WIZZ AIR Skiathos vid
Thank you for clarifying what you meant by a "safety event". So presumably you are excluding "accidents*" (which would instead be referred to as such), but potentially encompassing "incidents*" and "serious incidents*", as the case may be.
* using the Annex 13 definitions in each case
It remains to be seen how this event ends up being categorised.
* using the Annex 13 definitions in each case
It remains to be seen how this event ends up being categorised.
EASA operations are required to have non-punitive management practices; if the company takes action that may be determined to be contrary to the mandatory safety policy statement components on that would be grounds for.... grounding of the AOC and denial of the AOCH as a FPP for the AOC. Being punitive comes with some serious risks, e.g., suspension or canceling of the AOC. Would EASA do that? They do take certificate action on occasions, I would suggest that reading and complying with the letter and spirit of the safety policy is a reasonable practice for managers, but is often lost in the day-to-day commercial realities. EASA has no restriction to consider mismanagement other than major non-compliance and worthy of certificate action.
^^^^^^^^^^
"On a side note, I saw a spotters photo of its landing. Wheels touched down before even reaching the piano keys… Definitely not in the TDZ…"
In the video doesn't the touchdown smoke from the landing gear appear after the piano keys?
One of the rubberneckers head does obscure the landing to be fair.
"On a side note, I saw a spotters photo of its landing. Wheels touched down before even reaching the piano keys… Definitely not in the TDZ…"
In the video doesn't the touchdown smoke from the landing gear appear after the piano keys?
One of the rubberneckers head does obscure the landing to be fair.
Only half a speed-brake
Re: non-event (assuming they did not touch short)
It's coming back slowly, fdr is getting a free shirt. Annex 13 may not be relevant (luckily for everyone) but the operator's SMS still is.
The proper wording in my good old company was 'occurrence', recorded, tracked and evaluated with appropriate levels of intensity but systematically in a similar fashion to an incident.
Everyone understands the iceberg theory, it's occurrences (again, luckily) that are the daily bread of operator's SMS discovery process. Not all occurences are equal as per the rarity/severity matrix. Here's a one with a significant learning potential.
Other words, squeezing this or similar thorughly is the whole reason why we bother with FDM/SMS at all. Nothing significant happened, everybody knows it was not right but we are incapable (limited in competence) to point a finger onto something deterministic, and there are zero identifiable defences in place why it could not happen again anytime later.
Typical findings (no mater which type of authority looks at it)
- training on short runways does not cover the differences explanation for aiming markers with regards to AFM compliant threshold clearance
- line pilot awareness of proper AFM aiming technique is low, with a possibility of forming a customary long habit on 2400+ m ICAO marked runways.
- PAPI relevance for landing is not understood by large proportion of line pilots leading to both over-use and/or ignorance
- NPA runways are unobserved territory for TCH and short touchdown distance given current technological limitations of FDM systems, moreover so on marginally short runways with low flight count rate typical for seasonal airports.
- in case of PAPI unusable there is no easily identifiable limit the line crews could observe and respect with regards to abandoning the approach in case of a profile which is too low
- this particular airport operate a 'contested wheel clearance' environment but at the same time installed PAPI does not provide any guidance for near approach profile due technical reasons and for extended periods of time, suggesting a lack of understanding and coherence from the QA team of airport operator and the NAA oversight.
- one of the benefits of stable approach technique is that below the threshold (1000 or 500) the flight path control requirement is reduced to maintaining a steady direct trajectory towards the landing. This enables crews to mentally unload and re-focus ahead of the aircraft before the landing itself which is a precursor to a desirable go-around mindset.
Given the inherent low experience of crews visitung JSI due lack of exposure, safety margins could be increased by publishing a 3D RNAV / RNP approach for the runway (acceptably in a form of prescribed visual manoeuvring track and profile). This will enable the use of present on-board technology to reduce crew workload by creating a perception scenario that is well rehearsed in daily operstions, laying ground for optimal cognitive performance during very short approach and transition to flare.
=========
The discussion here, not despite but thanks to the widely differing opinions at certain moments, is a wonderful case of true safety work.
The way I see it, at a game of golf one plays the ball against the perils of the course and own performance, counting the strokes and being honest about it. Whereas the Rules of Golf (R&A USGA) are a mere attempt at a technical specification of what 'honest' actually means in the context.
SMS + Flt Ops QA is all the same. Building published standards on how to deal with things, but at the same time actually working safety is not confined to inside SMS/QA (and also not assured by formal following of the audited guidelines).
