AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)
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How else can you explain the loss of the engine/s and subsequent pre-crash fire? I would expect violent lateral oscillations took place. Try flying a model aeroplane without a tailfin- anything can happen. The weight loss was irrelevant.
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Were the flaps in F1 position, that is key, one must say. The question of the radius of gyration being prevalent on AMR 587 is questionable to outside sanguine individual. A question yet to be proposed indeed 
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Can someone further enlighten us on the Interflug A310 incident? I was puzzled as to the relevance of this in the documentary ever since I saw it. Don't think it is correct.
My memory of reading the report on the Interflug at Moscow was that the tower ordered them to go around, and they engaged TOGA mode. The pitch seemed excessive to the pilot, who pushed the column forward thinking this would disengage the automatic mode. He had not been informed or trained that this action could not disengage TOGA mode, and the result was that, he still having elevator authority, he was commanding nose down, while the stab was going nose up as requested by TOGA mode. This caused the first stall and the subsequent roller coaster ride (three further stalls I think) before they got stabilised.
What has this got to do with rudder deflections? The film claimed that rudder deflections set this incident off, but I seriously doubt this, and they certainly had nothing to do with the roller coaster ride.
As for the other incidents to A300-600s or A310s, e.g. Tarom over Orly, and the tragic crashes by China Airlines (at Nagoya in 94 and Taipei (in 98?) these were cases where the pilots thought their actions could cancel the automatic mode (not TOGA mode in every case) when they could not. Rudder was absolutely not involved in those cases.
I have a suspicion that the film was desperately looking for precedents to AA 587 and couldn't find any, and so discovered different types of incidents but also involving Airbuses and hoped no one would notice that rudders weren't involved. But if anyone can show that rudder was involved in these incidents I'm happy to be corrected.
My memory of reading the report on the Interflug at Moscow was that the tower ordered them to go around, and they engaged TOGA mode. The pitch seemed excessive to the pilot, who pushed the column forward thinking this would disengage the automatic mode. He had not been informed or trained that this action could not disengage TOGA mode, and the result was that, he still having elevator authority, he was commanding nose down, while the stab was going nose up as requested by TOGA mode. This caused the first stall and the subsequent roller coaster ride (three further stalls I think) before they got stabilised.
What has this got to do with rudder deflections? The film claimed that rudder deflections set this incident off, but I seriously doubt this, and they certainly had nothing to do with the roller coaster ride.
As for the other incidents to A300-600s or A310s, e.g. Tarom over Orly, and the tragic crashes by China Airlines (at Nagoya in 94 and Taipei (in 98?) these were cases where the pilots thought their actions could cancel the automatic mode (not TOGA mode in every case) when they could not. Rudder was absolutely not involved in those cases.
I have a suspicion that the film was desperately looking for precedents to AA 587 and couldn't find any, and so discovered different types of incidents but also involving Airbuses and hoped no one would notice that rudders weren't involved. But if anyone can show that rudder was involved in these incidents I'm happy to be corrected.
Can anyone tell me how they know who was making the control inputs on AA 587?
How do we know that the LHS was not applying any control input?
I know there are pros and cons about taking over control but wouldn't most commanders take over control when the situation starts to get really serious?
None of these questions is intended to criticise the flight crew - just for info.
How do we know that the LHS was not applying any control input?
I know there are pros and cons about taking over control but wouldn't most commanders take over control when the situation starts to get really serious?
None of these questions is intended to criticise the flight crew - just for info.
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It has not actually been determined that ANY pilot made the controll inputs into 587. It has been INFERRED that the pilots made the controll inputs.
There was an incident at AA in the past where an autopilot clutch did not disengage from the rudder axis and submitted the aircraft to extreme yaw motions back and forth including movement of the rudder puddels by the autopilot. The aircraft was landed in Miami with damage. The A/D that resulted from that incident found another aircraft with a similar problem (in a nutshell it was a wire chafing problem)
Cheers
Wino
There was an incident at AA in the past where an autopilot clutch did not disengage from the rudder axis and submitted the aircraft to extreme yaw motions back and forth including movement of the rudder puddels by the autopilot. The aircraft was landed in Miami with damage. The A/D that resulted from that incident found another aircraft with a similar problem (in a nutshell it was a wire chafing problem)
Cheers
Wino
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Am only a humble APTL student and PPL holder, but I watched the Horizon programme with great interest.
