AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
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Would you kick the rudder in this manner? Hell no, or any other pilot!
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Although I am not a proponent of conspiracies, I still do not understand the departure of both engines so quickly either during the rudder deflections or immediately after the departure of the fin. I feel that there is a missing link here that none of us see yet. IMHO, the lateral forces the aircraft suffered should not have been great enough to fail both engine pylons. After reading all of the documentation that has come out over the past several weeks, the failure of the engines is never really discussed other than to acknowledge that it happened. I think the key to this discussion is not what we see, but what we don't see. The challenge is to determine the final configuration of the aircraft immediately prior to impact, and to work backwards from there to figure out what it would take to get it to that configuration. Each party has delivered volumes of information, but no one has addressed all of the questions. That bothers me.
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patrickal,
Your comment,
"I still do not understand the departure of both engines so quickly either during the rudder deflections or immediately after the departure of the fin."
The 27' vertical stabilizer becomes an additional flight control surface in the presence of rotating vortices. The rotating vortices striking this large surface area, broadside, initiated an instantaneous left yaw! The extreme inertia forces, created by this abrupt yaw, tore off both engines from their pylons and the tail from its attachment Lugs. The abrupt left yaw also caused an immediate, left, Dutch Roll.
This was the first such accident in 100 years of flight.
Your comment,
"I still do not understand the departure of both engines so quickly either during the rudder deflections or immediately after the departure of the fin."
The 27' vertical stabilizer becomes an additional flight control surface in the presence of rotating vortices. The rotating vortices striking this large surface area, broadside, initiated an instantaneous left yaw! The extreme inertia forces, created by this abrupt yaw, tore off both engines from their pylons and the tail from its attachment Lugs. The abrupt left yaw also caused an immediate, left, Dutch Roll.
This was the first such accident in 100 years of flight.
Last edited by wsherif1; 6th Apr 2004 at 06:22.
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Engines being chucked off the pylons (or indeed the pylons failing entirely) is certainly nothing new...happened before in the early sixties with 707 aircraft.
OTOH, the 'training' AA provided their crews, using the rudder in a manner for which it was NOT intended...has led to disaster.
The lessons learned oh so many years ago have been totally ignored...at least with American Airlines, and the idiots in the flight crew training department.
Need examples?
Just look at the AA hull loss record, and the very basic mistakes made by the AA crew concerned.
Cali was the most egregious, IMO.
OTOH, the 'training' AA provided their crews, using the rudder in a manner for which it was NOT intended...has led to disaster.
The lessons learned oh so many years ago have been totally ignored...at least with American Airlines, and the idiots in the flight crew training department.
Need examples?
Just look at the AA hull loss record, and the very basic mistakes made by the AA crew concerned.
Cali was the most egregious, IMO.
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411A
Your comment,
"OTOH, the 'training' AA provided their crews, using the rudder in a manner for which it was NOT intended...has led to disaster."
The crew was not using the rudder!!!
Your comment,
"OTOH, the 'training' AA provided their crews, using the rudder in a manner for which it was NOT intended...has led to disaster."
The crew was not using the rudder!!!
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Report: Airbus ‘Manipulated’ Rudder Numbers
Report: Airbus ‘Manipulated’ Rudder Numbers
By Howard Schwach
A highly-respected German news magazine reported this week that evidence exists that may prove that Airbus Industries, which is headquartered in Hamburg, “manipulated” the engineering test numbers relating to the rudders of its A300-600 aircraft, the same type of jet airliner that flew as American A
You either have to be a subscriber or wait until next week to read the rest here:
http://www.rockawave.com/news/2004/0..._Page/036.html
By Howard Schwach
A highly-respected German news magazine reported this week that evidence exists that may prove that Airbus Industries, which is headquartered in Hamburg, “manipulated” the engineering test numbers relating to the rudders of its A300-600 aircraft, the same type of jet airliner that flew as American A
You either have to be a subscriber or wait until next week to read the rest here:
http://www.rockawave.com/news/2004/0..._Page/036.html
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Just a few remarks:
- The original article has a question mark in the headline.
