AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
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In what has now become a PPrune tradition, my ancestry and aeronautical knowledge was called into question when I posted this on an early thread on AA587....
"At the altitude/speed these events occurred, normally a pilots feet are on the floor, letting the yaw damper system do its job. "
'An A-300 or any other large twin is not a Pitts Special, nor should it be flown as one. There are different skills/disciplines required to fly each one well – and sometimes those skills are mutually exclusive."
"At the altitude/speed these events occurred, normally a pilots feet are on the floor, letting the yaw damper system do its job. "
'An A-300 or any other large twin is not a Pitts Special, nor should it be flown as one. There are different skills/disciplines required to fly each one well – and sometimes those skills are mutually exclusive."
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Read the reports on the rudder servo mechanism that is peculiar to that model. The forces can get to the extreme. I don't understand why they changed the bits from the ones used on previous marks. They did not produce simular forces or results. If it ain't broke don't fix it.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
An NTSB investigator said this!!
I am astounded that an NTSB investigator would make the following statement (wrt the November 2001 accident of American Airlines Flight 587, in which the A300-600 lost its tail.)
From AP comes the following:-
"NTSB investigator David Ivie said "The only time pilots should use the rudder is when they're landing or taking off in a crosswind.......the rest of the time, your feet should be on the floor."
Has this guy ever had any flying lessons?
If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together.
What hope is there for aviation, when an INVESTIGATOR sprouts this sort of stuff??!!
From AP comes the following:-
"NTSB investigator David Ivie said "The only time pilots should use the rudder is when they're landing or taking off in a crosswind.......the rest of the time, your feet should be on the floor."
Has this guy ever had any flying lessons?
If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together.
What hope is there for aviation, when an INVESTIGATOR sprouts this sort of stuff??!!
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Kaptin M
I agree that its a bit of a profound statement to make given that he hasn't mentioned engine failures....BUT
In a swept wing aircraft? I think not.
I agree that its a bit of a profound statement to make given that he hasn't mentioned engine failures....BUT
If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together
Last edited by kishna; 29th Oct 2004 at 08:14.
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Kaptin M
Anyone who uses rudder with aileron in a Boeing with me gets a (nice) bollocking!
Anyone who doesn't in a Piper also gets a bollocking!
You might like to extract foot from mouth, Kaptin, after displaying that level of ignorance!
Anyone who uses rudder with aileron in a Boeing with me gets a (nice) bollocking!
Anyone who doesn't in a Piper also gets a bollocking!
You might like to extract foot from mouth, Kaptin, after displaying that level of ignorance!
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RRAMJET, I might disagree with you regarding the question of whether or not there was an upset condition. According to the Hess report (NTSB exhibit link below) Molin did not use the rudder during the first wake encounter, but did during the second wake encounter.
NTSB exhibit - Hess report - possible PIO
The nature of the 2 wake encounters are different for the following reasons. At the time that AA 587 encountered the first wake, it was in a left turn (previously requested by ATC) with a bank angle of about 25 degrees left. The first wake is believed to have been from the left wingtip of the JAL 747, thus its rotation was clockwise (as the pilot would "look" straight ahead into the vortex). Since the aircraft was in a left banking turn, this wake did not disturb the aircraft that much.
However when the second vortex was encountered a few seconds later, while still in the left turn, the plane reacted more severely. The second vortex is believed to have come from the right wingtip of the JAL 747, thus is was rotating counter-clockwise. Since the aircraft was already in a left banking turn, the vortex only exacerbated the left bank. Molin responsed to this by applying full right aileron, and then tried to assist the right roll with the rudder. This in turn started the rapid chain of events that lead to the loss of the fin.
So the question may be, did Molin believe that his aircraft had entered, or was about to enter an "upset condition", when the left banking turn began to roll left even more severely with the rotating vortex of the second wake encounter?
NTSB exhibit - Hess report - possible PIO
The nature of the 2 wake encounters are different for the following reasons. At the time that AA 587 encountered the first wake, it was in a left turn (previously requested by ATC) with a bank angle of about 25 degrees left. The first wake is believed to have been from the left wingtip of the JAL 747, thus its rotation was clockwise (as the pilot would "look" straight ahead into the vortex). Since the aircraft was in a left banking turn, this wake did not disturb the aircraft that much.
