I’d like to try to understand the flight crew’s decision path.

1. After taking off from LAX, the engine is shut down. The professional consensus is that the flight crew were correct in deciding to proceed (that’s good enough for me).
2. Having so decided, at the same time they chose to return to LHR rather than go to an airport such as BOS (which presumably would have had fewer disadvantages than a return to LAX).
3. Presumably, they made this decision calculating that they would be very unlikely to have to divert to MAN and require a PAN.
4. At some point (only a few hours into the flight according to my great circle mapper), they made a final decision to cross the Atlantic.
5. Similarly, they decided on the same basis not to divert to KEF or PIK.
6. Can I conclude that reasonably non-forecastable event(s) occurred fairly late in the flight?
Feel free to flame this SLF.

You won't get flamed for asking logical and sensible questions, especially as you admit to not being a pilot.

Your analysis would appear to be a good guess and your final question is what we would all like to find out!

Unfortunately on every occasion where an event like this comes to wider attention everybody has an opinion on what they did wrong and what they should have done before the full story is known.

Naturally this will always anger those of us who operate aircraft for a living and don't engage in what our American cousins so aptly call 'armchair quarter - backing'.

It is especially galling to anybody working for a decent airline where safety is probably without exception at the top of that airline's agenda.

Agreed.
As I said earlier, presumably the track was northerm or polar, so en-route divs may have been a bit thin. However, a div to KEF, GLA, PIK or similar should have been available towards the end of the flight, by which time and the fuel consumption problem would have manifested itself and should have been noticed.

Regardless of what has been said previously, 5t landing fuel, (of which 3t may or may not have been unusable) ain't a lot for any big aircraft, never mind a 3-engined 744.

Planning for the worst case scenario , what would they have done if MAN became unavailable for some reason? (Unlikely I know, but still a possibility that should have been taken into account). When the decision was made to divert (Plan B), what was Plan C? Where were they planning to go if they couldn't use MAN?

It's dead easy to be critical with 20/20 hindsight, (and many have been), but it appears that there may be lessons to be learnt (again) from this occurrence. As I asked before, who is investigating this incident and where will the findings be published? It should be interesting reading.

Second time you have referred to a polar route. Perhaps you might study a globe and, being a professional pilot, stop talking nonsense.

Oh really?

Perhaps you could take this up with the CAA because it is above the acceptable figure that has been in force since the 744 was introduced in the late 1980s

Why not? Perhaps you could use some more unfounded speculation in your answer.

Or what about if the UK had been wiped out due to a nuclear bomb, they would have been really stuck then. Suprised they didn't take that into account.

First accurate statement you have made.

If you are a pilot then the answer should be obvious. Why don't you wait anyway, perhaps you could then give us the benefit of some more of the utter tripe that you post.

Final 3 Greens.
Re-read Bermondsey's post and, yes, I did misread it.
Thanks!

I find it quite interesting that a lot of second guessing, or arm chair analysis, complete with speculation about what ifs, are being made in this thread.

All of the considerations have already been taken into account even before the plane takes the air. The statistical considerations, the what ifs and last but not least the identification and response to any enroute problems. This is all nicely contained in the recommended operating procedures and/or trained in the flight crew.

The demonstration of the adequacy of this is the historical record itself, both by the operator as well as the aircraft type.

I just don't see the point of the uninformed debating procedures rather than simply asking for understanding.

As a member of the public, I hope that you will allow me to make a small point that relates possibly to both this thread and to another that seems to be popular currently. I have mentioned previously in this thread, that I wholeheartedly back the flight crew of the airline that I choose to fly with and that I trust them and rely on them to be competent and business like at work.
Referring to the other thread that I mentioned previously that has details of a situation where a pilot has been arrested for alledged drinking prior to a flight, I am gobsmacked at some responses that infer that 'it happens sometimes', that we all make mistakes' and that raise vocal objection to being tested prior to departure.
The flightcrew have my full backing on the basis that I believe that they are not intoxicated.
You guys have many lives at stake, and I firmly believe that you should be in the best condition when you take your seats.
For the vast majority who I know adhere to this, I really hope that you will niot be offended by my comment.

