With respect Beagle, 'most prudent' does not always equate to 'correct'.

I would take the decision to continue as being the correct decision IF having considered all the factors, including of course enroute contingency planning of fuel and alternates it met my/company criteria. This may vary from day to day.

I would have to have a 'check mark' or 'tick' in all the boxes to continue, and the default would be that if that were that not the case, to proceed to a suitable enroute alternate. Remember time is not a factor here, as it takes about 5 hours from LAX to leaving mainland Canada. At all stages using the DODAR concept, there is the R=Review option or 'howgoesit', and decisions can be changed - that is exercising good CRM/command/decision making skills.

Diverting somewhere enroute is sometimes the 'easy' option, not the'correct' option. Making such decisions to continue are sometimes more difficult than that to divert and shows calm, rational thought and certainly not a reckless commitment to continue.

I applaud my colleagues:ok:

Mike - were the FAA invited to send a representative to that meeting, as they're the ones squawking the loudest? Has a copy been info'ed to them?
Just curious...

Top Bunk, absolutely correct. Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Montreal, etc must have all been fairly close abeam, ORD,BOS,JFK a little further. It's not press-on-itis, it's teamwork and confidence in a plan. By the time Montreal was passed, the plan must have looked solid. BA are not idiots.

And I can just imagine the tree-hugger headlines in California if BA had stayed off-shore and dumped fuel over their cute little sea-otters: "Nasty Colonials attempt to destroy precious marine habitat during jet near-disaster".
:hmm:

The FAA has more pressing problems here at home with the dismal state of service in the US carriers and lack of infrastructure investment...:mad:

TopBunk and Danny,

ACH (asymmetric committal height): the height, from which a safe go-around is assured (or as the regulation says, below which the pilot SHOULD not attempt another approach), taking into account the time needed to accelerate the engine, retract gear and reduce flaps, the airplane type, gross weight, elevation of the airport, temperature, winds, obstacle clearance and qualification of pilot.

In reviewing the manuals I found the notice, that on a two engine approach landing is committed upon lowering the gear (and then found comments along the same line in messages here - thanks!).

That raises an interesting question however: What do you do, if the landing target is not assured for one or the other reason, when you get down to say 300 feet AGL?

Where did I say or imply that? My kernel argument is, that loosing an engine reduces safety margin and increases risk, which should be kept as short and as minimal as possible.

BTW, as you have mentioned that too: I did not say anywhere, that this crew did anything illegal. I have not mentioned the legal side at all in my postings so far. I argue from the point of risk management and safety margins and the paying customers' (those, who in the end pay the wages of pilots and all other employees of airlines) perceiption of safety issues.

The discussion so far has shown, that an approach on two engines leaves no safety margin whatsoever, if between lowering the gear and arriving on the runway a safe landing is prevented.

And that's exactly, what I said in all my postings today. A Go-Around is not an option in this scenario, neither performancewise because of the insufficient achievable climb gradient (as I said throughout the discussion) nor legally as I now learned from reviewing the manuals, so the go-around out of a two engine approach is not an option on any airport. That is actually worse than I believed earlier today.

My mistakes in this discussion, as it has unfolded, has been the language, which is not in line with regular pilot talk (of course! See below), the oversight of the legal ban of a go-around on the two engine approach, once the gear has been lowered, and too late a review of manuals.

So far the discussion could not change my view. If you will, despite being an European, I am with FAA on this one.

Now, I am software developer, developing mathematic models of air flow and aerodynamics of airplanes - as such I have flown a significant number of hours in full flight sims of various airplane types and have flown them all into their extremes to cross check predictions out of the modelling (so my "joyrides" were "workrides" in reality). Clearly, I do not know all the details of procedures, certainly not the legal side of them and certainly not by heart.

Me, too, no doubt about that. I just need to mention the Atlantic Glider ...

Simon

Danny, I know that I will never take control of a 747 :ugh:
But I have to say, to continue to the point that you issue a mayday(yes they did) call on final, thinking that you did not have enough fuel to perform a go-around. In that situation you have no options, you have to land
I just think it may have been prudent to put it down before it got to that stage.
I know you guys get paid to make these decisions but I have to agree with B-Eagle on this one.:8
E.F.

