Boeing could cancel the 737 MAX 10
Neither #44 nor #46 would be into gold-plated from their nature, though I think tdracer does refer to something else with "gold-plated": The amount of newly developed superior tech involved with the "new" AF1. Though, maybe, he can elaborate.
BTW, the existing AF1 is very fancy and plush, but in a very businesslike way. Lots of nice leather and fine wood furniture. It's in no way lavish with the things like gold toilet fixtures that showed up on some of the VIP 747's bound for the Middle East. One of my special memories of working on the current AF1 was after an incredibly long two weeks (16-17 hour days for 12 days straight - the engines were a mess when I got there, and I had to cover both the day and evening shifts). Finally, we did engine runs on a Sunday (minimum disruption to the other activities) and the engines performed perfectly - I was done, but they had other engine running stuff to do (hydraulics/pneumatics/electrical generation) and they didn't want to shutdown to let me off. So I went down to the president's office and watched an NFL football game on the big screen TV with a couple of mechanics.
My briefing on the new AF1 didn't go into the interior furnishing, but I'd be surprised if they are much different than the current aircraft (oh, and I'm glad Trumps AF1 paint scheme is DOA)
As far as software approval, they got it for the MAX with this program running off a single sensor:
10 IF AOA > LIMIT THEN TRIM = TRIM + 1
15 WAIT 5; *** ADDED THIS ***
20 GOTO 10
Boeing is said to have a contract with Southwest about the MAX. Claiming it would need to pay 1 million dollars per aircraft ordered if MAX pilots need more than CBT. Stuff like this. Not much might be known outside. EICAS would change procedures. The fact that they did not install it yet seems to indicate how tricky it is.
And the more Boeing changes the closer they come to the legal tipping point where authorities don't accept grandfathering anymore whenever "more than 50 percent" is considered to be new.
And the more Boeing changes the closer they come to the legal tipping point where authorities don't accept grandfathering anymore whenever "more than 50 percent" is considered to be new.
Would it though? When I flew the 737, admittedly some time ago, I was rated on the -100 to the -500 and regularly swapped between the -200 (steam) and -400 (hybrid glass + FMC) on the same day. No regulator problems with that.
As far as software approval, they got it for the MAX with this program running off a single sensor:
10 IF AOA > LIMIT THEN TRIM = TRIM + 1
15 WAIT 5; *** ADDED THIS ***
20 GOTO 10
As far as software approval, they got it for the MAX with this program running off a single sensor:
10 IF AOA > LIMIT THEN TRIM = TRIM + 1
15 WAIT 5; *** ADDED THIS ***
20 GOTO 10
At the risk of repeating myself (again), MCAS was certified "Essential" - that's DAL (Design Assurance Level) C. Essential systems are allowed single failures since it's assumed that crew can adequately detect and react to a malfunction (the entire MCAS fiasco goes back to that seriously flawed assumption). EICAS is "Critical" - DAL A. Going from a DAL C to a DAL A system increases the costs exponentially (both hardware and software) (which is probably why they wanted to make MCAS DAL C). Further, while all other Boeing commercial aircraft have EICAS, it's far from a 'cut and paste system'. It basically needs to be customized for each application, and the 737 is a very different animal than even the 767 and is a world away from the FBW 777 and 787.
Adding EICAS to the 737 would be a multi-year, multi-billion dollar exercise.
So you're honestly suggesting that Boeing should repeat the fiasco of MCAS on a 737 EICAS?
No, of course not - that was part ironic, part humorous (maybe?) What it has exposed is that for Boeing, DAL C might as well be DAL K, for Kwality. What is even more ironic is that if EICAS (DAL A) failed completely, the aeroplane would carry on flying and most critical fault diagnosis and remedy would still be available; with an MCAS (DAL C) fault, the aeroplane can crash out-of-control almost immediately, as proven on two separate occasions. Just sayin’...
The current flight deck on the 737NG and MAX may not be perfect, but it's perfectly adequate (as demonstrated by the virtually identical hull loss rates between the NG and the A320 series).
You're basically arguing that a 737 EICAS doesn't have to be perfect, while at the same time arguing that the current flight deck - with hundreds of millions of hours of safe operation - is somehow unsafe.