You may rest assured that alcohol played zero part in this 'incident' (what 'incident'?- there was no 'incident', but some still can't believe it)

Rainboe

I wasn't really referring to the non incident at MCR. That is a scenario that I have no intention of delving in to for a variety of reasons that all have legal and moral repercussion!".
There seemed to be a conflict between some of the posts on the two threads.
Most of the pro's on this thread would wish that the passengers would trust the flightcrew to make the correct decision. I totally agree and I hope I made that clear.
What seemed to go against this ,were some comments on the other thread where the contributor felt that it would be intrusive to be tested at prior to a flight or that being snitched on by a colleague, groundstaff was totally abhorrent.
I totally respect your profession. You are skilled operators of complex equipment working under high pressure. I just need to know that you are fit to do it. (and I know that most are) but sometimes you are only as good as your 'worst' player.
Again, I hope that you will not take offence.

Good grief,

time to close this topic,

and thanks again for being an "operator"
and bringing fitness in to question ....
and thinking passenger wise
and bringing unfounded speculations

Let's have a beer Lewis


:hmm:

As a BA Boeing driver

I have found this thread very interesting, not only for the (lack of at times) accurate technical inputs but the perception of "non-drivers" regarding SOP's

With regard to SOP's it's all very well to say this is agreed with Boeings, the CAA or whoever so it must be OK, but is it?

For example, to dispatch a 757 with a rear booster pump u/s there is a requirement to carry extra fuel (for the approach situation to make sure the forward one is not uncovered if a GA was required) and also to open the crossfeed for the approach.

All very sensible you might say, but why on earth if the pump fails in flight does the QRH not at least require the crossfeed to be opened (obviously the extra fuel requirement cannot be met without a techstop)?

The response from Boeings (via BA) was that the chance of a fuel pump failure followed by a GA was so remote as to be ignored. But I ask you would airmanship suggest the crossfeed be opened? Alas no, not SOP's!

With regard to the public perception of "what’s left in the tanks" I am sure there are many out there that still think the tanks are filled full before every flight, and very few that are aware that, once airborne, (within certain constraints) the fuel "diversion" from Rwy **L can be the parallel Rwy **R!

They cannot understand how this re-planned operation, with all the support of Flight Planning (as they used to be known), Maintrol (with the appropriate Fleet Management's involvement) could result in a situation of the Captain transmitting a "Pan" call and then in his opinion having to change it to a "Mayday"

I will not speculate as to the reason, apart from suggesting that he obviously felt he did not have all the fuel in the tanks at his disposal!

With regard to comments made about pumps switched on without the synoptic showing it to be producing pressure as happening on occasions (because the fuel output pressure on that pump is lower than the others) could I ask the following question of 747-400 drivers (and perhaps those on other Boeings) and our helpful engineer at Manchester?

If with two tanks feeding any number of engines, with the crossfeed valve open ,what is to stop the rear pump with the highest pressure running the show? (once the fwd pumps are uncovered at low contents level with the increased attitude on the approach)


My perception of the system is that, the single "higher pressure" pump will supply all the fuel (assuming it can satisfy the total demand) and continue so to do until the tank is empty. Basic physics! Once the tank is empty and the "higher pressure" pump output pressure drops the pump in the other tank (lower pressure pump) would then supply all the engines.

All well and good, but would you, as the driver, like to see the one tank supposedly not feeding once the crossfeed (SOP's) had been opened? I too would have used the magic (Mayday) word!

Obviously as the "normal" fuel feed with all engines running (once the centre and stab tanks are empty) is tank to engine. (glance at http://www.meriweather.com/747/over/fuel.html)

It must have come as a bit of a shock (having carried out SOP's at low fuel levels and opened the crossfeed(s)), and on three engines to then be concerned (due to the fuel synoptic and tank quantity indications) regarding the perceived amount of useable fuel on board.