Prime example here in few simple steps
+ occurrence discovered by coincidence
+ list the available limits and guidance at present
+ shake the tree hard and see what the wider pool thinks of it before telling them what went missing
+ evaluate probability of re-occurence and hazard level facing the defences already in place
+ determine the cheese holes and requirements to close them
Events where the crew gets it (even very) wrong but scratches no paint are the iceberg tips. Making sure the underwater piece is evaluated in full is how a pro-active risk management should run.
It's coming back slowly, fdr is getting a free shirt. Annex 13 may not be relevant (luckily for everyone) but the operator's SMS still is.
The proper wording in my good old company was 'occurrence', recorded, tracked and evaluated with appropriate levels of intensity but systematically in a similar fashion to an incident.
Everyone understands the iceberg theory, it's occurrences (again, luckily) that are the daily bread of operator's SMS discovery process. Not all occurences are equal as per the rarity/severity matrix. Here's a one with a significant learning potential.
Other words, squeezing this or similar thorughly is the whole reason why we bother with FDM/SMS at all. Nothing significant happened, everybody knows it was not right but we are incapable (limited in competence) to point a finger onto something deterministic, and there are zero identifiable defences in place why it could not happen again anytime later.
Typical findings (no mater which type of authority looks at it)
- training on short runways does not cover the differences explanation for aiming markers with regards to AFM compliant threshold clearance
- line pilot awareness of proper AFM aiming technique is low, with a possibility of forming a customary long habit on 2400+ m ICAO marked runways.
- PAPI relevance for landing is not understood by large proportion of line pilots leading to both over-use and/or ignorance
- NPA runways are unobserved territory for TCH and short touchdown distance given current technological limitations of FDM systems, moreover so on marginally short runways with low flight count rate typical for seasonal airports.
- in case of PAPI unusable there is no easily identifiable limit the line crews could observe and respect with regards to abandoning the approach in case of a profile which is too low
- this particular airport operate a 'contested wheel clearance' environment but at the same time installed PAPI does not provide any guidance for near approach profile due technical reasons and for extended periods of time, suggesting a lack of understanding and coherence from the QA team of airport operator and the NAA oversight.
- one of the benefits of stable approach technique is that below the threshold (1000 or 500) the flight path control requirement is reduced to maintaining a steady direct trajectory towards the landing. This enables crews to mentally unload and re-focus ahead of the aircraft before the landing itself which is a precursor to a desirable go-around mindset.
Given the inherent low experience of crews visitung JSI due lack of exposure, safety margins could be increased by publishing a 3D RNAV / RNP approach for the runway (acceptably in a form of prescribed visual manoeuvring track and profile). This will enable the use of present on-board technology to reduce crew workload by creating a perception scenario that is well rehearsed in daily operstions, laying ground for optimal cognitive performance during very short approach and transition to flare.
=========
The discussion here, not despite but thanks to the widely differing opinions at certain moments, is a wonderful case of true safety work.
The way I see it, at a game of golf one plays the ball against the perils of the course and own performance, counting the strokes and being honest about it. Whereas the Rules of Golf (R&A USGA) are a mere attempt at a technical specification of what 'honest' actually means in the context.
SMS + Flt Ops QA is all the same. Building published standards on how to deal with things, but at the same time actually working safety is not confined to inside SMS/QA (and also not assured by formal following of the audited guidelines).
Prime example here in few simple steps
+ occurrence discovered by coincidence
+ list the available limits and guidance at present
+ shake the tree hard and see what the wider pool thinks of it before telling them what went missing
+ evaluate probability of re-occurence and hazard level facing the defences already in place
+ determine the cheese holes and requirements to close them
Events where the crew gets it (even very) wrong but scratches no paint are the iceberg tips. Making sure the underwater piece is evaluated in full is how a pro-active risk management should run.
Last edited by FlightDetent; 25th Aug 2022 at 01:04.
@FlightDetent, all very good points, however,
I don't think this would help. In my view, this approach and landing went pear-shaped at 200ft. I see a discernable duck-under about then, and then a pronouced level-off (or at least significant flattening) of the last stages to get to the runway and a smooth, little-flare landing. This was on a gin-clear day with, I assume, a working PAPI. I doubt whether any 3D approach would have made slope control below 200ft any easier than using the PAPI. Before then, it's just an approach like any other.
Touchdown:
Given the inherent low experience of crews visitung JSI due lack of exposure, safety margins could be increased by publishing a 3D RNAV / RNP approach for the runway (acceptably in a form of prescribed visual manoeuvring track and profile). This will enable the use of present on-board technology to reduce crew workload by creating a perception scenario that is well rehearsed in daily operstions, laying ground for optimal cognitive performance during very short approach and transition to flare.