- Airbus (not Airbus Industrie(s)) is not headquartered in Hamburg
- The article does not mention 'evidence', it talks of indications.
- The original article has a question mark in the headline.
- Airbus (not Airbus Industrie(s)) is not headquartered in Hamburg
- The article does not mention 'evidence', it talks of indications.
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el lute,
just a bit of banter!
only joking about the airbus thing, just looked a bit like it, first post, jumping to defence etc.
...i wouldn't be suprised if it was just a bit of airbus bashing. the facts as you point out don't seem to add up. I couldn't get access to the article, but that is a very serious allegation.
regards from the kitchin
just a bit of banter!
only joking about the airbus thing, just looked a bit like it, first post, jumping to defence etc.
...i wouldn't be suprised if it was just a bit of airbus bashing. the facts as you point out don't seem to add up. I couldn't get access to the article, but that is a very serious allegation.
regards from the kitchin
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Sorry to defend Airbus but as a European I am going to. After all we all know Airbus is better than Boeing and no further debate on that as it is fact
Anyway I would like to question the sources of the article.
A website called Wave quotes "A highly-respected German news magazine"
So which magazine is that and which page, edition etc?
Also why was it not in FI?
I believe that in the Crash report on the AA accident the test results showed that the tail withstood much more force than was required before failure.
This smacks of poor journalistic style.
Anyway I would like to question the sources of the article.
A website called Wave quotes "A highly-respected German news magazine"
So which magazine is that and which page, edition etc?
Also why was it not in FI?
I believe that in the Crash report on the AA accident the test results showed that the tail withstood much more force than was required before failure.
This smacks of poor journalistic style.
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Sorry to defend Airbus but as a European I am going to. After all we all know Airbus is better than Boeing and no further debate on that as it is fact
Another Pearl of Wisdom. Please shoot me. I am so tired of this. Shoot me, please! 
Rebel PPRuNer
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What's really sad about 747focal is that he has given up finding good things to report about Boeing and now spends his time mining the seams of conspiracy theories about the American Airlines tragedy and what will happen when A380s do upper deck evacs.
The death of the Sonic Cruiser seems to have shattered his will to see any good in the world.
If the A350 ever happens and competes effectively with the short range 7E7 he may have to be institutionalised...
The death of the Sonic Cruiser seems to have shattered his will to see any good in the world.
If the A350 ever happens and competes effectively with the short range 7E7 he may have to be institutionalised...
How much does Boeing pay you? I can do that too, if the euro$$ are right (well for Airbus that is
747FOCAL,
Both Boeing and Airbus have highlighted concerns about rudder usage in their upset recovery literature, warning that too much rudder could lead to loss of control or even structural failure.
Also IFALPA has published literature regarding rudder usage in their upset recovery literature, for both Boeings and Airbus.
You have had a totally unbalanced campaign relating to this incident, facts are that the aircraft does meet the FAR 25 design requirements, and the Flight 587 flight data recorder (FDR) shows three lateral accelerations of 0.3g and 0.4g right, and 0.4g left, in the approximately 7 seconds before it appears that the fin came off. Analysis show that the aircraft may have been in a full slip to produce the high accelerations. During the same period the FDR shows the rudder making about five deflections of 5 to 10-11 degrees, culminating in a rudder reversal immediately before the fin apparently came off. The 10-11-degree deflection is the maximum allowed by the A300's rudder limiter at that airspeed, suggesting it was working correctly.
The FARs paragraph 25.351 covers yaw manoeuvre conditions, and 25.341 covers gust and turbulence loads.
Paragraph 25.351 spells out a simple manoeuvre and requires that the manufacturer analyse the loads at four conditions. The manoeuvre is to:
Ultimate loads as per FAR 25, only needs to be tolerated for 3 seconds (not 7 seconds) and can result in permanent deformation. There is no requirement on what the strength must be after surviving ultimate load.