As part of my course I recently read the UK CAA's circular on Wake Turbulence (AIC 17/1999, Pink 188, 25 Feb, for those in the UK). The thrust of it, especially the latter half is that avoidance is the key.
The Horizon programme compared the flight paths of the JAL 744 and the A300, noting that the A300 turned inside JALs track, and that this meant the wake vortex had drifted down to the A300's track position - hence the encounter.
My first question is were both aircraft flying a SID or not, and if they were, was the portion of the SID in which the accident occured (ie the left climbing turn following departure) a part in which there was no track guidance? (I believe the ICAO stuff on track guidance states track guidance to be achieved within 10km for a turning departure). If both follow the same track, given the wind drift the A300 should not have encountered the 744's wake.
Having been warned of wake turbulence danger, how much consideration was given to their intended flight path with regard to where JALs wake was likely to be - namely turning inside is probably not a good idea. Given the wake turbulence drifts down I was also surprised that the A300 was not above JALs wake, as I would have expected an A300 to outclimb a 744. Overriding this it must be said that there is still much to learn about wake turbulence encounters.
Perhaps of more alarm to someone who is working toward a career as a commercial pilot was Airbus Chief Test pilot saying that wing low should only be corrected with aileron, even at high pitch angles. When taught to fly from day, albeit in Cessna and Piper, we are taught correct wing low at high pitch angle and low speed with rudder. Using aileron will may result in stalling the wings. The problem IMHO in this area lies in the fact that handling a commercial jet and a light training aircraft are completely different - and the problem is that there is little training to bridge the gap. That said I believe from earlier posts the variant of the A300 concerned had no outboard ailerons, hence stalling the wind by applying aileron at high pitch angle following a wing drop maybe unlikely on this particular aircraft type. Thoughts? If this is the case - does the Operating Manual for the aircraft make comment on this? (as required by the JAA regulations concerning handling characteristics unique to the aircraft).
It has all certainly made me think about how I will use the rudder in future in my little C152 and PA28.
Finally from ICAO Annex 13 - Accident Investigation."The sole purpose of accident investigation is to prevent repetition, not to apportion blame". It seems once again all and sundry are concerned with avoiding being blamed, whilst perhaps the true reason for the deaths of several hundred people has not been found.
As part of my course I recently read the UK CAA's circular on Wake Turbulence (AIC 17/1999, Pink 188, 25 Feb, for those in the UK). The thrust of it, especially the latter half is that avoidance is the key.
The Horizon programme compared the flight paths of the JAL 744 and the A300, noting that the A300 turned inside JALs track, and that this meant the wake vortex had drifted down to the A300's track position - hence the encounter.
My first question is were both aircraft flying a SID or not, and if they were, was the portion of the SID in which the accident occured (ie the left climbing turn following departure) a part in which there was no track guidance? (I believe the ICAO stuff on track guidance states track guidance to be achieved within 10km for a turning departure). If both follow the same track, given the wind drift the A300 should not have encountered the 744's wake.
Having been warned of wake turbulence danger, how much consideration was given to their intended flight path with regard to where JALs wake was likely to be - namely turning inside is probably not a good idea. Given the wake turbulence drifts down I was also surprised that the A300 was not above JALs wake, as I would have expected an A300 to outclimb a 744. Overriding this it must be said that there is still much to learn about wake turbulence encounters.
Perhaps of more alarm to someone who is working toward a career as a commercial pilot was Airbus Chief Test pilot saying that wing low should only be corrected with aileron, even at high pitch angles. When taught to fly from day, albeit in Cessna and Piper, we are taught correct wing low at high pitch angle and low speed with rudder. Using aileron will may result in stalling the wings. The problem IMHO in this area lies in the fact that handling a commercial jet and a light training aircraft are completely different - and the problem is that there is little training to bridge the gap. That said I believe from earlier posts the variant of the A300 concerned had no outboard ailerons, hence stalling the wind by applying aileron at high pitch angle following a wing drop maybe unlikely on this particular aircraft type. Thoughts? If this is the case - does the Operating Manual for the aircraft make comment on this? (as required by the JAA regulations concerning handling characteristics unique to the aircraft).
