Final Report: April 2018 737 high speed aborted TO
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Bloggs, Thanks, #100
I have fallen foul of my own criticism of using incomplete or summarised, third party accident reporting.
I will reconsider the technical issues in the report, but initial reaction is that for most aircraft the control check is a true check, but there are still some which are not - grandfather rights (DC 9 - MD80).
For this thread, the 737 airbrake detent - Takeoff Config Warning; some aircraft better than others, where this 737 required special maintenance procedures, with additional risk of error.
The MD83 crew faced a no-win situation; something which the industry should not tolerate.
The contributing factors were avoidable providing later safety standards had been applied; they were not. Thus the safety responsibility - these who should bear the risk, lies with the regulators and manufacturers, not those last in the chain of events, the 'crew'.
The time history indicates a 7 sec period between Rotate and the Abort call; a measure of the difficulty in assessing the situation and deciding what to do.
No dispersions on the MD crew, they acted as they saw the situation, but for those in this thread who believe that it is possible to have instant awareness and decision making in these situations should reconsider human behaviour, particularly in rare and surprising situations.
This also applies to those who write SOPs, what is imagined to occur vs reality; who knew of the limitations of the control check.
It is better to consider the SOPs for RTO as only applying up to V1; thereafter Go.
There will be situational exceptions above V1, but not sufficiently imaginable for a SOP - nothing is Standard.
In these rare circumstances, requiring pilot judgement, the mindset should consider the action of stopping as only to reduce the effects an accident.
I have fallen foul of my own criticism of using incomplete or summarised, third party accident reporting.
I will reconsider the technical issues in the report, but initial reaction is that for most aircraft the control check is a true check, but there are still some which are not - grandfather rights (DC 9 - MD80).
For this thread, the 737 airbrake detent - Takeoff Config Warning; some aircraft better than others, where this 737 required special maintenance procedures, with additional risk of error.
The MD83 crew faced a no-win situation; something which the industry should not tolerate.
The contributing factors were avoidable providing later safety standards had been applied; they were not. Thus the safety responsibility - these who should bear the risk, lies with the regulators and manufacturers, not those last in the chain of events, the 'crew'.
The time history indicates a 7 sec period between Rotate and the Abort call; a measure of the difficulty in assessing the situation and deciding what to do.
No dispersions on the MD crew, they acted as they saw the situation, but for those in this thread who believe that it is possible to have instant awareness and decision making in these situations should reconsider human behaviour, particularly in rare and surprising situations.
This also applies to those who write SOPs, what is imagined to occur vs reality; who knew of the limitations of the control check.
It is better to consider the SOPs for RTO as only applying up to V1; thereafter Go.
There will be situational exceptions above V1, but not sufficiently imaginable for a SOP - nothing is Standard.
In these rare circumstances, requiring pilot judgement, the mindset should consider the action of stopping as only to reduce the effects an accident.
safetypee
I agree. I remember attending a presentation at work on: Conscious and subconscious behaviours in a safety critical environment. One of the problems, I was told, is that, "In an emergency your subconscious tends to arrive first".
I agree. I remember attending a presentation at work on: Conscious and subconscious behaviours in a safety critical environment. One of the problems, I was told, is that, "In an emergency your subconscious tends to arrive first".
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Rob, bet that training exercise was still a bit of a flatulence trigger though. Mine was (training), passed 80kts, rapidly getting to V!, Expecting the V1 call but FO briefed to feign death, or something. No call. J u s t got away with it .
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PPRuNe Towers
Hydraulic failure in a B737 does not stop you rotating at Vr.
There is a fine line between novel scenarios that enhance training and instructors own made up “ what ifs “ that lead you to doubt SOPs and sound judgement.
There is nothing achieved by putting trainees in unsurvivable situations.
There are many runways I operate out of where rejecting after V1 will result in going over the breakwater and into the sea.
Finito.
No point in training that.
Hydraulic failure in a B737 does not stop you rotating at Vr.
There is a fine line between novel scenarios that enhance training and instructors own made up “ what ifs “ that lead you to doubt SOPs and sound judgement.
