A350 pilot startled by windshear alarm
Absolutely right. Training and practise needs to be improved 
@vilas, yes I don't know when trainers stopped checking that pilots could handle emergencies without running back to their Mums in tears. Years ago if you didn't make the grade, you didn't become a pilot. This seems to have changed ?
Hi iceman50, apologies if I misquoted you. Pprune software keeps dropping my quote boxes, so I keep them as short as possible. Anyway; it only takes about 2 seconds to say "ready for wind-shear drill?", or even just ask "Ready?", and by doing so you will remove any startle.
Hi Nick 1, if you are referring to my post, I am not saying it was, sorry. My point was that things could be forgotten.
@vilas, yes I don't know when trainers stopped checking that pilots could handle emergencies without running back to their Mums in tears. Years ago if you didn't make the grade, you didn't become a pilot. This seems to have changed ?
Hi iceman50, apologies if I misquoted you. Pprune software keeps dropping my quote boxes, so I keep them as short as possible. Anyway; it only takes about 2 seconds to say "ready for wind-shear drill?", or even just ask "Ready?", and by doing so you will remove any startle.
Hi Nick 1, if you are referring to my post, I am not saying it was, sorry. My point was that things could be forgotten.
Highly Trained?
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/busi...ight-447-crash[/QUOTE]
"These were highly trained people,..."
Highly trained but not in actually flying an airplane.
"These were highly trained people,..."
Highly trained but not in actually flying an airplane.
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What exactly does this mean?
The copilot, confronted with the surprise effect in connection with the unexpected triggering of the predictive windshear warning, the change in the rate of work and the increased workload was then “absent” for a few minutes. This cognitive incapacitation was not initially identified by the captain or the relief pilot.
Aside from that, the predictive windshear alert on the Bus is a bit annoying, and with SOP, it requires a GA...
The copilot, confronted with the surprise effect in connection with the unexpected triggering of the predictive windshear warning, the change in the rate of work and the increased workload was then “absent” for a few minutes. This cognitive incapacitation was not initially identified by the captain or the relief pilot.
Aside from that, the predictive windshear alert on the Bus is a bit annoying, and with SOP, it requires a GA...
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turbidus
Predictive Windshear is not a memory item anymore, just a pilot technique and by FCTM you can disregard the alert as long as there are no other signs of possible windshear conditions and the reactive windshear system is operational.
Obviously common sense will be to be go around minded if there are any signs of hazards but there is no need to rush things.
Predictive Windshear is not a memory item anymore, just a pilot technique and by FCTM you can disregard the alert as long as there are no other signs of possible windshear conditions and the reactive windshear system is operational.
Obviously common sense will be to be go around minded if there are any signs of hazards but there is no need to rush things.
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From the report it was indeed a predictive w/s alert hence the go-around decision from the PIC. Lots of human factor in this event I believe, especially in the final stages of a LH flight when You really need to push yourself to stand up to the situation as the traps of tiredness and complacency are opening their wide arms in front of You.
Re: “I take it to mean the copilot froze.”
The word surprise can be interpreted in several ways; extreme fear <or> deviation from normal expectation based on experience. Also, different after translation;
Original - Il ajoute avoir été surpris, au vu des conditions météorologiques du jour, par l’alarme predictive windshear, can be translated as “He adds that he was surprised, given the weather conditions of the day, by the predictive windshear alarm”.
The differing tense (was surprised) from the official English report (had been surprised) enables different interpretations of how the situation is considered in hindsight - our expectations, our surprise.
The report indicated that the PF understood the Capts GA instruction, and that the initial normal GA actions were correctly executed, which suggests that any ‘impairment’ occurred after these actions.
The first deviation from normalcy appears to be related to the expectation that the AP was engaged - but it wasn't; soft TOGA thrust triggers mode change, the route is in FMS/ND, Alt set (all re-briefed by technology at the time of action) - except the aircraft did not respond as expected.
This conflict may have held the PF’s focus of attention, ‘highjacking’ cognitive resource - why isn't the aircraft flying as expected - as it would in the simulator, as the SOP, etc, …
Add the need to fly the route, alt acquire, … mind overload with situational reassessment, seeking understanding, insufficient capacity for control, … to remember events - mind elsewhere.
Re: “Predictive Windshear is not a memory item anymore,”
Interesting, which together with the FCOM note - reassess PWS, and info about spurious triggers, indicates the reduced value of the system.
Any system which claims to enhance awareness should be of higher integrity that the basic awareness - pre PWS the crew could interpret the weather radar as a situation which might / might not involve windshear, but avoiding uncertainty, as windshear training requires, with a GA.
