Air Transat crew not to blame in A330 emergency landing in the Azores
 

Investigators Redirect Focus On Air Transat Emergency Landing In Azores. .

Well, maybe the cockpit crew wasn't out to lunch after all. It could have been a software glitch that made things more than confusing for the crew of Air Transat's Flight 236 and ultimately led to an emergency dead-stick landing in the Azores last August, after the jet ran out of fuel over the Atlantic Ocean. According to a report in the Canadian Press, Portuguese investigators are now focusing on aircraft system software that provides information to the cockpit crew. Investigators suspect the software mistakenly identified a fuel leak as a fuel imbalance, prompting the crew to respond erroneously to the situation. The Air Transat flight with 291 pax and 13 crewmembers aboard landed safely August 24 at a military air base in the isolated islands of the Azores. "What we're discussing very carefully is whether the information provided by the computer to the crew is the best information to deal with the problem, and we have some serious doubts with that," Frederico Serra said in an interview from Lisbon, Portugal. "There is something wrong with this system. There is something that was not given to crew on time." After the incident, Transport Canada ordered all Air Transat pilots to take "remedial" fuel-management training that would stress the need to divert to the nearest possible airport at the first signs of engine-related emergency. Now it seems the mistake was not in the crew response, but in the bad information the software gave them.

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A fuel leak can initially appear as a fuel imabalance on the ECAM fuel page.

A quick check is to add the FUEL USED to the FOB to see if it tallies with the DEPARTURE FUEL. If not, something is amiss.

The QRH paper checklist for FUEL IMBALANCE is quite explicit in directing the reader to check if the condition is due to a fuel leak.

[ 03 February 2002: Message edited by: 320DRIVER ]</p>

I am offended by the headline you used for this thread, almost as much as I am by the inaccuracy of the article you have quoted.

This story must be taken with a huge grain of salt. The investigator has given no explanation as to the shortcomings of the ECAM system, or as to how the ECAM system should be set up to give information about a fuel leak. Given that there are so many places where a fuel leak could occur on any aircraft, especially one the size of the A330, just exactly what would he have the manufacturer do, put a leak sensor every 2 metres along every fuel line? Do they do the same thing with the hydraulic systems? Of course not!

The A330 ECAM gives ample information regarding a fuel leak, if the pilot takes the time to interpret the given information. Proper fuel monitoring and correct use of the QRH procedures for fuel imbalance would have prevented this accident, IMHO. For many years, pilots of far less sophisticated aircraft have been responsible for monitoring their fuel enroute, not only to verify the figures computed in the flight plan, but to monitor for any unexplained loss of fuel from the system. This is something that seems to have been missed on that nearly tragic night last summer. Makes me shiver just to think about it!

Scud

[ 03 February 2002: Message edited by: Scud Runner ]

[ 03 February 2002: Message edited by: Scud Runner ]</p>

In my limited experience I dont recall any EICAS or EICAM warning or caution for "fuel leak." The first indication would be fuel imbalance or possibly low fuel pressure, followed by the associated warnings and cautions for engine failure if you did not do something to keep motion lotion flowing to both power plants. Anyone come across a fuel leak caution or warning.? BTW, not trying to second guess the Transat guys as I dont have enough info and would`nt know what to do with it if I did.

Unfortunately, this incident highlights a growing trend within our industry. Blind adherance to checklists and procedures. As a check airman I am seeing more and more of this. And it concerns me. So many checklists are now saying if this light comes on, do this. Instead of investigating what the problem really is. One of the new major hot buttons for Crew Resource Management is how automation is taking flight crews out of the loop.

It is my experience that pilots rely on EICAS, rote checklists and full automation for one reason- that's how they're taught. The old "whole man" concept of teaching the full system first, then how to use it, is just harder and therefore not done.

I've met 3 MD-11 pilots in the last year, including one captain, who believed that it was a fly-by-wire aircraft. Eight weeks of training and they didn't even know that the control system is almost identical to the DC-10 (except for some stability augmentation).

Tan - close, the manual reversion is in case of flight computer failure. The cables operate the hydraulic surface rams. If you lose hydraulics, you are stuffed.

320 driver is right there is no ECAM wng for a fuel leak.It draws the pilots attn to a fuel imbalance and then the QRH

Sorry, I got posted before I was finished.. .The QRH tells the pilot to check for a fuel leak,something that was not done on this occasion.. .rick1128 this time you are wrong!This time the crew did not follow the drill.

Put the flight engineer back in the cockpit!

javelin

I don't think so but I will haul out my manuals and check. My recollection is that the hydraulic's are protected in this situation from a different source.

The beer is on me if I'm wrong...

APFDS, you wrote,

"rick1128 this time you are wrong!This time the crew did not follow the drill."

Could you enlighten us as to what information you have that allows you to make that kind of statement? . .There are a lot of people who would like to know.

HotDog is right, bring 'em back. A Flight Engineer would have caught this problem quick, IMHO.

Bin the Bus?

Aircraft=Complex machine.. .Pilot=Person who flies and navigates aircraft.. .Automation=System for controlling and monitoring aircraft systems.. .Engineer=Person who understands aircraft systems and the automation system.

As an industrial engineer we would never dream of operating a plant without an engineer close on hand to get it working when it goes wrong, never mind how much automation we have to help. Transplant that idea to an aircraft in Mid-Atlantic!

. .Bring back the flight engineer and we will all be safer (and feel safer).

[ 04 February 2002: Message edited by: Nihontraveller ]</p>

Nihon-Wish I could have flown the YS-11.

Bin the Bus? I've never been trained on an Airbus (although might be in the future), but no matter how advanced the technology on fly-by-wire series, the US airlines' economic advantage operating Airbus products (and their major foothold here) is mostly due to tax subsidies which are provided by so many European/British taxpayers.

The first major foothold in North America, or the USA, was 'allegedly' via kickbacks to some former airline CEO(s), via the 'alleged' CDU/CSU "Verbindung".

Suffa? Oft besoffen?

[ 04 February 2002: Message edited by: Ignition Override ]</p>

Thank God we still have some 747's flying that have a Flight Engineer.. .I avoid Airbus like the plague, and -400s if I can, on international flights, and I do a lot.. .Unfortunately, it's becoming harder to do all the time, but I keep asking, AND I let the relavent airline know I'm doing it!. .Pity Boeing didn't build more -300's. ."If it ain't a Classic Boeing, I ain't going!"

Flight Detent: What exactly is it about 2 man cockpits that scare you? The only 744 hull loss I can think of was SQ and an engineer would not have made much difference. A340/330s have caught fire on the ground, but that is because of engineers using hydraulics when they shouldn't right? And I remember a certain B727 where the engineer walked into the cockpit and pushed in a circuit breaker without saying anything first. If I were you I'd avoid engineers like the plague, and classics too. Especially in bad wx! Stick with the 'upgrades!' :)

Rumour has it that the engine was not shutdown because the Captain, who was a senior management pilot, was worried that Transat would lose their ETOPs clearance if that was done. Ha!

SDAC, I think you will find that the captain was not senior management.