The crew landed at LEX Friday night, had Saturday off, and went back on duty Sunday morning.

Crew rest is not likely an issue.

I had heard that as well, but did not know it was a fact.

I was of the impression they were doing a stand up?

I learned this from a Comair pilot so it seems to be accurate.

Before take off check list amendment proposal
 

Yes, this tragic mistake could be as contributor factor the marking of runway 22 at LEX.

Go to Goggle earth and zoom into the airport: if you notice the 22 marks are way at the beginning of the runway. Yuo will read the marks at yr right end sight turning the A/C left into a 22 heading (which is 4 units short than 26) if you align yourself inseatd on the 26 you must cross the markings before taking off. This does not happen on the 22.
CRM tell us to be aware that often if you believe to be somewere your eyes will confirm to yr brain.

Very sorry indeed, As happen to the Singapore Airline disaster in Taipei. However if the crew would have inserted the localizer freq.and heading into the box the Flight Director would have set warnings (with its misalignment) into the pilots regarding the wrong way out.

Hope that Localizer alignment on T/O (standard on some other airlines) will be mandatory part of the before take off check list world wide.

My sympaty to the families including those not even mentioned by the perverted US media : the pilots ones.

There was no 'intersection takeoff' granted. I will tell you all that much.

Be aware that Google Earth's image does not show the recent (last week) resurfacing and remarking of rwy22. The new displacement of of rwy22 may have made it more confusing. There are some current photos on some of the news links that accurately show the new markings.

Also noted on the NTSB briefing, the perimeter fence was compromised by the aircraft. The first impact above ground was a tree beyond the fence at about a height of 25ft. which would indicate the aircraft left the ground after exiting the end of the runway. EDIT - I looked at the photo again and realized it's possible that the first on scene airport fire department could have barrelled through the fence to access the crash or they may have passed through one created by the aircraft.

As jondc9 says - this is an accident no-one wanted, but one in the US regionals, sadly, that was just waiting to happen due to systemic failures all the way along the line - with crew fatigue at the top of the list....

Check the runway assigned...
 

A very long time ago, when I was doing the initial B707 training at PanAmerican, they had just changed the 'before takeoff' checklist, to add the following at the end, IE, the last item, which MUST be done on the runway, prior to brakes release or, in the case of rolling takeoffs, before the throttles were advanced....

Configuration Check.

1. Flaps...set to the desired setting
2. Speed Brake...forward
3. Stab trim...set in the takeoff range
4. Compass headings...compared, and bugs set to the DESIRED RNY HEADING

Good idea then...good idea now.

411 just mentioned this and I was wondering...

Is the DI in an EFIS generated by a gyro (like a regular DI)? I ask because, when I fly, one of the last items on my pre-takeoff checklist is to set the DI against the Magnetic Compass. Do you still do that with a 'glass cockpit'? A side issue of doing this, since you are lined up on the centreline, is to mentally confirm that you are on the right runway.

In the lunchtime (local) press conference the Airport Director would not comment on which runway had been used but he did say that 08/26 was 'a GA runway for daylight use only'. Are there any lights at all on that runway?

A final thought. If (as has been suggested but not confirmed) they were cleared to depart from the intersection then wouldn't a fully lit runway 22 have been visible to both pilots at their 10 o'clock?

Departure from the intersection on 22 would have given them the required 5,000 feet but less than 2,000 on 26

Previous poster said they arrived Friday night and left Sunday morning. Fatigue from the schedule doesn't appear, at first glance, to be an issue.

One of the many ironies of operating a “sophisticated” transport aircraft is that your rental car will probably be better equipped for surface guidance (GPS driven map) than the aircraft you are in.

A piece of paper (10-9) and a wet compass for guidance…..that is (along with signage) the normal way to find your way around some of the busiest and most complex airports in the world.

Surface maps are slowly making their way into cockpits via design (A-380, B 787) or as afterthoughts (EFB’s). They are long overdue.

Honeywell has a system that may have saved the day:

http://www.honeywell.com/sites/aero/...4E407D99FE.htm

And others are working on similar systems.

Clearly has the appearance of an accident that involves many human factors, airport layout and taxiway closures / changes playing a big factor, KUDO's to the law enforcement officers that risked serious injury to pull out the First Officer. Condolences to all families and friends.

Totally agree with you. One would have thought that this would be standard now after SQ6. :rolleyes:

Loose
looking on the chart an INT T/O seems to be feasible, may however resulted in some misunderstanding in regard to TWY changes.
http://66.226.83.248/aptdiag/w240/03974.gif

Still is... basic check trained when working on the instrument rating. Also, if the extended runway centerline is not straight up we stop and talk about it. It could be do to one of may failures associated with the complexities of the modern jet, or just lined up on the wrong runway. This can happen at airports with intersecting runways at the end with minor heading differences.

If the tower was manned, and I beleive it were... what were they during this time????

Long and the short, very sad. Hopefully some good will come from this accident.

complacency
 

Yes, they should have done this and that and the other thing. And I used to do all those things everytime. But I've noticed that I don't anymore. Because I fly the same equipment on the same routes with the same people day after day after day. And everything is automated so when I miss something minor nobody notices because old George and all his wizz bang gadgets cover for me. So many times I don't even notice that I missed something. "Oops, I forgot to…. Oh well". Besides, I'm busy with the important stuff. Like bitching about my schedule, my pay, my working conditions, my boss, my wife. Yes, I've just been off for 4 days. I may even recently have had my two weeks leave on a beach or in the mountains. I'm not sick. I'm not tired. But I am sick and tired. The job is turning into a daily grind. Even though I love flying. I even think about flying when I'm working. I think about retirement and how I'll buy a sea plane and fly around the Carribean. So while thinking all this, my muscle memory has flipped all the required switches and punched all the necessary buttons and spoken all the right things into the mike and off we go for the umpteenth time.
Except that this time we lined up on the wrong @#$% runway.

I don't know about conversation in that particular accident, but would correct RT procedures have prevented that accident?

What I mean is the very common read back of our US collegues like

TWR: XYZ 123 cleared for take off runway 25R
XYZ 123: Roger cleared for take off

That's a good one Bigmouth, thanks :D
Complacency is THE danger to avoid. Lost the sense of awareness and responsability, my thoughts shifted to roster, pay and pension, how sad!

R.I.P. all

F4F :(

Interesting point raised. I feel this is a case of US controllers knowing the rules well and sticking to their hidden meanings and signifigances.

At our airline, far far away from the USA, it is SOP that all taxi clearances should specifically include crossing instructions of other runways. If they are not included, then we are to ask for them. Coming to this airline I thought it odd, but started to see the value of it.

On a recent flight departing a major Indian airport we were cleared to taxi to the departure runway, without mention of being cleared to cross the parallel runway that lay before the takeoff runway. When I asked to confirm that we are also cleared the cross that parallel runway (as per our SOP) the prompt response was "negative, hold short" of that one too.