One last thought... I wonder after the IFSD, with the flight planners help, the re-plan (fuel calculation) suggested they could make it to Heathrow direct.

In amongst a minefield of speculation or worse, I seem to recall that somewhere a long time back in this thread, the mention was made of an adverse Flight level change while crossing the Atlantic that changed the plan and the fuel parameters. If that's the case, then it looks to me like the original plan probably would have been OK.

In passing, and it's completely off thread in one respect, there was an interesting and reasonably accurate if somewhat sensationalist program on RTE this evening, french made, talking about aircraft accidents and incidents.

One fact that emerged was that in a particular year, probably 2 to 3 ago, as Air France were still flying Concorde at the time, and they were talking about engine failures during take off, and the ability of even large twins to still get airborne, there were 18 Million take offs, and 200 "problems" after V1 that did not result in any form of subsequent "incident", other than a safe landing. It was mentioned in the same section of the programme that "incidents" occurred on average every 2000 takeoffs on aircraft such as Constellations, which changed with the arrival of jets, and now, with the modern jets, the "incident" rate is down to less than 1 per million take offs.

I suspect that in the absence of spotters with radios, this "incident" might not have even reached this board. That it has, and is provoking such heated comments is slightly worrying, not because it made it here, but because it's generating such heated emotions. Given some of the other emotions that get generated over other subjects, I'm just glad it wasn't an Airbus that had the problem, we'd be at risk of an eternal thread!

Steve, the best thing to do with IFSD threads is "don't read them" (not quite achieved it myself :{)

you can just about bet that a row will start on every one .....

here's a few threads .... have a look through them ....

http://www.pprune.org/forums/search....der=descending

:ok:

I see this story has now made it onto p7 (with a 2" column on p1) of today's Times. Seems the reason for continuing was so that BA could avoid paying out compensation for the delay - saved them £100k apparently. Balpa get a mention too.

Aiglon

The Times also has this picture
http://images.thetimes.co.uk/TGD/pic...,181613,00.jpg

and the article Flying faulty jumbo across Atlantic saves BA £100,000 has the following quote from David Learmount:

“It was a very odd decision to continue to London. Even if the pilot didn’t want to dump so much fuel, he could have diverted to Chicago.

“You are not as safe on three engines as you are on four and I suspect that, given the choice, most passengers would have opted to return to LA.”

Of course, if they had got the level they aked for across the pond, they would have made London, and it would all be a complete non event, much like the DEL LHR 3 engine flight 2 weeks ago.

;)

I think that it is time to drop this whole speculative and rather inane thread.:p

What a waste of paper. Worst of all is David Learmount's comment "You are not as safe on three engines as on four". Astounding logic. Bit like saying eight engines are safer than seven. He seems to forget that many people will get on two engined aircraft and travel across the atlantic, the pacific and other wilderness areas. Mr Learmount should be undergo a bit of operational experience before being let near his word processor again.

The rest of the article is not much better. 10% facts, 40%speculation, 50% wrong. If cannot trust the accuracy of this story why on earth should regard ANY of the other stories in todays rag as accurate?

Strange time for pilots. If we do a go around, passengers report us to the Police for being drunk. If we continue after an inflight shutdown on a 4 engine aircraft, we are accused of just doing it to save on the compensation. Whilst I would never want us to be immune from scrutiny - we should be left to do our jobs - as we do day in and day out - professionally.

T'bug

speculative and rather inane


mmmmm, I know what you mean, Why should the odd "Mayday" interest anyone?

A friend who was fairly senior in the media at one time has just emailed to ask my opinion as a retired Captain, but never with BA.

Given the known facts and working out the options from my own experience I have no problems in fully supporting the captain.

Seems to me that there was no perfect solution, but the one he chose appears to address the needs for passenger safety, passenger convenience and company economics most admirably.

As to the idea it was simply to save money on compensation: Until we know that the engine failed for some reason within BA's control and not debris or bird ingestion, that question doesn't even arise. Mervyn Granshaw's quoted comments seemed hardly appropriate.

