Finnair AY 141 emergency smoke landing

[The AvgasDinosaur]

https://www.airlive.net/alert-finnai...gency-landing/

Looks a lot more than a bad smell in flight
David

[ManaAdaSystem]

A quick return and all safely on the ground. Airmanship. I had a discussion with a CAE instructor who said the most important part of an incident like this, is to complete all procedures and check lists, not to get on ground fast.
I did not agree. Still don’t.

[Nightstop]

Looks very much like contamination of the air conditioning packs with deice/anti ice fluid which was applied prior to departure. Unpleasant, but clears once the ingested fluid has been consumed and clean air works its way through the system. Can also occur when runway/taxiway deice fluid is ingested by the packs.

[goeasy]

Yes quite agree it looks just like pack smoke. Just so sad that they won’t get the smell out of a lovely newish A350.

[captainsmiffy]

Wasn’t it getting the procedures right and doing the checklists that ultimately became the downfall of the Swissair jet?

[Mcdubh]

Yes 229 total pax + crew died doing checklist with the airplane was burning ,I think get him down ASP and then do the checklist

[Maninthebar]

Indicative that the checklists are at fault then?

[Herod]

I always thought that the most frightening thing when flying was an uncontrolled fire in the air. The only answer is to get it down and evacuated ASAP. Hopefully there is somewhere you can.

[Sailvi767]

Originally Posted by captainsmiffy

Wasn’t it getting the procedures right and doing the checklists that ultimately became the downfall of the Swissair jet?

Yes, they even went into holding with a fire onboard.

[tdracer]

Originally Posted by Sailvi767

Yes, they even went into holding with a fire onboard.

Memory says they went into a hold to dump fuel - it wasn't the checklist that delayed landing, it was trying to get down to max landing weight (a bad idea in retrospect).

[Beamr]

Reported as de-ice applied mistakenly to APU.

[M.Mouse]

Airmanship. I had a discussion with a CAE instructor who said the most important part of an incident like this, is to complete all procedures and check lists, not to get on ground fast.
I did not agree. Still don’t.

For Boeing 777 and 787 the 'Fire, Smoke or Fumes' non-normal checklist emphasises more than once not to delay landing in order to complete the checklist. I suspect other Boeing models have similar wording.

[RatherBeFlying]

1.16.6 Theoretical emergency descent calculations

TSB Report on Swiss Air 111

If the aircraft had followed the theoretical emergency descent profile, the first systems failure event apparent to the pilots-the disconnect of the autopilot at 0124:09-would have occurred on the landing approach in the vicinity of the Golf beacon, approximately 5 nm from the threshold of Runway 06. The aircraft would have subsequently experienced progressive systems failures on the approach. When the flight recorders stopped at 0125:41, the aircraft would have been at approximately 700 feet above the runway threshold elevation. The earliest estimated threshold crossing time was 0126:17, which would have been 1 minute, 35 seconds, after the pilots had declared an emergency. Approximately 35 more seconds would be required to land and stop the aircraft; therefore, the completion of the landing would have been at approximately 0127.

1.1 History of the flight
At approximately 0130, observers in the area of St. Margaret's Bay, Nova Scotia, saw a large aircraft fly overhead at low altitude and heard the sound of its engines. At about 0131, several observers heard a sound described as a loud clap. Seismographic recorders in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and in Moncton, New Brunswick, recorded a seismic event at 0131:18, which coincides with the time the aircraft struck the water.

[42go]

Originally Posted by Sailvi767 View Post
Yes, they even went into holding with a fire onboard.

Memory says they went into a hold to dump fuel - it wasn't the checklist that delayed landing, it was trying to get down to max landing weight (a bad idea in retrospect).
-----------------------
This is, as I recall, incorrect. Firstly the crew were in no way aware of the awful future for what they thought was a simple electrical smoke issue.

Secondly, as RBF has posted, there would have been no way the situation could have been saved as there just was not enough time from initiating the descent to losing complete control. I do not recall ANY 'holding'.

They were most definitely doomed at the outset.

The whole event begs the question of whether the somewhat 'relaxed' approach nowadays to 'fumes events' is wise?

[Two's in]

Originally Posted by Maninthebar

Indicative that the checklists are at fault then?

Not really, that's why it's called Captaincy or Airmanship. A quick round of "what's the worst thing that could happen here?" will dictate the criticality of checklists. Swissair should have been the benchmark answer to that question.

[Alrosa]

Originally Posted by M.Mouse

For Boeing 777 and 787 the 'Fire, Smoke or Fumes' non-normal checklist emphasises more than once not to delay landing in order to complete the checklist. I suspect other Boeing models have similar wording.