However when the second vortex was encountered a few seconds later, while still in the left turn, the plane reacted more severely. The second vortex is believed to have come from the right wingtip of the JAL 747, thus is was rotating counter-clockwise. Since the aircraft was already in a left banking turn, the vortex only exacerbated the left bank. Molin responsed to this by applying full right aileron, and then tried to assist the right roll with the rudder. This in turn started the rapid chain of events that lead to the loss of the fin.
So the question may be, did Molin believe that his aircraft had entered, or was about to enter an "upset condition", when the left banking turn began to roll left even more severely with the rotating vortex of the second wake encounter?
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I can't comment on other types of commercial airliners, but on the Airbus 319/20/21 series, rudder is only to be used in the following circumstances:
On take-off roll to maintain centreline
On landing to align a/c with runway in the flare
In single engine flight with autopilot disengaged - no auto trim
Rudder should not be used in wake turbulence encounters for this type of a/c.
On take-off roll to maintain centreline
On landing to align a/c with runway in the flare
In single engine flight with autopilot disengaged - no auto trim
Rudder should not be used in wake turbulence encounters for this type of a/c.
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Kaptin M:
On a JET? Have you ever had any flying lessons in anything bigger than a PA-28??!! 
R1
Has this guy ever had any flying lessons? If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together.
R1
Using only aileron inputs (sufficient according to the NTSB guy) was not enough on a heavily-loaded 747-400 on departure from San Francisco (SFO) years ago. While an engine surged/had numerous compressor stalls etc, rudder input was required to compensate for too much yaw. Using more than a small amount of aileron also extends flight spoilers, which decreases lift.
Do all NTSB investigators have no pilot experience, other than in planes with centerline thrust? If so, their specialties must be very compartmentalized. Which investigators have broad enough aviation experience (as a pilot), to realistically determine the primary cause(s)?
Do all NTSB investigators have no pilot experience, other than in planes with centerline thrust? If so, their specialties must be very compartmentalized. Which investigators have broad enough aviation experience (as a pilot), to realistically determine the primary cause(s)?
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Indeed, Ignition Override, that UAL incident was a close one...they missed the hill by about 100 feet, as I recall.
Of course, one must remember...
it is one thing to use sufficient rudder as required in the aysemetric case, and quite another to pedal-bike the rudder...ala, AA style.
Clearly AA pilots received poor training for the 'upset' case...I wonder if the Sky Gods have actually learned anything from this accident...such is their preoccupation with...'we know better than others'.
Of course, one must remember...
it is one thing to use sufficient rudder as required in the aysemetric case, and quite another to pedal-bike the rudder...ala, AA style.
Clearly AA pilots received poor training for the 'upset' case...I wonder if the Sky Gods have actually learned anything from this accident...such is their preoccupation with...'we know better than others'.
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Yeah well...
Quite a few folks don't seem to agree with you, wsherif1, including those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience.
So, for your part...wishful thinking.
So, for your part...wishful thinking.
wsherif1,
As a pilot you know that an A300 being a land aeroplane cannot land in water, but as a pilot what do you know about the limitations certified by FAR 25 ?
The FDR showed a total acceleration of 0.8g, 0.4 left and 0.4 right. The NTSB does not have an axe to grind, its just reporting the facts.
To quote what I have said before ...
This is not the first wake turbulance accident, one of the more high profile, however educational material has been around for a while because of previous enounters.
Everyone knows all US major airlines are hurting at the moment, and this accident may be the end of AA. AA and their pilots do have an axe to grind to ensure their survival. The international community is not that uneducated to come up with their own conclusions.
I feel sorry for the families thats have lost as a result of this accident, may they RIP.
As a pilot you know that an A300 being a land aeroplane cannot land in water, but as a pilot what do you know about the limitations certified by FAR 25 ?
The FDR showed a total acceleration of 0.8g, 0.4 left and 0.4 right. The NTSB does not have an axe to grind, its just reporting the facts.
To quote what I have said before ...
the Flight 587 flight data recorder (FDR) shows three lateral accelerations of 0.3g and 0.4g right, and 0.4g left, in the approximately 7 seconds before it appears that the fin came off. Analysis show that the aircraft may have been in a full slip to produce the high accelerations. During the same period the FDR shows the rudder making about five deflections of 5 to 10-11 degrees, culminating in a rudder reversal immediately before the fin apparently came off. The 10-11-degree deflection is the maximum allowed by the A300's rudder limiter
Everyone knows all US major airlines are hurting at the moment, and this accident may be the end of AA. AA and their pilots do have an axe to grind to ensure their survival. The international community is not that uneducated to come up with their own conclusions.