The A300 rudder is relatively powerful because it is large, about 34% of the total fin chord. Rudder effectiveness also washes out with increasing sideslip, and this affects the critical anti-slip rudder more than pro-slip rudder. The A300 rudder has ±30 degrees of authority at speeds below 165 KIAS, and the limiter progressively cuts this back to 3.5 degrees at maximum speed. It may be tempting to further limit the rudder at higher speeds, but it needs enough authority to handle engine failure with some margin, and serve as a yaw damper. There also are unusual conditions such as multiple leading edge flap failure that may require a large amount of rudder to counteract.
Given the limited amount of FDR data released by the NTSB it is not clear if forces in the rudder exceeded ultimate loads, but the high sideslip and rapid full rudder motions are ripe for this possibility. The exact motions may never be known because the FDR only measured the rudder twice per second, while it can move at 39 deg/s the rudder could go from neutral to the stop and back between samples. And as the NTSB has stated fast rudder motions were distorted by being filtered.
Now as for this article for the manipulation of data by airbus, I have news for you Boeing, and just about every other manufacturer I can think of does the same. Compliance with the FAR 25.351 yaw manoeuvre may be shown analytically, and the airframe manufacturers may not actually conduct a full-force manoeuvre. Why take an aircraft to 100% design load in flight, when you can limit loads to the neighbourhood of 80%, and use this data to validate a model, which combined with ground test results shows the aircraft complies with regulations.
What I see is obvious from this accident, so does IFALPA, so does Boeing and Airbus, is that the design regulations that are set by organisations such as the FAA are the legal requirement for manufactures to meet, a type certificate data sheet issued by the FAA is a licence stating that the manufacturer meets the design requirements as specified the FARs.
If an airline then alledgedly subsequently decides to promulgate an upset recovery technique based upon the senior pilots previous military training, and not in accordance with the what the FAA had allowed for in the FARs, one will never know about this alledged deficiency in the check and training procedures until and accident such as this occurs resulting in a lot of finger pointing. Still some airlines say they know better than IFALPA, Boeing, and Airbus, putting their pilots and passengers into the experimental category.
Bottom line, the aircraft met and exceeded the design requirements as specified in the FARs. If the FARs are not covering all the design requirements that the public demands, don’t blame Airbus or Boeing, blame the FAA.
Like your unbalanced campaign for the A380 upper deck evacuations, Boeing NEVER conducted upper deck evacuations for the 747 as part of its certification, but have a certified capacity of 660 people, at least Airbus is going to demonstrate it in certification phase.
Obviously this article was written to appeal to Americans of a certain intellect, interesting social experiment to see who runs with it.
IFALPA Safety & Security Bulletins relating to rudder use :
Use of Rudder on Airbus
Use of Rudder on Boeing
Edit: added IFALPA links
Both Boeing and Airbus have highlighted concerns about rudder usage in their upset recovery literature, warning that too much rudder could lead to loss of control or even structural failure.
Also IFALPA has published literature regarding rudder usage in their upset recovery literature, for both Boeings and Airbus.
You have had a totally unbalanced campaign relating to this incident, facts are that the aircraft does meet the FAR 25 design requirements, and the Flight 587 flight data recorder (FDR) shows three lateral accelerations of 0.3g and 0.4g right, and 0.4g left, in the approximately 7 seconds before it appears that the fin came off. Analysis show that the aircraft may have been in a full slip to produce the high accelerations. During the same period the FDR shows the rudder making about five deflections of 5 to 10-11 degrees, culminating in a rudder reversal immediately before the fin apparently came off. The 10-11-degree deflection is the maximum allowed by the A300's rudder limiter at that airspeed, suggesting it was working correctly.
The FARs paragraph 25.351 covers yaw manoeuvre conditions, and 25.341 covers gust and turbulence loads.