Just how many times does it have to be posted?

They had enough fuel.

They missunderstood the information presented to them.

They were not about to run out of fuel.

They had 8 tons on landing.

8 tons is close to an hours flying time.

They were NOT about to run out of fuel.

Egerton. I'm glad you and BEagle agree. Neither of you have flown the aircraft concerned. Blueprint (whose posting was erroneous and misleading) had flown Classics, I guess, and BEagle, I believe, the mighty '10. (BEagle: like it or not, if it happened again tomorrow, we'd probably do it again)

The 747 is designed to do it, the manufacturer approves it, the CAA certifies it, the operator trains it (and approved it in this case), the crew were happy with it on the day and the FAA have their collective heads up their @rses.

Now PLEASE can we save some bandwidth for the BA pension thread ;) ??

PS: Austrian Simon: if English is not your first language then congratulations on the standard of your postings. Most professional pilots are not software developers (NoD excepted :) ) and we would not dream of offering advice on a software developers forum. I can understand your interest in the subject, but with respect, your experience (as described by you) does not enable you to contribute anything meaningful to the B744 qualified pilots on here in this discussion. Welcome to PPRuNe!

I know I am wasting my breath but...

Before commencing the approach you make sure you have an assured landing. You are cleared to land before commencing the approach. In other words the runway is sterile. It is yours.

A go around from AFTER gear down is practiced in the simulator, and perfectly flyable. Indeed it is in the current BA check.

The B747-400 is certified to do it. Boeing have approved the procedure. It is part of the aircraft certification. How on earth is that illegal??

l337

Yes they had enough fuel but it was mostly in Nbr 2 tank.
I know I am a mere engineer, but I find the B744 fuel system complicated.
If you fly a B777 or A320 or B737, go look at the B744 fuel system. 8 tanks and 16 pumps and override pumps and transfer valves and point sensors etc. It would be complicated for an F/E let alone a pilot. However in NORMAL operations it works just fine. The pilots set it up at engine start and then leave it alone. During the cruise they get an EICAS message and turn off some switches. And the rest is automatic. However, with an engine out, you have to do things differently. You have to keep the aircraft balanced, and use up all the fuel in Nbr 2 tank before TOD. This may sound easy , but its not. They had fuel left in Nbr 2 tank, and the book says tank to engine on descent. So they landed with LHR fuel, but unusable. I hope the BA B744 manual explains how to do this better now.

By the way I have taken off in a Tristar on a 2 engine ferry flight and thought the lack of V1 was not very funny, especially as the F/E told me as we were taxying out for T/O!

Blueloo wrote:

The reason we have those enhanced standards is precisely because they are inherently less safe than 3/4 eng a/c. And for your info.- the BA 767 engines are directly compatible with the 744 and vice-versa. Same motors, just that you've only got two to start with.





AS wrote:

That's why you make sure that rwy is yours & yours alone for the approach.:rolleyes:

You are applying twin-engine logic to a 4-eng a/c. :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

You're still not listening. 2-eng is perfectly safe including G/A. Depending on weight, OAT etc a G/A from about 500' is achievable. It's been a while since I flew the a/c, but we used to practice just that - G/A after the commit point. If some moron decides to drive his van across a 'sterile' rwy with Mayday traffic at 1nm Final on 2 engines then he deserves to have his genes removed from the gene-pool.

Double engine failure and a rwy incursion at 300'. You're stretching the bounds of reality now AS.

Hogwash.

No it is not. No more difficult than a single-engine apch on a twin.

AS, I don't mean to be sarcastic, but there is so much more you said earlier that is complete nonsense to those of us who earn a living flying these things. I just can't be bothered to respond to the rest.

A period of silence from you would now be most welcome.

Idol (12yrs 100/200 & 400). And unlike you, I'm no expert.

Someone mentioned specially trained 3 engine ferry crews, in BA only one person on a ferry flight has any exceptional training and that is normally a training captain. An ordinary line FO, with no extra training, occupies the other seat.

That is BA's CAA approved procedure for a 3 engine ferry.