Certainly holds true for the 737CL :

[Sailvi767]

There were lots of questions about Swissair 111 including the fact it was a 2 man crew on a long flight. Here is the short version of final minutes. At 2210 they first detected smoke. They felt it was air conditioning smoke. 4 minutes later they were 66 miles from Halifax and realized it was smoke from a possible fire. They declared Pan Pan Pan at that point. Test in a simulator determined from that point it was possible to put the aircraft on the ground at Halifax in under 14 minutes or 2228 It would have required a maximum effort and was probably not possible with a 2 man crew. A relief pilot handling the smoke and fire checklist might have allowed a quicker arrival. The crew was task saturated. The aircraft crashed at 2231. The crash may have contribute to the survival of the crew on a FedEx DC10 who also had a onboard fire diverting into Stewart NY. They landed in just under 14 minutes from divert initiation to touchdown from 33,000 feet. The violated both ATC speed restrictions and max aircraft speed but lived. The aircraft was destroyed. It was interesting that from the onset of smoke or smoke warnings both crews took about 4 minutes before initiating diverts. I am not faulting the MD11 crew in anyway. Trying to run the complicated smoke and fire checklist, divert checklist, overweight landing checklist, calculate landing distances ect.. while trying to fly the aircraft was overwhelming. The FedEx flight had the benefit of a 3 man crew with jumpseaters. US airlines were required to have a 3 man crew on flights of that length.

• Swissair 111 heavy is declaring Pan Pan Pan. We have smoke in the cockpit, request deviate immediate right turn to a convenient place. I guess Boston," the pilot radios air traffic control. (Pan Pan Pan is a distress code.)
  
  After informing the pilot that Halifax is much closer, a controller asks, "Would you prefer to go into Halifax?"
  
  "Affirmative," says the pilot, who turns north and is cleared to descend to 10,000 feet (3030 meters).
  
  
• As the plane reaches the coast of Nova Scotia, the pilot is assigned a path for landing. The controller informs the pilot, "You've got 30 miles (48 kilometers) to fly to the (runway) threshold."
  
  "We need more than 30 miles," he responds, concerned that he is still too high to descend to a landing within that distance. The controller then instructs the pilot to turn left to lose some more altitude, and he veers away from Halifax.
  
  
• As the pilot approaches an altitude of 10,000 feet (3,030 meters), he informs the control tower, "We must dump some fuel." He requests permission to make a right or left turn, which would take him south, back out over the ocean and away from the Halifax airport. He is cleared to make a 200-degree turn to the left.
  
  
• Immediately after executing the turn, at 10:24 p.m., the pilot's conversation becomes more urgent: "We are declaring an emergency.... We have to land immediately." It is the last transmission from Swissair 111, which is at 9,700 feet (2,940 meters).
  
  
• Over the next six minutes, the pilot proceeds back out toward the ocean in a southbound direction, then turns in a complete circle, apparently trying to realign his route to the east, which would have taken him once again toward the Halifax airport.
  
  
• The plane hits the water at about 10:30 p.m., some 16 minutes after the smoke in the cockpit was first reported.

[wiggy]

There were lots of questions about Swissair 111 including the fact it was a 2 man crew on a long flight.

……………

[hoistop]

Originally Posted by ManaAdaSystem

A quick return and all safely on the ground. Airmanship. I had a discussion with a CAE instructor who said the most important part of an incident like this, is to complete all procedures and check lists, not to get on ground fast.
I did not agree. Still don’t.

I am a fan of procedures and checklists, but common sense is still No. 1 - checklists and porcedures are there to help, not to become a slave of ones. SWR 111 prove him wrong.

[Nightstop]

Work load during an airborne Smoke, Fumes, Fire event is extremely high. It’s easy to get so focused on the need to get onto the ground quickly that you unintentionally neglect other important safety factors, such as normal checklists and terrain clearance. EGPWS Terrain MAP display helps.

I’ve had one real smoke/fire event, it was Avionics Smoke due to a galley oven fire just after airborne and gear selected up..landed back at the departure airport within 4.5 minutes after a night visual circuit. Molten plastic around the forward galley produced fumes that, with hindsight, made us wish we’d put our O2 masks on. No checklists consulted at all, survival mode kicks in. We didn’t know it was a galley fire until on Final approach (galley air is sucked into the Avionics bay, hence the Avionics Smoke warning).

Simulator scenarios are usually commenced at cruise altitude. Most I’ve experienced result in PF flying single pilot programming the FMC and talking to ATC/Cabin Crew while the PNF attempts to complete the checklist in thick smoke. Unable to see the instruments in front of you or cross check what the other pilot is doing makes for a very high workload and goes against the grain of normal Ops cross checking and SOP’s. Armchair experts on here would benefit from seeing such an exercise.