There is nothing achieved by putting trainees in unsurvivable situations.
There are many runways I operate out of where rejecting after V1 will result in going over the breakwater and into the sea.
Finito.
No point in training that.
For those who use training scenarios after V1; would these result from a single systems failure in your aircraft.
Are these realistic 'aircraft unable to fly' situations, or just 'lets think of a situation'.
There is no training value in the latter, which could negatively influence crew's interpretation of real, but not critical failures requiring continued takeoff.
I doubt that any modern aircraft have any single, undetectable systems failure which results in the inability to fly.
Are these realistic 'aircraft unable to fly' situations, or just 'lets think of a situation'.
There is no training value in the latter, which could negatively influence crew's interpretation of real, but not critical failures requiring continued takeoff.
I doubt that any modern aircraft have any single, undetectable systems failure which results in the inability to fly.
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PEI 37: Drifting a bit, but ,
There is huge traing value in 'let's think of a situation' so long as it is kept in the classroom. After much debate, rigid reminder & enforcement over the principle, STOP before V1, GO after.would be the instructional aim.
In the Sim, again, "training" would involve enforcement of the rule.
There is huge traing value in 'let's think of a situation' so long as it is kept in the classroom. After much debate, rigid reminder & enforcement over the principle, STOP before V1, GO after.would be the instructional aim.
In the Sim, again, "training" would involve enforcement of the rule.
I would have thought running through scenarios where a V1+ stop is a good idea, then telling people NEVER to do it, might lead to a bit of cognitive dissonance in the recipients?
If there were unlimited time and budget for training, then you could start throwing one-in-a-million problems into the pot, but that is not what we have. Probably better to concentrate on things like raw data NPAs, rejected landings and conventional RTOs. ATQP, EBT, etc. focus on things that have relevance to the operation, some derived from FOQA/ASR.
I think it is the responsibility of any aircraft commander to have at least thought a little bit about what could drive a quick decision to abort >V1, and what the outcomes might be in different scenarios. I don’t think it’s something you can have SOPs for, as every day is different. If you get it right, you’ll be a hero, if you don’t, you might have to carry on walking. Luckily, the overwhelming majority of professional pilots won’t ever be placed in this situation, so we should have some sympathy for those who have been...
If there were unlimited time and budget for training, then you could start throwing one-in-a-million problems into the pot, but that is not what we have. Probably better to concentrate on things like raw data NPAs, rejected landings and conventional RTOs. ATQP, EBT, etc. focus on things that have relevance to the operation, some derived from FOQA/ASR.
I think it is the responsibility of any aircraft commander to have at least thought a little bit about what could drive a quick decision to abort >V1, and what the outcomes might be in different scenarios. I don’t think it’s something you can have SOPs for, as every day is different. If you get it right, you’ll be a hero, if you don’t, you might have to carry on walking. Luckily, the overwhelming majority of professional pilots won’t ever be placed in this situation, so we should have some sympathy for those who have been...
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Agree, we all use the V1 concept every time we fly, but it doesn’t mean the world is black or white.
There are for instance cases where I will continue with failures from below V1. Rejects above V1 may turn out to be the only option.
There are for instance cases where I will continue with failures from below V1. Rejects above V1 may turn out to be the only option.
You have to be a little careful with that as continuing below V1 can have consequences as bad (or worse) as stopping after. Vmcg, obstacle clearance and the like. As ever, it depends on the exact circumstances what the options and the result of taking one of those options are...
It is impossible to have a plan for every possible contingency for every takeoff. At the end of the day the situation where the Captain will have only a few seconds to decide what to do for an emergency will usually fall into the fairly obvious keep going category, but there will be the odd one where all the skill and knowledge acquired to get to that left seat will be called on to in maybe 2 or 3 seconds make a decision that will be very consequential.
The only defence we have is good training and effective line checking to keep standards up, something I would suggest was deficient in this airline.
The only defence we have is good training and effective line checking to keep standards up, something I would suggest was deficient in this airline.