It has all certainly made me think about how I will use the rudder in future in my little C152 and PA28.
Finally from ICAO Annex 13 - Accident Investigation."The sole purpose of accident investigation is to prevent repetition, not to apportion blame". It seems once again all and sundry are concerned with avoiding being blamed, whilst perhaps the true reason for the deaths of several hundred people has not been found.
>When taught to fly from day, albeit in Cessna and Piper, we are taught correct wing low at high pitch angle and low speed with rudder. <
timzsta, the points you make are well put.
However, if you have been taught the above then, I believe, you were taught incorrectly.
Many years ago, part of the stall recovery was to "prevent further wing drop with rudder" which is not the same as "correct wing low...with rudder". This part of the recovery was then omitted since it was believed (correctly,I think) that use of rudder near the stall was more likely to induce a spin. All these remarks apply to light training aircraft not swept wing jet transports.
However, in the case of AA 587 they were not in a stalled condition but pilots can revert to old procedures when under pressure.
timzsta, the points you make are well put.
However, if you have been taught the above then, I believe, you were taught incorrectly.
Many years ago, part of the stall recovery was to "prevent further wing drop with rudder" which is not the same as "correct wing low...with rudder". This part of the recovery was then omitted since it was believed (correctly,I think) that use of rudder near the stall was more likely to induce a spin. All these remarks apply to light training aircraft not swept wing jet transports.
However, in the case of AA 587 they were not in a stalled condition but pilots can revert to old procedures when under pressure.
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Pom,
exactly what pilots are you referring to when you remark that almost all pilots universally dislike non moving throttles? Presumably, you must be speaking from personal experience, as most Airbus pilots I know don't give it a second thought as to whether they move or not. They certainly don't dislike them. If you mean most Boeing only pilots dislike them, then that is rather different, and again, pretty meaningless, as you can hardly criticise something you haven't tried.
And of course there are differing approaches from the two manufacturers; whether one is engineering as opposed to pilot led, is a matter that restarts the whole very tiresome debate of which is supposedly the better producer of commercial aircraft. Ultimately, if you are fortunate enough to be operating either manufacturers product then you are fortunate indeed.
exactly what pilots are you referring to when you remark that almost all pilots universally dislike non moving throttles? Presumably, you must be speaking from personal experience, as most Airbus pilots I know don't give it a second thought as to whether they move or not. They certainly don't dislike them. If you mean most Boeing only pilots dislike them, then that is rather different, and again, pretty meaningless, as you can hardly criticise something you haven't tried.
And of course there are differing approaches from the two manufacturers; whether one is engineering as opposed to pilot led, is a matter that restarts the whole very tiresome debate of which is supposedly the better producer of commercial aircraft. Ultimately, if you are fortunate enough to be operating either manufacturers product then you are fortunate indeed.
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stalls in swept wing jet transports...
Timzsta,
Having personally done full stalls in two heavy jet types, can positively say that a wing is NOT leveled with rudder...if you do, the blue side definately does not remain up, needless to say, BAD.
Having personally done full stalls in two heavy jet types, can positively say that a wing is NOT leveled with rudder...if you do, the blue side definately does not remain up, needless to say, BAD.
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Timzsta, you're chasing a red herring about the wake vortex issue. What is the alternative- to take out every airport that has a heavy jet movement for 10 minutes until it has completely dissipated? Wake vortexes are something we have learnt to live with acceptably- it was not the wake vortex that caused the crash, it was just a link in a chain like an aeroplane crashing on a fog approach- it's not the fog that is the cause, rather the procedures and handling of the situation. All jet pilots fly through wake vortexes, it is unavoidable. One just has to ensure that the short duration encounter is handled.
Before proper separation standards were imposed, we got caught once flying up the core of one very close to where AA crashed. On a Canarsie approach into JFK just after Canarsie onto R/W 31- slow and low. I was handling and it took almost full aileron on a VC10 to attempt to keep level. Once 'stabilised', it then took an interesting few seconds to exit it! An immensely powerful phenomenon- I have no doubt something smaller would have ended up upside down. But the separation standards we have now are adequate- it's other things that must be examined.