Touchdown:
IMO a 3D approach based on Baro-VNAV would be of limited use as at the high ISA deviations experienced during the operational season, it would provide a steeper path than the PAPIs so would still require correction and visual flying.
I don't think this would help. In my view, this approach and landing went pear-shaped at 200ft. I see a discernable duck-under about then, and then a pronouced level-off (or at least significant flattening) of the last stages to get to the runway and a smooth, little-flare landing.
Usual ADS-B caveats apply.
Only half a speed-brake
Bloggs and JW, thank you for chewing through my post.
You are both correct with the observations. In the part quoted above, I was aiming at a different phase but did not explain, apologies.
What happens BEFORE arriving at 1000' on the centreline. Anyone can do that, but it can be bit of a workload, processing the trajectory unknowns. Introducing a published track / profile for the lineup might help crews who are not everyday proficient in eyeballing a visual arrival from a random 4D position. Even if it is not directly linked to the shallow landing profile.
Am I saying the coalface A32x pilots of the EU LoCos can't fly a random visual pattern while picking their noses? To my opinion the answer is no, they cannot and most definitely they were not shown how to orient themselves in one. Definitely not in the Short and Narrow SIM qualification session.
Dave
This can well be an artefact as the recoding rate drops 50% down low, probably due to receiver signal shielding. But timing matches the voiced opinions the sneaky pass was a result of not keeping the descent profile where needed. It is well visible on the video at the moment of the wing pickup.
And in case it paints a correct picture, the profile is somewhat familiar to me
. Find yourself high, compensate with a steeper angle but misjudge when that is enough and end below the desired profile. They arrested the descent and just went for the numbers, a
natural reaction.
Probably not many naval aviators here, but is this not the reason why carrier decks have a signaller to wave the planes off? Because the pilot brain focuses on getting it right to such an extent the decision-making capability is pretty much gone in the last moments.,
You are both correct with the observations. In the part quoted above, I was aiming at a different phase but did not explain, apologies.
What happens BEFORE arriving at 1000' on the centreline. Anyone can do that, but it can be bit of a workload, processing the trajectory unknowns. Introducing a published track / profile for the lineup might help crews who are not everyday proficient in eyeballing a visual arrival from a random 4D position. Even if it is not directly linked to the shallow landing profile.
Am I saying the coalface A32x pilots of the EU LoCos can't fly a random visual pattern while picking their noses? To my opinion the answer is no, they cannot and most definitely they were not shown how to orient themselves in one. Definitely not in the Short and Narrow SIM qualification session.
Dave
This can well be an artefact as the recoding rate drops 50% down low, probably due to receiver signal shielding. But timing matches the voiced opinions the sneaky pass was a result of not keeping the descent profile where needed. It is well visible on the video at the moment of the wing pickup.
And in case it paints a correct picture, the profile is somewhat familiar to me
. Find yourself high, compensate with a steeper angle but misjudge when that is enough and end below the desired profile. They arrested the descent and just went for the numbers, anatural reaction.
Probably not many naval aviators here, but is this not the reason why carrier decks have a signaller to wave the planes off? Because the pilot brain focuses on getting it right to such an extent the decision-making capability is pretty much gone in the last moments.,
Same flight?
Not sure whether the same flight and an alternate view and some
editing or the captain went back to
really show how a pilot forum to disrupt the industry.
In any case - that is low!
Matt
editing or the captain went back to
really show how a pilot forum to disrupt the industry.
In any case - that is low!
Matt
same event?
That looks even lower and the chap in the green sports replica top looks even more blown away than the spotter freeze framed several posts above.
I wonder if the audible “Too low. Cameras” annunciation might need to be uploaded into the call-out system in due course! 😂
Matt
That looks even lower and the chap in the green sports replica top looks even more blown away than the spotter freeze framed several posts above.
I wonder if the audible “Too low. Cameras” annunciation might need to be uploaded into the call-out system in due course! 😂
Matt
Not sure whether the same flight and an alternate view and some
editing or the captain went back to
really show how a pilot forum to disrupt the industry.
In any case - that is low!
https://youtu.be/2hQ9hFZ-KyA
Matt
editing or the captain went back to
really show how a pilot forum to disrupt the industry.
In any case - that is low!
https://youtu.be/2hQ9hFZ-KyA
Matt
He probably is, but don't judge that by him stating facts.
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Too low and unacceptable? Yes. Is the skipper an idiot? No, I don't think so. He did not get out of bed on that day with the intention to screw it up.
It can happen to any of us.
It can happen to any of us.