Would it be impolite to say “Whoosh”?
Given the very public and very costly MCAS debacle, which may still propel Boeing Commercial into even direr straits, what are the options? They cannot afford to be anything other than diligent if they went down the EICAS route, or, as this thread title suggests, bite the bullet and set off for pastures new. The spotlight is on, the FAA are once bitten, twice shy and foreign regulators are not going to go along for the ride.
Having a similar level of hull losses is one thing, but knowing that at least two of them arose because of known issues and were the product of toxic corporate culture is quite another. What else is hiding in there, and has the culture actually changed? We all know the 737 would be uncertifiable under modern regulations, so “unsafe” as far as the rules are concerned; cars without seat belts had millions of hours of safe operation as well.
My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?
Given the very public and very costly MCAS debacle, which may still propel Boeing Commercial into even direr straits, what are the options? They cannot afford to be anything other than diligent if they went down the EICAS route, or, as this thread title suggests, bite the bullet and set off for pastures new. The spotlight is on, the FAA are once bitten, twice shy and foreign regulators are not going to go along for the ride.
Having a similar level of hull losses is one thing, but knowing that at least two of them arose because of known issues and were the product of toxic corporate culture is quite another. What else is hiding in there, and has the culture actually changed? We all know the 737 would be uncertifiable under modern regulations, so “unsafe” as far as the rules are concerned; cars without seat belts had millions of hours of safe operation as well.
My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?
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But you're missing the point. Another 'quick and dirty' MCAS style implementation of EICAS could easily turn into another disaster. Sure, the aircraft will continue to fly, but will a crew - given dangerously misleading engine indications, false or misleading warnings or lack or real warnings - be able to fly and land it?
The issue with the MCAS was, that it actively screwed up the aircraft flyability.
The issue with the B737 is more the ancient -no longer certifiable- mechanical and electrical constructions. Perfect according to historical standards, though it is no longer acceptable, that (for example) the fuselage does break up along its joints, or the cockpit overhead panels land on the crews heads, when more than a hard-landing is surprising the crew. Or the outright confusingly designed RA sensor - control units matching, which was the fundamental issue with the Turkish B737 before reaching AMS.
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Apologies - I was referring to the posts suggesting implementing EICAS on the 737 would be cheap and easy - which is very much not the case. I'd (apparently erroneously) lumped you in with that crowd.
Common type rating - even with 'differences' training - is a very sensitive subject. Worse, it's largely subjective - there are few hard and fast rules - so it's very difficult to predict what the regulators will do. The 757 and 767 have shared a common type rating for 40 years (and actually share a common flight deck), but we spent a lot of time on pins and needles because no one wanted to be the one that implemented a change on one or the other that caused the regulators to decide they'd become too different and could no longer have a common type rating. We were working on implementing autostart on the 767 (mainly for the CF6-80C2 FADEC) in the early 1990's. Upper management killed it due mainly to the potential impact on the 757/767 common type rating, afraid it might be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back (much to my relief as there were some nasty technical issues we'd need to deal with to implement it on the 767)
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Would it be impolite to say “Whoosh”?
Given the very public and very costly MCAS debacle, which may still propel Boeing Commercial into even direr straits, what are the options? They cannot afford to be anything other than diligent if they went down the EICAS route, or, as this thread title suggests, bite the bullet and set off for pastures new. The spotlight is on, the FAA are once bitten, twice shy and foreign regulators are not going to go along for the ride.
Having a similar level of hull losses is one thing, but knowing that at least two of them arose because of known issues and were the product of toxic corporate culture is quite another. What else is hiding in there, and has the culture actually changed? We all know the 737 would be uncertifiable under modern regulations, so “unsafe” as far as the rules are concerned; cars without seat belts had millions of hours of safe operation as well.
My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?
Given the very public and very costly MCAS debacle, which may still propel Boeing Commercial into even direr straits, what are the options? They cannot afford to be anything other than diligent if they went down the EICAS route, or, as this thread title suggests, bite the bullet and set off for pastures new. The spotlight is on, the FAA are once bitten, twice shy and foreign regulators are not going to go along for the ride.