Paragraph 25.351 spells out a simple manoeuvre and requires that the manufacturer analyse the loads at four conditions. The manoeuvre is to:
- Fly straight and level, and step on the rudder pedal with a large force (condition A),
- Maintain rudder and let the aircraft swing to a peak sideslip angle that is beyond equilibrium slip due to fuselage momentum (condition B),
- Maintain rudder and let the aircraft swing back to equilibrium sideslip (condition C), and
- Neutralize the rudder while at equilibrium sideslip (condition D).
Ultimate loads as per FAR 25, only needs to be tolerated for 3 seconds (not 7 seconds) and can result in permanent deformation. There is no requirement on what the strength must be after surviving ultimate load.
The A300 rudder is relatively powerful because it is large, about 34% of the total fin chord. Rudder effectiveness also washes out with increasing sideslip, and this affects the critical anti-slip rudder more than pro-slip rudder. The A300 rudder has ±30 degrees of authority at speeds below 165 KIAS, and the limiter progressively cuts this back to 3.5 degrees at maximum speed. It may be tempting to further limit the rudder at higher speeds, but it needs enough authority to handle engine failure with some margin, and serve as a yaw damper. There also are unusual conditions such as multiple leading edge flap failure that may require a large amount of rudder to counteract.
Given the limited amount of FDR data released by the NTSB it is not clear if forces in the rudder exceeded ultimate loads, but the high sideslip and rapid full rudder motions are ripe for this possibility. The exact motions may never be known because the FDR only measured the rudder twice per second, while it can move at 39 deg/s the rudder could go from neutral to the stop and back between samples. And as the NTSB has stated fast rudder motions were distorted by being filtered.
Now as for this article for the manipulation of data by airbus, I have news for you Boeing, and just about every other manufacturer I can think of does the same. Compliance with the FAR 25.351 yaw manoeuvre may be shown analytically, and the airframe manufacturers may not actually conduct a full-force manoeuvre. Why take an aircraft to 100% design load in flight, when you can limit loads to the neighbourhood of 80%, and use this data to validate a model, which combined with ground test results shows the aircraft complies with regulations.
What I see is obvious from this accident, so does IFALPA, so does Boeing and Airbus, is that the design regulations that are set by organisations such as the FAA are the legal requirement for manufactures to meet, a type certificate data sheet issued by the FAA is a licence stating that the manufacturer meets the design requirements as specified the FARs.
If an airline then alledgedly subsequently decides to promulgate an upset recovery technique based upon the senior pilots previous military training, and not in accordance with the what the FAA had allowed for in the FARs, one will never know about this alledged deficiency in the check and training procedures until and accident such as this occurs resulting in a lot of finger pointing. Still some airlines say they know better than IFALPA, Boeing, and Airbus, putting their pilots and passengers into the experimental category.
Bottom line, the aircraft met and exceeded the design requirements as specified in the FARs. If the FARs are not covering all the design requirements that the public demands, don’t blame Airbus or Boeing, blame the FAA.
Like your unbalanced campaign for the A380 upper deck evacuations, Boeing NEVER conducted upper deck evacuations for the 747 as part of its certification, but have a certified capacity of 660 people, at least Airbus is going to demonstrate it in certification phase.
Obviously this article was written to appeal to Americans of a certain intellect, interesting social experiment to see who runs with it.
IFALPA Safety & Security Bulletins relating to rudder use :
Use of Rudder on Airbus
Use of Rudder on Boeing
Edit: added IFALPA links
Last edited by swh; 15th Sep 2004 at 10:25.
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Oh don't be a tard. I was not saying this was the truth. I just spotted it and thought I would post it. You old granny ladies would have nothing to do, but eat your crumpets and tea if I didn't throw a hot rock in your thongs once in awhile.
I still throw the rocks at Boeing, just search around.
I still throw the rocks at Boeing, just search around.