In modern times, a new ‘ambiguous‘ radar sensor - is the display valid PWS or is the display false, and I can ignore it - true or false. What if the warning is true, a hazard, don't ignore, confusion, etc, …
Beware technology which ‘enhances awareness’, but actually ‘highjacks’ the mind, increasing mental workload.
The word surprise can be interpreted in several ways; extreme fear <or> deviation from normal expectation based on experience. Also, different after translation;
Original - Il ajoute avoir été surpris, au vu des conditions météorologiques du jour, par l’alarme predictive windshear, can be translated as “He adds that he was surprised, given the weather conditions of the day, by the predictive windshear alarm”.
The differing tense (was surprised) from the official English report (had been surprised) enables different interpretations of how the situation is considered in hindsight - our expectations, our surprise.
The report indicated that the PF understood the Capts GA instruction, and that the initial normal GA actions were correctly executed, which suggests that any ‘impairment’ occurred after these actions.
The first deviation from normalcy appears to be related to the expectation that the AP was engaged - but it wasn't; soft TOGA thrust triggers mode change, the route is in FMS/ND, Alt set (all re-briefed by technology at the time of action) - except the aircraft did not respond as expected.
This conflict may have held the PF’s focus of attention, ‘highjacking’ cognitive resource - why isn't the aircraft flying as expected - as it would in the simulator, as the SOP, etc, …
Add the need to fly the route, alt acquire, … mind overload with situational reassessment, seeking understanding, insufficient capacity for control, … to remember events - mind elsewhere.
Re: “Predictive Windshear is not a memory item anymore,”
Interesting, which together with the FCOM note - reassess PWS, and info about spurious triggers, indicates the reduced value of the system.
Any system which claims to enhance awareness should be of higher integrity that the basic awareness - pre PWS the crew could interpret the weather radar as a situation which might / might not involve windshear, but avoiding uncertainty, as windshear training requires, with a GA.
In modern times, a new ‘ambiguous‘ radar sensor - is the display valid PWS or is the display false, and I can ignore it - true or false. What if the warning is true, a hazard, don't ignore, confusion, etc, …
Beware technology which ‘enhances awareness’, but actually ‘highjacks’ the mind, increasing mental workload.
Last edited by safetypee; 20th Jul 2021 at 09:42.
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safetypee
Interesting analysis.
Guess you are a trainer?
I have been in this game for a while and the F/Os who are easiest to fly with and who are most reliable are those who have done something else.
Ex military or single pilot night freight , doesn’t matter. What they have in common is extra RAM when everything goes pear-shaped.
You cant buy experience and you cant train it in the simulator.
I don’t like Cadetship schemes.
Plus, as an aside , I don’t understand how “ cognitive capture “ or “hijacking the mind” can be the result of the extraordinary improvement in the technology in the cockpit over the last 40 years.
Its brilliant. But its a tool. Not and end in itself.
The problem is the operators.
Interesting analysis.
Guess you are a trainer?
I have been in this game for a while and the F/Os who are easiest to fly with and who are most reliable are those who have done something else.
Ex military or single pilot night freight , doesn’t matter. What they have in common is extra RAM when everything goes pear-shaped.
You cant buy experience and you cant train it in the simulator.
I don’t like Cadetship schemes.
Plus, as an aside , I don’t understand how “ cognitive capture “ or “hijacking the mind” can be the result of the extraordinary improvement in the technology in the cockpit over the last 40 years.
Its brilliant. But its a tool. Not and end in itself.
The problem is the operators.
Last edited by TukwillaFlyboy; 20th Jul 2021 at 10:18.
This quote jumps out of the Vanity Fair article. “A senior executive at Airbus mentioned to me that in Britain and the United States the elites do not become airline pilots, whereas in France, as in less developed countries, they still do”
I’m not sure I’d agree that the job and (lack of) status of being an airline pilot nowadays attracts the “elite” , (however defined) to the job. I would also extend that to senior management and Directors too, sadly. The airline industry doesn’t attract the innovators or deep thinkers . I guess there are easier and more bucks to be had elsewhere.
I’m not sure I’d agree that the job and (lack of) status of being an airline pilot nowadays attracts the “elite” , (however defined) to the job. I would also extend that to senior management and Directors too, sadly. The airline industry doesn’t attract the innovators or deep thinkers . I guess there are easier and more bucks to be had elsewhere.
Re: I don’t understand how “ cognitive capture “ or “hijacking the mind” can be the result of the extraordinary improvement in the technology in the cockpit over the last 40 years.
Not all technology; effects depends on how tech has been implemented and used. Consider situations as a combined system of man and machine, not one against the other in isolation.
e.g. https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ao-2016-064/
An enhanced awareness display on the PFD -
“The pilot flying reported that the synthetic vision image created the impression …”
“Incorrect instrument indications that are not associated with a failure mode present pilots with a complex and challenging situation.”