Having a similar level of hull losses is one thing, but knowing that at least two of them arose because of known issues and were the product of toxic corporate culture is quite another. What else is hiding in there, and has the culture actually changed? We all know the 737 would be uncertifiable under modern regulations, so “unsafe” as far as the rules are concerned; cars without seat belts had millions of hours of safe operation as well.
My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?
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In the meantime !
Delta buys 100 Boeing Max planes, its first major order with the manufacturer in more than a decade. The deal is for 100 737 Max 10 planes, with options for 30 more. Deliveries are slated to begin in 2025. It's Delta first fresh order for new Boeing planes in more than a decade.Jul 18, 2022
Delta buys 100 Boeing Max planes, its first major order with the manufacturer in more than a decade. The deal is for 100 737 Max 10 planes, with options for 30 more. Deliveries are slated to begin in 2025. It's Delta first fresh order for new Boeing planes in more than a decade.Jul 18, 2022
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In the meantime !
Delta buys 100 Boeing Max planes, its first major order with the manufacturer in more than a decade. The deal is for 100 737 Max 10 planes, with options for 30 more. Deliveries are slated to begin in 2025. It's Delta first fresh order for new Boeing planes in more than a decade.Jul 18, 2022
Delta buys 100 Boeing Max planes, its first major order with the manufacturer in more than a decade. The deal is for 100 737 Max 10 planes, with options for 30 more. Deliveries are slated to begin in 2025. It's Delta first fresh order for new Boeing planes in more than a decade.Jul 18, 2022
To me, this sounds a bit like an opportunistic order (The MAX-10 is bigger as the airplanes it is going to replace, at such a qty scale). So, when the MAX-10 finds its grave before certification-birth, Delta has some negotiation cookies to get a good deal on a MAX-9 "downgrade". And, in the (unlikely ???) situation, the MAX-10 gets its certification, Delta could sell to Ryanair, who will be desperate for new, somewhat bigger airplanes, by then .....
Essential systems are allowed single failures since it's assumed that crew can adequately detect and react to a malfunction (the entire MCAS fiasco goes back to that seriously flawed assumption). EICAS is "Critical" - DAL A. Going from a DAL C to a DAL A system increases the costs exponentially (both hardware and software) (which is probably why they wanted to make MCAS DAL C)
The Airbus ECAM has some insidious characteristics to it, where there is a compounded/cascading defect, there can be a continuous rolling series of alerts and actions that make it difficult for the drivers to stay on top of the problem. Boeing's EICAS and the ECL-NNML do handle that condition with much more grace and less frustration.
All in all, the most frustrating problem is not having a checklist on a screen, or on plastic or in a book, (or on a boat, or with a goat, or with green eggs and ham, Sam..) it is actually getting a crew to start actioning what they train to do in the simulator routinely, and then in the real world, the crews ad-lib for various reasons. The justifications are depressing to listen to when there is the subsequent washup, yet that is where we seem to have ended up as a group of operators.
FDR, all true, including the expectation that a common horn sounding at 10,000’ wouldn’t get me to check the parking brake, but a licenced crew did in fact not recognise the horn was sounding “cabin altitude high” and a bunch of people died. Don’t forget just how far left the old bell curve stretches. By definition there are >50,000 flights a day operated by at least one below average crew member. That’s a lot of dice rolling.
Ultimately, a 737 Max will be flying on the 100th anniversary of the first flight. The perverse reality in that is there will be somewhere 100 years of systems development completely ignored in the service of expediency. Anyway, in competent hands the aeroplane is a money maker and currently enjoys an industry typical safety record. Its just a shame Boeing didn’t have the time, available talent or money to leapfrog the 320 and set the stage for the next 50 years.
Ultimately, a 737 Max will be flying on the 100th anniversary of the first flight. The perverse reality in that is there will be somewhere 100 years of systems development completely ignored in the service of expediency. Anyway, in competent hands the aeroplane is a money maker and currently enjoys an industry typical safety record. Its just a shame Boeing didn’t have the time, available talent or money to leapfrog the 320 and set the stage for the next 50 years.
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The trick with running (large) businesses is, to "play chess", always take care to have alternative options, when things don't go as planned. For this case: IF Delta indeed does not want the MAX-10 in these qty, and it gets certified, sell off to other parties. IF it doesn't get certified, go back to Boeing and demand the MAX-9, with discount, etc.
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