Now that I am "reduced" to SLF status, I would be happy to travel with him anytime and anywhere.:ok:

Ben Webster deserves a letter to the editor signed by as many 747-rated pilots as can be found (not working for BA to avoid appearance of conflict of interest) that support the decision making in this flight.

Now you're getting it!

I've been saying this for years.

Stop buying these hack rags, save a few trees and send a message to the publishers. Hit 'em in the pocket, where it hurts.

Personally I think the Captain should resign, Boeing and Rolls Royce should pay at least £1Million in compensation to ALL the passengers each and British Airways should be liquidated and bring back BOAC/BEA.:p

I understand that the engine failed on takeoff at LAX at 100' altitude and the crew/company elected to continue to LHR. Control Tower saw sparks coming from the engine.

While a 74 is ok on 3 engines, it's certainly going to burn A LOT more fuel at lower altitude and higher drag.

I wouldn't go on an ocean crossing with a failed engine due to unknown reasons, unknown damage, unbalanced windmilling, etc. Could the reason the company elected to continue with a disabled aircraft have anything to do with the new passenger compensation regulations?

You would also have to consider the possibility of the other engine on the same side failing. If that happened you'd be in a lot of hurt both fuel wise and landing controllability wise. Also, I'm not sure on the -400, but on the -200 depending on which side the engines are out on, the gear will go down but won't come up, hence probably no go-around capability.

Roadtrip you have NO idea what your talking about some of the gear will not come up if you have a sys 1 or 4 hydraulic failure an engine failure is not a hydraulic failure.

SMOC

opps. Faulty memory. 74s were a few years back. Made me pull out a very dusty OM. At least on the 200, the manual states that once the gear is down, you should not attempt a go-around, 2E one side. It is possible, but VMCA2 comes into play, drag from retracting the gear, etc. would make it a not-so-sure thing and maybe having to trade altitude for airspeed, if you have it. I've done it many times in the sim (of course) and an 2E one-side approach is not to bad if it's not rushed and planned carefully for. Of course the 400 with more power is probably better, to a point.

Bottom line is a 2E approach one-side is a very undesirable thing. I guess Boing (and hence the company) thinks it's ok to continue on 3E, but personally I think it's a bad idea with possible damage to an engine.

:eek:

I see much speculation in these threads. I will not be so rude as to comment upon inanity. However, here goes! Reflect on these things. Did the aircraft eventually fly the Great Circle or the Rhumb Line Route? Was not nearly all of the flight across a land mass, serviced with good category diversion airfields. Were not updates on Alternates' WX regularily available. Is not Manchester a BA/SOP Alternate for London, HR,GW? I remember flight planning for a fifth pod ferry. I do not seem to remember that three pod driftdowns were a worry, nor two pod at lower weights.
I think that the Crew had a multitude of escape routes and that, like good Commanders, they planned accordingly. (Wellington would never have won at Waterloo without The Prussians). They most certainly had their Island Alternates stitched up. Oh yes, this Mayday/Pan matter. I seem to remember that the CAA now requires that a fuel shortage be communicated by means of a Mayday call, not a Pan call. If I am correct in this, then the gravity of the situation reflected in a such Mayday call inbound Manchester, may not be reflective of the true gravity of the situation.
:)

What is BA's emergency fuel level for the 744?
From our Ops Gen "An emergency exists if the fuel remaining reduces to an amount where an approach to land should be started without delay. A MAYDAY call must be made if the Emergency Fuel Level is reached."

I'm sure the crew would have considered the above as part of their planning/contingency and have been well aware that UK ATC will only provide a priority approach in response to a MAYDAY call.

the thread 'anyone got a towbar' refers to aircraft diverting with fuel problems with Mayday called. Maybe the BA a/c had similar problems transferring fuel.

cavortingcheetah

Your will not be popular on this thread for using reasoned and sensible argument!

If I was a betting man I would say your speculation is probably the nearest to what actually happened of anything written so far.