I feel sorry for the families thats have lost as a result of this accident, may they RIP.
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411A,
Your comment,
"Quite a few folks don't seem to agree with you, wsherif1, including those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience."
Those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience, especially the NTSB, are guilty of the following.
1. Removal of the ATC Chairman's factual report, on the United B737 accident over Colorado Springs,CO March 3, 1991. The report included the sworn testimony of the final controller, who was handling the aircraft, and he tells exactly what happened! (Not what the NTSB claims!)
2. The NTSB misread the FDR Chart in the United Boeing 747 severe air turbulence accident. (1 fatality, 5 broken necks,6 broken backs, on 12/28/97.) The NTSB read the chart and reported the reading as 0.8 negative G, the actual G reading was 1.8 negative G! (A senior NTSB investigator, when asked, said, "You start from the zero G line and then count down to the maximum reading! When did we start flying around at zero G?)
3. The NTSB removed essential evidence from the FDR chart in the TWA 800 accident and then issued a modified chart.
There are other incidents, but for the sake of brevity I will stop here.
All of the above are substantiated by copies of the actual reports and the FDR Charts involved.
NTSB ignorance, or cover-ups? Both!
Your comment,
"Quite a few folks don't seem to agree with you, wsherif1, including those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience."
Those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience, especially the NTSB, are guilty of the following.
1. Removal of the ATC Chairman's factual report, on the United B737 accident over Colorado Springs,CO March 3, 1991. The report included the sworn testimony of the final controller, who was handling the aircraft, and he tells exactly what happened! (Not what the NTSB claims!)
2. The NTSB misread the FDR Chart in the United Boeing 747 severe air turbulence accident. (1 fatality, 5 broken necks,6 broken backs, on 12/28/97.) The NTSB read the chart and reported the reading as 0.8 negative G, the actual G reading was 1.8 negative G! (A senior NTSB investigator, when asked, said, "You start from the zero G line and then count down to the maximum reading! When did we start flying around at zero G?)
3. The NTSB removed essential evidence from the FDR chart in the TWA 800 accident and then issued a modified chart.
There are other incidents, but for the sake of brevity I will stop here.
All of the above are substantiated by copies of the actual reports and the FDR Charts involved.
NTSB ignorance, or cover-ups? Both!
Last edited by wsherif1; 6th Nov 2004 at 00:32.
The latest "Aviation Week and Space Technology" issue published a very interesting letter from a reader. The reader refers to AA flight 587, and highlights some possible contradictions between certification temperatures, pressures and assumed g-loads for the composite vertical stabilizers, and actual 'real world' temperatures, altitudes, g-loads. He then questions design loads assumed (?) for the horizontal stabilizers. (How about engine pylons?)
The multiple, graphite (fiber)-epoxy layers must require a very unique approach in 'C' and 'D-Check' inspections, do they not?
Do all certification authorities (FAA/CAA/B**/DGAC...), especially in countries where such composite airframe components are fabricated (good pun?), assume that all questions about composite parts have been answered long ago, or are any remaining cert./testing questions moot and purely academic?
Do the A-300/310 rudders not have some "fly-by-wire" components, and are such inputs in the FDR data very easy to distinguish from pilot inputs?
The multiple, graphite (fiber)-epoxy layers must require a very unique approach in 'C' and 'D-Check' inspections, do they not?
Do all certification authorities (FAA/CAA/B**/DGAC...), especially in countries where such composite airframe components are fabricated (good pun?), assume that all questions about composite parts have been answered long ago, or are any remaining cert./testing questions moot and purely academic?
Do the A-300/310 rudders not have some "fly-by-wire" components, and are such inputs in the FDR data very easy to distinguish from pilot inputs?
Last edited by Ignition Override; 5th Nov 2004 at 07:35.
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Gentlemen:
The following statement by Dr Hess is in his report on the AA 587 accident. "In addition, the rudder is probably the most powerful aerodynamic surface on the A300-600. It constitutes 30% of the area of the entire vertical stabilizer, itself nearly 490 square feet in area."