“The synthetic vision system was not to be used for primary input or navigation, with the following warning in the Pilot’s Guide (used by the operator)”
“Pilot Advisory Letter included a description of the event. The letter also advised pilots that the use of synthetic vision is for situational awareness and should not be utilised for the indication of attitude or altitude in lieu of the primary flight display indications for pitch, roll, yaw, or altitude.“
… so ‘synthetic awareness’ is independent of aircraft attitude and altitude … design issue, regulation, operator, but not the pilot if able to …
“The check pilot immediately looked outside and was able to discern a visible horizon due to the moonlight.”
Relating to this incident …
the PF had the impression that the AP was engaged;
limitations for the use of PWS for ‘situation enhancement’
there were no aircraft system failure warnings,
reestablishing awareness must include man-machine-situation, this takes time and mental effort for the crew, but analysis in hindsight is not so constrained.
Not all technology; effects depends on how tech has been implemented and used. Consider situations as a combined system of man and machine, not one against the other in isolation.
e.g. https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...r/ao-2016-064/
An enhanced awareness display on the PFD -
“The pilot flying reported that the synthetic vision image created the impression …”
“Incorrect instrument indications that are not associated with a failure mode present pilots with a complex and challenging situation.”
“The synthetic vision system was not to be used for primary input or navigation, with the following warning in the Pilot’s Guide (used by the operator)”
“Pilot Advisory Letter included a description of the event. The letter also advised pilots that the use of synthetic vision is for situational awareness and should not be utilised for the indication of attitude or altitude in lieu of the primary flight display indications for pitch, roll, yaw, or altitude.“
… so ‘synthetic awareness’ is independent of aircraft attitude and altitude … design issue, regulation, operator, but not the pilot if able to …
“The check pilot immediately looked outside and was able to discern a visible horizon due to the moonlight.”
Relating to this incident …
the PF had the impression that the AP was engaged;
limitations for the use of PWS for ‘situation enhancement’
there were no aircraft system failure warnings,
reestablishing awareness must include man-machine-situation, this takes time and mental effort for the crew, but analysis in hindsight is not so constrained.
Last edited by safetypee; 20th Jul 2021 at 11:13. Reason: Relating to …
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I'm with you tukwilla, and in an environment where 80% of FOs come from high school through cadet schemes which indoctrinate adherence to encyclopedic SOPs before all else, if anything slightly unusual or surprising happens, you can see their brains desperately trying to access their recollection of the relevant SOP, rather than just flying the aeroplane, pitch and power then add the layers as capacity comes back in.
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Uplinker
Dull, boring and pointless! Continual repetition simply breeds complacency and pattern matching. After 5 x Go-Arounds then 5 x Eng Out G/A the brain is already starting to slumber and the prospect of going into the training environment to do mind numbing repetition is miserable.
Dull, boring and pointless! Continual repetition simply breeds complacency and pattern matching. After 5 x Go-Arounds then 5 x Eng Out G/A the brain is already starting to slumber and the prospect of going into the training environment to do mind numbing repetition is miserable.
Perhaps we should be teaching cognitive and analytical skills rather than relying on muscle memory and SOPS’s? At the risk of being cynical,the airline training business is a sausage machine, and teaching to a budget has worked well for the airlines and the bottom line so far. I don’t doubt that the occasional hull loss is already priced into the share price.
Only half a speed-brake
Bengerman
Sarcasm, right?
The elephant in the room is that after each of those G/As the trainer must use a stick and beat crew hands bloody to get it absolutely perfectly right every single time, IN ORDER to enforce a proper drill-learning that can be later relied upon. Shooting 10x "somehow we managed well" does not build what is needed decades down the road. Is such a solution available these days? Definitely not in the western civilian world, and then it becomes simple. Train with foam swords, get gummi bears.
Guided cognitive instruction could achieve equivalent results but the resources are not allocated even in the best industry-practice syllabi. Having said that, a widebody FO freezing on a G/A he himself executed is hard evidence of training system failure.
Sarcasm, right?
The elephant in the room is that after each of those G/As the trainer must use a stick and beat crew hands bloody to get it absolutely perfectly right every single time, IN ORDER to enforce a proper drill-learning that can be later relied upon. Shooting 10x "somehow we managed well" does not build what is needed decades down the road. Is such a solution available these days? Definitely not in the western civilian world, and then it becomes simple. Train with foam swords, get gummi bears.
Guided cognitive instruction could achieve equivalent results but the resources are not allocated even in the best industry-practice syllabi. Having said that, a widebody FO freezing on a G/A he himself executed is hard evidence of training system failure.