It didn't affect all MSNs. Only those in which auto switching of the standby lighting to one of the remaining busses wasn't incorporated. I'll dig out the details later today and PM you.

just a little sidenote to a previous reply...

"Citroën" is written with a tréma, not with an accent circonflexe.

Going back to electric failures, and as previously mentioned, this has happened to non-computerized aircraft as well. Trans States Airlines based in STL, back in the days operating for TWE, had an incident in a J-32. With the engines running on the ground the crew hit the master test light switch. What followed was a flameout on both engines. If I recall correctly, it was due to a faulty diode in the test circuitry of the start/stop selector. Now that's scary ... :uhoh:

(This aircraft got hit 7 times by lightning during its life under TWE, subsequently it was nicknamed "sparky") ;)

7 7 7 7

Hopefully a read-only component could not easily be altered, but a random access memory can be altered due to natural radiation sources, and of course, a software bug. So I wonder what is being suspected here? I would hope the SRAM would have error-correction circuitry. I am hoping they get to the real root cause of this worrysome incident. Isolating it down to the compenent is a good first step, but only a first step.

Appalling, if you can't get a feed in the kitchen. :rolleyes:

I get an excellent signal whan the thrust reversers are deployed. Anybody else notice this compared to FL390?
Regards
D'vay

Tremas - pips and other nonsense?
 

Thank you Squawk for the language point - I always thought a ´trema´was what one received in oneś bowels when departing LHR at V2 and experiencing total engine shutdown.....I stand corrected.
On the subject of mobile signals, I was rudely awakened from my slumbers recently at FL370 with an irascible pip from my Nokia as T-mobile CZ advised me that I had entered their territory......:D
:mad: ing mobiles!

The report wrongly writes Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM).
It should read ROM Read-Only-Memory or
Static Random-Access-Memory (SRAM)

Can someone clear this up !?
.
.

The AAIB has just issued its formal report on the serious incident involving Easyjet A319, G-EZAC, in September 2006:

Air Accidents Investigation: 4/2009 G-EZAC Report Sections

Causal factors were identified as:

The investigation identified the following causal factors in this incident:

1. An intermittent fault in the No 1 Generator Control Unit, which caused the loss of the left electrical network

2. An aircraft electrical system design which required manual reconfiguration of the electrical feed to the AC Essential busbar in the event of de-energisation of the No 1 AC busbar, leading to the loss or degradation of multiple aircraft systems, until the electrical system is reconfigured

3. The inability of the flight crew to reconfigure the electrical system, for reasons which could not be established

4. Master Minimum Equipment List provisions which allowed dispatch with a main generator inoperative without consideration of any previous history of electrical system faults on the aircraft

5. Inadequate measures for identifying Generator Control Units repeatedly rejected from service due to repetition of the same intermittent fault.

I can't decide what scares me most, the loss of systems or the resultant AIRPROX :eek:

At least it proved to all its critics that an Airbus still can be flown manually without most of its automatics.

HB

11 Sept 2001
 

Some passengers on the 11 Sept 2001 flight which crashed near Pittsburg, PA had cell phone contact with friends and family who advised them on what was going on. Otherwise they wouldn't have fully understood. Because they had an idea of what was going on, the passengers attempted to regain control of the aircraft. Unfortunately, they didn't succeed.

I look on it as they did suceed as they were dead men walking on the plane, in their actions they prevented a greater loss of life in forcing Hijackers to crash it.

I fully agree. :ok:

Ed

SLF here...but one with some background in RF and antenna theory.

The antenna arrays used for cellular phones are designed for maximum efficiency in a horizontal plane with as little energy as possible "wasted" in a vertical direction. However, no antenna system is perfect and there will be some signal outside the optimum area--how much depends on many factors including the height above ground of the tower and the topography the site is designed to cover.

There is one other design "feature" that may account for some of the effects people have noticed: a by product of the antenna design is that there is frequently a fairly strong vertical lobe directly above the tower. This would have the effect of showing a fairly strong signal on a phone briefly as a plane passes directly over a tower site--but with this disappearing again rapidly when the aircraft is not directly above the transmitter. At modern aircraft speeds, there is not usually enough time for the phone to sync to the system before the signal is lost--though there can be service briefly in a few locations.

As somebody has already said, location makes a big difference and there will be places, particularly in the early part of a climb or late part of a descent, where you will get an adequate signal...but the higher you fly, the less likely you are to be able to use your phones.

Bob

Guess it should be Static Random-Access-Memory. Static ROM doesn't make much sense.

In a nut shell, RAM can be modified at wish, ROM can't, but depending on type it is either hard coded at manufacturing time or can be field reprogrammed but this isn't the same as what would happen under normal running conditions.

Wikipedia reference on memory types: Read-only memory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

fc101

Guess which newspaper (this morning).

Wait for it ....

"Terrified passengers watch on in horror as doomed aircraft is buzzed by Tupolev F-1 Mirage fighters with guns blazing over Irish Sea"

It's an Air Bus say no more :ugh:

I'll be moving on shaky grounds when I say this, but in this case I might have tried to reset one bus or two by means of a circuit breaker. It might helped or it might have not. It depends on the time available of course. But if you fear to get shot down... (btw you wouldn't, they try to establish visual contact, if you rock your wings you are safe, just follow them to the next runway).

We were in a holding somewhere over Bologna at 3000ft and couldn't make sense out of the synoptic page. Contactor and relays didn't want to behave like they should have. We were able to get a bus back only after a CB reset and could continue our flight. (That was another type though).

HB