Danny,

Yep, I am aware of the note, but was trying to keep it simple for our Simon. I have practised said procedure.

Cheers,

Ricky :ok:

idol detent - you are forgetting so many other factors which are required for ETOPS certification. It is not just about the engines. It is about many systems. THe engines play a large part in the equation, and an engine failure from an ETOPS fleet aircraft can affect the ETOPS certification.



What this comes down to was, was this the safest course of action. The answer to that will be debated. Continue with and engine failed and have to declare a fuel emergency..... or dump fuel and land at MLW.

For my mind, Safety before schedule will remain my priority.

Quite. I was merely poining out that the BA767 and -400 engines are the same. They are not ETOPS 'special editions' as was implied in your post. ;)


Likewise.

Having used all the resources available to them and considered the many factors that needed to be considered, the crew elected to continue on 3 engs. Nothing illegal and not un-safe to my mind. I would quite possibly have done the same. Why the FAA are up in arms is beyond me.

Rgds

Idol

The safest option was not to leave the ground in the first place. Flying is not risk free. The only question is was a flight on 3 engines at an acceptable level of risk.

Nearly every 744 pilot on this forum seems to believe that the risk was at an acceptable level, why do the non 744 pilots find this so difficult to comprehend?

I am only wanabee, but the arguments put forward by the 744 pilots along with my respect for BA leaves me in no doubt that their decision was sound.

Requirements and considerations for three engine ferry don't apply in this case. Special training and crewing for the ferry scenario is necessary due to the abnormal takeoff procedures and handling characteristics encountered when initially setting off with only three out of four. In a nutshell, the difficult bit of getting airborne on three is tracking the runway as thrust is applied and correctly responding to the loss of a second engine. Quite tricky actually, with some of it going against the grain but all completely irrelevant in the case of an engine failing after a normal takeoff.

There's a set margin of safety, and this flight certainly cut into it, although whether the cut was deep enough to compromise that safety is obviously open to debate. When operating on three prepare for operating on two, and plan accordingly with a knowledge of the limitations and risk that the situation is going to impose. Suffice to say that it would seem as though commercial considerations entered into this particular go/no-go decision. Continuing wasn't actually unsafe because nothing went additionally wrong, but under the given the circumstances landing and calling it a day would undoubtedly have been safer. The FAA has a point - why roll the dice?

So many replies to this thread, and only Strepsils has come close to getting it right. Again, the relevent part of FAR 121.565:

Did the aircraft have the fuel to make the airport (Healthrow) that the PIC selected? No it did not, since an emergency was declared and a fuel diversion to Manchester was required, short of Heathrow.

Therefore was proceeding to the selected airport (Heathrow) as safe as landing at the nearest airport? No it was not, because the aircraft didn't have the fuel to make the selected airport (Heathrow).

One of the linked articles speculates that the crew might have had the fuel if they had not spent so much time over the Pacific near LAX. Maybe so, but this does not change the requirement that most of the flight has to be planned all over again (as required by FAR 121.565) before continuing the flight.

Was the crew in violation of FAR 121.565 when they turned the pointy end East towards Healthrow? Yes they were, because they did not meet the requirement of part (b)(2) of this regulation.

It really is that simple.

According to what I have read on this thread, they did meet the requirement of 121.565. People keep saying they had LHR fuel(and I assune alternate fuel). But from what swedish steve said, here on page 4, if I read it correctly, they mismanaged their fuel. Or perhaps there was a fuel pump malfunction, or something similar. Can anyone confirm.

Just to reapeat what I said on the original thread. The FAA's original complaint was filed by an inexperienced FAA duty officer who has since been sat upon. The decision to continue the flight was made in accordance with the Company Ops manual which had been filed with and approved by the FAA so that they ,the FAA, could issue a Foriegn Carrier Certificate.

END OF STORY (again)

Cheers Beerdrinker.

As suspected - look like the Septics are trying to back out in a face saving manner.

I agree with Mike J. Improving their 3rd world airports would be a good start - although I have to say that I love the simplicity of their departures.

Utter rubbish.

The QRH on the day covered the senario they arrived at.

That is "All pumps on, all cross-feeds open"

Simple.