When this total, 490 square foot flat plate area, of the vertical stabilizer and rudder combined, was struck broadside by the rotating forces in the left wing tip vortex of the "Heavy B 747, an instantaneous left "Yaw" maneuver was induced, along with the resultant, abrupt, left "Dutch Roll" into the ground. (Low altitude!)
NASA states that the rotating forces in an aircraft wake vortex can reach 300'/sec. AA 587 made a formation join up on the center of a virtual, horizontal tornado!
AA 587 did not encounter two vortices, the first encounter was when they entered the fringe of the left wing tip vortex and the second encounter was when they entered the core of the vortex.
A pilot cannot shear off both engines, from their support structures, by pilot induced rudder inputs alone!
This is the first accident, of this type, in 100 years of flight!
(An aircraft join-up on a virtual horizontal tornado.)
The NTSB will again cover-up the real cause of the accident and blame the pilot for over-use of the rudder!
This accident was not, "Pilot Error"!!!
The following statement by Dr Hess is in his report on the AA 587 accident. "In addition, the rudder is probably the most powerful aerodynamic surface on the A300-600. It constitutes 30% of the area of the entire vertical stabilizer, itself nearly 490 square feet in area."
When this total, 490 square foot flat plate area, of the vertical stabilizer and rudder combined, was struck broadside by the rotating forces in the left wing tip vortex of the "Heavy B 747, an instantaneous left "Yaw" maneuver was induced, along with the resultant, abrupt, left "Dutch Roll" into the ground. (Low altitude!)
NASA states that the rotating forces in an aircraft wake vortex can reach 300'/sec. AA 587 made a formation join up on the center of a virtual, horizontal tornado!
AA 587 did not encounter two vortices, the first encounter was when they entered the fringe of the left wing tip vortex and the second encounter was when they entered the core of the vortex.
A pilot cannot shear off both engines, from their support structures, by pilot induced rudder inputs alone!
This is the first accident, of this type, in 100 years of flight!
(An aircraft join-up on a virtual horizontal tornado.)
The NTSB will again cover-up the real cause of the accident and blame the pilot for over-use of the rudder!
This accident was not, "Pilot Error"!!!
wsherif1,
Don’t know what game you are playing, deleting posts then posting them again, I find it very annoying.
You seem to pushing the APA line ..... if you are can you just come out and say so !
To quote that same report by Dr Hess ....
"Flight Data Recorder (FDR) information indicates that both wheel and pedal were moved repeatedly to their maximum positions"
Now nobody..FAA/CAA/DGAC/IFALPA/NTSB and your Dr Hess will say this is a good thing to do, or something an FAR 25 aircraft is certified to do whilst in-flight.
Dr Hess is an eminent academic who’s analytical opinion I have a lot of time for.
Don’t know what game you are playing, deleting posts then posting them again, I find it very annoying.
You seem to pushing the APA line ..... if you are can you just come out and say so !
To quote that same report by Dr Hess ....
"Flight Data Recorder (FDR) information indicates that both wheel and pedal were moved repeatedly to their maximum positions"
Now nobody..FAA/CAA/DGAC/IFALPA/NTSB and your Dr Hess will say this is a good thing to do, or something an FAR 25 aircraft is certified to do whilst in-flight.
Dr Hess is an eminent academic who’s analytical opinion I have a lot of time for.
Could some of Wsherif1's information be valid, whether from a pilot, or maintenance perspective, actual or assumed by the audience?
Did somebody else in this "thread" state that the A-310/300 rudder control input becomes very sensitive after a certain rudder angle or pedal pressure? I suppose that carbon-fiber aircraft structure always behaves as designed during preliminary engineering tests...no matter what the pressure/temp ranges. On the FAR 25 plane which "we" fly (main series max takeoff weight 108,000 lbs.) , we have no limitations, warnings or prohibitions concerning rudder pedal pressure and when the pedals can or can not be pushed, trimmed or anything about the speed of rudder input. The rudder restrictor is relied upon. And except for a tiny bit of rudder trim now and then, using the grey knob, nobody here uses the rudder pedals except a little bit during landing in a strong crosswind and during engine failure training in the simulators.