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OK. Last effort. Fullwings, not difficult at all. Up to 80 kts, stop for anything, beteween 80 & V1 only for specific items, well rehearsed, well discussed, even here, big Boeing making it very clear, big airbus making it very clear,......after V1 ...................go baby go baby go, FFS ! Back to thread though, the KTM guy made the wrong decision" was very lucky to have got away with minimal damage.
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Ok.
No thinking required, only follow predetermind rules, sounds good....
Now we can expand those no-thinking-rules to all parts of the flight, easy....
Then we have no-thinking for the full flight. We all know that computers are much better and more reliable than humans at executing no-thinking actions based on easy to follow rules....
We now can get rid of the humans in seat row zero. We save on salary since computers are much more reliable in executing no-thinking easy to follow rules. Accident rates should drop markedly....
No thinking required, only follow predetermind rules, sounds good....
Now we can expand those no-thinking-rules to all parts of the flight, easy....
Then we have no-thinking for the full flight. We all know that computers are much better and more reliable than humans at executing no-thinking actions based on easy to follow rules....
We now can get rid of the humans in seat row zero. We save on salary since computers are much more reliable in executing no-thinking easy to follow rules. Accident rates should drop markedly....
after V1 ...................go baby go baby go
I would be right up there with the critics if this had been a rushed approach with many opportunities to throw it away and have another go; as it was, there was a config warning around V1, taking off hot-and-high from a terrain-constrained airfield. By the time you can positively ascertain what is causing it and how it is going to affect flight (or even allow flight at all), it would be too late, so a decision is required. The conflicting pressures of learnt behaviour in 'V1 must go' vs. 'config warning must stop' (as it will have been almost exclusively trained and experienced at low speed, requiring a stop) shouldn’t be underestimated. We only really find out how we behave in unlikely/unforseen scenarios when they actually happen...
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Geeeps, some of you guys made my job easy. You know, the bit where, in the de-brief, I take my "Training hat" off, put on my "Examiner Hat" , place my portable licence shredding machine to 'warm up mode' and say..........." I think we'll stop you there "........
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Landflap,
You have added nothing thoughtful or meaningful to this discussion other than stating the bleeding obvious and when that fails, frustration fuelled sarcasm aimed at other posters. A cursory review of some of your past posts would lead me to conclude I would rather sit next to FullWings on a flight or have his ilk training or testing me in the sim.
I have absolutely no problem with this post being removed by the moderators.
You have added nothing thoughtful or meaningful to this discussion other than stating the bleeding obvious and when that fails, frustration fuelled sarcasm aimed at other posters. A cursory review of some of your past posts would lead me to conclude I would rather sit next to FullWings on a flight or have his ilk training or testing me in the sim.
I have absolutely no problem with this post being removed by the moderators.
Last edited by Crosswind Limits; 12th Feb 2021 at 17:04.
Xwind: "Frustration fueled sarcasm" clearly displayed by yourself. Cursory view of your threads suggests similar explosions that Landflap, me and many others of our ilk look carefully at not only in the training/ testing but at the very basic selection procedure.
Choosing to sit next to our behind anyone on a flightdeck is is a choice you can enjoy. ( actually, do you have a choice in your company-?) But do exercise that choice carefully X-wind. I know who I would rather be sitting next to as we hurtle towards V1 . I also think that the hotheads who extol the virtue of "thinking outside the box" as they hurtle towards VR after V1 troll these forums in increasing numbers.
I think your post adds nothing thoughtful or meaningful to the "discussion" either and , once again, you might be moderated out. Surprised it is still up after 24 hrs.
Choosing to sit next to our behind anyone on a flightdeck is is a choice you can enjoy. ( actually, do you have a choice in your company-?) But do exercise that choice carefully X-wind. I know who I would rather be sitting next to as we hurtle towards V1 . I also think that the hotheads who extol the virtue of "thinking outside the box" as they hurtle towards VR after V1 troll these forums in increasing numbers.
I think your post adds nothing thoughtful or meaningful to the "discussion" either and , once again, you might be moderated out. Surprised it is still up after 24 hrs.