763jock

With respect that quote from one of your company manuals is very imprecise. In BA the amount is defined generically i.e. 30 minutes holding fuel at 1500' blah, blah. It is shown in kgs. on the flight plan and is the amount that must remain in tanks after landing.

Our SOPs are that if it is likely to land with less than that fuel a PAN call must be made and if an aircraft WILL land with less than that fuel a MAYDAY call must be made.

The article I had the misfortune to read in The Times was cringemaking in the extreme. Since News International took over The Times it has slowly descended to the level of The Sun and the article was nothing less than one would expect, up to its usual abysmally low standards.

As for Mr. Learmount, does he actually know anything about aviation?

James

This was mentioned by 'RatherBeFlying' on page 3 of this thread, and the fuel transfer problems have been discussed at length. I suggest that people read the entire thread before posting or we could end up going round in circles.

Airclues

MM.
Our Ops Gen specifies different figures for the multitude of types we operate. They range from 900 kgs up to 3700kgs. I did not post the figures as they are not relevant to this thread, but they are calculated IAW the 30 mins holding etc as you state.

Just wondered what the actual figure is for the 744?

Anyone insinuating, that it is a non event, landing with 5Ts of fuel left in a 744, after inflight replanning, and given the scenario here, are fooling themselves and Joe public, if you ask me. How can you even suggest, that it is a wise and a safe move, to press on to a maintenance station, with less than final reserve fuel available(mayday call was given) upon landing?

I admit the information available is very sparse, if at all true. I can hardly wait, to read the report with great interest. I think there are lessons to be learned for everyone here! We don't wanna see anymore "A310 out of fuel" like accidents.

VK

M.Mouse - what is minimum legal fuel upon landing in MAN for a 744(given the scenario - true/false)?

From memory about 4,500 kgs.

How much fuel do most people think airliners land with everyday?

I sometimes wonder why what appears to be a perfectly reasonable decision by an operating crew becomes an hot issue on PPRuNe.
OK, so one engine on a 4 engine aircraft is shut down. It still has 3 remaining engines which is one more than a 767 and 3 times the number of engines that a twin has with one shut down which can now operate up to 3 hrs away from a suitable airport. Hardly big deal and worthy of 12 pages on PPRuNe.

So it continues from LAX to the UK. En-Route is passes many airports that it could land if necessary, probably passing reasonably close to Glasgow and Belfast.

It eventually lands at Manchester with 5 tonnes of fuel; perfectly adequate for the landing and a possible alternate; say Birmingham or Liverpool presuming that the weather wasn’t Cat3 at the time.
To ensure that he doesn't get messed about by ATC or other aircraft with lowish fuel he calls a MAYDAY.

The crew have done an excellent job, safety wasn’t compromised, ATC gave him the priority that I would expect, passengers got close to their destination and no doubt someone was able to do a 3 engined ferry if necessary.

Well done guys good safe commercial operation; it's about time that this thread was shut down

:) Here's a little thought. If all the nonsense that has been talked about on all the pages on this thread weree talked about through all the hours that it took BA (BOAC:ok: ) to get to Manch then it is a compliment to the crew that they did not run out of hot air over Gander.:p

Here's another twerp pushing their agenda on this: Richard North , who runs an anti-EU weblog and has decided to drink the Koolaid about this story.

;) Sky9
Most heartily seconded and agreed with. Must nip off outside wearing anorak. Bye.:uhoh:

What does the 747 QRH say in the engine failure/shutdown procedure? On all the Boeing twins "plan to land at nearest suitable airport" is mentioned. My guess (never flown more than 2 donks!) is that this is not a requirement on the 747...

"Well done guys good safe commercial operation; it's about time that this thread was shut down."

There are many who disagree. To my mind they got away with it by the skin of their teeth having been driven by commercial pressure... This time they got away with it - but what about next time?

Strewth, this thread is in danger of actually becoming rational!

No it was not commercial pressure it was standard operating procedures in place and used countless times before.

So everytime any airliner lands with around reserve fuel \'they got away with it\'?





What is the policy at Virgin for an IFSD on a 4 engined aeroplane?