Kite from recall I believe exactly the scenario you painted caused an airprox. Unexpected slow down or stop in climb meant serious loss of separation against traffic the pilot had never even considered.

In controlled airspace don't manoeuvre on TA alone.

It would seem that you are all keen to condemn the easy captain. I think the point you are making about TCAS is that it doesn't give you the whole picture. Maybe you are all missing the whole picture yourselves. Other threads have talked about the way easy pilots are worked up to and beyond flight time limitations and I would not be surprised if we had, in this case, a tired captain who unfortunately lost his rag for one moment. All we prove from this is that safety is connected to tiredness. I think we can all agree on that.

Agree that many people these days work under regimes that require self monitoring/policing, but if you do say 'I'm unfit', god help you! (see Crossair report!)
I think this particular case is about resentment of the way TCAS is being used by pilots to second guess controllers. Controllers, by nature, will resist 'giving up control'. We will, of course, eventually be replaced by technology. But that technology is not TCAS.
In my experience, the last year has seen an enormous increase in use by pilots of TCAS to question instructions, sequences etc. I am not attacking that right, per se, but when those questions are TCAS derived, I have issues. Whilst TCAS is a dramatic safety enhancement when used correctly, I feel it's limitations are being ignored. And that is detrimental.

As an easy captain I would not condem the captains actions to protect the saftey of his aircraft, however any heated exchange on the RT is both pointless and childish especially when you are dealing with someone whos first language is not english. A more grown up way would have been to apologise for causing concern and file an ASR then follow it to its conclusion. Its what called being proffesional!

My own `spin` on this is that:

Avoidance manoeuvres should not be flown on the basis of a TA only, (azimuth could well be in error) unless the crew have positive visual contact with the intruding aircraft and ASSESS THAT AN ACTUAL RISK OF COLLISION EXISTS.

Isn't part the problem that as usual technology is some way ahead of regulation. Is it not time the likes of ICAO / JAA / EASA sorted out some internationally agreed regulations as to the role and use of TCAS II? At the moment it seems that crews are governed on its use by aircraft QRH and Company Operations manuals - which will differ from manufacturer to manufacturer and airline to airline.

ATC are there to ensure safe separation, TCAS II is there for when ATC gets it wrong. TCAS II is a great system, but it does not give the whole picture. Hence you dont maneouvre for a TA.

And having a rant at ATC is very unprofessional - not the way it should be.

(edited for spelling)

This depends on the company!

Stanley Eevil sums it up well!

Timzsa :
quoting you :
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TCAS II is there for when ATC gets it wrong
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Not true , in fact most RAs I have seen are un-necessary or nuisance RAs cause by pilots elected to fly the last 1000 ft of their asigned altitude with a vertical rate exceeding 1000 ft/ min and causing RAs between otherwise perfectly separated aircraft.

Level busts are also prime candidates for TCAS RAs.

The point Stanley Eevil makes is a very valid one, especially in the lower altitudes. We must not forget than a VFR without a functioning mode C ( and there are quite a few of those below 10.000 ft ) will only trigger a TA, and indeed if you make visual contact and you judge it is at the same altitude, you should manoeuvre to avoid...