It still seems very strange to me that any pilot would use rudder pedals in wake turbulence, when our first reaction is to move the yoke, in order for ailerons to correct for any sudden, unwanted roll. At AA, did only one pilot state that he had seen the FO use them aggresively, and did he actually see the guys legs moving? Could the NTSB's "impartial" investigation have become biased by such a statement? We once had a yaw damper go out of control and smoothly yaw several times a jet transport back and forth, as if we had pushed on the pedals to near both left and right limits. It was departing Knoxville (TYS) many years ago. After turning the yaw damper switch off and pulling the rudder power knob to manual, the problem stopped as we quickly did a climb/descent checklist and turned back soon onto base leg . That problem was never solved.
What about with a much more complex system on a heavy jet? An Air South (?) B-737 crew suffered an uncommanded rudder "hardover" and was probably the only crew to have survived such an incident. This was very similar to the United 737 and USAir 737 tragedies. Do larger, more complex aircraft never misbehave? How about documentation? It is 'alleged' by a local pilot that a very large cargo airline "misplaced" or "altered" numerous aircraft logbook pages concerning main gear cracks (which were documented BEFORE both accidents) after at least two heavy jets suffered collapsed main landing gears. Major accidents were involved, and company aircraft insurance, for all fleets, was allegedly in jeopardy . Apparently the insurance policies work out much better when lack of (or altered/substituted?) documentation on known aircraft problems can help "prove" (or at least direct blame) that it was the Captains' fault(s)? I doubt that a Maintenance VP or line maintenance supervisors always want an early retirement
.
Did somebody else in this "thread" state that the A-310/300 rudder control input becomes very sensitive after a certain rudder angle or pedal pressure? I suppose that carbon-fiber aircraft structure always behaves as designed during preliminary engineering tests...no matter what the pressure/temp ranges. On the FAR 25 plane which "we" fly (main series max takeoff weight 108,000 lbs.) , we have no limitations, warnings or prohibitions concerning rudder pedal pressure and when the pedals can or can not be pushed, trimmed or anything about the speed of rudder input. The rudder restrictor is relied upon. And except for a tiny bit of rudder trim now and then, using the grey knob, nobody here uses the rudder pedals except a little bit during landing in a strong crosswind and during engine failure training in the simulators.
It still seems very strange to me that any pilot would use rudder pedals in wake turbulence, when our first reaction is to move the yoke, in order for ailerons to correct for any sudden, unwanted roll. At AA, did only one pilot state that he had seen the FO use them aggresively, and did he actually see the guys legs moving? Could the NTSB's "impartial" investigation have become biased by such a statement? We once had a yaw damper go out of control and smoothly yaw several times a jet transport back and forth, as if we had pushed on the pedals to near both left and right limits. It was departing Knoxville (TYS) many years ago. After turning the yaw damper switch off and pulling the rudder power knob to manual, the problem stopped as we quickly did a climb/descent checklist and turned back soon onto base leg . That problem was never solved.
What about with a much more complex system on a heavy jet? An Air South (?) B-737 crew suffered an uncommanded rudder "hardover" and was probably the only crew to have survived such an incident. This was very similar to the United 737 and USAir 737 tragedies. Do larger, more complex aircraft never misbehave? How about documentation? It is 'alleged' by a local pilot that a very large cargo airline "misplaced" or "altered" numerous aircraft logbook pages concerning main gear cracks (which were documented BEFORE both accidents) after at least two heavy jets suffered collapsed main landing gears. Major accidents were involved, and company aircraft insurance, for all fleets, was allegedly in jeopardy
. Apparently the insurance policies work out much better when lack of (or altered/substituted?) documentation on known aircraft problems can help "prove" (or at least direct blame) that it was the Captains' fault(s)? I doubt that a Maintenance VP or line maintenance supervisors always want an early retirement .
Last edited by Ignition Override; 7th Nov 2004 at 03:50.
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411A
Your comment,
"Unfortunately...wsherif1, you have positively no idea what you are talking about.
"Send me a fax no. and I will forward copies of the NTSB deleted sections of the accident reports, and the removal, by the NTSB, of essential evidence from the modified FDR charts, I referred to.
Your comment,
"Unfortunately...wsherif1, you have positively no idea what you are talking about.
"Send me a fax no. and I will forward copies of the NTSB deleted sections of the accident reports, and the removal, by the NTSB, of essential evidence from the modified FDR charts, I referred to.