Before proper separation standards were imposed, we got caught once flying up the core of one very close to where AA crashed. On a Canarsie approach into JFK just after Canarsie onto R/W 31- slow and low. I was handling and it took almost full aileron on a VC10 to attempt to keep level. Once 'stabilised', it then took an interesting few seconds to exit it! An immensely powerful phenomenon- I have no doubt something smaller would have ended up upside down. But the separation standards we have now are adequate- it's other things that must be examined.
)
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Didn't manage to see all of the prog on telly, but a couple of questions:
The wake vortex encounter did not look particulary bad and the supposed contol inputs look excessive for such a manouvre. How bad in the opinion of jet pilots was the encounter?
My own feeling is that the control inpts were either caused by a mechanical/software problem (similar to Wino's posts) or two pilots trying to control and perhaps adding to each others actions (although I doubt that). However that is only a feeling and I would have to see a lot more evidence to actually decide that.
My commercial experience at the moment is on a small turboprop and I am training onto the 757 at the moment so I read the discussion about rudder with interest. Certainly in the Jetstream I never used rudder (or thought about it) to correct turbulence or wake encounters. I was however a little bit excessive on my briefings about thunderstorms when first out of training and talked about pitching to the stick shaker in the event of windshear, mostly due to some weather videos I had seen discussing microbursts and my sim training. That was when I was just starting my career though - unlike those in the accident.
Secondly, a question about training. The AA trainer on the programme said he had never heard that a reversal was bad news (which really surprised me, as I thought it was bad), yet all big aircraft manufacturers susequently said it was. Now what else are we missing? It seems to me that basically as airline pilots we are trained to fly from A to B on a normal sort of flight. We are also trained to deal with engine failures/fires etc and the multi crew bit which is all good stuff. But how much handling do we really do? How many people really understand the envelope of an aircraft? When you become a trainer, what extra handling/engineering type training do you get? If there is none, then the guy who teaches you in the sim or on line and tells you what you can and can't do is not in a position to tell you in some respects. This became apparent to me when a training captain with a non technical background told me things that turned out to be totally wrong about a bit on the aircraft (contrary to my technical training and another engineers view). Perhaps this will start to age old discussion of do we teach (for instance) spinning, or just how not to get into one? My point is that we appear to be missing some important aspects of flying. Certainly the upset training on my ATPL course was minimal and the spinning training was poor, with most people not really knowing what it was all about. I do not say this as a criticism of any airline or training establishment, but more of the culture we have in the airline industry. Also, I do not add this bit to say that the pilots caused the accident, but to widen the discussion as to the quality of our training and abilities. Comments welcome.
The wake vortex encounter did not look particulary bad and the supposed contol inputs look excessive for such a manouvre. How bad in the opinion of jet pilots was the encounter?
My own feeling is that the control inpts were either caused by a mechanical/software problem (similar to Wino's posts) or two pilots trying to control and perhaps adding to each others actions (although I doubt that). However that is only a feeling and I would have to see a lot more evidence to actually decide that.
My commercial experience at the moment is on a small turboprop and I am training onto the 757 at the moment so I read the discussion about rudder with interest. Certainly in the Jetstream I never used rudder (or thought about it) to correct turbulence or wake encounters. I was however a little bit excessive on my briefings about thunderstorms when first out of training and talked about pitching to the stick shaker in the event of windshear, mostly due to some weather videos I had seen discussing microbursts and my sim training. That was when I was just starting my career though - unlike those in the accident.
Secondly, a question about training. The AA trainer on the programme said he had never heard that a reversal was bad news (which really surprised me, as I thought it was bad), yet all big aircraft manufacturers susequently said it was. Now what else are we missing? It seems to me that basically as airline pilots we are trained to fly from A to B on a normal sort of flight. We are also trained to deal with engine failures/fires etc and the multi crew bit which is all good stuff. But how much handling do we really do? How many people really understand the envelope of an aircraft? When you become a trainer, what extra handling/engineering type training do you get? If there is none, then the guy who teaches you in the sim or on line and tells you what you can and can't do is not in a position to tell you in some respects. This became apparent to me when a training captain with a non technical background told me things that turned out to be totally wrong about a bit on the aircraft (contrary to my technical training and another engineers view). Perhaps this will start to age old discussion of do we teach (for instance) spinning, or just how not to get into one? My point is that we appear to be missing some important aspects of flying. Certainly the upset training on my ATPL course was minimal and the spinning training was poor, with most people not really knowing what it was all about. I do not say this as a criticism of any airline or training establishment, but more of the culture we have in the airline industry. Also, I do not add this bit to say that the pilots caused the accident, but to widen the discussion as to the quality of our training and abilities. Comments welcome.
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and therein is a story...
Jetstream Rider,
Having read Davies well authored book (Handling the Big Jets, first printing) in 1968, I approached large heavy swept wing jet transport aircraft wanting to know as much as possible.
Beyond the sim, and in the aircraft, have many scars from the training Captains of the time telling me (thumping bigtime)...keep OFF the #@%&* rudder, unless an engine should fail (shutdown) or landing in a crosswind....period.
Lessons learned a long time ago should never ever be forgotton, and in my opinion, AA and their training, have a lot to answer for.
Sadly, many younger guys will never know...
Having read Davies well authored book (Handling the Big Jets, first printing) in 1968, I approached large heavy swept wing jet transport aircraft wanting to know as much as possible.
Beyond the sim, and in the aircraft, have many scars from the training Captains of the time telling me (thumping bigtime)...keep OFF the #@%&* rudder, unless an engine should fail (shutdown) or landing in a crosswind....period.
Lessons learned a long time ago should never ever be forgotton, and in my opinion, AA and their training, have a lot to answer for.
Sadly, many younger guys will never know...
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The AA boys are understandably trying to protect the reputation of one of their own and their training system. This encounter requires examination beyond that. I think it was probably one of the more serious encountres that lasted longer than normal as they were probably caught in the core and flying pretty well up it. There was no joint wrestling with controls, the NHP would always announce he was getting involved. It depends on his background how aggressively the controls are handled. I think the vast majority would not react so strongly, which is what the aeroplane manufacturers obviously intended judging by their subsequent advice. I don't think the Airbus is at fault in any way. A sad incident and time for us all to digest exactly what the rudder is for and how it should be used. The vast majority of us are aware that the rudder/fin is to be handled 'delicately'.
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Quote: "Having read Davies well authored book (Handling the Big Jets, first printing) in 1968, I approached large heavy swept wing jet transport aircraft wanting to know as much as possible".
Me too, I read "Handling the Big Jets" before I started my type rating and am not content with only being able to fly from A to B. However, in the past, whenever I have asked to do anything out of the ordinary I get a "why would you want to do that?" response, or a "but you'll never need to". I begged one of my ATPL instructors to let me fly in icing for instance (in a suitably equipped aircraft I hasten to add), but he couldn't understand why I wanted to. It is that sort of attitude that I think needs to be taken out of aviation. If it is left to the student's motivation to find out about the aerodynamics and loads on an aircraft, then most will miss out on important knowledge, as frankly humans can be very lazy.
I will watch with interest what this accident report will say as I still cannot believe, that even if AA taught the use of rudder, that the actual control movements were the intended inputs. But I do think that from the comments of many pilots about the rudder that our training could cover more aircraft envelope/response training and that it is very important.
Me too, I read "Handling the Big Jets" before I started my type rating and am not content with only being able to fly from A to B. However, in the past, whenever I have asked to do anything out of the ordinary I get a "why would you want to do that?" response, or a "but you'll never need to". I begged one of my ATPL instructors to let me fly in icing for instance (in a suitably equipped aircraft I hasten to add), but he couldn't understand why I wanted to. It is that sort of attitude that I think needs to be taken out of aviation. If it is left to the student's motivation to find out about the aerodynamics and loads on an aircraft, then most will miss out on important knowledge, as frankly humans can be very lazy.
I will watch with interest what this accident report will say as I still cannot believe, that even if AA taught the use of rudder, that the actual control movements were the intended inputs. But I do think that from the comments of many pilots about the rudder that our training could cover more aircraft envelope/response training and that it is very important.
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timzta/any light aircraft pilots
With apologies for going off topic (?), whatever is correct for your Cessna/Piper light aircraft may not be correct for a swept wing airliner. There may be a dangerous trap in transferring what you read herein to your light aircraft flying. Be wary.
Ask your instructor/training captain, as applicable to whatever you're flying, for clarification.
What you're reading in this thread applies to a particular swept wing airliner (which may, itself, have individual peculiarities).
With apologies for going off topic (?), whatever is correct for your Cessna/Piper light aircraft may not be correct for a swept wing airliner. There may be a dangerous trap in transferring what you read herein to your light aircraft flying. Be wary.
Ask your instructor/training captain, as applicable to whatever you're flying, for clarification.
What you're reading in this thread applies to a particular swept wing airliner (which may, itself, have individual peculiarities).
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I thought the program was good, except for the reference to the Interflug incident which was nothing to do with vortex turbulence - but the engagement of TOGA mode instead of Go Around mode.
I was very surprised at the AA chief pilots assertion that he had never heard that you should not treat the rudder control with such violence. The rudder control is very powerful in a heavy jet.
I was very surprised at the AA chief pilots assertion that he had never heard that you should not treat the rudder control with such violence. The rudder control is very powerful in a heavy jet.
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Swept wing aircraft, when they stall, become uncontrolable. When the wing drops, that wing tip then stalls. Because the wingtip is well aft of the centre of lift, the nose continues to rise while the wingtip continues to fall a little. There is no recovery possible - even with small rudder input to stop the wing dropping because the huge amount of lift inboard ( and forward of the c of g), at the now increasing high angle of attack keeps the angle of attack increasing to an uncontrolable pitch. Some military aircraft have a huge fully movable tailplane and massive excess(combat) power to save the day in such an encounter, but certainly not in a bog standard transport design. Civil aircraft have stick shakers, pushers, nudgers and so on to help prevent getting anywhere near the full stall, from which there will be no recovery. Rudder is not part of the procedure here and never has been. In theory, a little bit of rudder will help to stop the dropping, but the secondary effects are enormous and difficult to counter accurately. Besides, by the time the desired effect is produced the angle of attack of the main wing is beyond correcting.
Rudder is not part of the procedure for controlling an aircraft upset when just about to stall either. Surely you fly yourself out of the problem using any height available. If there is insuficient height available then a crash is inevitable.
In the AA accident, the speed and g involved shows the aircraft well above the stall. If they were not stalling, then surely they should use the available height to fly out of the problem.? If they (and not a rogue autopilot or control surface) did indeed apply those control inputs, it seems they might have been in too much of a hurry to get the aircraft back on an even keel, and were not prepared to use their height for recovery.
Regarding the Interflug A310 in Russia. On my 6 week Airbus course at Toulouse, this incident was a central part of our one day flight safety seminar. They spent 2 hours covering the incident with video reconstruction from the digital FDR ( possible because the aircraft subsequently landed safely). There was no attempt to cover up Airbus deficiencies. The crews problems were not aggravated by use of rudder. The crew could, however, have prevented the subsequent aerobatics during recovery by using the controls to fly out of the problem. No mention or suggestion on this course that the crew should have, or should not have used rudder. I'm surprised that the TV documentary used this serious incident in their programme - it was irrelevent.
Rudder is not part of the procedure for controlling an aircraft upset when just about to stall either. Surely you fly yourself out of the problem using any height available. If there is insuficient height available then a crash is inevitable.
In the AA accident, the speed and g involved shows the aircraft well above the stall. If they were not stalling, then surely they should use the available height to fly out of the problem.? If they (and not a rogue autopilot or control surface) did indeed apply those control inputs, it seems they might have been in too much of a hurry to get the aircraft back on an even keel, and were not prepared to use their height for recovery.
Regarding the Interflug A310 in Russia. On my 6 week Airbus course at Toulouse, this incident was a central part of our one day flight safety seminar. They spent 2 hours covering the incident with video reconstruction from the digital FDR ( possible because the aircraft subsequently landed safely). There was no attempt to cover up Airbus deficiencies. The crews problems were not aggravated by use of rudder. The crew could, however, have prevented the subsequent aerobatics during recovery by using the controls to fly out of the problem. No mention or suggestion on this course that the crew should have, or should not have used rudder. I'm surprised that the TV documentary used this serious incident in their programme - it was irrelevent.
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Interflug
I'm surprised that the TV documentary used this serious incident in their programme - it was irrelevent.
